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This thesis provides a comparative examination of the emergence and trajectory of two agrarian 
struggles that broke out in the wake of Colombia’s neoliberal restructuring: the Association of Small 
and Medium-Scale Farmers of Líbano (Asopema) and the Peasant Association of the Cimitarra 
Valley (ACVC).  The variation in form and character of the struggles is explained in terms of: 1) 
divergent paths of capitalist development, state formation and forms of neoliberal restructuring; 2) 
class basis and livelihood strategies of each movement; and 3) class organisations and regional 
cultures. Both movements emerged in the context of the threefold crisis of neoliberalism: the 
subsistence crisis in peasant agriculture, the unemployment crisis and the legitimacy crisis of the 
Colombian state. While the formation of both movements can be traced to the experience of past 
struggles, there are also a number of substantively new dimensions to the contemporary processes. In 
their different ways, both movements have drawn on a critique of the corporate food system and 
political violence, and sought greater self-reliance, food sovereignty, ecological sustainability and 
political autonomy. However, since Asopema members were more dependent on the market for their 
reproduction, their struggles were more centred on re-incorporation, and they were more susceptible 
to co-optation through targeted social programmes. Meanwhile, since the Cimitarra peasants are 
located in more marginal territories, they have been more reliant on a combination of market and non-
market relations for their reproduction. Moreover, the ACVC’s construction of an ‘autonomous rural 
community’ allowed for the movement to be sustained by carving out a space to meet the basic 
subsistence needs of its members, whilst also maintaining grassroots participation and autonomous 
political leadership. Finally, I assess the movements’ recent efforts to build oppositional blocs to alter 
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One of the most far-reaching and dramatic changes to have resulted from Colombia’s half-century 
civil war has been the massive dispossession of the peasantry. Colombia’s peasants bore the brunt of 
the conflict, which saw 25,000 deaths and five million people flee their homes in two decades between 
1982 and 2012 (CNRR, 2013). Peasants have also suffered the worst effects of free-market policies, 
which have resulted in new processes of land concentration, unbridled exploitation of natural 
resources and marginalisation of rural producers. Yet despite the unprecedented assault on their lands 
and livelihoods, peasants continue to be incredibly important to Colombian society and politics. 
Peasants have not only adapted through a variety of livelihood strategies, but they have also been 
some of the most prominent voices of opposition to neoliberalism and the extractivist growth model. 
In recent years, peasant protests have grown in size and intensity, they have achieved new levels of 
unity and cohesion, and they have even changed the course of national politics. Whatever their 
difficulties, the resurgence of peasant movements has demonstrated that control and access to land 
and rural resources continue to be fundamental issues for many Colombians, and that alternative 
development paths are possible, even in the neoliberal era. 
 Struggles over land control and access have long shaped Colombian history, stemming back 
to the wave of peasant revolts catalysed by the initial penetration of market relations and the 
privatisation of public lands that occurred as the country became integrated into the world capitalist 
economy at the end of the 19th century. At the peak of the land reform movement in the 1960s and 
1970s, unresolved tensions gave rise to an armed guerrilla movement which eventually evolved into 
the world’s longest insurgency, lasting over half a century and controlling many of Colombia’s most 
marginal rural territories. Unlike their Central American counterparts, the guerrillas did not give up 
arms in the 1990s, and the countryside quickly became entangled in paramilitary counterinsurgent 
terror operations that paved the way for new processes of land concentration and peasant 
dispossession.   
 Yet while agrarian conflicts are not new to the Colombian countryside, the most recent wave 
of rural revolts has emerged in a very different context. Since the failure of the land reform project in 
1972 and particularly since the enactment of free-market reforms of the 1990s and 2000s, Colombia’s 
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rural sector has been more deeply assimilated into world markets than ever before, while rural 
inhabitants have experienced deepening and interconnected crises. Land issues have not been 
resolved, but they have certainly lost much of their political weight, while peasants have been forced 
to engage in a diverse range of activities in order to survive, leading to major reconfigurations— and 
often disintegration— of peasant households. It is in this context that a new wave of peasant revolts 
erupting from the mid-1990s must be understood as a response to the deepening of market relations 
in the Colombian countryside under neoliberalism. 
 This thesis is about the effects of socio-economic change and political violence on Colombia’s 
peasantries in the neoliberal era. I seek to understand how peasants adapted to sudden and drastic 
changes in their livelihoods, how they made sense of shocks generated by outside forces, and how 
they organised politically to confront the intensified assault on their lands, resources and ways of life. 
This thesis also seeks to explain the different types of peasant response to neoliberal agrarian 
restructuring. In a rural landscape that has experienced several decades of capitalist penetration and 
state formation, it is essential to point out that today’s peasantries are not characterised by a single, 
‘essential’  mode of production, culture or way of life.  Peasants are situated in very different sets of 
agrarian structures, which in turn shape their motivations and course of action: how they are able to 
adapt their livelihoods in order to survive, the types of conflict that arise, how they organise 
collectively and the alliances they form. In a broader sense, then, this thesis is about the process and 
variations of political class formation amongst different sets of peasantries in the neoliberal era. 
Rather than presume a uniform ‘peasantness’ opposed to neoliberalism, my research examines 
peasants in specific historical conditions and geographical locations, constituted through particular 
trajectories of capitalist development, sets of class relations and institutional arrangements, and with 
their own cultural traditions and political histories.  
 In order to understand the diversity in peasant response to neoliberal restructuring, my 
research is based on a comparative case study of two different trajectories of agrarian change and 
mobilisation in Colombia. The first is the peasants of the Cimitarra valley of the Middle Magdalena, 
an oil enclave settled by colonos (settlers) throughout the second half of the twentieth century that 
has long been the heartland of Colombia’s traditions of dissent and radicalism. In this region, 
neoliberal restructuring followed the path of violent peasant dispossession in the hands of an emergent 
class of predatory agrarian elites. The second is the municipality of Líbano in the Tolíma department, 
one of Colombia’s major coffee producing regions, where independent coffee smallholders have long 
provided a stronghold of support for the bipartisan political system. In the coffee regions, neoliberal 
restructuring involved the removal of supports and benefits that had once protected small farmers in 
the previous era of ‘coffee developmentalism’, resulting in new forms of adverse incorporation into 
global commodity chains and accentuating processes of differentiation.   
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 These regions have been chosen for two main reasons. First, because they are representative 
of the diverse ‘paths’ of neoliberal transformation: one through violent dispossession in the hands of 
predatory landed property and agri-business investors, and the other through new processes of adverse 
incorporation in global commodity chains. Second, they have also been home to some of the most 
important peasant movements that emerged in the fallout of neoliberal devastation: the Association 
of small and medium farmers of Líbano, Asopema, and the Association of peasant farmers of the 
Cimitarra Valley, the ACVC. In selecting these two cases I do not mean to suggest that the 
development of radical peasant movements was a necessary, widespread or even common response 
to neoliberal restructuring. Instead, my analysis points to the specificity of historical experience of 
agrarian change of these two sets of producers, the particular changes in social production relations 
between direct producers, appropriators and landlords in each geographical context the particular 
forms of political leadership and the cultural traditions they drew on to express their dissent in order 
to explain these rare and often unexpected eruptions of intense political activity.  
 The story of these two movements is not a celebratory account of ‘resistance to globalisation’ 
or a straightforward tale of peasants rising like the sun to the leading edge of new opposition. Rather, 
the lessons drawn from the Colombian countryside are ambiguous, which is a consequence of both 
the complexity and rapidity of the changes that occurred, but also suggests the need to examine 
agrarian movements not as snapshots but also in the long duree: how the movements unfolded over 
time in response to changing political and economic environment. Thus to make sense of the way 
these events unfolded requires a variety of analytical perspectives— ranging from broader historical-
structural explanations, to micro-level accounts of social and cultural processes. To understand the 
issues relevant to contemporary peasant movements, I draw on a range of analytical tools combining 
Marxist political economy and class analysis, critical development theory, rural sociology and social 
movement theory, and investigate a range of issues such as the impact of neoliberalism on peasant 
agriculture, political violence, alternative community-based development projects as well as the 
politics of movement- and alliance-building. In doing so, I seek to develop understandings of 
contemporary peasant social movements beyond romanticised tales of peasant resistance towards 
more comprehensive accounts of rural movements’ engagement with concrete processes of socio-
economic change and political forces, as well the tensions and contradictions they face in attempting 
to sustain their struggles over time. 
 The overall conclusion of this thesis is that neoliberal agrarian restructuring triggered a wave 
of rural revolts from broad sectors of the Colombian peasantry. However, the fate of the movements 
that arose during this period was cemented by a combination of the rise of the far-right and the turn 
to a model of accumulation premised on natural resource extraction. While political violence crippled 
the leadership of the movements, the predatory export-led growth model sent its social base into 
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disarray. The near-annihilation of left-wing parties and retreat of the left in the face of severe 
repression coincided with government concessions to leave the emergent agrarian movement 
increasingly dispersed and fragmented, while the radical leadership became isolated. The result was 
that the mobilisations galvanised by the neoliberal subsistence crisis failed to develop into an 
oppositional bloc able to alter the balance of power in Colombian society. To understand how this 
outcome came to pass requires closer inspection of the micro-level processes at play: the 
particularities of peasant livelihood adaptations, cultural understandings, and political strategies in 
the rural mobilisations that erupted in response to neoliberal restructuring in the mid-1990s. My 
argument is that the variations in patterns of rural revolt in the Cimitarra and Líbano can be explained 
by 1) divergent paths of capitalist development, state formation and forms of neoliberal restructuring; 
2) class basis and livelihood strategies of the movement; and 3) class organisations and regional 
cultures. 
 In Líbano, the withdrawal of state benefits and protections drove peasants into debt, 
generating new processes of rapid differentiation and dispossession, as well as triggering a legitimacy 
crisis for the coffee elite and political bosses. The formation of Asopema can be traced to the activities 
of consciousness-raising and political education by a new generation of Liberation Theology activists. 
Grassroots work and consciousness-raising eventually led to the formation of a radical peasant 
movement outside the institutional control of Fedecafé. However, after the initial wave of 
mobilisations, the movement disintegrated with incredible rapidity. A brutal paramilitary offensive 
separated the leadership from its base of support, while reconstituted forms of clientelist co-optation 
through targeted poverty reduction programmes led peasants to opt for individualised solutions to 
their problems.  In the Middle Magdalena, predatory land appropriations in the hands of an emergent 
agrarian elite investing in agribusiness turned the longstanding conflict with peasant settlers into a 
“zero-sum” game, in which reformist concessions were ruled out and control of territory and regional 
state power were at stake. The enclosures triggered an upswell in mobilisation, and Communist 
peasant organisers drew on longstanding traditions of collective work, subsistence farming, bonds of 
solidarity and the ethic of self-defence to build a radical ‘autonomous territorial movement’ aimed at 
confronting global capital penetration and state power. The construction of an autonomous territorial 
movement allowed the ACVC to sustain the mobilisation through a combination of organising around 
everyday livelihood needs of their members, alongside deeper processes of politicisation, 
mobilisation and alliance-building. The experience of the ACVC suggests that the rural movements 
best able to withstand hostile conditions of coercion and co-optation are those that developed 
mechanisms for sustained grassroots participation and political autonomy. Notwithstanding the 
remarkable achievements of the ACVC, its radical and confrontational approach left the movement 
isolated from broader Colombian civil society.  The broader outcome of these new rural mobilisation 
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processes was that, although the neoliberal subsistence crisis galvanised new forms of social 
mobilisation across the country, these incipient movements were nonetheless unable to develop an 
oppositional bloc sufficient to alter the balance of forces within civil society. 
 My analysis also highlights the relevance of different forms of market integration of peasant 
smallholders and institutionalised class relations for explaining the divergence in the trajectories of 
these two movements. On the one hand, because Líbano’s smallholders are more integrated into 
market relations they were also more dependent on state support and funding, which in conjunction 
with the isolated and competitive nature of production tended to undermine the autonomy and 
cohesion of radical, autonomous peasant movements like Asopema. On the other, since the ACVC is 
located in more marginal frontier territories, its membership depends on both market and non-market 
relations for reproduction, associated with ties of reciprocity and traditions of collective work, while 
state absence has provided a space for the formation of an ‘autonomous rural community’ in the 
Cimitarra valley. While the Cimitarra peasants do depend on entering the market to secure their 
household incomes, the autonomous rural community provides the basis for negotiating market 
access for ACVC members on a more collective basis, whilst simultaneously politicising and 
mobilising its members around a broader transformational process. Thus the difference in form and 
experience of market integration among the two sets of rural producers had an important impact on 
the outcome and political character of each process. 
 The outcome of these struggles is not a  fait accompli but a continuous process. Recent 
developments in Colombia’s rural politics provide a stark reminder of how peasant movements can 
ebb and flow with astonishing rapidity. Since the mid-2000s, an influx of investments in natural 
resource extraction has catalysed a new wave of agrarian conflicts, as peasants have been pitted in 
direct conflict with multinational mining and agribusiness companies. The unprecedented assault on 
natural resources has catalysed a new wave of ‘socio-territorial’ struggles over land and natural 
resources. These often began as spontaneous responses to local issues, but the amplification of these 
processes has also given birth to new social and political forces. Socio-territorial struggles have 
connected peasant, indigenous and afro-Colombian groups with urban environmental, student and 
feminist activists and international movements and NGOs, which have achieved remarkable levels of 
unity and cohesion in a short amount of time. Their protests were triggered by the common threat to 
land, natural resources and ways of life, but their demands have also extended much further, 
questioning the model of economic growth itself and demanding food sovereignty and alternative 
development.  Both Líbano and the Cimitarra valley peasant movements have been at the forefront 
of these struggles, which have provided the foundations for new processes of politicisation and 
strategies of alliances. My analysis of these contemporary movement projects seeks to provide 
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considerations for how ‘militant particularisms’ based on a particular set of localised values, cultural 
practices and solidarities can be united and generalised into a more universal politics. 
 
Relevance of research 
At first sight, the theme of peasants and their revolts might appear anachronistic. The study of peasant 
rebellions experienced a boom in the 1960s and 1970s with the observation that rapid transformations 
of rural social structures provoked by the penetration of capitalism throughout the Global South of 
the previous half-century had been accompanied by ‘class-based revolts from below’ (Skocpol 1979). 
The eruption of major peasant rebellions in non-Western countries such as Russia, Mexico, China 
and Cuba ignited lively debate among Western scholars seeking to understand why the 20th century 
had been the era of “peasant wars” (Wolf 1969; see also Paige 1975; Migdal 1974; Moore 1966; 
Skocpol 1979). However, the next decade brought a wave of criticism that questioned the empirical, 
theoretical and political validity of this object of study. With the defeat of the majority of the 
revolutionary guerrilla movements and the decline in land movements, the assumption that ‘There Is 
No Alternative’ increasingly infused rural studies, and the focus shifted away from issues of political 
economy towards technical issues of adapting to markets (Kay, 2008). 
 In a different way, certain Marxist scholars have also presumed that peasant rebellions are a 
thing of the past. Of course, this was not because they shared the conservative position on the end of 
social conflict in the course of history, but as a consequence of the adherence to the mechanical notion 
of the laws of development of the forces and relations of production. Historian Eric Hobsbawm 
notoriously heralded 'the death of the peasantry' as 'the most dramatic and far-reaching social change 
of the second half of [the twentieth] century' (Hobsbawm 1994: 289). In his view, peasants were 
incapable of surviving the forces of change as capitalism spread throughout the world, and were 
destined to undergo both economic disintegration and decomposition as a social class able to 
represent their interests. While Hobsbawm certainly recognised the political agency of peasants, these 
groups were “pre-political” and lacked the organisational capacity of modern movements 
(Hobsbawm 1959: 2). 
 More recently, the view that the peasantry has been eroded as a social class has been revived 
by Marxist theorists of global capitalism in the context of the restructuring of agricultural relations 
by transnational capital. Writing on Latin America, William Robinson argues that, ‘a major story of 
globalisation—worldwide—is the agonising death of the peasantry’ (Robinson 2008: 
169).  According to this view, the expansion of global commodity chains throughout the agricultural 
systems of the periphery has brought an inescapable disintegration of peasant livelihoods. Although 
adherents to this view shy away from completely dismissing the political agency of subaltern groups, 
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the struggles of peasants become subsumed within new broader categories such as the new ‘global 
informal working class’ (Davis 2006), the ‘precariat’ (Standing 2011) or the ‘multitude’ (Hardt and 
Negri 2005).  
 However, perhaps the most trenchant academic challenge to traditional studies of peasant 
politics came from a new strand of  'post-Marxist' academia, which in the 1970s and 1980s 
orchestrated what Wood has called 'the retreat from class' (Wood, 1998) and even a retreat from 
history (Wood and Foster 1997). As chapter 2 discusses in greater detail, post-Marxist critics took 
aim at what was seen to be the functionalist, reductionist, teleological and Eurocentric presumptions 
underlying traditional Marxian approaches (Laclau and Mouffe 1985). The main thrust of the attack 
was twofold: first, against the notion of objective or structural referents in the theory of class, which 
it claimed could never be identified as the chief determinants of the political character of social 
groups; and second, an attack on the historical materialist method, with the argument that the history 
of Third World societies could never be understood as unfolding according to some pre-ordained 
teleological scheme. The ultimate evidence for this was taken to be the emergence of ‘new’ rural 
social movements in Latin America, which do not mobilise around class-based identities (such as the 
demands of the peasantry), but rather around ethnicity, gender, and human rights discourses (Alvarez, 
Dagnino and Escobar 1998). The emergent post-Marxism, including 'New Social Movement' or 
‘decolonial’ theory, shifted the academic agenda away from issues of the political economy of 
agriculture and rural societies, to micro-level explorations of identity construction, everyday 
resistances, counter-cultures and locality (Mignolo and Escobar, 2013). 
However, since the turn of the century, the resurgence of peasant social movements has spurred 
a renewal of scholarly interest in peasant revolts. A large body of inquiry has been dedicated to 
understanding the emergence, characteristics and prospects of new rural revolts, as well as the 
potential for alternative development paths in the neoliberal era (Gudynas 2013; Moyo and Yeros 
2005; Nash 2001; Petras and Veltmeyer 2011; Vergara-Camus 2014; Vergara-Camus and Kay 2017; 
Webber 2017; Wolford 2010; Zibechi 2012). These studies suggest a number of reasons why the 
abandonment of the study of peasants and their revolts may have been premature.  
 The first is quite simply that ‘peasants’ continue to exist— at least in some form. In Colombia 
for example, the percentage of rural inhabitants may have more than halved in the span of four 
decades (1971-2010), yet their absolute numbers have not diminished, and they still represent nearly 
a third of the population (PNUD 2011). Many of these are agricultural producers whose livelihoods 
are in some part derived from access to land, and who maintain a distinct ‘peasant condition’, which, 
is a vital determinant of their survival strategies and economic interests, as well as their forms of 
cultural identity and political action. Even if the social composition of contemporary rural popular 
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classes is incredibly diverse, omission of the distinct ‘peasant’ character of these actors would 
represent a fundamental oversight in any analysis of their particular socio-economic characteristics 
and their political campaigns today.  
 Yet while the peasantry may not have disappeared entirely, it certainly faces very hard times. 
Neoliberal agrarian restructuring has exacerbated the ‘double (under-) development squeeze’ that has 
long characterised Latin American countrysides (De Janvry et al., 1989; Kay, 1997).  On the one 
hand, structural reforms heightened the unemployment crisis in commercial agriculture and urban 
centres, while on the other, market-led changes in property access, together with the closure of the 
agrarian frontier restricted peasants’ ability to access land throughout the 1990s. As a result, the two 
main escape valves for dispossessed peasants-- frontier migration or urban employment-- have 
increasingly been sealed off. These processes have had dramatic effects on peasant economies as well 
as their cultures and politics, as they become increasingly precarious and isolated in their attempts to 
hold on to their lands and livelihoods. 
 This leads to the second reason for the continued relevance of studies of the peasant question 
today: such investigations have a great deal to teach us about the transformative changes that have 
taken place in the economic and political landscape in the neoliberal era. This phenomenon is not 
entirely new. For centuries, the peasants of the periphery have been forced to accommodate to global 
transformations of food and agricultural systems, processes that have taken place in the context of 
successive world-historic political regimes of colonisation and imperialism. As Mazoyer and Roudart 
remind us, the current crisis of peasant livelihoods is reminiscent of that of the late nineteenth century, 
when transformations in transport and trade meant that the worlds' agrarian systems ‘progressively 
confronted each other in the same increasingly unified world market’ (Mazoyer and Roudart 2006). 
Nonetheless, neoliberal globalisation presents us with a series of epoch-defining changes in agrarian 
systems, including the restructuring of the state, market-oriented reforms to land and property 
regimes, the concentration and centralisation of capital, financial speculation and an unprecedented 
assault on natural resources in the hands of multinational mining and agribusiness corporations. These 
processes demand closer attention in their historically and spatially specific contexts. The study of 
the peasant question today, then, provides a window for analysing the impacts of the major social, 
productive and political transformations that have taken place in recent years on patterns of class 
structure, social conflicts and political developments in the countryside. 
The third reason is the political relevance of the issue. Peasant movements of the periphery 
represent some of the leading forces in the contemporary struggle against neoliberalism and 
globalisation, and their experiences contain many lessons for understanding the strategies and 
ideologies for resistance today (Borras, Edelman and Kay 2008; Deere and Royce 2009; Gudynas 
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2013; Moyo and Yeros 2005; Petras and Veltmeyer, 2011; Vergara-Camus 2014; Webber 2011; 
Wolford 2010; Zibechi 2012). The recent line of scholarship on contemporary peasant movements 
has made a number of important observations on this theme. First, they have connected recent changes 
in the global market with the eruption of a new wave of peasant revolts. Second, they have illustrated 
the dynamics of continuity and change between the ‘new’ rural movements and the ‘old' labour and 
guerrilla movements of the mid-20th century. Detailed case studies have shown how these 
movements have come to combine class-based grievances concerning land and rural resources with 
issues of culture and identity (Webber, 2011). Third, they have explored the changing aims, strategies 
and scope of their organising. In contrast to the previous wave of guerrilla insurgencies, socialist 
revolution is no longer on the agenda, which is a response to changing political circumstances and 
balance of class forces. Rather, the emphasis of these movements has been on issues of agrarian 
democracy, community participation, territorial autonomy, self-management, alternative 
development, while also being informed by ecological and feminist concerns. It is also noteworthy 
that their strategy of organisation is no longer restricted to a regional or even national level; rather, 
the demands for agrarian reform and food sovereignty around the world have often been united into 
a global peasant movement led by Via Campesina (Altieri and Toledo 2011; Borras Jr, Edelman, and 
Kay 2009; McMichael, 2009; Martinez-Torres and Rosset 2010). While much has been written on 
the more successful and well-known instances of these new peasant movements such as Mexico’s 
Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN), Brazil’s Landless Rural Workers’ Movement (MST), 
relatively little has been written on Colombia’s new peasant movements.1 This is largely because for 
much of the 2000s most of the territories where peasant movements had erupted became deeply 
embroiled in armed conflict between guerrilla and counter-insurgent forces. Yet even a glance at 
contemporary Colombian politics reveals that these movements are some of the most dynamic 
political forces in Colombia today— leading major marches and strikes at the national level, gaining 
important concessions for agrarian issues and building political instruments.  This thesis aims to shed 
light on the emergence of these movements in two very different regional contexts, the dynamics of 
their tactics, alliances and strategies, and their prospects in the current era. 
 
Contribution of this thesis to the debate 
What are peasants?  What are the prospects of this form of production in the face of capitalist 
development? Why do they rebel? What is the political character of their struggles?  These questions 
have a long tradition in critical scholarship in developing countries, stemming back to the debates 
                                               
1 Much of the research on ‘New’ peasant movements during this period tended to focus on the FARC (Brittain, 2010), indigenous movements (Findji, 
1992), or Afro-Colombian movements (Grueso et al., 2003) rather than peasant movements. 
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that first arose in Russia at the turn of the twentieth century, which underwent a revival in Latin 
America in the 1970s and have been renewed in the past two decades in the context of the agrarian 
crisis (Akram-Lodhi and Kay 2009, Bartra et al., 1979).  
 The debate on the peasant question has traditionally been dominated by two theoretical 
paradigms. The first is the agrarian populist approach that stems back to the ideas of the Russian 
Narodnik tradition of the mid nineteenth century and the ideas of Mao and the Chinese revolution, 
known in Latin America as the campesinista (“peasantist”) approach; the second is the social 
differentiation approach initially adopted by Lenin in his study of the development of capitalism in 
Russia (1967), and later developed in Latin America by the descampesinistas (“proletarianists”).   At 
issue in the debate are the changing dynamics of the peasant economy in response to capitalist 
penetration, peasant differentiation, the role of cooperatives and the character of struggles in the 
countryside .  On the one hand, campesinistas emphasised the resilience of peasant economies in the 
face of change. Peasants were both able to resist the encroachment of capital and also offer a 
significant and viable alternative to the dominant political and economic model of the time (A. Bartra, 
1979; Esteva, 1978; Moncayo and Rojas, 1979; Warman, 1980). On the other, the descampesinistas 
suggested that peasantries were destined to disintegrate with the progression of capitalism and 
modernisation (R. Bartra 1974; Kalmanovitz 1980). 
In the globalisation era, new processes of “disembedding” of the market from society have 
renewed old debates on the fate of the peasantry. On the one hand, a group of scholars has revived 
many of the arguments of the campesinistas, arguing that peasants have not only demonstrated 
resilience against the tide of globalisation, but moreover their productive systems based on agro-
ecological techniques and in search of food sovereignty offer an appealing alternative to current 
agrarian crisis. A central thesis of these authors is that there exists a distinct ‘peasant condition’, based 
around a shared way of life, community, values, solidarities, ecological relations and reciprocities 
found in subsistence farming that represent a distinct worldview and worthy alternative to the profit 
motive of contemporary corporate agricultural systems (Altieri and Toledo 2011; Edelman 2005; 
Rosset 2008; Ploeg 2012). 
However, such arguments have been brought into doubt by a number of writers. In a similar 
vein to the descampesinistas before them, these critics have emphasised that the spread of capitalist 
relations and the concomitant crisis of agrarian labour throughout the Third World have resulted in 
the irreversible disintegration of peasant livelihoods (Mooij, Bryceson and Kay 2000). With the 
development of a generalised system of commodity production, they argue, the subordinated social 
and productive systems of small farmers have become increasingly difficult to maintain; the 
expansion of capitalist social relations inexorably works against the peasantries, rendering this form 
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of production obsolete. Contemporary capitalism has restructured agriculture through global 
commodity chains, which have unevenly incorporated small farmers at different stages. Meanwhile, 
a crisis in petty commodity production has left smallholders increasingly isolated and fragmented, 
divorced from transnational circuits of capital accumulation (Bernstein 2006; 2012).  
At issue in the debate are two fundamentally different visions of what constitutes the 
peasantry,  its fate with the development of capitalist social relations in the countryside and crucially, 
its political character. On the one hand, the campesinistas emphasise the internal dynamics and shared 
economic features of the peasant family. Yet this approach risks ‘essentialising’ peasants, presuming 
their persistence as a homogenous ‘other’ to capital and overlooking the differences between them. 
On the other, however, in starting from the analysis of the capitalist system, then trying to identify 
the location of peasants within it, the descampesinistas seemed unable to account for the 
particularities of this form of production and peasants’ political agency (Moyo and Yeros 2005; Otero 
1999)2.   
This thesis seeks to enter this debate, but also to transcend it. Rather than presume an innate 
‘otherness’ to peasants on the one hand, or attempt to identify their ‘objective’ structural location on 
the other, my starting point is to examine the specificity of peasant logics of production— in all their 
diversity, in relation to their integration into broader sets of agrarian class structures and how they 
experience and respond to processes of agrarian change. Drawing on the notion of class developed 
by Thompson and Wood, I view peasants as ‘conscious and active historical beings, who are ‘ 
‘subject’ and ‘object’ at once, both agents and material forces in objective processes’ (Wood 1995: 
92).  The various pathways of agrarian change should not be understood simply as the evolution of a 
system, a structural process determined by conditions that are ‘objective’ in their effects on 
individuals, shaping and determining their actions. What happens to peasants is not just the result of 
systemic forces operating on them, but the result of actions that are consciously taken in a subjective, 
strategic or political response to these forces through particular livelihood strategies and cultural 
practices. The notions of peasants’ class and social reproduction cannot be reduced to structural or 
material conditions of their existence: they also encompass purposeful forms of agency, which 
encompass political and cultural determinants, and are always integrated into the wider social totality. 
In this sense, my analysis considers, on the one hand, the development of capitalist agriculture and 
its effects on structures of property and power at the global, national and local levels and on the other, 
the specificities of petty commodity production and its relation to processes of constitution of political 
agency amongst peasants. 
                                               
2 The dilemma concerns the ‘Janus-faced’ nature of the peasant household (Shanin, 1971), which espoused neither the interests of the bourgeoisie nor those of the proletariat in 
any straightforward way.  Peasants occupied a “contradictory class position”, or had a “double character”, in that ‘both the capitalist and the labourer were combined in the same 
person: the direct producer’ (Bartra, 1974; see also Paré, 1979.)  
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On a basic level, it should be stressed that the ‘peasants’ that form the basis of this study do 
not easily fit into the categories of ‘peasant’ or ‘proletariat’, since they are torn between wage labour 
on the one hand and petty commodity production on the other. They derived their incomes from a 
variety of sources— including agricultural production and waged labour, they often crossed the rural-
urban divide and they were also subject to differentiation along the lines of class, region, gender and 
ethnicity.  In this light, the starting point for my analysis is that the main base of support for 
contemporary movements is the semi-proletariat— a group in constant flux, hovering across the rural-
urban divide and engaged in a multiplicity of on-farm and off-farm activities oscillating between 
seasons (Kay, 2004; 2006; Otero, 1999). Contemporary ‘peasants’ encompass a vast set of petty 
commodity producing and labour types, ranging from small proprietors, capitalist farmers, petty 
commodity producers, subsistence farmers, landless or land-hungry settlers, semi-proletarianised 
labourers and informal and migrant workers (Akram-Lodhi and Kay 2009; Bernstein, 2010; Edelman, 
2013).  For this reason, it is impossible to determine any fixed class location of peasants: this is a 
differentiated set of actors occupying contradictory locations within rural class relations that change 
over time. They are increasingly being converted into ‘labour nomads’ who ‘lack secure footing in 
either city or countryside’ and are forced into perpetual migration between the two (Davis, 2006: 46). 
The relevance of this observation is not that it allows for the assignation of a specific form of 
class consciousness to a given class position, but because of the type of experience it brings (Vergara 
Camus, 2014: 75). Ongoing processes of semi-proletarianisation have given today’s peasantries a 
diverse variety of class experiences: depeasantisation, violent dispossession, migration, and 
proletarianisation, but they have also adapted through strategies of repeasantisation— and collective 
struggle. In the neoliberal era, the subsistence crisis in agriculture and the crisis in urban 
unemployment have given rise to new processes of repeasantisation, as peasants have turned to land 
as a means of securing subsistence, and adopted different farming techniques based on diversified 
production and self-provisioning. Many of these actors can thus be seen to maintain a distinct ‘peasant 
condition’ that is a vital determinant of their survival strategies, economic interests and political 
actions (Ploeg 2012; Rosset and Martínez-Torres 2012). Omission of the distinctly ‘peasant’ 
character of these actors would represent a fundamental oversight in any analysis of the very 
particular socio-economic characteristics of these actors and their political campaigns today.  
However, the turn to repeasantisation is not a question of innate qualities of peasantness or 
cultural resilience, but a practical and strategic response to surrounding conditions. Peasants do not 
exist in an isolated, unchanging or idyllic rural life. Their ability to reproduce their livelihoods 
depends on access to the means of subsistence; yet the conditions of this access are often in the hands 
of forces beyond their control, determined by the specific configurations of capital, labour and land 
between various class forces: relations with landlords, merchants or other farmers, as well as the state 
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(Neocosmos 1986).  Rather than presume an innate peasant resilience, my exploration of this new 
‘peasant condition’ starts from concrete analysis of how diverse groups of peasants’ varied 
interactions with the market and relationship to land is situated within broader class structures and 
institutional arrangements, as well as its political implications in terms of tactical and strategic 
potential for building class power. Following Otero (1999), my argument is that rather than 
economistic accounts of the peasantry that sees class formation as an economic, political and cultural 
process analysed through a comparative analysis of processes of class formation regional case studies. 
 
Political class formation and peasants 
A large body of scholarly research has been dedicated to explaining the emergence and political 
character of peasant revolts. Much of the debate has drawn on comparative analyses of major peasant 
revolts to examine the relevance of three interrelated issues: 1) the class basis of agrarian conflicts 
and forms of class cleavage; 2) political mediations and the balance of class power; and 3) the cultural 
and organisational dynamics of peasant-based movements. While the first two dimensions are 
concerned with the why of peasant revolts—- explaining which strata of peasants are more likely to 
rebel and the historical and structural features giving rise to resistance, the third addresses the how: 
the processes through which rebellions are made and the forms of consciousness they adopt. 
1. Which peasants rebel? 
The question of which peasants are most prone to revolt has been a central issue for much of the 
scholarship on peasant revolutions in developing countries. At issue is both the social composition of 
peasant movements and the relations and cleavages between different agrarian classes. In Peasant 
Wars of the Twentieth Century, Wolf observes that it is middle peasants, with secure access to land 
and employing family labour, who are most likely to revolt. Since they were independent producers, 
they were less vulnerable to manipulation by landlords and had the most to lose from market 
penetration (Wolf 1969: 290-293). By contrast, Paige doubted this hypothesis, arguing that 
smallholders were less likely to risk their land by joining a revolutionary movement. Rather, their 
struggles tended to focus on immediate goals such as prices for their crops. Paige took a different 
approach to analysing which peasants were most prone to revolt, basing his analysis on varieties of 
class relations between ‘cultivating’ and ‘non-cultivating’ classes. The relevant factor in 
understanding the basis of agrarian revolts was ‘the relationship of the rural population to the new 
forms of class cleavage and class conflict introduced by the agricultural export economy’ (1975: 3). 
He argued that revolution was on the agenda when the non-cultivating classes derived their income 
from land, which pitted them into direct confrontation with peasants. His analysis led him to conclude 
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that it was the wage-earning cultivators who were better positioned to support revolutionary 
movements (1975: 48–51).  
 In their different ways, Wolf and Paige both brought the question of the social composition 
of the peasantry and its forms of reproduction into a broader dialogue with issues of class conflict 
and political power at regional, national and international levels. Their hypotheses provide an incisive 
starting point for analysis, even if the agrarian class structures and forms of cleavage in Latin 
American countrysides are very different today. However, Paige’s over-reliance on structural 
conditions led him to adopt a deterministic account of rural revolt, suggesting that the conscious 
political activity of peasants could be read from their class position (Otero, 1999). Wolf, in contrast, 
looked to a range of experiential, cultural, associational and tactical implications of peasants’ location 
within broader webs of power.  Wolf stressed the need for a more complex treatment of the rural-
urban divide in understanding the social composition of rural revolts, pointing to the role of cross-
sector alliances and rural-urban family ties. He observed that more important than ‘the growth of an 
industrial proletariat’ was ‘the development of an industrial workforce still closely geared to life in 
the villages’ for escalating revolts (Wolf 1969: 292).  
 Many contemporary studies of peasant revolts have emphasised the relevance of the 
contemporary dynamics of commodification of peasant livelihoods, rapid proletarianisation and the 
crisis of wage labour for understanding peasant revolts in the neoliberal era (Eckstein 1989; Edelman 
1999; 2005; Petras and Veltmeyer 2011; Otero 1999; Vergara-Camus 2014). Eckstein argued that the 
urban employment crisis propelled rural revolts by sealing off the ‘exit options’ for peasants expelled 
from agriculture (2001: 46). Edelman (1999; 2005) provides a closer understanding of this process 
by emphasising the new pressures on the labour-consumer dynamics of rural households generated 
by urban influences:  
At the same time that peasant expectations have risen, in many less-developed countries, the rural-urban gap-in 
living standards, in consumption, in life chances-- has only widened. This combination of converging expectations 
and diverging life chances has potentially explosive consequences (2005: 337).  
Although the urban unemployment crisis has been a central feature of Latin America’s rapid 
industrialisation throughout the second half of the twentieth century, Vergara-Camus argues that the 
cultural and ideological impact of proletarianisation on rural inhabitants is very different today. He 
observes that the experiences of rural-urban migration: ‘are not as important in terms of access to 
revolutionary ideas—especially not today—as they are in terms of experiences of alienation and 
marginalisation’ (2014: 76). Since separation from the means of subsistence exposes peasants to 
unemployment and precarious work in the cities, marginalised peasants have increasingly sought to 
hold on to land through strategies of re-peasantisation. I return to this discussion below. 
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 In order to analyse the relevance of the social composition of rural classes in the emergence 
of peasant revolts, my research compares the differentiated impact of processes of commodification 
and proletarianisation on two very different sectors of the Colombian peasantry.  At one end of the 
spectrum, the peasants of Líbano consist of small, independent producers of coffee and petty 
commodities that emerged with the expansion of the coffee market in the early twentieth century 
(Sánchez 1985). Meanwhile, the Cimitarra peasants consisted in settlers and landless workers who 
combined subsistence and petty commodity production with wage work in the oil refinery in the local 
town of Barrancabermeja. Their access to lands and markets was very precarious, and they were 
highly vulnerable to expulsion in the hands of landed capital.  
 For these early generations of peasants, the ties between rural cultivation and urban labour 
played a key role in the outbreak of rural revolt. In Líbano, the rapid industrialisation of coffee 
production on local haciendas gave rise to a new proletariat— mostly of female labourers— with one 
foot in the town, one in the countryside.  By the 1920s, the particular ties of solidarity between 
peasants and workers provided the basis for a uniquely radical peasant-worker uprising known as the 
Bolcheviques del Líbano. In the Middle Magdalena, the combination of waged employment in the oil 
industry with subsistence production acted as a buffer from the boom-bust fluctuations of the oil 
industry and high prices in company stores (Vega, Nuñez and Pereira 2009; Velasco 1992).  With the 
rapid development and radicalisation of labour unions in the oil enclave of Barrancabermeja, radical 
ideas quickly spilled over to the countryside. The rural-urban alliance was solidified with the outbreak 
of strikes that shook Barrancabermeja in the 1920s, during which peasants supplied food to striking 
workers who in turn demanded land for cultivators alongside protections conditions for workers. 
 In the period following the great depression up to the 1970s, rapid processes of 
commodification of agricultural production, industrialisation and proletarianisation dramatically 
changed the social composition of peasantries and gave rise to new forms of revolt. In the coffee 
regions, small farmers gained access to land and incorporated green revolution technologies into the 
production process, developing a detailed knowledge of world coffee markets and a heavy 
dependence on credits. The rapid differentiation that ensued generated a growing sense of resentment 
amongst smaller farmers who were increasingly subordinated within the ‘coffee developmentalism’ 
model. Meanwhile, in the Middle Magdalena, processes of proletarianisation and semi-
proletarianisation of rural cultivators took place in the context of a vibrant civic strike movement of 
the 1970s and 1980s, tightening rural-urban solidarities and organisational capacities. 
 Broadly speaking, neoliberal reforms generated a subsistence crisis for both these sectors of 
the peasantry, associated with the removal of protections for domestic agriculture, restricted access 
to land and the rise of urban unemployment. Yet the class basis and antagonisms were very different 
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in each case. In the Cimitarra valley, waves of investment in large scale agro-fuel plantations 
propelled the longstanding land dispute between peasant settlers and landed capital.   Meanwhile, in 
Líbano, the withdrawal of state benefits and protections dashed expectations of social mobility 
associated with smallholder coffee farming, driving rapid processes of differentiation and adverse 
incorporation amongst peasants. In the context of soaring urban unemployment together with 
paramilitary capture of many provincial towns including Barrancabermeja, urban migration no longer 
represented a viable ‘exit option’ for peasants squeezed out of agriculture. While neoliberalism 
created the conditions for the eruption of revolts amongst sectors of coffee farmers more closely 
integrated with capitalist markets and frontier settlers dependent on both monetary and non-monetary 
relations for their reproduction, the development and political character of these processes was 
determined by the varied effects of political mediations, regional cultures and the development of 
class organisations amongst these sectors. 
2. Political mediations 
The emergence and success of peasant revolts is not only conditioned by the social and cultural 
characteristics of peasants themselves. It is also determined by broader political conditions in terms 
of the exercise of state power and the balance of class forces (Goodwin and Skocpol 1989; Skocpol 
1979). The capitalist state is the primary medium through which capital exercises its socio-economic 
and political power, providing the institutional basis for the accumulation of capital, and securing the 
continued viability of capitalism by countering its contradictions and tendencies to crisis through 
intervention at specific conjunctures (Offe 1974). For the purposes of my analysis, the role of the 
Colombian state in orienting the path of capitalist development in the countryside has been twofold: 
first, in the enactment of agrarian policies with the aim of securing economic growth; second in the 
adoption of strategies of coercion and consent in order to gain legitimacy and stave off political unrest.  
 However the state apparatus should not be understood as a monolithic entity, and the effects 
of its interventions are neither unified nor fixed. The different emphasis given by the state to various 
goals is a reflection of world market conditions and the correlation of class forces at an international, 
national and regional level. As I will show, the goals and forms of intervention are often contradictory, 
favouring landlords even at the expense of direct producers and a loss of its own legitimacy. The 
course of capitalist development in the Colombian countryside has historically been marked by 
significant regional variation in the form of state intervention as a result of uneven geographical 
development and different outcomes of socio-political power struggles between groups.  
 Goodwin and Skocpol argue that the outbreak of peasant revolutions is in large part 
conditioned by ‘the relative vulnerability of different sorts of political regimes to the formation of 
broad revolutionary coalitions and, perhaps, to actual overthrow by revolutionary forces’ (1989: 492). 
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Whether or not a regime is vulnerable to revolutionary overthrow depends on its susceptibility to 
politico-military crises and the disruption of the dominance of the ruling classes (Skocpol 1979). On 
the one hand, revolutionary movements ‘typically coalesce in opposition to closed or exclusionary, 
as well as organisationally weak (or suddenly weakened), authoritarian regimes’ (Goodwin and 
Skocpol 1989: 495). On the other, those regimes most immune from revolutionary overthrow include 
‘multiparty democracies’, ‘quasi-democracies’, ‘“inclusionary” authoritarian’ and ‘single-party 
corporatist’ regimes (1989: 495-6). The ambiguity of the Colombian regime and its relation to popular 
movements is in large part due to the contradictory nature of its various strategic projects, the 
changing balance of power amongst elites and its response to class struggle.  
 Colombia has historically differed from most other major Andean countries in a number of 
respects. Throughout the 20th century, Colombia was governed by a ‘closed’ and internally 
fragmented ruling class dubbed “The Twenty-four Families”, which never fully extended 
representation to popular classes in the period following the great depression. By preventing the 
emergence of a left-populist coalition, the ruling elite instead plunged the country into a decade-long 
bi-partisan war known as “La Violencia”. With the onset of the Cold War, the Colombian regime also 
became a key ally in the United States’ hemispheric counter-insurgent strategy, serving as the testing 
ground for various experiments in harsh repression aimed at defeating the revolutionary upsurges of 
the 1960s and 1970s. The exclusionary, dependent and repressive nature of  the regime radicalised 
opponents amongst the popular classes as well as reformist political classes, yet this was paralleled 
by the development of a powerful, US-led military geared towards social repression. 
 However, while the exclusionary regime certainly radicalised the opposition, the challengers 
were never able to galvanise a broad enough base of support for a successful revolution. Although 
political representation of the popular sectors was eliminated, the regime still imposed restricted 
forms of political participation on key middle sectors of urban middle classes and peasants, co-opting 
leaders and handing out clientelistic benefits. This produced a deep affiliation with the main parties 
amongst middle classes and undercut their inclinations towards independent political action (Safford 
and Palacios, 2001; Wickham-Crowley 1992). In the post-war era, this exclusionary corporatist 
regime was sustained by the accumulation model based on ‘coffee developmentalism’, which 
promoted import-substitution-industrialisation financed by the export earnings of the coffee sector. 
With the creation of Fedecafé, the state was able to incorporate medium and small coffee farmers into 
its political machine by enacting a series of social reforms that simultaneously accommodated to the 
industrial and agrarian elite while incorporating sectors of small and medium coffee farmers and 
urban middle classes. Yet the hegemonic project of the dominant classes was unevenly spread: in vast 
areas of the countryside— particularly in the frontiers, the regional state apparatus was dominated by 
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cattle ranchers and landlords through associations like Fedegan, who wielded state power as an 
unveiled instrument of class rule. 
 The neoliberal turn entailed a major reorganisation of the Colombian state and its relation to 
the balance of class forces and the market. As the state was redirected to facilitate wealth 
accumulation in the hands of international capital, the previous model of developmentalist political 
incorporation was undermined through the elimination of protections and supports, the privatisation 
of state enterprises, the end of land reform, re-commodification of natural resources and labour 
flexibilisation. The changes involved new forms of exclusion of broad sectors of the population, with 
the effect of undermining the legitimacy of the institutional order on which stability had rested, 
catalysing pre-existing tensions and giving rise to new cleavages. In the coffee regions, Fedecafé’s 
hegemonic project was undermined with the abrogation of the International Coffee Agreement of 
1989, which lifted the shield that had protected small farmers from the disruptions of the global 
market, triggering a new wave of mobilisations (Hough, 2009; Robledo, 2001).  
 Although the 1991 constitution had included democratic reforms aimed at re-incorporating 
radicalised sectors, decentralisation effectively triggered a regional power struggle resulting in the 
creation of ‘armed authoritarian enclaves’ that took on state-like functions (Gill 2016; Hylton 2010; 
Velasco, 2006). In the Middle Magdalena, a far-right power bloc linked to drug mafias, landlords and 
local politicians and supported by the US emerged with the aim of seizing land from small farmers, 
capturing regional state power and institutionalising a new social order predicated on the re-
concentration of land, rapacious exploitation of natural resources, flexibilised labour and harsh 
repression.  
 This thesis examines the role of political mediations from above in terms of three main 
conditions: 1) the form of economic development they promote in the countryside; 2) their impact on 
the distribution of power and resources between groups— in particular whether they favour the 
reproduction of direct producers; and 3) whether or not they favour the development of oppositional 
movements, and the class character of these movements. The form of political mediation, I argue, 
helps to explain both the eruption and sustainability of radical movements. Although the neoliberal 
turn entailed a model of economic development involving the exclusion and dispossession of broad 
sectors of the rural popular classes and an upwards redistribution of land and resources, they also 
adopted new strategies of peasant incorporation via ‘market citizenship’ (Harvey 2001) in 
conjunction with harsh repression, which tended to undermine their independence.  
 The eruption of new peasant movements throughout the Colombian countryside from the mid-
nineties was a response to three circumstances: 1) the dislocations sparked by neoliberal reforms and 
the legitimacy crisis of the state, which gave rise to new cleavages and polarisations; 2) limited 
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democratic reforms and political decentralisation, which opened a space for broader political 
participation of groups beyond the two-party system but also sparked a regional dispute over state 
power; and 3) the defeat of guerrilla movements across Latin America, which prompted a shift in 
strategy amongst the left in favour of attempting to bring about a change in the balance of forces 
within civil society, foster new forms of political participation and create a national coalition in 
opposition to neoliberal policies. Yet the fate of these movements was largely determined by the 
extensive repression of state and para-state forces in the context of the counter-insurgent war that 
peaked between 1996 and 2002. The near-annihilation of the left combined with a strategy of limited 
concessions to quell the upswell and prevent the formation of a broader anti-neoliberal coalition, and 
the new movements succumbed to internal divisions and fragmentation, in some cases leading to 
complete disintegration. However, the character of peasant movements was also conditioned by the 
type of state intervention during this period. Where the state offered concessions in the form of 
poverty reduction or productive adaption funds, this tended to undermine the independence of of 
peasant political organisations. This was either because participants were co-opted or movements lost 
their leadership roles since struggles were confined to seeking improved terms of inclusion within 
the neoliberal order, while members remained politically passive. Meanwhile, where the state posed 
a direct threat to peasants’ livelihoods, movements tended to adopt a more confrontational and 
oppositional stance. When benefits are offered as a result of the pressure placed on the state by 
political organisations, the sustainability of the movement depends on how they are able to negotiate 
and administer the concessions, whilst continuing to represent the members’ interests independently. 
The ACVC’s construction of an autonomous rural territory played a central role in this regard by 
carving out a space to negotiate concessions to meet the specific needs of its members within the 
neoliberal system, whilst simultaneously developing popular understandings, practices and 
solidarities in the longer-term project of building alternative forms of production and governance. 
Thus, I argue those movements best able to withstand coercion and co-optation in the neoliberal era 
are those that have development mechanisms for obtaining concessions for their members whilst 
simultaneously maintaining grassroots participation and political autonomy.  
3. Peasant cultures and class organisations 
While macro-level political and economic factors conditioned the emergence of peasant revolts and 
shaped the contours of what was possible in their struggles, the character and development of these 
processes can only be understood at the level of experience— the way peasants made sense of these 
changes, responded and organised politically.  As discussed above, to understand these processes of 
political class formation requires humanising and contextualising broader structural processes: 
exploring the particular contingencies and practices that give rise to class formation in given historical 
and cultural circumstances. Processes of class formation do not have a pre-ordained set of outcomes 
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nor do they take place at a specified time: they may involve long, drawn out processes of contestation 
and gradual change or sudden outbursts of activity. The method of comparison of spatially and 
temporally situated processes allows for closer understanding of how particular traditions, practices, 
and political associations can shape the outcome of any mobilisation process.  
 Political class formation refers to the different types of agency asserted by the peasantry as 
they respond and adapt to processes of agrarian change. A long tradition of rural sociological 
scholarship in Latin America has been dedicated to identifying the strategies of peasant reproduction 
in the face of capitalist development, particularly by gaining access to the means of subsistence.  In 
his seminal research project Historia doble de la Costa, Colombian sociologist Orlando Fals Fals-
Borda observed how: 
The ethos of the small and medium cultivator was reproduced and even multiplied […] despite the development 
of capitalist agriculture. The peasant mode of production resisted the initial penetration of capital, learning to 
adapt and even thrive through “repeasantisation” (1976: 15).  
Fals-Borda observed that a “peasant ethos of resistance” was being formed through the process of 
struggle for land itself, which combined a particular logic of production, the traditional values and 
customs of rural life with a desire for freedom and harmonious co-existence with nature  (1976:18). 
While Fals-Borda was influenced by the ideas of the campesinistas in Mexico, the desire for land and 
freedom amongst peasants and indigenous groups on the Colombian coast was specifically tied to the 
process of colonisation-expulsion-appropriation associated with the experience of settlement in the 
agrarian frontier. 
 Fals-Borda’s observations are illustrative of the central feature of ‘consciousness’  attributed 
to peasants from within the campesinista tradition: a distinct sense of subalternity linked to resistance 
to penetration from outside forces. In contrast to the common assertion that the distinct variety of 
subalternity, isolation and marginalisation of peasants represents a weakness (Marx 2008[1897];  
Hobsbawm, 1978), a central hypothesis of many theorists of peasant revolts is that such conditions 
can also represent a hidden strength. For James Scott, the key for understanding why revolts break 
out among peasant smallholders lies in their capacity to stand outside the hegemony exercised by the 
ruling elites (1977: 271). He writes: ‘far from being handicapped, the obsolete values of peasants and 
their local orientation may well be the source of their radical action’ (1977: 281).  Geographical 
marginality may represent a major barrier to socio-economic development in peasant regions, but it 
also provides a space for the formation of local communal solidarities in tension with the dominant 
class culture.  
 However, Scott’s emphasis on the peculiarities of peasant culture tends to mystify an innate 
‘peasantness’, characterised by a communal- and subsistence-orientation shared by all peasant 
villages. It is also inherently pre-capitalist and backward-looking in character— doomed to fade away 
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as capitalist development completes its course. By contrast, Eric Wolf’s account takes peasant culture 
not as a static entity but a dynamic process, continuously in dialogue with ‘the field of power which 
surrounds it’ (1969: 290). Wolf’s inquiry into the subjective character of peasant revolts involves a 
more complex treatment of the variation in property relations between peasants, their relation to one 
another and the dominant classes in determining the divergences in peasant culture. Peasant culture 
refers not to an innate ‘essence’ common to all peasants and confined to a pre-capitalist past, but: ‘a 
concrete historical experience which lives on in the present and continues to determine its shape and 
meaning’ (Wolf, 1969: 276).  
 According to this understanding, peasant political culture is not conceived as a homogenous 
or static reality— whether ‘traditional’ or ‘modern’ in character, but ‘socially constituted and socially 
constituting’ (Roseberry 1989: 20)— dependent on peasants’ understandings of the sets of social 
relations in which find themselves, and how they act in accordance with that understanding in 
response to particular political and historical moments. Rather than confining an essentialised culture 
to pre-capitalist era, in Wolf’s account the experiences and memories of previous struggles become 
resources for interpreting and responding to new conditions arising in processes of structural 
transformation. This historical experience carries the memory of antagonisms, struggles and 
solidarities of the past, but the peasantry can also adopt new strategies for reproducing and 
reconstituting itself in the future. These may be quelled, only to resurge again with a sudden relevance 
to new political moments. In this account, cultures are never fixed but constantly reworked in 
response to ongoing processes of agrarian change and evolving political conditions throughout time. 
 Building on the notion that peasant cultures are constantly being reconstituted in response to 
ongoing processes of agrarian change, more recent scholarship in the campesinista tradition has made 
a connection between the experience of depeasantisation and urban unemployment in the neoliberal 
era with the formation of new collective peasant identities through the struggle for land. Bernardo 
Fernandes has developed an approach for understanding the processes of agrarian change in terms of 
the forms of purposeful agency developed by peasants, linked to their strategies for reproducing their 
livelihoods within the changing dynamics of capitalist development. Seen in this way, the separation 
of peasants from the means of production does not necessarily imply their proletarianisation. Rather, 
peasants may counter processes of dispossession and depeasantisation through active, collective 
projects of  repeasantisation (Fernandes, 2005: 325-326; see also: de Souza Martins 2002; Kröger 
2011; Ploeg 2012; Vergara-Camus 2014; Wolford 2010). Through the process of struggle for land 
itself, peasants may simultaneously resist proletarianisation and forge new identities, collective 
practices and forms of consciousness. In some cases, this means retaining their position as 
smallholders, and in others it means building cultures of solidarity and moving to a new understanding 
and form of agrarian struggle emphasising territorial autonomy and collective resource management. 
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The particular type of outcome depends on both the type of ‘exit options’ available to peasants, as 
well as the role of class organisations in the struggle for territorial resistance. 
 From this perspective, major transformative processes underway in the countryside can be 
conceived not only as transitions in productive relations, but also times of intense political and 
cultural activity— when memories of the past are revitalised and given new meanings, while the 
realisation of hopes and expectations requires new understandings, solidarities and strategies. As with 
the initial penetration of capital, neoliberal restructuring generated a double-edged crisis: a 
subsistence crisis for peasants and a legitimacy crisis for the social institutions on which stability had 
rested. Scholars of peasant revolts have noted that such times of crisis can also be times of rapid un-
making and re-making of social identities, as old bonds are torn apart and new sets of relations are 
formed; new antagonisms are generated and cultural symbols acquire new meanings (Smith, 1989; 
Migdal, 1975; Wolf, 1969). Raúl Zibechi (2012: 11) describes these moments as ‘times in which 
there is an intensely creative outpouring— during which social groups release huge amounts of 
energy’. These act ‘like a bolt of lightning’: unveiling antagonistic relations and shredding the fabric 
of social control.  
 Far from static or fixed essences, cultural traditions are thus constantly subject to change. At 
times of crisis and heightened political activity, meanings and understandings of ‘community’ can 
suddenly be thrown into question and opened to contestation. As Smith observes: ‘once resistance is 
expressed openly and in concert, the imperatives of such intense political activity take on a 
momentum of their own’ (1991:27). Confrontations and disputes are times when antagonisms 
between classes may be generated or uncovered, new solidarities and alliances can be built, and 
understandings of political activity itself can take on new meanings and implications. Leaders can 
draw on different historical experiences, conceptions of injustice and cultural traditions to shape 
collective understandings, and they can also draw on new repositories of social activity— tactics of 
protest and organisation. 
 This conceptualisation grants a different explanatory role to the notion of peasant culture, 
which acts not as a fixed entity but a variable with a determining impact on the outcome of processes 
of class formation. Regional cultures shaped the form and character of peasant struggles, illuminating 
the precise mechanisms through which specific outcomes were reached. This is not a question of 
establishing whether full ‘class consciousness’— understood as revolutionary character-- was 
reached, as different forms of struggle are adopted by peasants in response to changing historical and 
political circumstances. Since the current balance of forces in Colombian society means revolution is 
not on the agenda, contemporary agrarian struggles ‘take place within the confines of capitalism’ 
(Otero, 1999: 3).  In analytical terms, this means that rather than adopting the teleological 
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measurement of whether ‘class consciousness’ is achieved, the subjective character of any form of 
peasant oppositional activity can be conceived as occupying positions on a spectrum, constantly 
subject to contestation and re-negotiation.  In this regard, a useful analytical pointer is provided by 
Moore’s (1966: 475-6) distinction between forms of subjective character of peasant solidarity, which 
can range from ‘conservative’ to ‘radical’. While the former is dominated by rich peasants or 
landlords, who provide a ‘niche’ within the social structure for poor peasants, the latter is a 
horizontally-aligned group defined in express hostility to the dominant classes. Another relevant 
factor in understanding divergences in subjective character of peasant struggles is by looking at the 
types of expression and tactics these adopt. These may differ at any given point, ranging from 
everyday, isolated instances of political activity— clandestine tactics for gaining economic value 
such as poaching, pilfering, foot-dragging or holding back the harvest(Scott 1986;   Kerkvliet 2009).  
At the other end are the overt oppositional practices captured in Fantasia’s notion of “cultures of 
solidarity”, which are expressed in the emergent values, behaviours, practices and organisational 
forms that arise during times of heightened political activity and mobilisation (Fantasia 1995). The 
expressions and aims adopted by any movement process are never determined by internal features 
alone: their vision of the type of change possible is always constructed in dialogue with broader 
societal influences, solidarities and strategies of alliances. 
 This brief exposition of the divergent subjective characters of peasant revolts points to a 
further analytical dimension needed to understand peasant class formation: the institutionalised 
relations between different agrarian classes and the role of class organisations. In this regard, Migdal 
has emphasised the importance of the mobilisation of political alliances and class movements in 
determining the character and outcome of peasant revolts. In Peasants, Politics, and Revolution, 
Migdal argues that political organisations were key to determining the way peasants respond to 
processes of agrarian change. Peasant organisations played a key role in organising and cohering 
peasant organisations in the face of capitalist penetration (1974). They could offer alternative forms 
of power, including dispute-settling mechanisms, political and administrative actions and alternative 
social and cultural relations— all of which become particularly vital when peasants’ livelihoods come 
under threat. With greater exposure to market relations and integration into increasingly complex 
societies, peasant associations must be able to accommodate to new demands, adopting a new variety 
of roles, tasks, and social relations that allow them to continue to provide the social basis for 
livelihood reproduction in the context of changing needs, practices and values of peasants, and 
demonstrate leadership in representing peasant interests and demanding concessions from the state 
(Migdal 1974: 193-4).  
 In this vein, recent scholarship has emphasised the role of peasant organisations in providing 
support for peasants in dealing with the neoliberal subsistence crisis. Fernandes conceptualises such 
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organisations as ‘socio-territorial movements’, which act as spaces of livelihood reproduction 
produced in the context of territorial conflict (Fernandes 2005: 325-326).  Territorial conflicts can be 
understood as having two axes: a vertical axis involving the struggle between classes, and a horizontal 
axes involving the ‘immaterial’ struggle over the definition of class. In the vertical axes, particular 
social classes reproduce territories under conditions of continual conflict with a variety of antagonists, 
from landlords to agribusiness, transnational capital or ruling elites. The horizontal axis involves a 
struggle among various communities, institutes, media and organisations seeking to shape the 
contours of class and articulate its collective interests. Composed of an array of formal organisations, 
educational process as well as informal networks of solidarity, kinship and friendship,  territorially-
based communities provide peasants with a specific territorial location from which they are both able 
to defend their communities from antagonists and reproduce a shared set of norms and values within 
the collective. Through their experience in these movements, peasants can develop a shared set of 
cultural norms and bonds of solidarity: they learn to form resistance to dispossession, challenge their 
exclusion and oppose state policies. Common understandings and values are developed through 
education in citizenship, class power and self-governance. The notion stresses the situated and 
territorial dynamics of peasant struggles, which deploy local understandings, practices and values in 
confrontation with antagonists. There are specific spatial dimensions to the operations of socio-
territorial movements in relation to the contemporary land struggle: territorial movements both defend 
the territorial and productive interests of their members in the struggle between classes- against 
landlords, the state, and neoliberal precariousness, as well as in the struggle among members of the 
same class in creating a space for building a shared culture. 
 The formation of the territorial organisation is not a fixed but continual process, frequently 
fragmented and subject to organisation or disorganisation at any given conjuncture. As Gramsci put 
it:  ‘subaltern groups are always subject to the activity of ruling groups, even when they rebel and 
rise up’  (Gramsci 1971: 54–5). As processes of resistance attempt to build social and political forces 
they also become more vulnerable to repression, appropriation and co-optation in the hands of the 
ruling classes. Thus, class organisations themselves may also be sites of struggle: as the dominant 
classes attempt to disorganise popular classes and destroy their movements, so movements from 
below continuously attempt to give structure, coherence and direction to social and political 
instruments.  
 Broadly speaking, the eruption of a new wave of rural mobilisations in the neoliberal era 
represented an organic development arising from the legitimacy crisis of the Colombian state, with 
the reconfiguration of state–civil society relations opening a space for the formation of new 
autonomous organisations. In my analysis, the subjective and political character of each movement 
process could be closely traced to the concrete sets of agrarian social relations in which they were 
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embedded, the livelihood strategies they adopted as well as their dialogue with the state and class 
organisations.   
 In Líbano, the formation of Asopema is only intelligible if traced back to the community work 
carried out by Liberation Theology and former ANUC activists in consciousness-raising amongst 
local smallholders throughout the 1980s. By encouraging peasants to take cognisance, question the 
dominant social hierarchy and become active subjects, this opened a space for the emergence of new 
forms of critical consciousness and politicisation among small farmers suffering the brunt of 
processes of differentiation, semi-proletarianisation and impoverishment that had accelerated since 
the introduction of Green Revolution technologies. The development of critical consciousness 
allowed peasants to overcome the ‘localised common sense’ concerning the naturalness of the 
established order dominated by Fedecafé and local political bosses, and a belief in ‘productivism’ 
and technical fixes as the solution to social problems. Eventually, in the mid 1990s, when neoliberal 
reforms sparked a debt crisis for smallholders, the large-scale mobilisations that broke out provided 
the basis for the construction of a radical peasant organisation outside the institutional control of 
Fedecafé. Peasants drew on a critique of the impact of Green Revolution technologies in terms of the 
loss of traditional diversified peasant production systems, the growing corporate control of the 
farming process, environmental degradation caused by chemicals and pest infestations, as well as 
new processes of inequality and impoverishment for smaller farmers. In the process they also formed 
new bonds of solidarity and common understandings. This process was emblematic of the broader 
legitimacy crisis of the Colombian state throughout the neoliberal period, and it was also a sign of 
organic developments linked to the emergence of new radical oppositional forces. 
  The formation of the ACVC has deeper roots in the traditions of co-operation, self-reliance 
and the ethic of self-defence associated with Communist organising amongst marginalised settlers in 
the agrarian frontier.  Landless peasants from a variety of ethnic and regional origins began settling 
the Cimitarra valley from the late 1970s, often fleeing landlord encroachments or violent expulsions 
following the failure of the land reform movement in 1972. These small riverside villages became 
known for their distinct ethic of co-operation and spirit of resistance known as the ‘cultura ribereña’. 
This was as much about developing strategies of self-reliance in agricultural production as it was 
about giving a sense of dignity and community for diverse groups of peasants in a common condition 
of subalternity.  In the context of state absence, these communities developed autonomous strategies 
of self-governance, which combined state-like activities of providing local services and infrastructure 
with deeper processes of political education and movement-building among its members. The civic 
strike movement of the 1970s and 1980s provided the basis for the formation of new rural-urban 
solidarities, organisational capacities and strategies of alliances. In the 1990s a wave of investments 
in agro-fuels triggered new land disputes between peasants and agri-business, accompanied by an 
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unprecedented wave of paramilitary violence. In this context the energies of the civic strikes were re-
channelled into a strategy of territorial defence in the Cimitarra valley through the construction of an 
‘autonomous rural community’, which combined self-reliance and pettycommodity production with 
semi-autonomous political organisation. The ACVC had always drawn on a moral discourse centred 
on the injustice of the latifundio system, where lands were left idle in the hands of absent landlords 
while settlers were forced into the most degraded lands which were insufficient to sustain a family. 
However, in the neoliberal era, as latifundios were capitalised and converted into mono-crop 
plantations of palm oil, the longstanding territorial conflict acquired new dimensions as peasants 
increasingly came to frame their critique in terms of the dominance of the new latifundio in the 
globalised food system.  These two experiences provide important considerations for understanding 
how in very different ways, rural struggles for autonomous forms of governance and production have 
become increasingly relevant in the neoliberal era. 
 
Studying peasants in the globalisation era: methodological note 
My research seeks to contribute historical and empirical considerations for a growing body of 
research on political class formation amongst peasants emphasising 1) the role of historical, cultural 
and geographical specificity in understanding large-scale historical processes and 2) the use of 
comparison and case studies (Hall et al. 2015; Otero, 1999; Vergara-Camus, 2014; Wickham-
Crowley and Eckstein 2015). 
This thesis spans three moments. It details the changing political and economic circumstances, 
social composition and modalities of rural struggle in: 1) the late 19th and early 20th centuries, when 
capitalist penetration and state modernisation sparked an early wave of peasant revolts; 2) the mid-
20th century, when rapid processes of capitalist development, industrialisation and differentiation 
saw the creation of the national peasant movement for agrarian reform; and 3) the neoliberal era, 
when a new wave of agrarian restructuring and appropriation of lands and natural resources brought 
an unprecedented assault on rural livelihoods and response from a diversity of new peasant social 
movements. Since the 2000s, neoliberalism has entered a second period premised on the acceleration 
of natural resource extraction. To capture the temporal order of social phenomena, I adopt the 
historical narrative mode, or what Thompson called ‘history as process’. This procedure captures the 
sense in which social phenomena are sequential and temporally ordered, unfolding as sequences of 
events through particular conjunctures in time and place. As Tilly puts it: ‘time and space are usually 
thick—drenched with causes that inhere in sequence, accumulation, contingency and proximity’ 
(Tilly, 1994: 270). Alongside this, the use of conjunctural explanation emphasises the particular 
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interplay of structural processes and contingent events, which may at times follow their own logic 
and create unique outcomes. 
The narrative of chapters three to nine combines historical-structural analysis of changes in the 
global and national political economy with comparative case study of micro-level processes of 
agrarian change and class formation in two rural regions in Colombia. The national level is 
maintained because it is state policies that have the most decisive impact on distribution of property 
and resources throughout society. Colombia’s insertion into the international division of labour and 
changes in geopolitical power relations provide the historical background for the agrarian 
transformations examined, but they are not explicitly discussed in order to maintain the focus on the 
changing internal social relations and webs of power.  The case studies of regional social formations 
have been adopted to provide ‘the detailed examination of an aspect of a historical episode’, which 
seeks ‘to develop or test historical explanations that may be generalisable to other events’ (George 
and Bennett 2005: 5). The case studies enter at different points throughout the historical narrative to 
demonstrate the relevance of diverse experiences of capitalist development and class formation within 
the larger macro-historical picture. The purpose of the case study is threefold. First, it allows for the 
testing of hypotheses on the structural conditions and mediating factors giving rise to the emergence 
of peasant movements. Second, it seeks to contribute substantive research to general knowledge on 
the historical and cultural processes through which the peasant movements that form part of broader 
political narratives on Colombia and Latin America are made and unmade. Third, the use of concrete, 
historically specific case studies allows for a greater appreciation of the lived experience of 
participants and organisers, allowing for the identification of particular relations and processes that 
lead to specific outcomes.  The focus of the case studies is on peasant households and communities 
in order to capture the distinct labour/producer/consumer dynamics of this form, and as such serve as 
a useful departure point for understanding the particular processes of change that take place within 
rural societies with the development of capitalist relations. 
In order to explain the divergence in agrarian class structures, trajectories of change and class 
formation, the method of ‘incorporated comparison’ (McMichael, 1990) is adopted between two 
regional processes of agrarian change and class formation.  The comparison is 'variation-finding' 
insofar as it seeks to establish ‘a principle of variation in the character or intensity of a phenomenon 
by examining systematic differences among instances’ (Tilly 1984). The advantage of this approach 
is that it can ‘give substance to a historical process (a whole) through comparison of its parts’ 
(McMichael, 1990: 386). This allows for a study of the divergences in concrete social, economic and 
political outcomes, such as economic growth, poverty, land distribution, labour forms, class relations 
and migration as well as the identification of patterns, and also accounting for variation within general 
trends.  The comparison provides a way to identify and separate particular variables and establish 
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common trends and patterns among different instances, allowing for historically and spatially 
grounded setting of 1) a particular unit of analysis: peasant economies and rural class conflicts; 2) in 
a particular time: 1990 to the present; and 3) two distinct geographic and social settings: the coffee 
regions of Líbano and the frontier zone of the Magdalena Medio.   
 The research for this dissertation involves data collection from a range of sources. For the 
basic statistical information on patterns of growth, landholding structures and household incomes, I 
rely on a wide range of published and unpublished documents on a national and regional level, 
patterns of growth, landholding structures and household incomes. For the information on the 
organisation and militancy of social classes, I use the database of the social research group CINEP, 
which has documented the frequency, aims and strategies of peasant movements in different regions 
of the country.  I also rely on the extensive revision of newspapers, local development reports from 
government institutes and nongovernmental organisations. However, the greatest concern of this 
research is with dynamic social processes, for which I rely on extensive revision of local documents, 
structured interviews and participant observation in the field research. My field research is based on 
two research trips: the first involved a year-long stay in Colombia from 2014 to 2015 and the second 
in July and August 2017. During these visits, I was able to stay in Barrancabermeja and Líbano, and 
conduct interviews and participate in workshops and activities that arose. Most of the research is 
taken from structured interviews with over 55 peasant farmers from the two regions as well as a 
further 27 interviews with representatives of NGOs, trade union activists, rural businessmen, 
journalists, academics and local government representatives. I was a participant observer in 15 
workshops and meetings between peasant organisations at a regional and national level during the 
field research. The most detailed interviews were those with farmers that had participated in the 
ACVC or Asopema movements. These involved long conversations on their experience as farmers, 
their histories of migration and production, and how this had changed during different historical 
periods, as well as why they had participated in movements, what they had sought in doing so and 
how they viewed the developments in the organisation.  In the historical analysis of this thesis, I have 
attempted to bring these experiences into dialogue with broader political and historical contexts 
within which these processes occurred.  
 My approach in theorising social movements is neither to focus solely on structural processes 
nor to romanticise local acts of resistance, but to contextualise movements in broader historical and 
political histories, whilst also seeking to explore in greater detail how different rural groups respond 
to changing conditions and the strategies they adopted to resist forces beyond their control. On the 
basis of a large number of in depth interviews, I sought to construct a narrative following the 
movement as a process, subject to ebb and flow over time, and with a variety of debates responding 
to different political and economic conjuncture. I analysed the outcome of the movement in terms of 
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its own goals as understood by the activists: that of building class power and challenging the 
economic and political status quo. I sought to understand and recognise their achievements where 
they occurred, whilst I analysed their setbacks both in terms of the difficulties posed by broader 
structural forces, as well as the strategies and tactics adopted by activists in the face of different 
conjunctures over time. In doing so, my modest hope was to recognise the particular dynamics of 
strategies of peasant resistance, but also their weaknesses in the face of structural forces acting against 
them. 
 
Organisation of thesis 
Chapters 
The remainder of this thesis is dedicated to theoretical and historical analysis of the conditions and 
processes of agrarian change and peasant mobilisation in Colombia.  The second chapter critically 
reviews the debates on peasants, class formation and agrarian change in Latin America, delineating 
the contribution of my research to historical and ongoing debates in the fields of historical 
materialism, rural sociology and social movement studies.  
 Chapter three examines the changes and conflicts surrounding the early transition to 
capitalism in the Colombian countryside in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. The initial wave of 
enclosures sparked new conflicts between, on the one hand, peasants who sought independent access 
to markets and to defend their claims to the land, and on the other, landlords who sought to increase 
coffee production on their estates by increasing supplies of peasant labour and blocking the latter 
from accessing land independently (LeGrand 1986). During the 1920s and 1930s, a wave of coffee 
mobilisations washed over the country as tenants fought to produce independently of the estates. In 
the coffee municipality of Líbano, the enclosures were combined with particular bonds of solidarity 
between workers and peasants and the organisational efforts of the Revolutionary Socialist Party 
(PSR) to give rise to a particularly radical instance of peasant revolt that fought for social revolution. 
The movement however, was crushed with fierce repression, and the mobilisations eventually paved 
the way for a redistribution of agrarian property in the form of a very limited land reform movement 
and the establishment of a model of coffee developmentalism, whereby rapid capitalist development 
on the back of the coffee industry was premised on small, capitalised family farmers. In 1948, 
unresolved tensions arising from rapid enclosures and state centralisation eventually burst out into a 
decade-long conflict known as la Violencia. 
 Chapter four examines the period of rapid economic growth, industrialisation and 
urbanisation that followed the end of la Violencia in the 1950s and 1960s. The rapid growth of this 
period was accompanied by highly unequal geographical development and state formation between 
38 
rural areas, resulting in significant regional heterogeneity in class structures. While a sector of small, 
capitalised coffee farmers enjoyed corporatist protections and became the backbone of support for 
the National Front, in the frontier, landless settler peasants confronted increasing marginalisation and 
landlord encroachment. Processes of differentiation, land concentration and demographic pressures 
soon gave rise to new demands for agrarian reform, and fearful of the threat of ‘peasant wars’, the 
Liberal government initiated the first national peasant movement, which drew its main base of support 
from tenant farmers demanding access to lands, credits and technological inputs. Although the land 
reform movement was ultimately unsuccessful in terms of property redistribution, it did pave the way 
for a new phase of rural capitalist development, as the introduction of green revolution technologies 
saw the technification of production cycles of small and medium producers such such as those in the 
coffee regions, leading to new processes of differentiation. Meanwhile, however, new settlement 
projects on public lands led landless and settler peasants into the frontier, where state abandonment 
provided a space guerrilla armies to expand rapidly. 
 Chapter five addresses the two decades following the defeat of the land reform movement in 
1972. The end of land reform demobilised tenant farmers and paved the way for a phase of capitalist 
development dominated by large landlords, who converted their estates into commercial agro-export 
farms and expelled peasants. Although the land reform movement was quickly dissolved, this did not 
bring an end to the agency of the peasantry completely. Rather, the axes of rural struggle shifted from 
the estates to the agrarian frontier, where marginalised settler peasants increasingly sought refuge in 
public lands (baldios)— and came to be organised in guerrilla armies. Communist party organising 
played a central role in building alternative territorial power structures that supported precarious 
peasant livelihoods and negotiated with the state. The civic strike movement provided the basis for 
strong alliances between peasants and workers in an attempt to construct an alternative power bloc. 
During this period, the processes of class formation between different groups of peasantries were 
highly diverse. In contrast to the radicalisation of the frontier regions, in the coffee regions the 
introduction of green revolution technologies brought an increased dependence on money as well as 
technical assistance in production. This made them increasingly dependent on technical knowledge 
and capitalist relations, creating new processes of segmentation between farmers but also pushing 
them into corporatist ties associated with Fedecafé.  
 Chapter six describes the emergence of neoliberalism in the midst of political turmoil and 
civil war. During this period, predation and violence enacted in the name of paramilitary counter-
terror operations paved the way for new wave of capitalist penetration and a massive reconfiguration 
of agrarian property structures. The chapter describes the various economic and extra-economic 
mechanisms through which peasants lost the access to the means of subsistence during this period. 
‘Market-led’ processes of enclosure included the introduction of market-led land reform and the 
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restructuring of Fedecafé’s system of benefits and protections for farmers. Meanwhile, ‘extra-
economic’ processes involved violent appropriation, such as the extensive wave of land seizures in 
the hands of narco-traffckers, landlords and paramilitaries. Both economic and extra-economic 
mechanisms paved the way for a massive upwards redistribution of property and resources.  The 
differentiated effects of neoliberal restructuring were conditioned by regional variations in 
institutional arrangements and social structures: coffee farmers faced new conditions of adverse 
incorporation and semi-proletarianisation, while frontier peasants confronted with predatory land 
appropriations and the paramilitary capture of regional state power. 
 Chapter seven turns a closer eye to the specific trajectories of neoliberal restructuring and 
agrarian struggles that unfolded in Líbano and the Middle Magdalena. While the crises generated by 
the restructuring created the conditions for peasant revolts, the political character and outcome of 
these processes depended on the particular dynamics of the institutional arrangements, cultural 
traditions and consciousness-raising amongst peasants as well as the balance of class forces. In the 
Cimitarra valley, the peasant mobilisations of the 1990s coalesced into a territorial movement seeking 
the establishment of autonomous territories to protect the traditions of subsistence farming and 
agrarian democracy in the frontier, which adopted a strategy combining negotiation with the state 
with grassroots mobilising and movement-building. Meanwhile, in the coffee regions, new strategies 
of consciousness-raising allowed for the emergence of new protests and mobilisations. They drew on 
cultural traditions associated with diversified smallholder farming processes as a basic right of 
peasants in the region.  
 Chapter eight then turns to the outcome of the mobilisations in the second half of the 1990s 
and early 2000s. The agrarian conflicts catalysed an intense conflict between paramilitaries and 
guerrillas that swept over the country, reaching a peak between 1996 and 2002. Brutal paramilitary 
violence and repression created havoc amongst rural populations, who were central targets of 
assassinations and mass displacements. Paramilitary violence virtually annihilated the peasant 
movement and decimated unions and left-wing political organisations. In some cases, movements 
were completely dissolved, and in others they were sent into retreat. Paramilitary violence also paved 
the way for transformations in productive relations, as vacated lands and flexibilised labour provided 
the conditions for the expansion of multinational mining and agribusiness corporations.  
 Chapter nine ends the historical analysis with an examination of the prospects for radical 
organising in a society that has been fragmented and atomised under neoliberalism and political 
violence.  I examine the more recent attempts at mobilising, co-ordinating and coalition building 
amongst the diversity of social struggles that have arisen in response to the extractivist development 
model. I assess the new strategies for building coalitions and political instruments, as well as their 
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negotiations with the state. The conclusion suggests although the popular movement has not been 
able to challenge the balance of power within civil society, there is a vitality and social energy within 
these movements derived from long experiences and cultures of resistance that live on in the 
Colombian left.  
 Finally in the concluding chapter I synthesise the main argument of this thesis and highlight 












One reason for the longstanding scholarly interest in the peasant question is that it also opens a 
broader discussion on the history of capitalism and resistance it to. The central issue in this debate is 
whether capitalist penetration will inevitably lead to the complete disintegration of the peasantry, or 
whether a distinct ‘peasant’ mode of production can in any way survive— or resist— capitalist 
subsumption. In recent years, the resurgence of peasant activism against neoliberalism throughout 
the Global South has renewed lively scholarly interest in the field of peasant studies. After decades 
of postmodernist dominance of the field, the return of this line of enquiry is certainly welcome. But 
it also raises some unresolved questions: What has been the impact of global capitalism on rural 
societies in the Global South? Does capitalism still have an ‘other’ operating outside its laws of 
motion? What are the prevailing class structures in contemporary agrarian society? What is the 
political character of peasant struggles?  What are the prospects of peasant-based alternatives to 
capitalism in its current form? This chapter provides an overview of how these questions have been 
approached both historically and today.  I develop a theoretical framework for understanding peasant 
social movements that draws from the neo-Chayanovian and heterodox Marxist traditions within the 
field of peasant studies. My analysis seeks to develop: 1) an historical understanding of capitalist 
development in terms of regionally specific sets of class relations and class struggles; and 2) an 
understanding of peasants as historically formed collectivities that combines the economic, cultural 
and political dimensions of class. 
 
The agrarian question 
The agrarian question first emerged as a recognisable field of enquiry in the late 19th century in a 
number of key Marxist texts. The central concern of these writings was to understand the forms and 
consequences of capitalist penetration in agrarian societies in developing economies, and most 
importantly the political implications of these changes. Engels’ The Peasant Question in France and 
Germany, Kautsky’s The Agrarian Question and Lenin’s The Development of Capitalism in Russia 
all explored the effects of the establishment of agrarian capitalism and private property in the 
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countryside, but there was also a more immediate political question at stake: how these changes would 
affect the political orientation of peasants, and as a result, the strategy of alliances the revolutionary 
movement should adopt. In their different ways, these thinkers drew on concrete analyses of the social 
composition of the peasantry, patterns of rural property structures and the role of the state to address 
this question— even if these concepts were not systematically theorised. 
 The most comprehensive and influential of the early Marxist peasant studies was Lenin’s 
Development of Capitalism in Russia (1964). To understand the fate of the peasantry, Lenin looked 
to the transformations that were underway with the rise of industrial capital, the unprecedented new 
demands it placed on agriculture and the changes in production techniques that accompanied the 
introduction of  new tools and machinery. This dynamic imposed a new market discipline on 
agricultural producers as they were forced to produce competitively for the market, engaging in cost 
cutting, specialisation, innovation and economies of scale. On the basis of this analysis, Lenin posited 
a basic model of three classes of peasants: large, medium and small, and examined the process of 
class formation among each as a response to changing conditions with the development of capitalism 
in the countryside (Lenin, 1964). Eventually, he argued, as the peasantry separated into classes of 
capital and labour, the middle peasants would diminish, as the majority of rural producers joined the 
ranks of the propertyless and exploited rural classes. As Bernstein describes: ‘Lenin used Marx’s 
theoretical concepts and method to derive the fundamental tendencies of a social dynamic from 
available empirical evidence’ (Bernstein 2009: 59). Fundamentally, what emerges from Lenin’s study 
is a conception of class that places social relations, dynamic processes and concrete empirical 
evidence at the centre of analysis. 
 Writing a quarter of a century later in the aftermath of the Russian revolution, agronomist 
Alexander Chayanov took a very different approach to understanding the characteristics and 
dynamics of change of the Russian peasantry.  Chayanov based his exploration of the effects of the 
integration of peasant households into capitalist commodity markets inequalities on an examination 
of the labour-consumer balance and the particular ‘motivation’ of peasant household production— 
which differed from that of a typical capitalist enterprise. His study brought him to a very different 
conclusion than that of Lenin: the inequalities amongst Russian peasants did not reflect processes of 
class differentiation, but variations in the demographic cycle (Chayanov 1966[1925]; Shanin 1973). 
His conclusions led him to throw support behind the development of peasant co-operatives as an 
alternative to vertical concentration in the process of agricultural modernisation.  
 The themes first raised by Lenin and Chayanov gained a new relevance in Latin America 
against the background of the upswell in revolutionary peasant movements and the land reform 
projects that swept over the continent in the 1960s.  The social and political upheaval of this period 
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provided the context for lively scholarly debate on questions such as rural class structures, the 
different roads of agrarian change, the political character of the peasantry and the viability of agrarian 
co-operatives (Kay, 2008). At issue in the debate was the question of the fate of the peasantry, but, 
as with the classic Marxist studies, the arguments were undergirded by questions of political strategy. 
On the one hand, inspired by Chayanov’s Narodnik tradition as well as the ideas of Mao and the 
Chinese revolution, the campesinista (“peasantist”) approach emphasised the resilience of peasant 
economies. For these theorists, peasants were both able to resist the encroachment of capital and also 
offer a viable alternative to the dominant economic development model of the time (Bartra, 1979; 
Esteva, 1978; Moncayo and Rojas, 1982; Warman, 1980).  On the other, the descampesinistas 
(“proletarianists”) pointed to a process of differentiation underway, with the emergence of proletarian 
and bourgeois forces with opposing political interests in the countryside (De la Peña, 1979). The 
political conclusion these authors drew from their observations was that a newly proletarianised 
peasantry should form an alliance with urban workers  to precipitate the socialist revolution. 
 At issue in the debate between the campesinistas and the descampesinistas were 
fundamentally different conceptions of the peasantry and its fate in the face of capitalist penetration. 
On the one hand, with all its emphasis on the internal dynamics of the peasant household and its logic 
of production, the campesinista approach risked ‘essentialising’ peasants, presuming their 
homogeneity and diverting attention from the development of capitalist social relations in the 
countryside and processes of class differentiation (Bernstein, 2010). Indeed, as Shanin has 
highlighted, there are a number of problems with translating Chayanov’s insights to developing 
countries. The objects of Chayanov’s studies were isolated peasant communities, producing in self-
contained farm units with little division of labour and that did not seek off-farm employment: this 
bore little resemblance to the global commodity chains transforming Latin America’s rural economies 
(see Shanin 1973). To speak of ‘peasants’ overlooked the fact that this may refer to a range of actors 
differentiated among class lines: rural workers, slum-dwellers, semi-proletariat and small and 
medium farmers. What is more, in this case it should also be supposed these different actors would 
have a different set of interests, worldviews, and perspectives, despite nominally belonging to the 
same community. In this sense, emphasis on the homogeneity of peasants not only risks romanticising 
peasants, but the notion of a unified peasant community can also be used to cover class divisions and 
internal conflicts amongst these actors  (Brass, 2001; Mintz, 1973). 
 On the other hand, in its own way, the descampesinista approach was also problematic in 
dealing with the complexities of class amongst peasants. Basing their analyses on a structural 
definition of class, descampesinistas were unable to account for the social, productive and cultural 
particularities relevant to this form of production. Descampesinistas tended to approach the issue of 
class formation from the starting point of ‘objective’ class position then, on this basis, looking for 
44 
cultural and political expressions of class consciousness 3 . Yet the main dilemma for such 
formulations was the ‘Janus-faced’ nature of the peasant household, which neither espoused the 
interests of the bourgeoisie nor those of the proletariat in any straightforward way (Shanin, 1973).  
The problem derives from ‘the fact that one finds both the capitalist and the labourer combined in the 
same person: the direct producer’ (Bartra, 1979; see also Paré, 1979)— that peasants occupied a 
‘contradictory class position’, or had a ‘double character’. This posed a conundrum for the task of 
ascertaining their political character: insofar as they were owners of the means of production, their 
class interests suggested an alliance with the bourgeoisie, but insofar as they were direct producers 
subject to exploitation, their class interests pointed to an alliance with the working classes in the 
revolutionary movement (Otero, 1999).  I return to this debate  later in this chapter. 
 It is worth emphasising that these debates took place at a critical juncture in the economic and 
political development of the Latin American countryside. At this point, a large proportion of the Latin 
American population lived in rural areas and derived its livelihood from agricultural production. But 
it was also subject to sweeping changes, as the majority of the population went from rural to urban in 
the 1950s and 1960s. As a consequence of this, the issues of small farmer economies and agrarian 
reform had a great deal of weight and were central in the major debates taking place at the time on 
course of national development. For its proponents, land redistribution and the promotion of small-
scale agriculture were key components in a broader process of initial accumulation necessary for 
industrialisation within the context of a state-led development model premised on creating linkages 
between agrarian capital and industrial capital and promoting further economic growth and 
modernisation. In Colombia the coffee sector played a central role in this, since the surplus generated 
from exports would be used to fuel national industrialisation. Perhaps the more important factor, 
however, was the balance of forces in the Cold War. The Cuban revolution and the mobilisation of 
rural forces across Latin America posed a very real threat to the prevailing order of the entire region.  
It was the prospect of violent revolution that motivated the land reform projects initiated under the 
Alliance for Progress in the 1960s, whereas for radicals what was at stake in the peasant question was 
the more urgent issue of societal transformation (Bernstein 2002; Kay 1998; Moyo and Yeros 2005). 
 However, at the beginning of the 1970s, this lively scholarly and political debate was brought 
to a halt by a major turn in the political tide.  As Latin American countries fell to dictatorships one 
by one and revolutionary movements were destroyed or collapsed, the terms and horizons of the 
debate on the peasant question were dramatically shifted.  Radical scholars were sent into exile, and 
                                               
3 Such thinking is demonstrated in statements such as Roger Bartra's prediction that:  
‘Little by little, following every land invasion, every march, every manifestation and every protest, the truly 
proletariat struggle will arise, that which directs its hits against the bourgeoisie and its political representatives’ 
(1974: 63) 
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the field of rural studies once dominated by Marxist thinkers went into rapid decline. As neoliberal 
technocrats came to dictate over economic policy, the agrarian question was soon reduced to issues 
of inserting economies into global markets rather than state-led agricultural programmes. 
Furthermore, the rapid urbanisation experienced by most Latin American countries during this period, 
together with the intense political violence erupting throughout the countryside meant that the once 
fertile field of agrarian research and debate had all but dried up in the late 1970s and 1980s (Kay, 
2006). 
 
Post-development and new social movement theory 
The extreme turmoil and changing political horizons of the 1970s provided the backdrop for a major 
shift in rural studies and the social sciences more broadly.  This shift can be traced back to European 
scholars from a variety of traditions within the left who shared growing frustration with the prevalent 
Marxist orthodoxy. There were three main motivations for this. The first was a rejection of the 
authoritarian and repressive practices of the Soviet Union under Stalin. Second was a resistance to 
rigid determinism and the problematic base/superstructure metaphor as a means of analysing social 
reality. Third were changing social realities, as the insertion of the majorities of working people into 
consumer society had altered their forms of cultural and political association. The turn in radical 
academia quickly came to be associated with the rise of ‘new’ forms of social activism in the 1968 
movement, which mobilised around a variety of issues such as ethnicity, gender, and identity (Best 
and Kellner, 1997; Gilbert, 2011; Gledhill, 2000; Harvey, 1989). 
 A complete survey of the field of new left scholarship that emerged from this turn is beyond 
the scope of this chapter, but it is possible to identify two distinct strands within this general turn. 
One was a debate within Marxism, most closely associated with  E.P. Thompson’s break from the 
Communist Party and criticisms of the determinist tendencies of Marxist orthodoxy. The second, 
while often citing Marxist authors such as Gramsci and Thompson as intellectual sources, proposed 
a distinct break from Marxism and indeed all forms of structuralist, historical materialist or class 
analysis. What united both these strands was a growing frustration with the structuralist and 
determinist tendencies associated with orthodox Marxism, and a growing concern for understanding 
diverse and changing social realities and forms of struggle, as well as questions of subjectivity, 
cultural identity and human agency. However, while Thompson was concerned with developing a 
more historically- and culturally- grounded understanding of determination and materialism, his ideas 
soon gave way to a new orthodoxy that closed its eyes to all questions of historical materialism and 
determination (Palmer, 1990: 115). In the field of agrarian studies, this involved ‘the replacement of 
peasant-as-economic-subject by earlier concepts of peasant as-cultural-subject’, as the scholarly 
46 
interest in peasants shifted from political economy and historical materialism to the fields of literature 
and culture (Brass, 2002: 3). 
 The post-Marxist turn was associated with two closely related and often overlapping lines of 
theory: post-development theory and new social movement theory (NSM).  The post-development 
school began with a Foucauldian critique that rejected development as a discourse shaped by 
imperialist projects and Eurocentric thinking. According to its proponents, development legitimised 
a series of interventions into Third World countries which had the effect of appropriating nature and 
dominating other cultures (Escobar, 1995; Sachs, 1992). Post-development theorists called not for 
more development alternatives but an abandonment of the entire paradigm of development, looking 
instead to the ‘radical alterity’ of indigenous knowledges and social movements.  
 NSM theory was first developed by European scholars as a way of understanding the changing 
dynamics of social class and identity in ‘post-industrial’ society (Melucci 1989; Touraine 1981). 
NSM theorists stressed the novelty of emergent forms of activism in the 1970s and 1980s: their social 
bases were no longer forged amongst traditional ‘class’ actors such as workers, but rather brought 
‘marginal’ groups into the political process; they were concerned with a new kind of politics of 
identity, which included ethnicity- and gender- based movements, and they adopted new forms of 
internal organisation, which embraced democracy and participation, seeking the primary goal of 
‘empowerment’ for their members supposedly denied by organisations of the past (Alvarez and 
Escobar 1992; Alvarez, Dagnino, and Escobar 1998; Esteva and Prakash 1998; for a critical view, 
see Hellman, 1992). These themes were soon integrated into Latin American post-development 
theory, as theorists turned to local cultures and knowledges of grassroots movements as an alternative 
to the modernising discourses of the established social sciences.  
 Throughout the 1990s, NSM and post-development theory gained prominence in Colombian 
radical academia as a new generation of scholars turned their attention to social movements and 
subaltern groups (Archila and Pardo, 2001; Fals-Borda, 1992; Escobar, 1992).  While the main part 
of the theoretical groundwork was imported from European post-structuralist and post-modernist 
theory, post-development and NSM theory was also developed in response to particular 
circumstances in Colombia. First, major social and productive changes had seen the last remnants of 
the haciendas broken up, accompanied by large-scale rural outmigration and a shift of the majority 
of the popular classes from rural to urban settings. Even if these changing social environments were 
very different from the ‘postindustrial’ society identified by Touraine, the notion that the changing 
composition of traditional classes of peasants and workers was giving rise to new forms of identity 
and societal cleavage seemed a more appropriate interpretation of changing social reality (Archila 
and Pardo, 2001; Archila, 2003; see also Edelman 2001; Foweraker 1995).  In this period, the rise of 
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‘civic’ actions as the chief issues of protest— including demands for public utilities, social services, 
or access to resources and water, together with gender, ethnicity and human rights (Archila, 2003; 
Romero, 1997) was taken as a sign that the “old” labour and peasant movements which had 
maintained class as the primary social conflict and principle for organisation had given way to ‘a 
multiplicity of social actors’ seeking to ‘establish their presence and sphere of autonomy in a 
fragmented social and political space’ (Escobar and Alvarez I992: 3). Social activism was now 
thought to focus on contestations over symbolic, informational, and cultural resources, and rights to 
specificity and difference (Findji 1992; Laclau and Mouffe 2001; Melucci 1985; Touraine 1988). 
 Another influence was the hegemonic crisis of the Colombian state, associated with the 
decline of developmentalism and traditional political parties, together with the increasing turn to 
authoritarianism and repression of the 1980s (Fals-Borda 1989; Foweraker 1995).  The role of the 
state was rejected both as a centralising socio-economic force and an object of struggle. The state 
came to be a prime target for attack, criticised as an instrument for administering national economic 
development and reproducing power relations, and a generation of activists came to repudiate the 
struggle for state power on principle, whether by armed or peaceful means (Fals-Borda 1989; 1992). 
Instead, they sought out a new arena and form of struggle, to be found in the marginal spaces left 
behind by development and the state, ‘either through innovation or the survival and resistance of 
popular practices’ (Fals-Borda 1992). This involved a reconsideration of the goals and tactics of 
movements entirely: since the type of changes they sought were to come in the everyday movement 
practices themselves, participation in NSMs, “process” and the micro-politics of meetings became 
the ultimate goals of activism, while the issues of organisation building and state power were rejected 
as either ‘electoralism’ or ‘vanguardism’ (Escobar 2000; Esteva and Prakash 1998; Fals-Borda 1992).  
 Finally, unlike in the rest of Latin America, where the turn to post-development and NSM 
was associated with the defeat of the peasant guerrilla insurgencies, in Colombia the rise of NSM 
coincided with the peak of the guerrilla struggle in the 1990s. But this was also a moment when the 
left became increasingly divided, and debates surrounding NSM theory had an important place in 
these political divisions. In reality, afro and indigenous communities, as well as women, had always 
formed the backbone of radical movements in Colombia, even if the mobilisations did not tend to 
recognise these points of divergence as such (Archila, 2003; Fajardo, 2016; Wade, 1999;  Zamosc, 
1986). However, it was at the peak of the land movement in the early 1970s, against the background 
of internal divisions and infighting within the National Peasant Association, the ANUC, that one of 
the main cleavages between the peasant and indigenous groups first emerged around the issue of 
ethnicity. As debates became more polarised, particularly over the issues of strategy and party-
building, the Indigenous movement, which had previously been a core component in peasant land 
struggles, distanced itself along ethnic, but also political and ideological lines (Archila, 2003:402-5).   
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 Archila notes that beginning in 1972, in conjunction with urban intellectuals, the indigenous 
movement began demanding autonomy ‘because of the specific characteristics that correspond to us, 
particularly cultural differences’ (Archila, 2003: 403-4). The indigenous movement rejected the 
issues of party-building and the capture of state power that dominated debates in the ANUC. Their 
struggles increasingly turned from fighting the state and landlords to fighting ‘the struggle from 
within’: instead of land invasions, their demands centred on the recuperation of Indigenous reserves 
from colonial times on the basis of cultural autonomy and difference (Archila, 2003; Wade, 1999;  
Zamosc, 1986).  The failure of land reform and the increasing displacement of peasants into marginal 
indigenous territories in the 1970s and 1980s only accentuated these tensions. Growing divisions 
were eventually cemented in the constitutional reforms of 1991, which officially defined Colombia 
as a pluri-ethnic and multicultural nation, assigning land and state resources on the basis of cultural 
identity. The result of all this, Fajardo notes, was to ‘generate conflicts between the two communities, 
and weaken the possibility of any eventual alliance between the two’ (Fajardo 2014, 104). 
 These political, ideological and academic divides amongst the left were reinforced by fierce 
state repression against both guerrilla insurgents and the left in general. In the 1980s when the FARC 
grew extensively and attempted to extend its base and reach out to urban activists, including an 
experiment in forming a political party, military and paramilitary forces responded by escalating the 
dirty war in the cities. This caused the FARC to retreat to rural areas, with the effect of isolating them 
from their urban social base and intellectuals (Archila, 2003; Brittain, 2010; Hylton, 2014; Leech, 
2011; Richani, 2013). Those who were not assassinated went into hiding or exile. As Richani notes: 
The dialogue between the guerrillas and the majority of leftist intellectuals was nearly severed in the 1990s. 
Consequently, the guerrillas lost an important political conduit in urban centres, which weakened their ability to 
mobilise within the cities (2013: 62). 
Together with widespread perceptions of the “crisis of Marxism” after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union in 1989 (Barker et al. 2013) and that the rural, class-based peasant demands of the FARC did 
not represent the concerns of growing urban popular and middle classes, what began as an academic 
divide was translated into a political and geographical split within the Colombian left. While the 
peasant insurgents withdrew to the countryside, continuing to follow a traditional Marxist-Leninist 
educational program based on the guiding principles of What is to be done?,  the remaining urban 
intellectuals were increasingly separated from the insurgencies, and grew more critical of Marxism, 
which they associated with all the problems of power politics: vanguardism, corruption, exclusion 
and violence (Archila, 2003; Fals-Borda, 1989). 
The politics of NSM 
Even if their ideas were not as original as many theorists had suggested, post-development and NSM 
critique provoked an important rethinking within critical scholarship on a number of issues. First was 
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a rejection of perpetual economic growth as the central objective of ‘developing’ societies, based as 
it was on a break of the metabolic link between society and nature, with destructive social, cultural 
and ecological implications (Barkin and Lemus, 2016; Latouche, 2004).  Second was an insistence 
on the need for closer attention to micro-level processes and historical specificities: the contingencies 
of how subjectivities and collective identities are formed, rather than over-privileging macro-
structural outcomes for understanding collective action. Indeed, in recent years, it is precisely at the 
point of convergence between traditional radical critiques of capitalism and post-development that 
some of the most important recent lines of thought and practice have emerged. The ideas and practices 
of Buen Vivir, for example, involve a critical approach to the ideology of progress and a search for 
alternatives to contemporary development as economic growth, the exploitation of nature and the 
shift to a society of materialism and consumerism, as well as a search for alternatives based in other 
cultural and social understandings of the ‘Good Life’ (Dávalos, 2008; Gudynas, 2011; Wanderley, 
2011). 
 Nonetheless, the claims made by post-development and NSM critique to be offering a ‘new 
paradigm’ that occupied an entirely ‘different space’ from all previous Western theories (Escobar 
and Mignolo, 2009: 42) were exaggerated to say the least, and failed to recognise the problematic 
implications of many of their conclusions (Hale, 1997). This problem is at least partly a consequence 
of these theorists’ tendency to see the issue in binary terms: either Marxism, with all its associated 
problems of determinism, functionalism, and teleology, or a complete break from all forms of 
structural analysis and absolute autonomy of the subjective realm (Best and Kellner, 1997). In 
overlooking the debates and developments on questions of determination and agency within the field 
of historical materialism, NSM theorists also threw out the crucial principles this line of analysis was 
trying to address. Even if we accept the problems of functionalist and teleological reasoning in many 
Marxist discussions of class, it does not follow that this problem can only be resolved by eschewing 
all historical materialist analysis in favour of an absolute turn to subjectivity and autonomous forms 
of consciousness. To simply replace ‘class reductionism’ with ‘class rejectionism’ (Vilas, 1993: 40) 
would suggest that experience, culture and subjectivity can be analysed as free-floating phenomena, 
irrespective of their concrete historical and material conditions.   
 In Colombian historical scholarship, this problem was brought to the fore in Charles 
Bergquist's critique of Orlando Fals-Borda’s extensive participatory action research study of popular 
culture and resistance, Historia Doble de la Costa  (Bergquist 1990; Fals-Borda 1986). Fals-Borda's 
study centred on the particular political culture of the Atlantic coast-- distinguished for its unique 
tolerance and aversion to violence. Yet for all the wealth of empirical detail on popular culture and 
resistance in the Colombian Atlantic region, Bergquist points out, Fals-Borda's neglect of broader 
political and economic power relations has problematic implications. A broader macro-contextual 
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analysis suggests that what Fals-Borda identifies as the peculiar regional political culture of his 
“patria chica” in fact stems from the paternalistic ethos of slave-owning regions. This leads him to 
ask: ‘How valuable, even on its own terms, is a history that seeks to arm the popular classes for 
democratic struggle by emphasising regional values when those very values seem to have been 
created by a slaveholding ruling class as a means of social control?’ (1990: 165).  The point is that, 
however distinct a set of cultural and community values, when they are not situated in historical and 
class context they can end up presuming— or even celebrating— the conditions of oppression that 
give rise to ‘resistance’ in the first place (see also Brass, 2003).  
 These observations provide an insight into the problematic political implications of this form 
of analysis. At issue is the failure to provide any account of how the cultural and political activities 
are situated in any broader context of class and power. For post-Marxists, the position adopted by any 
group is not rooted in existing material conditions within a capitalist economy, but are rather products 
of discursive construction. This goes beyond the claim that economic interests are not directly 
translated into political and ideological orientations. Rather, the stronger claim being made is that 
there is no such thing as class or material interests, except insofar as they are discursively constituted 
through ideology and politics. The mistake in this reasoning is to assume that if no direct or 
mechanical relationship exists between objective conditions and social identity, absolutely no 
relationship exists between them (Gledhill 2000: 192). Yet the conclusion this leads to is a troubling 
one. If we are to reject the possibility of any real historical or empirical conditions giving rise to such 
identities, then the conclusion seems to be that these identities have no objective moorings at all. It is 
one thing to say that there is no simple, mechanical or unilinear relationship between class as 
objectively defined and class identities and consciousness- a notion no Marxist would deny— and 
quite another to say that the relationship between the two is entirely contingent. 
 This debate has significant implications for understanding the economic and political 
trajectories of the peasantry in recent Latin American history.  Historical accounts of the land reform 
period demonstrated important processes of class differentiation taking place amongst the peasantry, 
which in turn had significant impacts on the social composition and political allegiances of the land 
reform movement (Bernstein, 2010; Brass, 2001). As Zamosc identified in the case of Colombia, the 
limited land reform measures gave rise to a new class of rural capitalists emerging within the 
movement. As the movement evolved, it was increasingly undermined by these class differentiations, 
as the demands of agricultural labourers faced opposition from middle and rich farmers in the 
movement who opposed wage increases. A poststructuralist analysis would be forced to conclude 
that these conflicts are not centred on competing material interests, but discursive construction— and 
rich farmers could just as easily side with the rural proletariat if only they adopted the appropriate 
discourse (Gledhill, 1988; Wood 1998: 61). The complexity of Zamosc’s political insights can only 
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be captured through analysis of how the changes in broader conditions in the agrarian political 
economy interact with changes in the way movements arise, as well as make and frame their claims.  
 This oversight becomes more crucial in considering movements’ political strategy in the 
context of the widening inequalities under neoliberalism. As Vilas points out, the emphasis on 
localised cultures and knowledges over broader efforts towards macro-structural change has in fact 
helped to ‘reproduce the fragmentation of the popular classes sought by the state and the market’ in 
the neoliberal order (1993: 42; see also Nederveen Pieterse, 2000; Kiely, 1995; Ziai, 2004)). With all 
its emphasis on the fragmentation, specificity and difference, NSM would seem to agree with the 
neoliberal doctrine that people should not seek alternatives in the form of material redistribution. 
Post-development thus permits the expansion of global capitalism while promoting non-
transformative self-help or ‘empowerment’ remedies for those marginalised from the economic 
development process  (Brass, 1991, 2002). I return to this theme below. 
  NSM's emphasis on difference and otherness romanticises an autonomy and fragmentation 
to rural movements whose political engagement, objectives and internal contradictions are in fact far 
more complex.  Rather than a ‘fetishisation of autonomy’ (Hellman 1992: 52), other researchers of 
these new movements have highlighted the importance of the broader dynamics of political economy 
in understanding claims over identity and culture. In Hristov’s analysis of the Colombian indigenous 
movement, she notes how changes in the rural power structure provided the conditions for the 
emergence of the movement, while material claims such as access and control over the means of 
production (land, water), and resistance to proletarianisation were central components of the 
indigenous struggle for communal autonomy and cultural difference (Hristov, 2005).  Webber’s 
analysis of Bolivia’s left-indigenous mobilisations of the early 2000s connects the neoliberal reforms 
of the 2000s with the impacts of state-repression along with the new ideological and organisational 
orientation of popular struggles. Rather than presume an autonomously existing identity of these 
movements, his historical study examines the formation of political culture and consciousness of the 
indigenous movement as they responded to these changes. Rather than presuming their autonomy, he 
posits an indigenous “combined-oppositional consciousness” where class and race are inseparable-- 
or ‘a collective consciousness in which the politics of class-struggle and indigenous liberation are 
tightly interwoven’ (2011: 27-30).  
 What this research suggests is that there is more correspondence between the class- and 
identity- based, or new and old rural movements than post development and NSM theorists have often 
allowed. Some of the most crucial historical research into processes of political class formation in 
Colombia examines precisely how processes of struggle are continuously refracted and  remade 
throughout changing circumstances (Gill, 2016; Van Isschot, 2015). In particular, the struggles of the 
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ANUC, and later the civic-strike movements of the 1970s and 1980s provided the basis for the rural-
urban solidarities, formal institutions and informal networks that allowed for the formation of the 
‘new’ movements of the 1990s and 2000s as they responded to neoliberal restructuring and political 
violence.  It is not that these ‘new’ groups have a fundamentally different set of community-based 
concerns and consciousness, but that they come to understand and defend their interests using a 
particular set of traditions, cultures and organisational strategies. Their campaigns for recognition of 
peasant identity and territorial autonomy, human rights and environmental protection are 
simultaneously about defending their material conditions in terms of access to land and resources as 
well as their cultural identity. To acknowledge that people share a common need to protect their well-
being, and mobilise to defend these basic interests does not have to evoke a strictly economistic 
interpretation of peasant agency (Chibber, 2013: 152-177).  Thus, rather than juxtapose the ‘new’ and 
‘old’  peasant movements, a more fruitful line of analysis examines the dynamics of continuity—and 
change—as peasants and movements respond to changing political and economic circumstances, and 
the new forms of identity and strategy that arise.  
 In contrast to NSM theory’s absolute turn to anti-universalism, a more fertile line of 
scholarship within Marxism has involved a closer engagement with the notion of historical causality, 
the relationship between macro-level changes in property and power structures and micro-level 
processes, understanding the variations in response between different communities and the formation 
of subjects and collective identity. Two lines of research stand out in this regard: first E.P. 
Thompson’s approach to class as a historically and culturally constituted process, and second the 
‘political Marxism’ developed by Brenner and Wood. 
 
Class as a process and relationship  
The work of E.P. Thompson offers another approach for thinking about class not in terms of an opposition 
between structure and agency, but as a historical process, where people’s responses and agencies interact with 
changing structural conditions. In The Making of the English Working Class, Thompson makes the case 
for understanding class as a historical phenomenon. He writes: ‘I do not see class as a ‘structure’, nor 
even as a ‘category’, but as something which in fact happens (and can be shown to have happened) 
in human relationships’ (1968: 12). By starting from history and experience, Thompson’s treatment 
of class provides a more complex understanding of history and determination without reducing class 
relations to subjective constructions.  Rather than renouncing the relevance of class as an objectively 
existing and determinant force, Thompson’s method looks to historically grounded analyses of the 
concrete processes whereby shared cultures and ways of life come to be constructed in response to 
the exploitative conditions in which people find themselves. The basic premise is that classes are not 
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discursively constructed, but clearly have a material foundation. He writes ‘the class experience is 
largely determined by the productive relations into which men are born— or enter involuntarily’ 
(Thompson 1963: 9).  But nonetheless, class-consciousness— which he describes as ‘the way in 
which these experiences are handled in cultural terms: embodied in traditions, value systems, ideas, 
and institutional forms’— cannot be mechanistically determined by productive relations alone. The 
crucial point is not to analyse these objective determinations merely as theoretical constructs but 
historical forces and social processes.  In this sense, Thompson suggests that class struggle comes 
before class:  
Classes do not exist as separate entities, look around, find an enemy class, and then start to struggle. On the contrary, people 
find themselves in a society structured in determined ways, (crucially, but not exclusively, in productive relations), they 
experience exploitation (or the need to maintain power over those they exploit),  they identify points of antagonistic interest, 
they commence to struggle around these issues and in the process of struggling they  discover themselves as classes, they come 
to know this discovery as class consciousness. Class and class-consciousness are always the last, not the first, stage in the real 
historical process (1963: 149) 
This approach both acknowledges the centrality of class relations as real objective forces and causal 
mechanisms, but argues that class must be understood as an active and historical process, while class 
consciousness is the cultural expression of the class experience. 
 While Thompson’s methodological procedure is premised on the ‘objective’ influences of 
‘the experience of productive transformations’  (Thompson 1963: 11), the key point of his analysis 
is that such transformations are not simply imposed on ‘some nondescript undifferentiated raw 
material of humanity’ (Thompson 1963) but rather on ‘historical beings, the bearers of historical 
legacies, traditions and values’ (Wood 1995: 92).  Thompson’s examination of the transformations 
of social relations occurring in the Industrial Revolution identifies not only a turning point in the 
processes of English working class formation, but also the continuity and change occurring in the 
historical trajectories of oppositional cultures and radical traditions. In this sense, through historical 
processes of struggle the working class was able to shape the way in which capitalism came into 
existence: ‘the working class made itself as much as it was made’ (Thompson, 1963: 194). In 
Thompson’s analysis, while the relations of production lie at the heart of class relationships, the 
determining structural pressures of productive relations can be demonstrated only as they work 
themselves out in a historical process of class formation, and these pressures could be apprehended 
only by introducing the notion of experience of struggle. As Katz writes: ‘class struggle represents 
the bridge between the objective determinant of class and class as an identifiable formation in specific 
historical contexts’ (1992).  
 In the field of agrarian studies, a comparable approach can be identified in the studies of 
Moore (1966) and Wolf (1969), who pointed to the central role of peasant struggles in the agrarian 
transition process in various geographical contexts. In these analyses, peasants are not simply 
subjective constructions but real social forces intervening in historical processes. The background for 
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these studies is provided by the social disruptions triggered by changes in the ‘objective’ conditions— 
the increasing incorporation of third world economies into the world market, and in Latin America 
the crisis of the latifundia system, the focus is on the new forms of antagonism in peasant-landlord 
relations, their relation to political and military forces, changes in peasant household production as 
well as the forging of new bonds of solidarity and loyalty in peasant communities.  This understanding 
of peasant does not focus principally on the ‘objective’ processes of commodification and socio-
economic transformation, but on their conscious activity, historical experiences and the real state of 
their struggles. 
 Thompson’s approach to class provides another way we might understand peasants— in all 
their heterogeneity— as constituting a class. Rather than starting with the conundrum of peasants’ 
objective class position as derived from the relations of production, peasants must be understood 
primarily as historical beings with legacies of struggle, traditions and values, as well as active 
participants in collective actions. While ‘objective’ processes occurring in transformations in 
productive relations place peasants into certain class positions, this analysis overlooks the crucial role 
of historical experience for understanding the class formation of the peasantry.  It fails to account for 
the relevance of particular, historically-situated sets of class actors and property relations: landlords, 
state institutions, capitalist farmers, the military, or the different ways through which peasants come 
to organise themselves in class ways. This is an issue that cannot be determined on a purely theoretical 
level because it is also historical, requiring analysis of the experience of past struggles and the cultural 
ways peasants interpret this experience.  
 The rural inhabitants of Líbano and the Cimitarra valley were not simply occupants of fixed 
class locations, but were also historical beings with their own traditions and cultures, who found 
themselves enmeshed in very particular struggles with landlords, the agrarian elite, and the state, and 
who built common causes with other political and social groups to defend their livelihoods. This 
perspective allows for an understanding of how heterogenous groups of rural popular classes 
struggled to reproduce themselves and built solidarities to defend themselves in the face of 
dispossession and depeasantisation generated by outside forces.  Under this conception, the peasantry 
can be understood as a multidimensional formation, constituted through interrelated socio-economic, 
political and cultural processes. This provides the basis for an understanding of ‘peasants’ that 
incorporates the dynamics of this form both as a social class (defined in terms of their relation to 
production) and as a political and cultural actor actively interpreting and making sense of these 
changes, and engaged in a process of struggle.   
 
The agrarian transition 
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A central theme in scholarly debate on the history of capitalism concerns the transition to capitalism 
in developing countries. Scholarly interest in this issue has been renewed in recent years in light of 
the profound changes in  rural societies of the third world under neoliberalism and the resurgence of 
peasant struggles. According to the ‘orthodox’ version commonly ascribed to Marx on the basis on 
his Preface to the Critique of Political Economy, the transition is based on an understanding of the 
history of capitalism where developments in the forces of production (technology, labour 
productivity) give rise to new relations of production. According to this version, the penetration of 
capitalist relations in the Third World would produce a similar trajectory of development to that 
experienced in the West. However, the problem with this notion is that it assumes the prior, universal 
existence of a capitalist impulse to maximise profit through technological improvements. Yet this, as 
Wood points out, is precisely ‘the very thing that needed to be explained’  (2002: 4).  
 In contrast to ‘orthodox’ Marxism, a different Marxian framework for understanding the 
transition was first developed by Brenner and Wood, and later expanded in the field of agrarian 
studies. The basic premise of this approach is the emphasis that Marxism is not about attempting to 
find a ‘total theory of history’, but an historical approach that seeks to explain the outcomes of 
processes of capitalist development in terms of empirically given circumstances, contradictions and 
struggles (Akram-Lodhi and Kay, 2009; Brenner 1976, 1977; Wood, 2002; ).  Often known as 
‘political Marxism’, this approach departs from an historically embedded understanding of agrarian 
transitions not in terms of the development of universal or natural laws, but as a process arising in 
specific historical circumstances— a product of a given set of social property relations, the conditions 
for reproduction for different classes, the distinct methods of surplus extraction and the struggles that 
break out between classes.  Since each social formation follows its own ‘rules for reproduction’, there 
may be significant diversities in particular trajectories, but these are by no means random or 
contingent. Any given process of agrarian change emerges from particular systems of class relations 
and the unfolding dynamics of conflict between lords and peasants acting in accordance with the rules 
for reproduction imposed by any given set of social-property relations (Brenner 1977, 1986; Wood 
1999). This approach recognises the specificities of history, the divergence of various trajectories, 
and the possibility of a variety of outcomes, but at the same time examines these trajectories in terms 
of a set of systemic ‘rules of reproduction’ in the capitalist system (Wood 2011). 
 According to this framework, capitalist development does not unfold according to an 
irresistible logic, inexorably dissolving all pre-capitalist institutions and relations. Rather it is only in 
exceptional situations of transformations in ‘social property relations’, and the conditions of 
reproduction of capitalists and producers that will lead to the emergence of new types of economic 
systems (Brenner 1977, 1986). The transition to capitalism can be seen as the emergence of a specific 
and contradictory set of social relations between labour and capital premised on a set of market 
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imperatives. This five main pillars of this are: 1) ‘the dispossession of pre-capitalist predatory landed 
property and the peasantry’ (Bernstein 2006: 451); 2) market dependence of producers; 3) the 
compulsion of competition between commodity producers; 4) the dominance of absolute private 
property and 5) the imperative of profit making for capital. This allows for an understanding of 
capitalism not as a given or determined force but a process that emerges in accordance with a series 
of specific conditions and struggles. Its course of development is not determined a priori, but depends 
on a particular balance of class forces and state interventions, which may only be examined on an 
empirical and historical basis. 
 Indeed, Marx’s own attempt to analyse the transition to capitalism in agriculture is provided  
the first volume of Capital, in chapter 26 on The Secret of Primitive Accumulation. In this chapter 
Marx explores the fundamental historical conditions and class basis for the development of 
capitalism, seen as the establishment of the capital-labour relation— of capitalist farmers on the one 
hand, and a class of ‘free, unprotected and rightless proletarians’ forced to sell their labour power for 
subsistence on the other. For Marx, the formation of these two basic classes stands at the very 
foundation of capitalist society. The eventual usurpation of the peasantry was not a unilinear or 
inevitable event, but a process dependent on the particular class relations, processes of dispossession, 
the formation of a capitalist class, the evolution of property relations and the emergence of the nation 
state. The agrarian transition, then, was a historically specific process occurring in England over 
centuries leading to the constitution of a specific set of social relations. The dynamics of this process 
were not uniform throughout different times and places; rather, ‘the history of this expropriation 
assumes different aspects in different countries, and runs through its various phases in different orders 
of succession, and at different historical epochs’ (Marx 1867,  876; see also Akram-Lodhi and Kay 
2009). Capitalist production began in agriculture in England, but once set in motion its spread to the 
rest of the world could be established in a number of complex and contradictory ways. The point, as 
Wood puts it, is then to understand ‘how the production of food came to be driven by the imperatives 
of competition, profit maximisation and the compulsion constantly to improve the forces of 
production’ (2009: 40). 
 One of Marx’s concerns in his examination of the peasantry was the contradiction between 
the highly dynamic growth of industrial capitalism and the persistence of a pre-capitalist ownership 
system: the transformation of extra-economic feudal exploitation into exploitation in the form of rents 
and taxes (Marx, 1867, Vol. 2; Neocosmos, 1986). Agrarian capitalism, then, does not emerge on a 
blank sheet, but rather takes hold of these pre-existing property relations without transforming them 
completely: landed property ceases to be a pre-capitalist relation based on extra-economic surplus 
extraction, giving way to a specific form of capitalist ground rent, which is over and above profits 
(Neocosmos, 1986). Thus while the development of capitalist relations might subject peasants to 
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processes of differentiation, dispossession and proletarianisation, capital may also subsume peasants 
through various ways that do not lead to their complete extinction. Thus many dimensions of peasant 
economies may retain their distinctly ‘peasant’ characteristics of small-scale petty commodity 
production whilst subjecting it to broader transformation under capitalism (Akram-Lodhi and Kay, 
2009). I return to this theme in greater detail below. 
 In classic formulations, the agrarian transition that occurs with the spread of capitalism entails 
both the dispossession of the peasantry from its land and the displacement of “politically” constituted 
property by “economic” power— separating direct producers from the means of production and 
creating landless individuals compelled to sell their labour (Marx, 1996 [1887]: 705; Brenner, 1986). 
Yet the concrete ways that processes of primitive accumulation unfold are not monolithic or 
inexorable, but highly uneven and contentious, contingent on the forms of capital accumulation, the 
balance of class forces and processes of state formation. In postcolonial societies, the state plays a 
central role in primitive accumulation and the transformation of property relations, but the form of 
state intervention has uneven regional manifestations and is constantly subject to alterations in 
response to  shifts in international and national political projects as well as class struggles from below 
(Mandel 1975). The result is a highly uneven development process, where the expansion of capitalist 
relations is not so much a momentary epoch but a permanent process of primitive accumulation 
(Bartra 1982: 46). The dynamics of these processes are conditioned by the balance of class forces 
within the state, and whether the state is able or willing to intervene in particular processes of capital 
accumulation. 
 The emergence of capitalist relations in Latin America took place in the second half of the 
nineteenth century against the background of the ‘golden age of the hacienda system’, when 
‘landlords were at the height of their economic power, political influence and social prestige’ (Kay, 
2002: 125).  During this period, increased demand on the world market for export commodities such 
as coffee, bananas, tobacco, rubber and cotton brought new dimensions to the struggles between 
landlords and peasants. The rise of new profit-making opportunities in these export crops motivated 
landlords to expand their haciendas, acquiring labour by forcing more tenants to pay their rent in 
labour or kind. As a result, agricultural production grew significantly in this period without major 
technical or social transformations, and increased output was mainly a result of the increase in area 
cultivated rather than labour productivity. Thus the growth in the export sector was achieved through 
the intensification of peasant production, which in turn represented a significant obstacle to economic 
development on increased integration with the world market (Kay 2002; Bernstein 2010; Brenner, 
1978: 85-86).   
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 A crucial dimension of the emergence of capitalist agriculture in Latin America is the struggle 
for property rights.  Power struggles over land between landlords and peasants played a major role in 
determining the form of capitalist development that would take place— the ability of landlords to 
take advantage of new profit opportunities and the ability of peasants to reproduce their livelihoods 
in the face of landlord encroachments.  Both the coffee and frontier regions in my study are 
characterised by the full development of capitalist relations in agriculture, yet the paths through which 
this was established were very different as a result of the very different outcomes of these land 
struggles. In Líbano meanwhile, following the success of the coffee struggles of the 1930s and the 
limited implementation of land reform and system of state supports for coffee farmers, the transition 
took place via a middle peasant path of small and medium coffee farmers created through favourable 
geographical conditions on the fertile Andean slopes, state policies favouring subsidies, land access 
and favourable market conditions. As the small farmers of Líbano possessed secure access to land, 
they were more subject to competitive pressures and the need for maximising strategies. Although 
they continued to produce for their own subsistence, often severely restricting consumption, adjusting 
production both to changes in commercial requirements and changes in the internal consumption 
needs of the household. With the introduction of Green Revolution technologies, profit maximisation 
has been a basic condition for survival especially in times of unemployment. In the agrarian frontier 
of the Middle Magdalena, the development of capitalism followed a junker path, led by landlords 
who transitioned to large-scale commercial farming and speculation, while expelling peasants and 
appropriating their lands. As predatory landed classes amassed the more fertile lands, direct producers 
were pushed deeper into the frontier. The distance from markets, isolation from the state and direct 
access to lands meant that their access to subsistence did not depend on competitive market pressures. 
This sector of settler peasants were unable to meet the household subsistence needs through 
agricultural production  alone, and were increasingly forced to sell their labour in the market to meet 
reproduction costs, thereby becoming increasingly subject to ongoing processes of semi-
proletarianisation. Both these trajectories, however, were subject to major transformations with the 
onset of neoliberalism. 
 
Neoliberalism and the agrarian transition 
One argument of this thesis is that this historical framing of the agrarian transition can provide the 
basis for examining the profound, rapid and interconnected changes that have taken place in the 
Colombian rural society under neoliberal agrarian restructuring. Broadly speaking, neoliberalism was 
a political project that developed in response to the over-accumulation crisis originating in Western 
countries in the 1970s, which sought to renew the conditions of capital accumulation and sustain the 
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wealth and power of the capitalist class  (Harvey 2003).  In developing countries, this has translated 
into a variety of policies introduced by domestic dominant classes in conjunction with international 
institutes and neoconservative forces in the North seeking to extend and deepen capitalist relations 
by liberalising trade in agricultural commodities, deregulating domestic agricultural markets, 
privatising para-state enterprises and strengthening the property rights of corporate capital and large 
landowners. The neoliberal turn was not a single or completed event, but  an ongoing series of 
processes rapidly changing in accordance with new imperatives emerging from changes in the global 
economy. Since the mid 2000s, the  multidimensional crisis in the neoliberal globalisation project has 
triggered another dramatic shift in control and access to land and rural resources in the form of a rush 
for land and resources (Borras et al. 2011; McMichael 2012). The effect of these multiple processes 
of neoliberal agrarian restructuring and resource appropriation has been a major reconfiguration in 
property and production relations in agriculture through the extension and deepening of the market 
imperative, threatening petty commodity production and generating new processes of dispossession, 
differentiation and exclusion.  
 The profound changes underway in rural societies in the contemporary era of neoliberal 
globalisation have led many theorists to propose a rethink of the relevance of the agrarian question 
for the contemporary context  (Akram-Lodhi and Kay 2009).  From a political economy perspective, 
Henry Bernstein has posed an important challenge for conceptualising the classic agrarian question 
today. Bernstein has argued that the problem of the agrarian transition was centred on the ‘classic’ 
agrarian question of capital: the ways that pre-capitalist landed classes were transformed by the 
penetration and development of capitalist social relations (Bernstein 1996; 2006, 2009)4.  In light of 
the dramatic developments in the productive forces on a global scale, which have decoupled 
agriculture from capital accumulation, the agrarian question of capital has been made redundant: 
global capital no longer needs access to agricultural resources to propel accumulation (Bernstein, 
2006: 450–1). A corollary of this is that, agrarian classes have been fully integrated into global 
commodity chains. The only question that remains is that of labour— or the fragmentation of rural 
classes of labour within a generalised system of commodity production (Bernstein, 2006: 454). 
 Bernstein’s argument provides an important starting point for contemporary political 
economy analysis of the agrarian question. As traditionally conceived, the agrarian question was 
about the establishment of capitalist relations in the countryside in the context of the broader 
                                               
4 The agrarian question of capital refers to the replacement of “pre-capitalist” social relations in agriculture 
with capitalist relations. Bernstein writes: ‘It centres on the transition to capitalism in which two definitive 
classes of pre-capitalist agrarian social formations - namely predatory landed property and the peasantry - are 
transformed, by the emergence of capitalist social relations of production, in turn the basis of an 
unprecedented development of the productive forces in farming’ (2006: 450) 
60 
processes of industrialisation and urbanisation. In Latin America, of particular importance were the 
land reform movements of the latter half of the twentieth century— which attempted to contribute to 
industrial development by transforming ‘pre-capitalist’ to capitalist property through a reformist 
alliance with sectors of the industrial bourgeoisie seeking to redirect the role of the state towards 
import substitution industrialisation. However, the potential for national industrial development of 
this sort is no longer at stake. Globalisation has meant that national economies are fully integrated 
into global commodity circuits, while the capacity of states to implement national development 
strategies has been severely curbed. The implication of this is that the sort of redistributive land 
reform that constituted the central demand of movements of the previous era is no longer on the 
agenda. In Colombia this is reflected in the replacement of redistributive land reform with market led 
variant and later the return of lands to dispossessed peasants as a form of victim compensation— as 
discussed in chapter six.  
 Given that the development of capitalist relations was already complete by the 1970s and that 
the agrarian transition as it was classically formulated is no longer central to capital accumulation in 
Colombia, we might agree with Bernstein that there is a sense in which the ‘agrarian question’ has 
already been bypassed. However, from another perspective, we may argue that the penetration and 
deepening of capitalist relations is never fully complete but an ongoing process, involving the 
ongoing processes of primitive accumulation— or neoliberal enclosure.  The continuity of enclosures, 
whether achieved through market-led processes of accumulation or supplemented by extra-market 
coercion has been a central feature of capitalist development in the neoliberal era, even if this is 
occurring at a very different historical stage in capitalist development. Given that social relations 
surrounding use and access to land and rural resources continue to be highly contentious issues, my 
argument is that the agrarian question continues to provide a framework for understanding the 
transformations in social property relations and struggles surrounding these processes in concrete 
circumstances of neoliberal restructuring.  
  At the core of neoliberal agrarian restructuring has been the expansion and deepening of 
processes of commodification of land, labour, nature and money, which threatens and undermines 
peasant petty commodity production. While on a macro-level, these new enclosures have a common 
source in the crises of capital and its search for new frontiers of accumulation, they have also unfolded 
in spatially-specific contexts exposing an array social structures and institutional arrangements to 
new market imperatives. The result has been a major reconfiguration in territorial and geographical 
dimensions of capital accumulation, as pre-existing social structures and institutional arrangements 
were reconfigured with the partial destruction of certain institutional arrangements, the creation of 
new markets and new process of commodification of land, labour and nature. It is thus important to 
stress the ‘contextual embeddedness’  (Brenner and Theodore, 2002) of neoliberalism, which has 
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unfolded within a given set of agrarian property structures, with their own histories of agrarian 
change, uneven development, and class struggle. This involves considering how specific processes 
of neoliberal restructuring have transformed social and productive relations in concrete 
circumstances, both shaping and shaped by class struggles.  
 Neoliberalism was not a monolithic entity, but a diversity of processes of restructuring, which 
can be specific to certain spatially defined sets of property structures— such as the different sets of 
agrarian class relations and institutional arrangements between Líbano and the Middle Magdalena, or 
commodity-specific, as with the restructuring of the coffee market centred around the abrogation of 
the International Coffee Agreement which drove small farmers into debt, or it can be enacted through 
changes in landownership, such as the reactionary agrarian elite’s appropriation of land and state 
power in the Middle Magdalena.  The diversity in patterns in the balance of class forces, property 
structures, institutional arrangements and histories of struggle explain the significant variation in 
forms and outcomes of different types of enclosure.  
 In many ways, the new enclosures resemble those of the early twentieth century, when 
changes in the global economy generated ‘rude shocks’ destroying the subsistence security of 
peasants and triggering an outbreak of rural conflicts (Wolf 1969; Scott 1976; Edelman 2005). But 
neoliberal enclosures also follow a different logic than those of the past. They do not involve the 
initial penetration of capitalist relations into rural societies where these hitherto did not exist, but 
commodification of labour and appropriation of land and resources by the dominant classes through 
the extension and deepening of market relations into sets of institutional and social agrarian relations 
already existing within capitalist relations, creating new pressures towards production for exchange 
over use and commodification of labour (Akram-Lodhi and Kay 2009; Vergara-Camus 2014). 
 The latest wave of enclosures has unfolded within a very different set of agrarian structures 
than the past. The enclosures that accompanied the initial insertion of the Colombian countryside into 
global commodity chains involved only the privatisation of lands and commodification of labour. In 
contrast to this, today’s agrarian property structures are characterised by deep and multiple integration 
in markets. There are two sides to this. On the one hand is the integration of petty commodity 
production into global circuits of capital— for land, commodities, credits, technology, which have 
brought intensified insecurities. Neoliberal enclosures have involved the reconfiguration of previous 
social and institutional arrangements according to the market imperative ‘to improve competitive 
profitability by enhancing the production of surplus-value within an increasingly globalised circuit 
of capital’ (Akram-Lodhi, 2009: 1448; see also Bernstein, 1996; 2006) giving rise to new 
vulnerabilities, differentiation and dispossession among producers.  
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 The other side is increased labour insecurity. Whereas the early enclosures were motivated by 
landlords’ attempts to incorporate peasant labour into the estate, current enclosures have been 
triggered by a different motive, since peasants are separated from lands and resources not for their 
labour, but simply because these are sought after by capital. In the current clearances, peasants find 
themselves in a situation where ‘their land is needed but their labour is not’ (Li, 2011: 286), and 
dispossession often forced them into the armies of unemployed and precarious workers eking out 
their livelihoods with little hope of finding work in urban slums (Bernstein, 1996; 2006).  
 As chapter seven describes in greater detail, the trajectories of neoliberal restructuring were 
highly divergent as a result of uneven geographical processes of capitalist development, sets of 
agrarian property structures, institutional arrangements and outcomes of class struggle across 
different territories. For coffee farmers, neoliberal restructuring followed a path of adverse 
incorporation, as exposure to new market disciplines generated new vulnerabilities. Throughout the 
second half of the twentieth century, coffee farmers had widely adopted modern technologies, which 
in turn deepened their dependence on loans and exacerbated the environmental conditions of the 
region. The subsistence crisis triggered by the restructuring of the coffee industry was a direct result 
of the vulnerabilities resulting from small farmers’ deep dependence on industrial agriculture: insects, 
infections, plummeting prices and the shoring up of credit created under free-market policies. 
Meanwhile in the Middle Magdalena, neoliberal restructuring followed the path of violent peasant 
dispossession in the hands of an emergent class of predatory agrarian elites.  Colombia’s reinsertion 
into the international division of labour on the basis of coca production saw the emergence of a new 
reactionary agrarian elite, which sought to acquire land in frontier territories under the belief of its 
increased valorisation. Meanwhile, petty commodity producing peasants also sought to hold on to the 
lands as a refuge from the urban labour crisis, sparking a fierce territorial dispute between peasants 
and predatory landed property. 
 To sum up, my examination of contemporary forms of primitive accumulation or neoliberal 
enclosure examines the specific processes through which market and extra-market forces are used to 
extend and deepen capitalist social relations in the countryside in line with new imperatives emerging 
from the global market, the struggles surrounding these processes and new process of segmentation, 
differentiation and dispossession arising amongst differentiated rural classes.  What this suggests is 
not that the agrarian question has been resolved, but that the recurrent and ongoing crises in global 
capitalism continue to promote capitalist transformations in agrarian property structures in their 
search to enclose land, labour and resources. This suggests that the agrarian question continues to be 




A ‘new’ peasant condition? 
 
This theoretical approach provides an alternative way of conceiving the fate of the peasantry under 
global capitalism. Rather than abandoning the notion of the ‘peasant’ entirely for its lack of analytical 
clarity (Ennew, Tribe, and Hirst 1977), the argument made here is that the term serves as a useful 
starting point for historical analysis of the particular strategies adopted by rural formations seeking 
to reproduce themselves in the face of economic change. However, the focus on the shared features 
of the peasantry should not necessarily evoke a static or homogenous actor. Rather than presume the 
homogeneity of peasants, an alternative method is to examine the particular logic of peasant 
production and explore its response to growing market pressures.   
  In this vein, a growing body of scholarship from the neo-Chayanovian tradition has been 
dedicated to developing the notion of the ‘peasant condition’ in the contemporary era. The notion of 
the ‘new peasant condition’ centres on the struggle to build autonomy in the face of recurrent crises 
of capitalism, marginalisation and economic exclusion (Edelman 2005; Rosset 2008; Ploeg 2012).  
There are three main dimensions to the notion of the struggle for peasant autonomy. First is autonomy 
from capital. While this does not necessarily invoke total independence from capitalism, the 
implication is that the ‘peasant condition’ aims at some degree of autonomy through the creation and 
consolidation of a self-controlled resource base, which involves reducing reliance on capital inputs 
and stronger interdependence amongst local producers and between producers and the environment.  
For many proponents, autonomy from inputs and credit markets simultaneously implies stronger 
collective ties and co-production between local rural producers (Ploeg, 2009; Rosset, 2011).  There 
is also an important ecological component to this conceptualisation, as the turn away from external 
inputs simultaneously involves a turn to productive diversification and self-sufficiency, which can 
mean an improvement in local knowledge, resources and technologies, and strengthening the local 
economy. A third component refers to political autonomy. This dimension emphasises the need for 
independence from the state and the construction of local-level forms of power, based on different 
forms of political participation and decision making. It involves forms of self-governance with some 
degree of autonomy from the state and electoral politics, such as those found in autonomous rural 
territories. A central feature of their organisational strategy is aimed at a rejection of structural 
hierarchies in favour of participatory forms of decision making (Barkin, 2002; Zibechi, 2010; 2012).  
 The recent adaptation of the notion of the ‘peasant condition’ provides a useful corrective to 
traditional agrarian political economy by incorporating a more nuanced understanding of the role of 
particular logics of production, responses to market signals, livelihood strategies, relations to land 
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and community ties within peasant households as situated in broader capitalist social relations without 
making the complete culturalist turn of post-development theory.  I have already argued in this 
chapter that rather than essentialising a particular peasant mode of production, a more fruitful line of 
research from the Thompsonian tradition starts from concrete experiences of processes of agrarian 
change and forms of peasant agency that arise. The neo-Chayanovian line of enquiry certainly 
provides a useful starting point for this line of inquiry insofar as it centres on identifying particular 
logics of production as they are lived in concrete class situations.  However closer interrogation of 
the notion of autonomy is needed in order to understand how this can be situated to a 
conceptualisation of capitalism and the processes of class differentiation.  
 It is first worth noting the different understandings of the term ‘capitalism’, and by extension 
the concept and the feasibility of autonomy and resistance invoked by different sides of the debate.  
On the one hand, proponents of the peasant condition have tended to conceive of capitalism as a 
particular set of farming practices and the set of social relations that come with them. In particular, it 
is associated with corporations or large-scale farmers integrated with global production chains. The 
implications of this are important, because it suggests that to be autonomous from capital can be 
conceived as engaging in a series of alternative farming practices that reduce dependence on capitalist 
practices, rather than in a total social system. Capitalism appears as an external or top-down force, 
embodied only in giant agri-food corporations or large capitalist farms, while peasants stand outside 
of its structures, aiming only to produce autonomously of the market.  There is an important contrast 
from the view that capitalism must be understood as a total economic, political, social and cultural 
system, which inevitably structures practices and choices, yet cannot be reduced to them. Under this 
conception, capitalism is not conceived as simply an external force constraining or subordinating 
peasant agency, but a totalising system, penetrating rural economies and giving rise to new processes 
of social differentiation within peasant ‘communities’ (Bernstein, 2014; Jansen, 2014).  
 This implies that peasant ‘agency’ should not be conceived as a set of independent choices or 
practices existing in an autonomous realm from capitalism; since diverse sets of petty commodity 
producers all exist within capitalism, albeit under very different sets of historical geographic and 
social conditions, their activities will always be subject to its laws. Hence, the emergence of ‘micro-
capitalism’ amongst different sets of rural producers refers to an understanding of agrarian capitalism 
‘in which subjects are not absent in agrarian capitalism but precisely active in creating it’ (Kees-
Jenson, 2014: 3-4).  The implications of this are important: when considered from the point of view 
of the uneven geographical development of capitalism across different regions and producer-types, 
‘autonomous’ spaces would appear to become precisely what capitalism needs in order to continue 
to accommodate to the changing demands of  accumulation in a globalising  economy. Seen from this 
perspective, the notion of autonomy does not necessarily menace, but may rather facilitate the 
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reproduction of the capitalist system. In Chayanovian terms, this was conceived as peasant ‘self-
exploitation’— whereby peasant agriculture becomes subsumed under capitalism, but lowering the 
costs of family labour, peasant household production can offer a form of  ‘subsidy’  to capital. 
Crucially, autonomy supports rural populations in bearing the costs of increasing precariousness of 
their livelihoods generated by economic restructuring and appropriation of their resources.  
 In view of this, while the notion of autonomy is important in understanding the forms and 
strategies of peasant struggles against neoliberalism, it should not thereby invoke  a unified peasantry 
or peasant mode of production that is outside of capitalism. Even if peasants have responded to market 
signals in different ways, without necessarily internalising the profit-maximising logic, there can be 
much variation in the form and degree of market integration among peasants, which also has a 
relevant impact on their behaviour and identity. There is no doubt that large-scale agribusiness and 
multinational corporations dominate Colombia’s agrarian class structures, while peasants are 
subordinated or marginalised within this very uneven system.  It is certainly true that concrete cases 
of rural producers rarely produce clear-cut classifications between different classes of peasants. In 
this sense, Ploeg’s formulation that rather than clear-cut class divides, ‘peasant’ and ‘entrepreneurial’ 
forms of agriculture are better conceived on a dynamic continuum, with significant fluidity between 
types, offers some insight (2012: 133-142). Yet it should not follow from this that there exists a 
distinguishable peasant ‘society’ with certain constitutive elements— household, kin, community, 
which have their own internal logic. As I have already argued, an alternative historical approach is 
premised on concrete examination of, on the one hand, the dynamics and logics of peasant petty 
commodity production, and on the other, specific processes of development of capitalism in 
agriculture.  This approach understands capitalism not as a pre-ordained system but as a historical 
process, and enquires into the conditions of existence and reproduction of specific social categories.  
By eschewing a wider political economy analysis, the notion of a ‘peasant condition’ tends of obscure 
the historically constituted processes of class differentiation to which rural communities are 
subjected. While it may be the case that many dynamics of peasant market interactions do not follow 
a strictly capitalist logic, it is important to be nuanced in analysing these characteristics as they exist 
in concrete social and institutionalised relations.   
 Rather than conceiving of peasants as belonging to a unified, autonomous community,  this 
perspective involves a closer examination of the concrete dynamics of market integration amongst 
different sets of rural producers, without necessarily presuming that a full process of class 
differentiation has taken place.  In the discussion of Political Marxism in this chapter, I argued that 
this issue must be addressed historically. Ellen Wood has argued that this question should be 
answered by asking: ‘in what specific conditions do competitive production and profit maximisation 
themselves become survival strategies, the basic condition of subsistence itself?’ (2009: 40). In 
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enquiring into these conditions, it cannot however be taken for granted that producers will always 
pursue profit maximising strategies in response to market pressures. Farmer responses to market 
imperatives do not result in a uniform or unilinear transition, but may take a variety of forms 
depending on geographical and political conditions, the ways producers adjust production and 
consumption and the relations between exploiting and producing classes (Wood, 2009: 41-42).  It is 
possible to identify variations in forms of market dependence resulting in different responses to 
market pressures. On the one hand, access to land gives farmers greater flexibility to withdraw from 
the market and turn to subsistence production in response to pressures. On the other, when the land 
controlled is insufficient to meet the market needs of producers, farmers were forced to increasingly 
enter the market— either through competitive production or the sale of their labour. In either scenario, 
the integration of peasant agriculture into commodity cycles quickly creates new forms of market 
dependence, and thereby class differentiation among peasants.  While richer farmers may then begin 
to accumulate land and hire wage labour, poorer peasants are compelled to lower household 
consumption or rely on wage work.  
 Developing this theme, Vergara Camus and Kay have argued that peasant differentiation 
occurs not simply as the result of the accumulation of wealth, but ‘when the market becomes an 
imperative and land is commodified and inserted into the circuit of capital’ (2017: 245). This suggests 
that peasants experience the market in a different way depending on whether and to what degree their 
access to land is commodified. When poorer peasants begin to experience pressures on the land, or 
the ‘market as an alienating imperative’ (2017: 245) they may respond individually by seeking labour, 
often with greater reliance on kinship networks for their reproduction. Another response, however, is 
political in character— by seeking ‘to politically re create peasant autonomy by challenging the 
formal separation of the economic and the political’ (2017: 245). This framework provides a basis 
for understanding the processes of class differentiation with the commodification of rural social 
relations ongoing in Latin America since the nineteenth century— and accelerated since the 
introduction of Green Revolution technologies in the 1970s and in the 1980s with the enactment of 
neoliberalism. 
 The two case studies of the Cimitarra valley and Líbano are instructive in this regard. 
Although both sets of smallholders resemble ‘classic’ peasant producers insofar as they rely on 
household labour and have restricted access to land, they are far from homogenous. Differences forms 
and degrees of commodification have had an important impact on their responses to pressures, and 
have resulted in stratifications between sets of peasants. For example, since the plots of Líbano’s 
coffee farmers are too small to meet their subsistence needs, they are more reliant on the market; even 
when they have attempted to reduce household consumption they were increasingly forced to enter 
the market to meet subsistence needs— either through production of crops with more ‘comparative 
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advantage’, like coca, or more commonly through migration and labour. Meanwhile, the larger, more 
marginal plots of the Cimitarra valley allow for the production of subsistence crops alongside 
commodities for sale in the market, allowing peasants to in these regions to retreat to subsistence 
production in the face of sudden and drastic shocks such as those of the 1990s and 2000s. These 
dynamics of farmers’ responses to sudden shocks in the market are described in detail in chapters 7 
and 8.  There is also much diversity within communities. On the more marginal highlands around 
Puerto Nuevo Ité in the Cimitarra valley, for example, there is a greater diversity of crop production, 
while peasants on the lower territories around Yondó and San Pablo are more involved in capitalist 
markets of palm or rice production. Moreover, many peasants in the Cimitarra valley actively seek 
access to international markets through palm or cacao production, which has often been a source of 
tensions and frictions within the ‘communities’ represented by social movements and NGOs. If we 
accept that different groups of farmers are involved in very different sets of property and production 
relations and thereby different class interests, it should at least be conceivable that they may too have 
very different aims and objectives in their political activity, despite nominally belonging to the same 
community. 
 This leads to an important theme concerning the subjective character of peasant behaviour. 
Often, to read the proponents of the ‘peasant condition’ is to get the impression that all peasants share 
certain innate characteristics that make them resilient to capitalism— a shared cosmological 
worldview, cultural heritage and ties of solidarity bound up with their alternative production logic 
(e.g. Barkin and Lemus 2016; Ploeg, 2008; Rosset 2008). The notions of peasantisation, strengthening 
local resource bases and self-reliance are too easily presumed to translate into an anti-capitalist 
politics that is not always shared by its proponents. That is not to deny the importance of  struggles 
for alternative forms of self-governance and independence from the state. Indeed, such struggles have 
a long history among peasants, with the Communist party building ‘red zones’ in rural territories 
through local relations of co-operation and self-governance as a strategy for building a local power 
base. As Lefebvre (1991: 54) writes: any ‘revolution that does not produce a new space has not 
realised its full potential; indeed it has failed in that has not changed life itself, but has merely changed 
ideological superstructures, institutions or political apparatuses’. While I do not question the potential 
for the notion of autonomy to foster a politics of prefiguring alternative relations, the search for 
autonomy not only fails to translate into a particular political character, but it may may even actively 
obstruct such a politics. The notion of seeking autonomy from the state suggests a rejection of state 
power, but it rarely conceives of any concrete suggestions for how this might come about. It is indeed 
perfectly possible to conceive of autonomy being attained without any challenge to state power. 
 By invoking a unified, homogenous community characterised by resistance to capital, 
proponents  of the ‘peasant condition’ not only tend to overlook the dynamics of class differentiation 
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within communities, but they also lack critical interrogation into the political dynamics of ‘peasant 
resistance’ and its location within the broader social social structures. In a system characterised by 
highly unequal power relations reinforced by paramilitary violence and the defeat of the left in 
Colombia, strategies of peasant resilience have tended to emphasise individual, rather than class-
based forms of resistance. In this scenario, strategies of repeasantisation were often mobilised as part 
of political projects focused on making individuals, and communities more resilient to the fallout of 
neoliberalism in the countryside, serving in turn to make them adapt to the socio-economic order 
under conditions out of their control. In this sense, the form of resistance engendered in peasantisation 
would seem to be of a more conservative character when situated in a broader social context. This 
problem is only made more acute by the common romanticised invocations of peasant ‘resistance’ as 
innately holding a radical or positive character, as celebrating individualised notions of self-reliance 
and adaptation to adverse conditions rather than mounting larger-scale projects of resistance to it.  
The point is not to deny that community self-reliance has a an role in the dynamics of peasant self-
organisation, as discussed further below, but to emphasise that strategies of repeasantisation need to 
pay closer attention to broader class structure and the state. Without disregarding the importance of 
building alternative spaces and social relations from the bottom up, the affinities of individualised 
survival strategies and neoliberal thinking need to be probed and problematised if they are to avoid 
co-optation within the model. 
 There is no doubt the themes of repeasantisation strategies and resistance to the agri-food 
regime and its exclusionary effects on peasant farming was central to the mobilising strategy of the 
Líbano and Cimitarra peasant movements. Moreover, following the neoliberal subsistence crisis there 
was an important shift to greater self-reliance, a reduction in chemical inputs, and more diversification 
in the farming systems of smallholders in both regions.  However, in my analysis the adoption of 
repeasantisation strategies among smallholders was not so easily translated into political effects. A 
distinction can be made between a form of ‘poverty-driven repeasantisation’, where greater self-
reliance and an adaptation of productive techniques were associated with peasants’ re-
accommodation into community organisations within a broader class structure dominated by the 
agrarian elite, and a ‘politicised repeasantisation’, where a turn to self-reliance has been associated 
with grassroots mobilisation, political autonomy and a critique of the economic model. While there 
will always be overlaps and complexities within these two visions, the distinction is important to 
draw because of the impact it had on the strategy of alliances made by each set of peasants, their 
relation to the state and the outcome of each mobilisation process. In the Cimitarra valley, agro-
ecological concerns and self-reliance became central themes in the movement process in the highly 
polarised context of a fierce dispute between peasants and landed capital. Waves of large-scale 
investments in agribusiness converted the territories at the centre of the dispute into agro-fuel mono-
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crop plantations. In this sense, the Cimitarra peasants’ defence of biodiversity and opposition to 
agribusiness can be considered a form of ‘politicised repeasantisation’ insofar as it has radical and 
confrontational undertones, implying a critique of the dominant class structure and the state. 
Meanwhile, in Líbano the introduction of diversified productive techniques was more about fostering 
resilience— and political quiescence— amongst farmers and restabilising the region by providing a 
coping mechanism for the subsistence crisis. It facilitated farmers’ re-integration into vertical class 
alignments through the community action committees and eventually contributed to the de-escalation 
of the radical process, restoring the surface appearance of “class harmony” experienced under the 
golden era of coffee prosperity. This was more of a ‘poverty-driven’ process insofar as it was a 
question of finding a ‘niche’ for small farmers within the neoliberal system dominated by the agrarian 
elite and coffee corporations. This suggests a more complex understanding of the tactical and political 
implications and potentials of repeasantisation, based on a broader view of the position of particular 
sets of agrarian producers within agrarian class structures and institutional arrangements, is needed 
to explain the variation in character and outcome of particular processes. 
 Closer inspection of the dynamics of market integration and differentiation processes among 
groups of rural producers leads to a further question regarding political behavior and forms of 
association. Even if it is clearly not the case that political behaviour can be directly read from class 
structures, it is nonetheless the case that particular relations to the means of production and processes 
of agrarian change bring different experiences to different sets of peasants, giving them different 
interests as well as worldviews and objectives, as well as relations to the state and other class forces. 
To conceive all producers as ‘peasant community’ or ‘rural poor’ can often obscure social dynamics 
and tensions between different sets of peasants, nor is it sufficient to talk only of class in terms of 
relation to the means of production.  Although the contours and dynamics of these divides are never 
given but always subject to change, it is nonetheless important to make these distinctions given their 
relevance in understanding the nature of the social base, the issues that unite and divide them and the 
outcome of the mobilization process. Farmers with more commoditised lifestyles, since they are more 
dependent on market for their reproduction, have mobilised around issues of tariffs, prices and debts. 
They also seek government protection from the shocks of the impact of the market, and support in 
accessing credits and technologies. The coffee farmers’ main grievances, for example, were centred 
on the prices of farming inputs, debts, credits and access to technical assistance.  Moreover, the form 
and impact of the market imperative is conditioned by type of access direct producers have to the 
land, and the pressures from and responses to appropriators. The small farmers of Líbano possessed 
the land, and as a result were subject to competitive pressures and the need for maximising strategies. 
Although they continued to produce for their own subsistence, often severely restricting consumption, 
adjusting production both to changes in commercial requirements and changes in the internal 
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consumption needs of the household. With the introduction of Green Revolution technologies, profit 
maximisation has been a basic condition for survival— especially in times of unemployment. 
Meanwhile, in the Middle Magdalena, access to land through frontier colonisation offered an escape 
valve from the pressures of dispossession and proletarianisation. However, due to very precarious 
conditions they were forced to sell their labour as well as turn to subsistence production to meet 
subsistence needs. The need to engage in these combined strategies for reproduction meant that bonds 
of cooperation, solidarity and reciprocity were central to their capacity to survive in the face of the 
development of capitalist agriculture, and was associated with the development of a strong anti-
capitalist culture. In terms of political character of their struggle, this has tended to centre on very 
different issues. First, they are strongly oriented around securing access to land, either in the form of 
agrarian reform, colonisation schemes (such as the DRI scheme discussed below) or through another 
type of contract arrangement. A second point is that members of this group are more likely to receive 
subsidies from food programs such as the Food security networks or Families in Action scheme. Since 
they are also more dependent on wage work, they have also mobilised around wages and living 
conditions. As already noted, the fluidity in class location amongst peasants has long been a source 
of tension and complexity in terms of their class and political character.   
 In this vein, Edelman and Borras (2016) provide a useful framework for understanding the 
forms and processes of social class differentiation amongst various sets rural producer types in the 
neoliberal era, while avoiding overly vague references to ‘rural communities’ or ‘people of the land’. 
Although these producers may all derive at least some of their livelihoods from working the land, 
they are primarily subject to differentiation ‘based on their contrasting locations in social relations 
around property and/or control of the means of production’ (1070). The key distinguishing factor in 
this regard is secure access to land, and whether their situation is leaning more towards the better or 
worse- off end of the spectrum.  These historically constituted class differences were a crucial factor 
in determining the form and character of the two peasant struggles: on the one hand, the concerns of 
the poor and landless farmers of the frontier were derived from their insecure access to land and 
precarious resources. Their demands centred on gaining access to land, whether via land reform or 
the creation of a peasant land reserve, as well as access to markets. Meanwhile, the farmers of 
Líbano’s coffee valleys had historically been defined by their more secure access to land; the concerns 
of their struggles were related to the debts and price drops that resulted from the restructuring of the 
coffee industry during this period. The contradictory locations of these farmers was crucial point for 
defining their mobilisations: while on the one hand, given the worsening conditions of this set of 
farmers, they tended to mobilise as small farmers, challenging the state and building broader 
coalitions with other sectors; yet when offered debt relief and a new round of supports they were re-
accommodated into the class and state structures, and their movements ceased to mobilise further. 
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 A more nuanced analysis of class differentiation and forms of struggle is critical in 
understanding the dynamics and tensions of rural mobilization processes as they develop over time.  
While sudden and rapid changes in production relations can often give rise to outbursts of radical 
activity, these can too also be easily quelled, as peasants retreat to tend the harvest or benefit from 
productive supports or poverty assistance. Thus, rather than presume the radical character of the 
peasant struggle for autonomy, what is needed is closer engagement with the dynamics of 
mobilisation cycles,  the rise and fall of political activity in the long term as well as the strategy of 
alliances of peasant political activity. In Líbano and to a lesser extent the Middle Magdalena, peasants 
were capable of radical upswells in political activity, but these outbursts often had difficulty in being 
sustained over time, while leaders also faced difficulties in maintaining their leadership and autonomy 
over the movements. These considerations are intended to develop a body of theory for understanding 
in greater detail not only the emergence of radical activity in the countryside, but also the evolutions 
and tensions of the movements over time. 











This chapter traces the historical conditions and socio-economic transformations surrounding the 
emergence of capitalism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Historical accounts of 
this period have frequently noted how the increased demand for agricultural commodities from 
industrialising European countries generated epoch-defining social and productive changes in rural 
societies across the Third World.  Early scholars of Colombian history tended to see the increased 
growth in agricultural export commodities as signalling the transition from a “backwards” to a 
“modern” society-- a process that would bring stability, peace and prosperity, putting an end to the 
political unrest and violent conflicts that had dominated the early nineteenth century (Parsons, 1949). 
The analysis presented here suggests these dynamics are more complex.  The changes taking place 
are not conceived as simply the growth of trade and commerce, or the transition from one form of 
society to another, but as transformations in agrarian social property relations associated with the 
emergence of capitalism-- the establishment of private property, market dependence and employment 
of wage labour. These processes were not inexorable or peaceful but highly disruptive, creating such 
dislocations and insecurities that they were soon met by two waves of agrarian conflict which swept 
the coffee regions in the early twentieth century.  
 The chapter analyses the particular political and historical conditions for the establishment of 
private property relations and class struggles in Colombia. Drawing on the examples of the processes 
of land privatisation, frontier settlement and landlord-peasant struggle in the coffee municipality of 
Líbano and the agrarian frontier in the Middle Magdalena, I argue that the diversity in paths of 
capitalist development and the changes and re-constitution of the peasantry find their explanation in 
the concrete dynamics of struggles over the establishment of private property rights as they are played 
out in particular social formations. In the coffee regions, massive peasant participation in the protests 
of the 1920s and 1930s led the Liberal party to implement an agrarian reform which had the effect of 
establishing a sector of peasants as small family farmers with access to land and full market 
dependence, allowing for the development of the coffee industry on the basis of smallholding 
agriculture. Meanwhile, peasants expelled from the temperate middle climates due to demographic 
pressures, the end of tenancy arrangements, land privatisation or violent conflict increasingly 
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migrated to lowland frontier territories such as the Middle Magdalena, where they struggled to 
maintain their subsistence as simple commodity producers. Early settlements tended to be isolated 
and precarious; they were abandoned by the state and highly vulnerable to the encroachments of 
landlords and merchants. In contrast to the coffee regions, the landed classes of the frontier sought 
profits through land speculation and cattle ranching rather than by incorporating peasant labour, and 
capitalist development in agriculture in these regions resembled a process of ongoing primitive 
accumulation. As a result, the principle form of agrarian conflict was based not on the hacendados’ 
attempts to incorporate peasants and appropriate their labour, but rather to expel the peasants and 
appropriate their crops. In these areas, the weakness of peasant resistance, the absence of state 
adjudication and the profit making strategies of landlords explain why the early transition to 
capitalism was accompanied by land concentration, marginality and illegality.   
 
The emergence of capitalism in the Colombian countryside 
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, three interrelated processes were underway in 
Colombia to create the conditions for the emergence of capitalism: the expansion of commercial 
agricultural production for export, the privatisation of public lands and state centralisation (Bushnell, 
1993; Legrand, 1992: 10-16; Kalmanovitz, 1985: 231; Palacios, 2003: 243). The changes were similar 
to those taking place across Latin American, with the insertion agriculture into the global economy 
in response to new demands for primary commodities from industrialising Western economies. Yet 
two important factors set the Colombian case aside from its other Latin American counterparts: the 
changes began later, and their political coordination was much weaker. Whereas for most of Latin 
America, the period immediately following Independence was shaped by a liberal nation-building 
agenda, in Colombia the nineteenth century was dominated by interminable civil wars between the 
Liberal and Conservative parties. Both parties were led by a handful of families from the traditional 
landed elites, who fought between themselves over municipal appointments and the patronage and 
profit-making opportunities that came with them. The two parties also counted with deep affiliation 
of the country’s urban and rural poor (Palacios 2002; Pearce 1990: 32). Regional conflicts between 
the two were fought for a total of 33 years of the nineteenth century, which eventually culminated in 
1899-1902 with the War of a Thousand Days, which spread throughout the country killing 100,000 
people. 
Historians Frank Safford and Marco Palacios describe these initial processes of capitalist 
development as marked by ‘spatial fragmentation […], economic atomisation and cultural 
differentiation’ (Safford and Palacios 2002: ix).  A number of circumstances, including population 
sparsity, precarious transport links and slow economic growth left a country divided along 
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geographical lines and fragmented in cultural and political terms. A major difficulty was finding 
commercial export markets. Early booms in tropical crops like rubber, fique, tobacco and bananas 
tended to be short-lived, and failed to generate a significant resource base to facilitate the 
modernisation process. This meant that still in 1850, as much as three quarters of Colombian territory 
was public land (terrenos baldios). Vast areas in the Andean mountains and lowlands, including the 
Caribbean coast, the Magdalena valley, the Eastern Plains, and the southern Amazon remained largely 
uninhabited, unexploited and open to settlement (Legrand, 1986). 
Finally, around 1870, Colombia’s early developmental difficulties began to be reversed by 
two principal circumstances: the construction of railroads, and the establishment of coffee as the chief 
export crop. Law 61 of 1874 established private land ownership, which, in conjunction with growth 
of agricultural export markets encouraged new processes of settlement into previously unexplored 
lands in the temperate middle climates and the lowlands, which quickly became centres of 
commercial production. Between 1894 and 1920, coffee production expanded from 150,000 sacks to 
2 million annually, and coffee exports soon became the backbone of the national economy (Bergquist 
1986; Palacios, 1980: 216).   
The development of capitalism on the back of the coffee industry also gave rise to a new 
agrarian bourgeoisie of coffee merchants and landlords. The new coffee bourgeoisie came to 
constitute a powerful economic group, which formed part of a broader oligarchy that included other 
commercial farmers and cattle ranchers that were dispersed throughout a number of cities and regions. 
A handful of families from the traditional landed elites dedicated themselves to politics, forming the 
country’s ‘political elite’ (Palacios, 2002; Pearce, 1990: 32). 
The result was that the development of ‘coffee capitalism’ did not transform, but was adapted 
into the traditional political order. The Liberal and Conservative parties were both controlled by 
landowners, and land legislation in this period clearly reflected their interests. In contrast to the 
“American road” of rural transition, where privatisation provided small farmers with access to low-
cost lands (Bernstein, 2010, 47), in Colombia land allocation clearly promoted land monopolisation 
in the hands of a few large landlords (Machado, 2009: 100-110). The majority of the land titles 
awarded during this period went to a handful of large private owners, and single titles often granted 
thousands of hectares (Legrande, 1986: 15; Jimeno, 1989). By this point, the basic agrarian structure 
was divided into minifundia on the Andean highlands and latifundia in the plains, a system which 
itself had evolved through a continuous struggle over land throughout the nineteenth century 
(Legrand, 1986).  
 A main concern for the landowners seeking to convert their estates to commercial production 
was the labour shortage. The merchants’ and landlords’ solution to the labour problem was to try to 
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tap labour from the ‘supplies’ of peasant settlers and indigenous people migrating from the Andean 
slopes into the lower valleys. But for their part, these peasants preferred to settle lands and produce 
for local markets, as families or small cooperatives independently of the estates (Legrand, 1992). To 
overcome this obstacle, landlords sought to tie the rural labour force to estates by enclosing peasants’ 
lands, transforming independent peasants into tenant farmers and contracted labourers. Despite the 
fact that land legislation officially protected peasant settlements, large proprietors were nonetheless 
able to possess peasant lands and transform them into labourers through illicit usurpations using 
barbed wire, fictitious claims or extending their estates to possess peasant lands and forcing peasants 
into tenancy agreements (Legrand, 1986: 63-90).  In this way, the establishment of private property 
in Colombia’s public lands marked the birth of a new form of agrarian conflict, where settlers were 
pitted against landlords and merchants in a struggle over property rights in the process of frontier 
settlement. 
As  Eric Wolf described, ‘peasant rebellions of the twentieth century are no longer simple 
responses to local problems.’ They are ‘parochial reactions to major social dislocations, set in motion 
by overwhelming societal change’ (1969: 295). Historian Catherine Legrand has documented how 
the settler peasants’ determination to maintain their independence in the face of the land enclosures 
of this period sparked a wave of peasant protests, which would lay the foundations for the dynamics 
of peasant resistance in Colombia for decades to come (1986: 63-90). The penetration of market 
forces and and landlord encroachments sparked a wave of rural protests, as peasants sought 
independent access to markets and to defend their claims to the land, and they frequently made claims 
to the state to defend them against landlord encroachments. The municipality of Líbano, department 
of Tolima, provides an illustrative example of the changes in class structure and new forms of agrarian 
struggle that arose during this period. 
 
Coffee colonisation and peasant protest: 1850-1932 
The early settlement of Líbano, a small coffee municipality on the temperate slopes Cordillera 
Central, is reflective of the dynamics of frontier settlement and agrarian conflict that arose with the 
early emergence of coffee capitalism. Líbano was first developed as a frontier territory in the mid 
nineteenth century by settlers from the Santander, Cundinamarca and Boyacá departments. Bordering 
Cundinamarca and Antioquia, the region stood at the dividing line between the two opposing sides 
of the civil wars. This meant it offered a refuge to highland peasants seeking to escape the violence 
by establishing independent plots on the basis of a traditional peasant subsistence economy (Ramírez 
2003: 30). At around 1,500 metres above sea level, Líbano’s warm slopes provided ample conditions 
for peasants to grow simple commodities such as corn, potato, and wheat on their plots, and with the 
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construction of transport links new settlers began arriving to the region. Between 1850 and 1854, 
around 8,000 hectares of land were allocated in small plots to 245 settlers in Líbano (Ramírez 2005: 
132). 
Líbano remained largely outside of the world economy until roughly the 1880s, when the 
municipality was quickly transformed into a major centre for coffee production. Improvements in 
river transportation, the construction of a road connecting Antioquia and Cundinamarca, together 
with a rise in coffee prices in the years 1874-1875 and 1887-1893 attracted a rising class of coffee 
entrepreneurs to the municipality, which was eventually established as an administrative unit in 1886. 
The new entrepreneurs were mostly Antioqueño Liberals, including politicians, lawyers, bankers, 
merchants, mine owners and landowners, who sought out public lands in frontier regions such as this 
in order to establish plantations for coffee exports (Legrand, 1986: 35). A handful of foreign 
businessmen of American, English and German origins, who had been involved in nearby gold 
mining, also established large coffee haciendas in the late 19th century (Ramírez 2003). 
Encroachment by this new agrarian bourgeoisie on settlers’ plots provoked an early wave of agrarian 
conflicts, where peasants petitioned the government in defending their claims. Legrand notes the 
eruption of 450 landlord-peasant conflicts between 1875 and 1920 most frequently in the key agro-
export zones of coffee in the mid-Andes (1986: 63-90). The movements were defensive and 
unorganised in character, in which peasants petitioned the government to defend their plots.  For its 
part, Líbano’s local government was suspicious of the peasants and tended to side with the landlords, 
meaning that settlers’ petitions were generally unsuccessful. Settlers were forced to sign tenancy 
contracts, and their fields would be incorporated into the haciendas (Ramírez, 2003: 5, Rincón, 2005).  
At the turn of the twentieth century, the arrival of coffee ‘turned Líbano into Colombia’s 
Potosí for agriculture’ (Ramírez, 2000: 17). Líbano quickly rose to become the largest and most 
prosperous municipality in North Tolima, recording a sizeable population of 16,000 in 1912. By 1926, 
there were 11 haciendas in the region, cultivating a total of around one and a half million coffee trees 
(Errázuriz 1986: 77). The creation of employment opportunities on the haciendas attracted a small 
wave of settlers to the region who occupied the highlands beyond the estates. The haciendas adopted 
a mixture of labour arrangements, predominantly service tenancy and sharecropping  (Ramírez 2008). 
It was not uncommon for sharecropper to make some savings and leave the haciendas in order to 
establish their own plots. As a result, minifundio became increasingly prominent in the marginal zones 
beyond the haciendas.  
The expansion of coffee in the early twentieth century generated an influx of foreign capital 
known as ‘the dance of the millions’, which transformed the national economy and all of society.  
Economic expansion meant industrial growth, public investment, rapid urbanisation and the creation 
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of an internal market. The creation of jobs and the promise of higher salaries in urban areas in the 
1920s induced a number of peasants to abandon the countryside, and by the end of the decade 26 per 
cent of the 7.4 million Colombians were living in the cities (Legrand, 1986: 103). The resultant labour 
shortage impeded the hacendados’ ability to expand coffee cultivation, which they attempted to 
resolve through the enganche system during harvest time, whereby wage labourers (jornaleros) were 
hired via labour contractors. Other methods included an increasing recourse to female labour, and the 
school calendar was even adapted to allow children to work during harvest time (Rincón 2005: 246).  
A particularity of Líbano’s haciendas was that take charge not only of the farming process, but also 
light industrial processing and transport of the coffee grain, employing a number of female labours 
as pickers and operators. These highly industrialised coffee haciendas were unique to Líbano— a 
result of the region’s isolation, but also a symbol of its prosperity. Coffee estates acted as far more 
than simply productive units. During the ‘Golden Age’ of the hacienda between roughly 1870 and 
1930, they were also the central axis for social, political and cultural life. Many haciendas had their 
own currency, identity cards, as well as police and surveillance regimes that regulated the behaviour 
of the tenants and labourers living on the estate (Errázuriz 1986; Ramírez 1999). 
By the end of the 1920s, the economic growth spurt had given rise to new social tensions on 
the estates. One civil servant of the time noted that: ‘overall development of the country between 
1922 and 1930 gave rise to new aspirations amongst peasants to reap the benefits of their own labour 
and possess the land’ (cited in Vega, 2004: 18). High inflation gave rise to demands for higher wages 
amongst workers on the estates, while high coffee prices led tenants to see labour obligations as 
increasingly burdensome, and many tried to profit from the coffee boom by selling coffee in markets 
outside the estate (Legrand, 1986). The hacendados opposed this, attempting to prohibit the sale of 
crops beyond the hacienda and enforcing the tenants’ labour obligations more strictly (Legrand, 
1986). Whereas previously, any tenant seeking independent subsistence had been able to leave the 
estate, by now the public lands had been fully colonised, preventing peasants from leaving the estate 
to obtain a plot on public lands, which gave rise to new demographic pressures. Tenants and workers 
grew increasingly restless, with conflicts mostly revolving around tenants’ labour obligations and the 
right to compensation for improvements (Sánchez, 1985: 37).  Meanwhile, independent peasants were 
unaffected by the problem of labour shortages since their farms used mostly family labour, and small 
coffee farmers were able to substantially increase production and improve their incomes.  
The great crash of 1928 sent the coffee industry from boom to bust. Since the entire economy 
of Líbano was directly dependent on the coffee industry, the sudden crash in commodity prices had 
a particularly severe impact.  There was a dramatic increase in unemployment amongst peasants, 
artisans and workers, which was made all the more acute by the high levels of inflation. During the 
1920s boom, many large coffee estate owners had borrowed heavily to fund the expansion of their 
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farms, and they now faced soaring debts and bankruptcy, which ‘jeopardized the very existence of 
the coffee hacendados as a class’ (Bergquist, 1986: 398). Meanwhile, the decline of public works 
projects saw urban workers laid off in masses, and many returned to the land as a way of etching out 
subsistence. This in turn augmented demographic pressures. As coffee prices fell and labour supplies 
grew, some estate owners sought to squeeze sharecroppers even further, increasing their workload 
and restricting their economic liberties.  
The turn from boom to bust acted as a catalyst for the rising social tensions, and peasants and 
rural labourers embarked on a new wave of land invasions. A total of 71 rural conflicts were registered 
between 1925 and 1930, in the form of disputes over land titles, tenant struggles against payment of 
rent, and movements by peasant squatters to occupy unused or underused plots on large private 
estates, initiating a small de facto agrarian reform (Vega, 2004: 22). This second wave of peasant 
struggles differed from those of the century before. The uprisings were taking place against the 
background of broader processes of class formation developing nationwide, with the creation of the 
first trade unions amongst railroad, port, petroleum and banana workers in the 1920s (Molina 1987; 
Sánchez 1985; Vega 2002). Labour strikes erupted in the export sectors throughout the 1920s, 
including Magdalena Medio oil workers in the Tropical Oil company in 1924, 1926 and 1927, and 
banana workers in the United Fruit company on the Atlantic coast in 1928 (Vega, 2002).  Since 
economic activity of Líbano followed a similar pattern of foreign-ownership, peasants and workers 
of Líbano sympathised with banana and petroleum strikers, which provided a strong influence in their 
own organisational processes (Sánchez, 1986: 29). 
The Revolutionary Socialist Party (PSR, renamed the Communist Party in 1930) sought a 
rural base amongst the peasantry, and began organising in Tolima in the early 1920s. Leaders toured 
rural villages giving speeches, encouraging the formation of local committees and supporting settlers 
in disputes with landlords (Legrand, 1986; Osterling, 1989). The PSR also facilitated the creation of 
ligas campesinas, which made demands for the ‘expropriation of landowners without compensation’ 
and ‘revolutionary land seizures’ (Vega Cantor, 2004). The Federated Workers’ Union was founded 
in 1923 as an umbrella union representing peasants and workers across a variety of sectors. As Vega 
Cantor notes, such organisations ‘allowed for a direct link to be established between socialists and 
workers, artisans and peasants throughout the 1920s, where social ideas diffused by the PSR held 
great sway’ (Vega, 2009: 158). As a result, peasant and worker movements were identifying with 
emergent Left-wing parties for the first time such as the newly formed Communist Party (which 
began as the Revolutionary Socialist Party, or PSR), or Gaitán’s Revolutionary Leftist National Union 
(UNIR). 
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The result of the PSR’s rural organising strategy was that peasant protests became infused 
with socialist ideas. A remarkable instance of the new dynamics of peasant protest occurred in Líbano, 
where a movement known as the Bolcheviques del Líbano was founded, which represented ‘the first 
armed insurrection of Latin America in which an army of peasants, with coordination and alliances 
with urban sectors, has posed the challenge of taking power in the name of socialist ideas’ (Sanchez, 
1985: 13). The Bolcheviques’ revolt was short-lived and quickly crushed by government forces. Mass 
incarcerations, repression and torture shortly followed, which Gaitán, who later worked on the case, 
described as a “merciless bloodbath” (Sánchez, 1985: 77). In 1935, another wave of coffee strikes 
was organised by the Communist Party and UNIR, the radical Liberal movement led by Gaitán. The 
strikes lasted six months, but they were nonetheless unable to paralyse the coffee sector completely, 
and coffee workers were never organised into effective, enduring unions.  Neither the Communist 
Party nor UNIR managed to break the electoral monopoly of the traditional parties, and leaders 
eventually abandoned their efforts (Bergquist, 1986: 60). The fate of these incipient organising 
processes was eventually sealed with the rise to power of the Liberal party in the 1930s, which, under 
presidents Enrique Olaya Herrera and Alfonso López Pumarejo sought to mediate and incorporate 
emergent social conflict. 
 
 
From revolt to reform 
The emergent protests provided the background for the electoral victory of the Liberal party in 1930.  
Following the model of post-revolutionary Mexico, Presidents Enrique Olaya Herrera and Alfonso 
López Pumarejo declared the “Revolución en Marcha”, which effectively created a corporatist state 
seeking to mediate the rising social conflicts. The Liberal government granted peasants the right to 
unionise in 1931, and soon after set about a limited land reform project.  For Liberal elites, a new 
‘welfarist’ approach would allow them to accommodate the demands of the lower and middle sectors 
within the party, maintaining its hegemony and staving off the formation of any third party challenger 
such as those that had emerged in other Latin American countries (Dix, 1986: 97). López’s movement 
had the effect of derailing an emergent rural and urban movement, destroying its independence and 
infusing many sectors with a deep emotional identification for the Liberal party (Bergquist, 1992: 
130; Mondragón 2002; Legrand 1986).  The first nationwide labour confederation, the Confederación 
de Trabajadores Colombianos (CTC) was established in 1936, effectively acting as the labour 
appendage of the Liberal party. The Communist Party, whose influence was already marginal within 
the trade union movement, pledged allegiance to the Liberals (Pécaut, 1987).  
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 The Agrarian Reform law 200 of 1936 represented the first real attempt to modernise 
landownership structures through the elimination of the unproductive latifundio system in favour of 
a more efficient use of land. The large coffee estates of Cundinamarca and Tolima were purchased 
with full compensation, broken up into parcels and sold to coffee workers and tenants (Bushnell, 
1993; Legrand, 1986). Yet the ambiguities in the law prevented deeper and more widespread process 
of reform. It granted a ten-year period for estates to be made productive, but was unclear whether it 
supported landlords or peasants as the basis of this reform. As a result, the law had little effect on the 
patterns of landed property.  For the most part landlords were successful in avoiding expropriation, 
evicting peasants and squatters who settled further into the agrarian frontier (Fajardo, 2002). The 
strength of the landowners within the Liberal party prevented any reform that would truly challenge 
their class power, and instead ensured that the networks of patronage that maintained bipartisan 
control in the countryside would remain intact.  
 In sum, class formation during the early 1920s was impeded due to a lack of leadership and 
regional fragmentation, associated with the structural problems of capitalist development on the basis 
of the coffee industry. Whereas in other Latin American countries, the growth of urban middle and 
working classes saw the birth of populist parties such as Argentina’s Peronistas, Peru’s APRA or 
Mexico’s PRI, in Colombia the formation of independent political movements was stifled by 
continued affiliations with the two party system (Pécaut 1987; Palacios 2001). This meant that the 
rapidly forming working classes were subjected to social transformations without any independent 
political representation (Dix 1967). This issue has been subject to a great deal of debate, and the 
inability of the left forces to offer leadership independently of the two main parties during this period 
of major social transformation is an important factor explaining Colombia’s conservative political 
trajectory throughout the twentieth century (Archila Neira 1998; Green 2000; Hylton, 2014). But it 
was also a structural question, related to the development of the coffee industry on the basis of small 
family farmers.  
 One particularity of the Colombian coffee industry is that it is not produced on large, 
mechanised farms employing waged labour, but small, capitalised family farms. A number of features 
of coffee farming make it particularly suitable to small-scale production systems. In Líbano coffee is 
grown on steep, vertical slopes, which represent a barrier to mechanisation even on larger estates. 
This meant that coffee production did not require large amounts of capital investment, nor particularly 
sophisticated technology.  peasants used few chemical fertilisers and pesticides; rather, they had kept 
chickens and pigs around the plantations, which served the double function of killing the insects and 
fertilising the grove. Seedlings would be obtained by keeping the cuttings of the previous harvest or 
through exchange with neighbouring farmers. Farmers combined commercial coffee production with 
cultivation of subsistence crops such as plantain, yucca and corn, as well as pigs and poultry, and 
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sugarcane could also be planted during lulls in the coffee cycles. The combined production of 
domestic food crops served as a “safety net” for lulls in the coffee market, when peasants would 
switch to selling other crops or use them for home consumption (Bergquist, 1986: 376; London, 1991: 
45-7).   
 But moreover, coffee production on the basis of small family farms also had significant 
political consequences. Family farming produced neither labour conflicts against hacendados nor 
bonds of solidarity amongst producers. The small farmers’ survival and reproduction depended on 
their ability to control land, and their struggle to attain plots placed them in constant competition with 
their fellow producers. As Bergquist concludes: ‘those coffee farmers who laboured in production 
thus saw the central myths of capitalist and Christian ideology played out on an intimate scale’ (1986: 
384). Coffee farmers perceived their ability to survive to be a question of property ownership, 
perseverance, and hard work— a logic well-suited to capitalist and Christian values. the small 
farmer’s aspirations to own land and produce for the market served to underpin the political monopoly 
of the two main parties. They learned that their ability to reproduce their livelihoods depended on 
affiliation with partisan politics within local power structures, and they came to depend on patron-
client relationships for access to resources. Deep bipartisan affiliations amongst coffee producers 
acted as a bulwark against the appeal of alternative or class-based organisations (Palacios, 1980; 
Bergquist, 1986). In this way, Colombia’s development on the back of ‘coffee capitalism’ was 
double-edged: coffee both promoted economic growth at the same time it inhibited the organisational 
and cultural autonomy of the popular forces that elsewhere challenged liberal principles and 
undermined the political legitimacy and cultural monopoly of the ruling classes’ (Bergquist 1992, p. 
295). 
 Seen in this light, Colombia’s rapid capitalist development on the basis of small coffee 
farmers in the early twentieth century served not to precipitate, but precisely to undermine incipient 
processes of independent class formation, while the urban working classes were left weak and without 
allies. The underlying tensions of this period of major socio-economic transformation without 
political representation suddenly exploded in 1948 with la Violencia. 
 
La Violencia  
 In contrast to the interminable civil conflicts of the nineteenth century, the first four decades 
of the twentieth century were marked by relative stability. But violence broke out again in the late 
1940s following the assassination of Gaitán. Gaitán’s death provoked rage amongst urban working 
and popular classes, who poured into the streets of Bogota in what soon became the largest urban riot 
of Latin America’s history, known as the Bogotazo. Described by one observer as an “earthquake of 
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people moved by the assassination of their own voice” (cited in Dix 1967: 105), the uprising revealed 
the extent of resentment that had fermented during this time, of a burgeoning class of workers and 
peasants whose attempts to find independent political expression had been repeatedly undermined by 
Liberal and Conservative elites. But it also represented a different form of uprising than the wars 
between Liberal and Conservative elites in the 19th century. Now, the ruling elites were facing 
widespread mobilisation from below amongst the popular classes.  
For the Left, the Bogotazo ignited hopes that the “Colombian Revolution” had begun 
(Gutierrez, 1962). A revolutionary junta was formed in Bogota, which seized the city’s radio stations, 
while the police put themselves “at the service of the revolution”. Smaller uprisings broke out in 
towns throughout the country. In Barrancabermeja, for example, oil workers seized control of the 
foreign-controlled oil refinery (Guzmán, Fals-Fals-Borda, and Umaña Luna 1962; Sánchez 1992, 83). 
Known as the Comuna de Barrancabermeja, the rebellion that ensued represented ‘the first instance 
in which a broad-based local movement composed of oil workers and other residents came together 
to challenge the authority of the Tropical Oil Company and the Colombian government’ (Van Isschot 
2015: 45). But small, isolated uprisings such as these could not ultimately be sustained. The hopes 
inspired by the initial rumblings were soon disappointed when the government regained control of 
the cities through a military occupation, paving the way for a ten-year Conservative dictatorship. 
The effect of the army’s seizure of control in the cities was not so much to put an end to the 
conflict as refract it into the countryside. The grip of traditional political clientelism still held strong 
in many rural areas, and regional gamonales mobilised their peasant clients into a series of bloody 
clashes between neighbouring communities. The rural conflict first broke out in the coffee regions, 
and it was here the fighting was fiercest, but it later spread to most of the country (Broderick 1975; 
Dix 1967; Hobsbawm 1963; Sánchez et al. 1984). The Conservative party recruited armed peasant 
bands called Chulavitas or Pajaros—the embryonic forms of contemporary paramilitaries-- while the 
Liberals responded by forming their own guerrilla groups to launch brutal counter-attacks (Pécaut 
1987).  The main victims on both sides were peasants. La Violencia saw an estimated 800,000 rural 
inhabitants displaced, most of whom were small and medium farmers, and 200,000 hectares of land 
usurped (Zamosc 1986, 23). 
Historians have offered various interpretations of la Violencia. Some have viewed it as a 
renewal of the seemingly interminable conflict between Liberals and Conservatives, while for others 
it represents a Conservative backlash against the threat posed by the movement surrounding Gaitán 
(Sanchez 1985; Roldán 1992).  Another interpretation sees the uprisings as peasants’ ‘anarchic and 
desperate response’ to frustrations with the Liberals’ failure to implement reform (Vega Cantor, 
2002). Historian Eric Hobsbawm described la Violencia as ‘the abortion of a classic social 
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revolution’, where class tensions built on the desire for change were distorted into banditry and 
anarchy through a lack of cohesion (1963: 248; see also Dix, 1967, 107). 
But another way of interpreting la Violencia looks at the impact of rural conflicts on the 
patterns of agrarian property structures, the emergence of new forms of capital accumulation, as well 
as the processes of dispossession and frontier migration that took place. While all were threatened by 
the conflict, it was the large landlords who had the most options for escape. Most moved to urban 
areas to escape the violence, leaving their farms under the charge of overseers, who often re-
established sharecropping systems amongst the farm labourers. However, since neither administrators 
nor tenants were willing to risk their lives defending somebody else’s property, most also fled, 
eventually forcing many of the largest estate owners to sell their coffee farms. Thus the Violence 
further precipitated the disintegration of the hacienda structures in Líbano, and most of the region’s 
haciendas were broken up and sold into smaller parcels (Sánchez and Meertens 1984).   
Meanwhile, it was small farmers that suffered the brunt of the violence. Conservative Pajaros 
would often force Liberal peasants to sell their plots at cheap rates or provoke mass displacements. 
Liberal elites took advantage of la Violencia as a means of stamping out radical currents within the 
Liberal party. The entire Tolima department was one of the epicentres of violence. A total of 31,000 
people were murdered, mostly small and medium peasants, and 55,000 plots were abandoned 
(Bergquist, 1986: 426-8). In Líbano alone, la Violencia was estimated to be responsible for six to 
eight thousand deaths. Most of the dispossessed fled to the cities where they swelled the armies of 
unemployed surplus workforces, although many also took refuge in more distant frontier territories 
like South Tolima or the Llanos, where they reorganised into Communist and Liberal guerrilla self-
defence forces. These processes of violent displacement provide one explanation for the massive 
decline in smallholding coffee producers by the 1950s (Sánchez and Meertens 1984). 
As for the abandoned lands, some passed into the hands of landlords, while others were sold 
to larger farmers in a bloody process of peasant differentiation (Bergquist, 1986: 423).  But the 
greatest beneficiaries of the massive displacements were local coffee merchants. Unlike small, 
medium, and large farmers, the merchants were not threatened by the initial land conflicts, and 
amassed substantial profits from the coffee boom that took off during the violence. They sought to 
invest these profits in cheap, abandoned lands, and often deliberately hired pajaros to displace 
peasants in order to appropriate their lands (Sánchez, 1991: 146). This emergent coffee bourgeoisie 
amassed small fortunes by increasing coffee production in coffee regions such as Líbano. They 
became important representatives on the local Fedecafé boards, and were quickly integrated into local 
clientelistic structures (Rincón, 2005: 307). 
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In sum, the Violence paved the way for deeper penetration and expansion of capitalist 
relations in the coffee regions, including the establishment of private property and market 
dependence. Processes of peasant dispossession and class differentiation were carved out in blood, 
as smaller peasants were cleared from the land to make way for a new class of rural entrepreneurs. 
With the repression of class-based organising the conditions were once again in place for the 
restoration of the traditional clientelistic political order. In Líbano political boss Alfonso Jaramillo 
took control of networks of production and power, re-incorporating the region into clientelistic 
structures under the shadow of bipartisan politics (Sánchez, 1985: 76). 
 
The Agrarian Frontier 
La Violencia provided the background for two important transformations in social property relations 
in the Colombian countryside.  First, fighting and land appropriations paved the way for a rapid 
privatisation of land (Guzman, Fals-Borda, Umaña Luna, 1980). Between 1931 and 1945, the 
Colombian government had granted private property titles on 60,000 hectares a year, from 1946 to 
1954 this figure rose to 150,000 hectares a year, and to 375,000 hectares a year from 1955 through 
1959 (Legrand, 1989: 13). The second was a change in labour relations, as former tenancy and 
sharecropping arrangements died out, and landlords increasingly used wage labour (Kalmanovitz, 
1978).  The changes in social-property relations created a new dynamic in Colombia’s rural conflict. 
Peasants pushed off their land migrated to what they hoped were safer places— normally the city, 
but also deeper into the frontier. Some sought refuge in old colonisation zones such as Sumapaz and 
South Tolima, where peasant organisation had been particularly strong in the 1930s. Others expelled 
under the Violencia headed toward new frontiers such as Urabá, the Llanos, Guaviare, Caquetá and 
the Middle Magdalena.   
 At the same time, a new class of agrarian capitalists was in formation in the agrarian frontier. 
Whereas the coffee hacendados had sought to incorporate peasant settlers onto new properties by 
appropriating their land and exploiting their labour, the new rural bourgeoisie in the frontier were 
rent-seekers and land speculators, who made profits by expelling settlers and expropriating their plots. 
This practice was particularly prevalent in lowland frontiers such as the Middle Magdalena, where 
frontier expansion was led by cattle ranchers and oil speculators appropriating peasant lands. New 
processes of expulsion resulted in a rapid accumulation of lands in the hands of landlords and oil 
companies— a protracted form of primitive accumulation.   
The result was that the contradictions of capitalist development in Colombia were increasingly 
played out in the agrarian frontier. In contrast to other Latin American countries, where the principal 
rural conflicts took the form of struggles of Indigenous communities against the hacendados, in 
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Colombia the central conflict was between settlers and landlords and merchants seeking to control 
land and labour in public land regions. These social conflicts in the frontier stem back to the 
emergence of capitalism in the Colombian countryside, and they only accelerated with the growth of 
the primary export economy. 
 
Frontier settlement and conflict in the Middle Magdalena 
 The Middle Magdalena, one of Colombia’s major agrarian frontiers, provides an illustrative 
case for understanding changes in labour and land relations related to new forms of landlord-peasant 
conflict as settlements expanded further into the frontier. The town of Barrancabermeja came into 
existence in 1919 with the awarding of a concession of 300,000 hectares to the Tropical Oil company, 
establishing the region as the country’s primary oil enclave, and providing a major destination for 
landless peasant settlers.  The first wave of frontier settlement was driven by commodification of 
haciendas, the construction of railways and the initiation of state-led colonisation projects.  From the 
1920s, peasant settlers arrived to the region from a diversity of regional and ethnic backgrounds: 
descendants from African slaves from the Atlantic and Pacific coasts who had formed palenques 
during colonial times, indigenous people excluded from the resguardos, or mestizos of Spanish-
Indian heritage from the Antioquia, Boyaca and Santander regions. The intermixing of migrants from 
a diversity of ethnic backgrounds gave rise to particular forms of co-operation, cosmopolitanism and 
solidarity as marginalised peasants were forced to work collectively in order to survive. The region 
soon became known for its strong and unified identity, called the ‘cultura ribereña’, renowned for its 
independent spirit and disdain for authority (Archila, 2006; Cadavid 1996, 11). As the oil town of 
Barrancabermeja erupted with an early strike wave between 1924 and 1927, peasants brought the 
striking workers food—   yuca, plantain, and rice— to the soup kitchens, and workers in turn backed 
the land claims of cultivators. 
Settlers might have come from diverse origins, but they shared the same quest for independent 
subsistence as petty commodity producers. This was achieved by clearing a plot of land, cultivating, 
producing enough to meet their needs of subsistence and selling a surplus to markets.  Frontier 
settlement is an incredibly arduous procedure. It involves slashing, burning, planting and harvesting 
under precarious conditions. They used simple tools and primitive technology: axes, machetes, 
shovels and hoes. The process of clearing the land and preparing it for agricultural production, known 
as “mejoras”, provides the initial exchange value of the settlers’ labour (Molano, 1990). While some 
peasants simply prepared the land in order to sell the mejoras immediately, others established 
subsistence economies based on family labour. For one family, a plot of around fifty hectares would 
provide basic subsistence. It allowed the family to farm one or two small plots of roughly five hectares 
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every six months. Between the initial period of clearing and planting and the first harvest, there was 
often a delay of four to six years. After the initial clearing process, settlers would begin by planting 
basic subsistence crops— predominantly corn, but also sugar cane, plantain, or rice. After feeding 
the family, any surplus from the crops would be used to feed pigs, chickens, and cattle, a task which 
was often carried out by the female member of the household. Women often also made basic artisanal 
goods: brooms and household items both for sale and for family use.  Roughly half of the harvest 
would be used to feed the family, and the other half would be sold in local markets or exchanged with 
neighbouring families (Cadavid 1996; Vargas 1992: 81). Many settlement zones were so far from 
markets that cattle was the only commodity that could be produced for sale.   
During the initial period, the plots provided for the family subsistence needs. But after the 
initial settlement period was over, peasants needed to enter the market to meet household 
consumption requirements. Yet local conditions for commercial production were incredibly 
precarious: low demand, low prices and high transport costs, since the only route to the nearest town 
was either by boat or by truck. The settler’s knowledge of the market and its functions was at best 
incomplete, and there was little guarantee that taking products to the market could cover transport 
costs. Surplus was never guaranteed, and anyway would only be available after two or three harvests.  
Meanwhile, limited processes of differentiation did occur as some families increased their production 
for the market move in to production of more basic commercial crops for sale in the market: rice, 
plantain, cocoa, coffee or cattle. As children grew up and demanded lots of their own, families would 
either have to expand further into the agrarian frontier or divide up the plot, augmenting demographic 
pressures. Settlers’ debts to local merchants mounted, and this was when they were most at risk from 
the encroachments of landlords and merchants. 
On arrival in the frontier territories, the peasants’ hopes of securing an independent livelihood 
from the land were constantly under threat. With difficult access to markets, credits and assistance, 
conditions in the frontier were incredibly precarious, and the crops they produced barely covered the 
costs of family subsistence. It was not unusual for settlers to combine farm work with other forms of 
labour- fishing, transport by mule or small boats, or else in the nearby logging, petroleum, or 
construction industries.  Vulnerable and precarious, more often than not peasants were forced to sell 
their plots (“mejoras”) to local landlords or merchants and migrate further into the frontier in search 
of subsistence (Alonso 1992, 27-35). 
Oil exploitation attracted not only settler peasants to the Middle Magdalena. It also drew the 
attention of a newly formed class of agrarian capitalists— a cohort of military generals who had been 
granted public lands in return for their participation in wars, as well as speculators, merchants, 
lawyers and politicians who all hoped to make quick profits from the rapid increase in land values. 
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Yet the land could only be claimed if it had already been cleared and colonised, and for this the labour 
of settler peasants was required (LeGrand, 1986). Against this background, colonisation became a 
process of incessant conflict throughout the agrarian frontier, between peasant settlers seeking to 
preserve their principle means of livelihood on the one hand, and a rising agrarian class of landlords, 
businessmen and merchants seeking to accumulate profits through the appropriation and control of 
territories and resources on the other (LeGrand, 1986). Merchants already established in the region 
controlled the transit routes. They dictated the rules which the newly arrived settlers would have to 
accept. In the frontier regions they had two main functions: expanding credits at excessively high 
interest rates, and also acquiring land after it had initially been cleared and worked by the peasants. 
After the peasants’ labour had served to increase the land value, the merchants would attempt to 
acquire the land for cattle ranching or speculative purposes (Molano 1992). In other cases, oil 
companies themselves would force the peasants from the land. Catherine Legrand noted public land 
conflicts between settlers and landlords in 7 municipalities the Middle Magdalena between 1870 and 
1900, and a further 8 municipalities between 1900 and 1917 (Legrand, 1988: 111-112).  The result 
was that the initial processes of land privatisation in the frontier regions paved the way for peasant 
expulsion and land concentration in the hands of merchants and landlords.  
A recurrent theme pervading settlement zones such as the Middle Magdalena is that of the 
‘absent state’. What this means is that as frontier regions were increasingly integrated into market 
relations, the new needs that arose— for public services, infrastructure, administration, as well as 
institutional protections such as access to justice and land adjudication-- were not met by the state 
(Jaramillo 1988, 20-6). When the state did make its presence felt, it was not as an impartial adjudicator 
with ‘relative autonomy’ from a particular sector; rather, the local authorities were typically in the 
hands of landlords, merchants, and oil corporations, who used lawsuits over boundaries, possessions 
of parcels and water to usurp settlers (Alonso 1992; Legrand 1986; Molano 1992). Against this 
background, peasant settlers were isolated—geographically and economically, but also politically. 
Settlers existed in a ‘constant state of semi-legality’ (Buendía, 2003): they had no means of redress 
when disputes arose, and there were no institutions to which they could make demands.  Given these 
circumstances, from the perspective of the peasant settlers, when they inevitably ran into economic 
crisis the options were limited. They could sell the land, and move out further into the frontier to form 
another settlement. Another option was to take out another loan from the local merchant. Or finally 
they could abandon the land and move to the city to search for labour opportunities.  
Until the 1960s, settler peasants counted with little organisation or defence against landlord 
encroachments.  Land struggles in the region were rare, and where they did take place this tended to 
be only spontaneous and isolated. The first peasant movement of any significance to erupt in the 
region happened during La Violencia. General Rafael Rangel Gómez, a commander from the Comuna 
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de Barrancabermeja, fled to the countryside following the rebellion’s dissipation, where he organised 
a band of Liberal peasant guerrillas to launch attacks on Conservative militias and nearby towns. 
However, the movement was quickly demobilised and descended into banditry (De Rementería 
1986). The overwhelming tendency for early settlers was to cede the lands and move further into the 
frontier. In the Santander departments of the Middle Magdalena, for example, as oil companies and 
landlords made claim to peasants’ lands, after an initial dispute the peasants were forced to leave 
(Alonso, 1997: 76). As a result, the initial privatisation of public titles in this region was soon 
accompanied by massive land concentration. 
 
Conclusion: early capitalist transformations and peasant revolts 
The trajectories of agrarian change and class formation during Colombia’s transition to capitalist 
agriculture varied significantly between the temperate coffee-producing regions and the frontier 
lowlands. Whereas in coffee regions such as Líbano, tenants on the coffee estates were better placed 
to organise revolts, and the widespread protests throughout the 1920s and 1930s eventually led to the 
breakup of the hacienda, land redistribution and the development of the coffee industry on the basis 
of small family farms. Meanwhile, in the frontier, the precarious economic conditions of the petty 
commodity producers, together with the sporadic and uncoordinated nature of protest, left them 
vulnerable to landlord encroachments. In this region, capitalist development came hand in hand with 
rapid land accumulation in the hands of merchants and speculators.  
 The outcome of peasant protest during this period also established the political and economic 
conditions for the trajectory of development throughout the twentieth century.  The  coffee 
mobilisations of the 1930s concluded with limited land reform and the establishment of a system of 
smallholder protections under a new system of coffee corporatism, a system which provided the 
backbone for rapid capital accumulation without disrupting the political order. Meanwhile, the 
contradictions of the growth model were increasingly displaced to the agrarian frontier. state absence 
and disorganisation of settler peasants initially left them vulnerable to landlord encroachment, and 
privatisation of public plots was quickly followed by rapid land concentration. Thus, by the mid 
twentieth century Colombia’s peasantries were highly differentiated along class and geographical 
lines, but still lacking significant political representation and agrarian reform. The unresolved 
agrarian question provided the background for a new phase of transformation and class formation 
under the National Front. 
Chapter 4 






The termination of la Violencia together with the signing of the National Front (NF) power sharing 
agreement in 1958 marked a new phase in the development of agrarian capitalism and class struggle 
in the Colombian countryside. The National Front (1958-1974) provided a stable basis for rapid 
industrialisation, modernisation and state-building, but it was also a highly exclusionary political 
regime, which left the rapidly expanding working and popular classes without political representation. 
Under the NF, governments secured their legitimacy by incorporating urban middle classes as well 
as sectors of small and medium peasants, most notably those in the coffee industry, through an 
extensive system of protections and supports offered by Fedecafé. However, the NF failed to provide 
a solution to the long-term problems of land hunger and impoverishment for the majority of the rural 
poor, who were increasingly expelled from agriculture, either pouring into urban slums or venturing 
further into the agrarian frontier in the hope of securing land and livelihood. Motivated by Cold War 
fears and growing rural unrest, modernising elites within the Liberal party initiated an agrarian reform 
project that sought to placate medium and small peasant sectors, extend the basis of Liberal support 
and create the conditions for a model of economic growth with greater social redistribution.  
 This chapter examines the changing contours and dynamics of agrarian class formation and 
peasant struggles under the NF regime. In the 1960s, the promise of reform and the creation of the  
Asociacion Nacional de Usuarios Campesinos (ANUC) gave rise to new forms of agency and 
organisation amongst peasants as they unified into a national peasant movement. Even if the ANUC 
was created and ultimately controlled by the Liberal party, it nonetheless provided a space for new 
forms of independent organisation and coordination amongst peasants, representing a clear break 
from the ties of clientelism and patronage that had previously dominated peasant politics. The 
movement was comprised of various sectors of small and medium peasants and rural workers, but 
was led by tenant farmers, who centred on the tactic of land occupation with the goal of pushing the 
government to implement reforms. However, the peasant movement failed to weaken the power of 
landlords or spark a significant reform process. Instead, the growing militancy and radicalisation of 
the peasant movement spurred the elite to close ranks against reform, as cemented in the Chicoral 
pact of 1972. This political shift in the balance of forces was reinforced by a change in the economic 
growth model, as the abandonment of the  import-substitution model in favour of export-oriented 
growth both allowed landlords to transition to agrarian capitalists, and it also meant that the rural poor 
were no longer relevant as consumers, but instead provided endless supplies of cheap labour for the 
agro-export sector.  The closure of agrarian reform put an end to the potential alliance between broad 
sectors of the peasantry and the modernising Liberals, but it did not translate into the end of the 
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peasant question entirely. Instead, as land-hungry peasants migrated further into the frontier, they 
were increasingly organised under the guerrilla insurgencies and came to see the state as the enemy.  
 
The National Front and exclusionary rural development 
By the late 1950s, la Violencia had brought such high levels of conflict that Liberal and Conservative 
elites came to see it as a threat, and they quickly brought the conflict to a halt with the the National 
Front (NF) pact in 1958. The NF, which dominated the political scene officially until 1974 and 
unofficially until 1991, was a bipartisan coalition allowing Liberal and Conservative party leaders to 
share bureaucratic posts and rotate the presidency between them. The NF brought an end to bipartisan 
violence at least at the national level and replaced it with a form of  ‘restricted democracy’, which 
served to entrench the dominance of the two main parties and eliminate third party competition. It 
also established a system of governance involving the ‘nationalisation of clientelism’ (Safford and 
Palacios, 200: 324), allowing the state take over from local chiefs and clientelistic networks as the 
source of patronage, governing through elite pacts between political classes and trade federations of 
agribusiness, industrialists and bankers (Palacios, 2006: 170-2).   
Meanwhile, the exclusionary political system had left a rapidly expanding working class 
without independent political representation.  Severe restrictions were placed on unions, and labour 
strikes in strategically important economic sectors such as communications, social security and oil 
were outlawed (Dix 1967; Medina, 1997).  The two main union federations were deeply embedded 
in the bi-partisan system.  Communists were expelled from the CTC, which acted as the labour wing 
of the Liberal party, while the UTC was closely aligned with the church and the Conservatives. 
Unions served as vehicles for legitimising the National Front, disciplining labour and preventing 
conflicts. The NF allowed for a new phase of rapid capitalist development and modernisation to 
proceed with little compromise or negotiation with the popular classes.    
 Even if the NF prevented political reform, it nonetheless provided the framework for a period 
of rapid capitalist development and modernisation in the 1950s and 1960s.  With the cessation of 
conflict, the economy swiftly returned to normality, paving the way for a period of sustained growth 
throughout the rest of the 1950s and 1960s. But economic development was highly exclusionary and 
geographically uneven. The most dynamic centres of accumulation were the cities, where industry 
was making major inroads in substituting imported manufactures of basic consumer goods. Between 
1951 and 1964, the economy was growing at an annual rate of around 6 per cent, the number of people 
employed in industry increased by 70 percent, the value of manufactured goods by 130 per cent and 
the participation of manufacturing in GDP by 3.7 per cent annually. In the same period, the population 
grew from 11.2 million to 17.4 million, and its majority went from rural to urban (Safford and 
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Palacios 2002: 308). Between 1951 and 1964, the population shift from the countryside to the cities 
totalled about 2.3 million people (DANE, 2015).   
The role of agricultural development in this period of rapid industrial growth was twofold. 
First, agricultural exports, particularly in coffee, were essential in providing the hard currency needed 
to purchase industrial machinery and equipment from abroad. Second, agricultural development 
would provide the raw materials needed for industry, and food products for the expanding urban 
population (Bushnell 1993: 234-5; Zamosc, 1986: 19).  However, no sooner had ISI begun than it 
became apparent that agriculture was lagging behind industry. Throughout the 1950s, coffee 
production had remained at the same level of 6 million sacks a year (Junguito and Pizano, 1991: 34). 
Peasant production of basic foodstuffs was not sufficient to provide for the rapid growth in demand, 
and mechanised agriculture was not developing quickly enough to fill the gap. By the 1950s, labour 
productivity in agriculture had dropped to a third that of industry (MIESA, 1990: 7).  As a result, the 
country grew increasingly dependent on foreign loans to supplement its foreign reserves and imports 
of agricultural products to provide raw materials for industry and food for consumption (Fajardo, 
2002). The imbalances came to a head in the early 1960s, when a slump in international coffee prices 
drained the foreign reserves needed to buy industrial equipment abroad, resulting in a major balance 
of payment crisis (Kalmanovitz and López, 2001). 
This might have been a period of rapid industrial growth, but the benefits were not felt equally 
by all. Economic development opened a limited space for inclusion of middle and working classes 
and some sectors of middle peasants through public investment and corporatist protections. But this 
restricted extension of national citizenship did not include the majority of working poor. Income 
distribution had become more unequal: by 1970, the poorest half of the urban population received 16 
percent of total urban income, and the highest tenth over 43 percent. The contradictions were even 
sharper in the countryside, where two-thirds of inhabitants were living in “absolute poverty” (UNDP, 
2011).  The rise in inequality was partly due to the fact that industrial growth had failed to keep up 
with the massive population growth and rate of rural-urban migration: urban population growth rates 
of 6 percent in the 1960s doubled the rates of growth in urban employment (De Janvry, 1981: 136).   
The exclusionary model of economic growth meant that displaced peasants were increasingly looking 
for access to land, rather than waged employment as the principle means of reproduction. 
 
Death of the Peasantry? 
The question of the disappearance of the peasantry was the subject of vigorous debate throughout this 
period (Moncayo and Rojas, 1979; Kalmanovitz, 1978).  On the one hand, so-called descampesinista, 
or proletarianist scholars pointed to signs that the peasant economy was disintegrating in the face of 
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rapid capitalist development, as reflected in the strong growth of mechanised agriculture compared 
to the weak performance of traditional (or ‘peasant’) agriculture. Commercial crops had grown at a 
rate of 8 percent annually in the 1950s and 1960s, compared to just 1 percent for traditional crops 
(Kalmanovitz, 1978: 34). The portion of agricultural land dedicated to mechanised agriculture had 
grown from 12 percent of the total in 1955 to 49 percent in 1988 (MIESA 1990). This was 
accompanied by an increasing concentration of landed property. Large estates of 200 hectares or more 
represented only 1 per cent of farms, but 46 per cent of the country’s best lands, while small peasant 
owners on less than 5 hectares of land, represented two thirds of producers on only 6 percent of 
agricultural land (IGAC, 2012). As a result of the conflicts of the agrarian reform period, large estates 
on the fertile flat lands were turning from cattle ranching towards modern, mechanised agriculture.  
But despite evidence of the dissolution of peasant economies, they were far from being wiped 
out entirely. In the 1960s, small farms of under 20 hectares still accounted for 61 per cent of total 
agricultural output (MIESA, 1990). Meanwhile, many peasants displaced from the haciendas during 
this period were choosing not to migrate to the city but further to the countryside in the form of 
frontier migration. Although the rural population might have decreased its share in the total, overall 
numbers had in fact grown, from 7.1 to 8.4 million inhabitants between 1951 and 1964. But also the 
distinction between ‘modern’ and ‘peasant’ agriculture was no longer so clear. Rather, many analysts 
pointed out that small family farms were adopting modern techniques and hiring wage labour to 
varying degrees (Lehmann, 1986; Llambí, 1988). Moreover, for labour intensive crops grown in the 
cold mountainous areas, peasant farming seemed to have a number of advantages, as described in 
chapter three. Nonetheless, there is little doubt that during this period the 1960s the future of the 
peasantry was at a crossroads (Zamosc, 1986: 27). 
 For its part, the Colombian peasantry was highly diverse, characterised by a variety of class 
sectors with different demands. Peasants were differentiated along geographical lines as well as class 
structure, which generally fit into four main patterns: 1) smallholder peasants in the ‘traditional’  
peasant regions of the central and Southern Andes, who held secure land titles and  had access to 
technologies, credits and local markets;  second were the settler peasants of the agrarian frontier, who 
had migrated from the densely populated Andean mountains in search of subsistence  on previously 
unexplored lands in areas such as the Pacific and Atlantic coasts, the Amazon and the Magdalena 
Medio; 3) servile or semi-servile tenancy relations continued to tie peasants to landowners in regions 
where traditional latifundia still dominated, such as the Atlantic coast and the Eastern Llanos; and 4), 
a rural proletariat was rapidly emerging in areas where the hacienda structure had given way to 
commercial agriculture along the Atlantic coast, Magdalena valley and Valle de Cauca regions 
(Bagley 1988; Fals-Borda 1975; Nossa 1986; Machado, 1999; Valderrama and Mondragón, 1998; 
Zamosc: 1986). 
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 In political terms, the diverse groups of peasants that occupied the Colombian countryside 
were subject to processes of differentiation and far from constituting a ‘class’. This was the result of 
the conflicts of la Violencia, as well as the processes of capitalist development that had ensued. As 
previously discussed, the effect of la Violencia was not only to wipe out embryonic forms of inter-
class conflict, but also to generate intra-class conflicts, as peasants were pitted against each other 
along bi-partisan lines. A decade of bloodshed had generated a mass exodus from the countryside, 
and those who were left had little disposition to re-engage in conflict. The structure of the smallholder 
coffee economy was a major contribution to this weakness, as discussed in chapter five (Bergquist, 
1986). At the outset of the agrarian reform project, then, peasants were characterised by structural 
diversity, geographical isolation, few ties of solidarity and organisational weakness (Bagley, 1988: 
45; Zamosc, 1986: 39).  
 
Towards Agrarian Reform 
Historical sociologist Daniel Pécaut described how the National Front’s rigidity had given rise to ‘an 
opposition that, lacking a means of expression, turned toward a plan of radical rupture’ (Pécaut 1992: 
227). Throughout the 1960s the stability of the National Front came under threat from rising 
alternative political movements. Rojas Pinilla’s Alianza Nacional Popular (ANAPO) had gained 
popularity amongst the urban middle classes.  In language reminiscent of Gaitán's national-populism, 
Rojas Pinilla denounced the National Front as an alliance of oligarchs protecting their own privileges 
against the common people (Bushnell, 1993: 229). Meanwhile, throughout the continent guerrilla 
armies inspired by the success of the Cuban revolution were emerging, seeking to emulate the foco 
tactics of Fidel and Che. In Colombia such movements differed from their Latin American 
counterparts insofar as certain strands of them  also had domestic roots, since they challenged the 
political monopoly of the Liberals and Conservatives under the National Front.   
The background of growing dissent, in conjunction with the influence of US foreign policy, 
led the Colombian government to adopt an increasingly militaristic approach to the peasant question. 
Established in 1964, President Kennedy’s Plan Lazo/Laso (Latin American Security Operation) 
aimed at eradicating the communist threat through counter-insurgency operations.  Plan Laso oversaw 
the reorganisation of Latin American militaries, granting them greater autonomy from the state and 
providing counter-insurgent training for hunting out the ‘enemy within’ (Duncan 2006; Richani 2007; 
Stokes 2005). The School of the Americas provided detailed intelligence manuals for the policing of 
everyday society, searching for signs of communist subversion everywhere from public education 
systems to the  ‘refusal of peasants to pay rent, taxes, or loan payments or unusual difficulty in their 
collection’ (cited in Stokes, 2005: 241). It promoted “civic-military action” that would mobilise and 
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militarise rural communities around a counter-insurgent agenda (Galli, 1978).the NF government 
deemed these territories “independent republics” and in 1964 directed the army to attack. The strategy 
of aerial bombings killed thousands of settlers, representing the first time the government had used 
violent force against the settlers. The Colombian government’s adoption of US-led anti-insurgent 
strategy marked a decisive turn in peasant-state relations. No longer a potential, albeit ineffective 
ally, peasants increasingly came to see the state as the enemy. 
In response to the army assault on the self-defence enclaves in Marquetalia, the Communist 
Party set up the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC). From its origins organising 
small bands of peasant settlers in defence of landlord encroachments, the FARC gradually extended 
its operations to other areas, in particular to regions of recent peasant settlements in the East and 
South of the Cordillera Oriental, where they developed a strong support base amongst frontier settlers.  
Meanwhile, the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN) was formed in the Santander department of 
the Middle Magdalena Valley in the early 1960s by students who had recently returned from Cuba. 
The ELN conformed more to the typical model of Latin American national liberation guerrilla armies, 
with early combatants consisting mostly in students and intellectuals, and with strong roots in the 
Liberation Theology movement, and they counted among their leaders revolutionary Colombian 
Priest Camilo Torres and the Spanish Priest Manuel Perez (Broderick 1975; 2000). The FARC and 
ELN rarely confronted each other, but nor did they collaborate in any systematic way (Gott, 1971). 
The threat from outside forces demonstrated the erosion of power of the two traditional parties and 
the creeping presence of class conflict in the countryside. 
If one side of the state’s response to the threat of peasant revolts was repression, the other side 
was reform, and in the 1960s the peasant question returned to the state’s agenda. The Colombian 
experience of agricultural development had attracted international interest since the 1940s and 50s, 
when a series of envoys from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development entitled 
“Operation Colombia” presented the Colombian case as a showcase for success for developing 
countries (Currie, 1966).  As Currie saw it, the continuation of the latifundio-minifundio system 
presented the main obstacle to economic growth in agriculture. The minifundia were characterised by 
an over-use of labour on marginal land, while the latifundia monopolised the best lands for the 
purposes of speculation and cattle-raising (Currie 1966; Duff 1968: 152). Based on this analysis, 
Operation Colombia included a series of recommendations to stimulate “accelerated development”: 
a controversial model premised on large-scale mechanised agriculture and a massive transfer of the 
labour force to the cities (Brittain 2005).  
 Other analysts, however, were concerned by the implications of Currie’s proposals. Taking 
heed of the experience of the Cuban Revolution, policymakers associated with President Kennedy’s 
95 
1961 Alliance for Progress saw that such rapid transformations in agriculture could spark a backlash 
from peasants. The rapid development of commercial agriculture, so the argument went, would not 
solve the problems of rural unemployment and low incomes. A massive flow of rural outmigration 
would not be absorbed by urban industry, and the low consumption capacity of peasants would stifle 
the expansion of an internal market (Berry, 1997). In contrast to Currie’s model of accelerated rural 
development, the so-called ‘Wise men’ of the the Alliance for Progress proposed a series of land 
reform programs that would effectively placate peasant unrest by ‘accommodating their land hunger 
within a market-led framework’ (Araghi, 2012: 125). Colombia was the first of 20 countries to apply 
for aid under the Alliance (Galli, 1978). 
 This provided the background for the two agrarian reform laws implemented under the 
National Front (Laws 135 of 1961 and 1 of 1968). Introduced by two cousins in the Liberal party, 
Lleras Camargo (1958-62) and Lleras Restrepo (1966-70), the laws were based on a Keynesian-
inspired growth model of rural development-with-redistribution, which resembled the 
recommendations of the Alliance for Progress. For these ‘modernising’ sectors of the elite, the 
motivation for reform combined economic, social and political factors. In economic terms, state-led 
agrarian reform was defended as a means to promote rural development, strengthen small and 
medium landowning, increase rural incomes, expand domestic markets and stem the rapid outflow of 
migrant labour to the cities (Zamosc 1986: 48).   
 But the main driving force behind the reforms was political. Reform was seen as the only way 
to  to ‘pacify’ peasants and restore class harmony the countryside. In his defence of the reforms, 
President Lleras argued that: ‘a landless, cultureless, sick and roaming peasantry is the most inclined 
to subversion […]. Landowners must think of the danger posed by this illiterate, undernourished and 
landless peasant’ (Valderrama and Mondragón, 1998: 24). Despite the radical discourse adopted by 
many proponents of land reform, it is questionable to what extent the power of the landlords was ever 
seriously challenged.  From the outset Lleras conceded to landlords the promise that expropriations 
could be avoided so long as the land could be put to productive use. At first, the need for reform 
achieved broad consensus amongst the dominant classes (Rivera 1987; Zamosc: 1986). Yet the initial 
projects of land acquisition and redistribution orchestrated by the Colombian Institute of Agrarian 
Reform (INCORA) were hesitant, and it soon became apparent that land reform would only proceed 
with the backing of a major organisational effort from the peasantry itself. 
 
 “Land for the Tiller”: the National Peasant Movement 1967—1972 
The creation of the first nationwide political movement representing peasants, ANUC, in 1967 was 
not an initiative of the peasantry itself, but Liberal President Lleras. For Lleras, the role of the ANUC 
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was double-edged. On the one hand, an organised peasant movement would act as a counterbalance 
to the power of the landlords, pushing forward the stalled land reform project by presenting demands 
and administering state support.  On the other, it could detach the peasants from the traditional 
structures of power exerted over them by the regional political bosses and recreate it as a clientele 
base for the Liberal party, providing the basis for a new ‘progressive alliance’ between peasants, 
urban middle classes and industrialists (Rivera, 1987: 61). 
 The ANUC’s creation might have been a ‘from above’ initiative, but it nonetheless had 
important implications in terms of independent political organisation of the peasantry. In contrast to 
previous reform projects, the establishment of ANUC was based not on placating peasant activism 
but rather mobilising and strengthening it (Rivera 1987). ANUC’s creation involved a major 
nationwide campaign aimed at organisation, training and capacity building. Land reform movements 
with local leadership were mobilised to varying degrees throughout the country, with the main focus 
on areas of high land concentration, prioritising areas of high peasant unrest (Bagley, 1988; Zamosc, 
1986: 66-67). Its leadership was diverse, ranging from Liberal and Conservative affiliates to 
Trotskyist and Maoist influences.  
 However, the growing levels of independent organisation demonstrated in ANUC’s initial 
land invasions provoked a fierce backlash.  Landlords began evicting peasants from their estates and 
using local authorities to suppress peasant activism. Cattle ranchers and agribusiness associations 
launched major media campaigns delegitimising the ANUC as a “communist conspiracy” (Bagley, 
1988: 21-24; Rivera, 1987: 75; Zamosc, 1986: 66-67).  Landlord resistance meant that the success of 
reforms came to depend on more radical, even illegal, activity. The scenario spurred an increase in 
peasant militancy, and ANUC’s leadership adopted an increasingly radical orientation. In 1971 the 
radical currents within ANUC took control of the leadership, and pushed for a break from the state 
and greater organisational and ideological autonomy (Zamosc, 1986: 66-96). They proceeded to 
organise a wave of major nationwide land occupations, encouraging direct land invasions and putting 
forward a broad platform of demands from land to working conditions for rural labourers (Rivera, 
1987). The year 1971 saw a peak in peasant activation, and 645 land invasions took place across the 
country, including 333 in the Atlantic coast alone (Zamosc, 1986: 75). Tenants and sharecroppers 
were the most important forces in the invasions, representing 41 percent of invasions, followed by 
settlers (36 percent), agricultural labourers (18 percent), and Indigenous groups (5 percent) (Zamosc, 
1986: 84). Acting in response to these occupations, INCORA appropriated 73,183 hectares in this 
year (Fajardo, 2002: 48). 
 But as the land reform movement developed, it was confronted by growing contradictions 
from within its own social base. ANUC represented a heterogenous groups of peasants with different 
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interests and campaigns, and the radicalisation of the movement exposed the underlying tensions both 
in the social base and leadership. In some cases, the movement was a victim of its own success, as 
the mobilised peasants that were awarded lands in Atlantic and Casanare soon dissipated and 
disaffiliated from the movement. In areas characterised by more consolidated sectors of middle 
peasants there was little support for this radical orientation, and peasants were more concerned with 
access to credits and subsidies than land appropriations. In other areas, the problem was one of 
organisational cohesion, either with different leftist forces competing for leadership, or a lack of 
grassroots activism and political education. In regions such as the Atlantic coast where the illicit crop 
bonanza took hold, the movements were paralysed. The illegal economy abruptly ended social 
tensions, uniting landlords, peasants, merchants and local authorities around a shared common 
interest. The rapid development of commercial agriculture was generating processes of 
proletarianisation amongst peasants. Abandoning the land in favour of work on agro-export estates, 
rural labourers no longer identified with peasant-based demands (Bagley, 1986; Rivera Cusicanqui, 
1987; Zamosc, 1986). For their part, indigenous groups divided from the peasant movement and 
instead defended the restoration of indigenous culture and the resguardo system (Archila, 2003). 
Attempts by the leadership to forge a worker-peasant alliance to push for further progressive reforms 
were prevented by divisions within the labour movement, and the ANUC was unable to effectively 
coordinate opposition to the conservative counter-offensive (Bagley, 1986: 37-9). 
 Moreover, the growing militancy of the ANUC sparked panic amongst various sectors of the 
dominant classes. At the height of Cold War frenzy, Liberal and Conservative elites closed ranks to 
prevent the reforms. In January 1972, President Pastrana convened an emergency meeting in Chicoral 
to tackle the peasant problem.  Various representatives of the dominant class participated, including 
landowners, agribusiness, industrialists and politicians of the two traditional parties— all except the 
Llerista faction of the liberal party.  This ‘formal declaration of agrarian counter-reform’ (Zamosc, 
1986: 98) marked a new alliance between sectors of the dominant classes, who closed ranks to prevent 
compromising with peasantry, but also the development of a more radical movement (Fajardo, 2002; 
Mondragón, 2002). In organisational terms, power was restored to the Juntas de Accion Comunal 
(JAC), vertically integrated committees aligning various agrarian classes at a local level. By 
channeling state resources through these committees, the goal was to prevent horizontal organisation 
of the peasantry, and reinforce local patterns of patronage in the hands of Liberal and Conservative 
party bosses (Bagley, 1986; Londoño, 1993; Zamosc, 1986: 187). 
  Comparative studies of land reform throughout Latin America have suggested that the 
Colombian model was at best ‘marginal’ in terms of its impact (de Janvry and Sadoulet, 1990; García 
1977; Kay 1998; Machado 2002). In 1972, of the half a million families that had applied for land, 
only 13,000 titles had been granted (Perry 1985: 111). The reforms had little impact on land 
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concentration, and may have even aggravated it. Realising the danger posed by the movement, 
landlords across the country reacted to agrarian reform laws by expelling tenants, and building local 
militias and death squads to defend their estates. By the 1980s it was revealed that of the 3.3 million 
hectares titled by INCORA, 60 percent were now in the hands of large farmers and ranchers (Balcázar 
2001). This was a continuation of the historic tendency for peasants to clear the land before ceding it 
to landlords and merchants. 
 This shift in the internal balance of forces was reinforced by changes in the national economic 
growth model and its relation to the world market. As previously discussed, part of the support for 
land reform amongst sectors of the political elite came from the reasoning that it would modernise 
agriculture away from the ‘backwards’ latifundio-minifindio model, and because higher rural incomes 
would boost domestic markets. But because of changes in the capitalist world economy, by the 1970s 
‘the historic notion of redistributive land reform as a gravedigger of feudal landed property was no 
longer applicable to the countrysides of the South’  (Bernstein, 2009: 247).  By now the traditional 
estate owners were demonstrating their capacity to respond to incentives to modernise their estates 
and convert them into productive commercial agro-export farms, thereby undermining the 
justification for reform.  Moreover, since capital accumulation was being re-oriented away from 
internal market expansion towards a new phase of export-led growth based on agro-industrial crops 
such as palm, sugar and soy this new class of commercial farmers enjoyed significant power within 
the economic development agenda (Galli, 1978; Griffin, 1979). They exerted power through 
influential lobby groups such as large farmers’ lobby, the SAC (Sociedad de Agricultores 
Colombianos). This privileged position in the growth model acted as a bulwark against the threat of 
expropriation.   
 At the same time, the orientation of economic growth towards export markets removed the 
pressure to establish the peasantry within domestic markets. Since the economic arguments 
supporting inward-oriented growth through smallholder production and domestic market expansion 
were no longer part of the nation-building project, agrarian reform lost its impetus on the national 
development agenda. Instead, peasants’ role in national development would be to provide ‘unlimited’ 
pools of surplus labour—depressing wages in the export sector and rendering it more competitive. 
This paved the way for a path of landlord-led modernisation through export-led growth on the back 
of cheap agricultural labour, while bypassing the resolution of the peasant question (Nossa 1986).  
 The declining weight of the smallholder economy and its reduced relevance for economic 
growth undermined the political weight of the peasant movement.  In the new growth model, peasants 
were ‘exploited and excluded’ (Rubio, 2001)— marginalised both in geographic terms from the most 
fertile agricultural land, but also economically from the main circuits of capital accumulation. 
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Whereas the agricultural sector represented 40 percent of the national economy in 1945, by 1984 it 
was just 11 percent (BNR, 2015). The share of peasant agriculture in total production, which stood at 
about two thirds in the 1960s, declined to less than a third in the 1980s— although this figure is 
somewhat misleading, as discussed above (Zamosc, 1986: 50). Rapid rural-urban migration meant 
that between 1964 and 1973 the share of the urban population went from 53 to 60 percent of the total. 
Meanwhile, the domestic food shortage was addressed by opening barriers to cheap imports of US 
grains, and by the late 1970s Colombia was importing over 85 percent of its wheat requirement (Galli, 
1978).  
 Against this background, for the Colombian elite, a more efficient solution to the peasant 
question involved not a challenge to the property regime, but greater militarisation. The ANUC 
suffered severe repression, including the assassination of of several leaders (CNRR, 2013). 
Decapitated by the violence, but also fraught by sectarian divides and factionalist leadership, the 
ANUC was distanced from its base and eventually succumbed to internal divisions, while its more 
radical wing was isolated (Bagley, 1986; Rivera, 1987; Zamosc 1986: 97-104). Whereas the ANUC 
had initiated 645 land invasions in 1971, in the three years between 1978 and 1981, just 6 took place 
(Mondragón, 2002). Meanwhile, the Communist threat appeared to have been quelled by a series of 
army assaults on the FARC. Combats, desertions and captures had reduced the guerrilla forces by 70 
percent by the early 1970s, and only a small handful of soldiers persisted in frontier regions such as 
the Middle Magdalena, Cauca and Tolima (Medina 2010: 355).  
 
1972-78: Counter-reform and frontier migration as an ‘escape valve’ 
The closure of land reform left a permanent scar on the development of capitalism in the Colombian 
countryside. All traces of reform were erased, and the state was re-established as an instrument for 
defending the interests of the landed classes. The Chicoral pact marked a breakdown in the potential 
alliance between the bourgeoisie and the peasantry within the liberal party, and a new phase was 
ushered in allowing Colombia’s agrarian question to be dominated by the most conservative faction 
of the ruling classes: large landowners, cattle ranchers and agribusiness, who mobilised around a 
counterinsurgency agenda premised on repression, massacres and dispossession, initiating a new era 
of ‘counter-agrarian reform’. 
 The two ‘counter-agrarian reform’ laws (4 of 1973 and 6 of 1975) established that estates 
already engaged in productive activities could not be expropriated, which effectively closed the door 
to the possibility of land redistribution. Instead, the only option for peasants to access lands would be 
titles to the public lands in the agrarian frontier. A second law permitted a return to sharecropping in 
order to ‘restore stability to the countryside’ (Fajardo 2014: 70). The result was not only to undermine 
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the land redistribution that had taken place in the previous era, but to actively reverse it. The few 
haciendas that had been acquired were returned to their original owners, and by the end of the year, 
90 percent of landed property remained intact (De Janvry and Sadoulet 1989; De Janvry 1981). 
Landownership became more concentrated. In 1966, small farms of 5 hectares or less represented 67 
per cent of the farm types and covered just 5 per cent of the total agricultural land, by 1996 they 
represented 65 per cent of farms on 3 per cent of the total agricultural land. In contrast, in 1966 farms 
of over 500 hectares covered 29 per cent of cultivated land; by 1996 they accounted for 61 per cent 
(Balcázar et al. 2001). 
 Following the failure of land reform, two alternative solutions to the peasant question 
emerged.  First, frontier migration programs were initiated as an ‘escape valve’ to relieve agrarian 
tensions and stem the flows of rural-urban migration. Between 1970 and 1984, programs for land 
access though further recolonisation into the agrarian frontier in the Amazon and Pacific regions 
benefitted 193,000 peasants, who colonised 18 million hectares of frontier territories (Fajardo, 2014). 
But the program had other unforeseen consequences. Peasants that had been mobilised and organised 
within the ANUC were left without representation, and sent into the agrarian frontier zones where 
the guerrilla armies were able to quickly extend their reach. In these frontier zones, peasants’ 
suppressed demand for land was reprojected into a far more dangerous force: the guerrilla insurgency 
(Bagley, 1986: 48; Mondragón, 2002: 37). The FARC led the way in armed ‘repeasantisation’ 
projects, and was quickly propelled to a leadership role in representing peasant resistance in the 
frontier. Thus, in seeking to extinguish the movement for reform, the colonisation program ended up 
fuelling a new phase in Colombia’s armed rebellion. 
 A second solution came from the Integrated Rural Development (DRI) program. The idea 
behind the DRI was to ‘resolve’ the problem of the stagnation of peasant economies through the 
introduction of technologies. Promoted and funded by the Rockefeller Foundation, the Inter-
American Development Bank and the World Bank, the DRI represented the Colombian chapter of 
the Green Revolution: a package of improved variety seeds and fertilisers and other agrochemicals, 
as well as an elaborate system of tax incentives, tariffs, services and credits with the objective of 
increasing smallholder productivity levels and stemming rural-urban migration.  The Green 
Revolution facilitated greater market dependence among peasants and the emergence of capitalist 
agriculture “from below”, integrating peasants into world market relations (Akram-Lodhi 2013: 92; 
Galli, 1978; García, 1973, 1981). The benefits of this program for peasants were minimal: 
smallholders may have increased their productivity, but the gains of these increases were offset by a 
drop in prices (Jaramillo 2001: 33). The DRI was also reflective of a broader shift in global policy, 
which now looked to resolve the problems of rural poverty through development programs that could 
raise the productivity of small farms, rather than redistributive land reform that would confront the 
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structures of wealth, property and power (Akram-Lodhi, 2013; Galli, 1978). As Fajardo describes, 
the DRI ‘facilitated the “transition” of policy away from the inefficient land reforms […] towards 
other initiatives with less discord from powerful sectors’ (2013: 83). 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has focused on the role of agrarian class relations and class-state coalitions in shaping 
path the agrarian transition followed during the period of rapid capitalist development, 
industrialisation and modernisation of the 1960s and 1970s. Following the failure of the land reform 
movement, the ‘transition’ to capitalism was completed through the transformation of ‘pre-capitalist’ 
landed property into capitalist farms. Meanwhile, the inequalities of the capital-intensive model of 
growth meant that a growing, fragmented reserve army of labour was left to seek out subsistence in 
the context of a growing crisis of labour. Displaced peasants and precarious workers increasingly 
turned to frontier migration, seeking out land as a refuge from the escalating labour crisis.  
Chapter 5 
Divergent trajectories of agrarian change and class formation 





The failure of land reform marked a definitive shift in relations between peasants and the state. 
Whereas from the 1930s to the 1960s, factions of the Liberal elite had courted peasant support with 
promises of land reform and promotion of small farmer agriculture, by the early 1970s it became 
clear that peasants’ hopes could not be fulfilled. Following the collapse of the reformist alliance that 
had allowed for the creation of the ANUC, the state withdrew its promise of long-term solutions to 
peasants’ problems through land reform and rural development, instead solidifying its allegiance with 
landlords on the basis of export-led growth and cheap labour. The state increasingly turned away 
from its strategy of incorporation of small peasants, and new processes of commodification of 
farming processes gave way to rapid differentiation and marginalisation in the coffee regions. 
Meanwhile, the state increasingly resorted to repression in dealing with social tensions. 
 In the context of the failure of agrarian reform and rapid economic growth of the 1960s to the 
1980s, the transition to capitalism in the frontier and coffee regions followed two divergent paths. 
The first was a junker path in the agrarian frontier, led by landlords who transitioned to large-scale 
commercial farming and speculation, while expelling peasants and appropriating their lands. In these 
regions, the predatory landed classes left a sector of settler peasants intact on the most marginal 
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territories, where they survived through petty commodity and subsistence production, while subjected 
to ongoing processes of semi-proletarianisation. The second was a more limited middle peasant path 
of small and medium coffee farmers created through favourable state policies and geographical 
conditions. This sector benefitted from green revolution technologies and was subject to rapid 
processes of commodification and differentiation during the coffee price boom of the 1970s. 
 This chapter explores how these very divergent spatial trajectories of agrarian change were 
associated with different processes of class formation between Líbano and the Cimitarra valley. 
During this period of rapid and exclusionary capitalist development, peasants were pushed into new 
social relations, incorporated into emergent political projects and forced to adopt new livelihood 
strategies. Different sets of small farmers in each region also drew on different cultural traditions and 
tools in order to make sense of these changes and continue to survive in the face of rapid change. A 
comparison of the frontier and coffee regions demonstrates how the different character of the two 
peasant movements during this period are explained by variations in geographical processes of 
capitalist development, trajectories of state-building and the cultural traditions and political 
leadership amongst peasants. In the frontier regions, the privatisation of public lands together with 
state abandonment meant settler peasants were forced to reconstruct their livelihoods through 
recolonisation, subsistence farming, and collective work. As a result, peasants in the frontier regions 
persisted through a combination of market and non-market relations and the formation of political 
associations autonomous of the state. The history of relations based on self-reliance, collective work 
and self-defence against the predations of latifundio, together with the rural-urban solidarities and 
political leadership of the Communist party were closely associated with the radical traditions of 
solidarity and reciprocity, alongside a culture of resistance to latifundio and the state.  Meanwhile, in 
the coffee regions, the context of land reform and the provision of subsidies and protections to small 
and medium farmers under the aegis of Fedecafé allowed for the emergence of a sector of small, 
capitalised family farmers highly dependent on money for their household reproduction. These are 
associated with weaker community ties, competition and a strong dependence on networks of 
patronage within the bipartisan system. The introduction of green revolution technologies paved the 
way for the technification and commodification of farming processes, pushing farmers into greater 
dependency on the state, reinforcing ties of patronage between political bosses and peasants whilst 
also driving new processes of differentiation and segmentation. 
 
Trajectories of state formation 
The National Front may have created the conditions for the modernisation of the national economy, 
but in the rural provinces the issue of state formation was yet unresolved. The development of 
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capitalist agriculture and state formation were both highly uneven and contentious processes in the 
countryside. The state continued to have very little presence particularly in zones of recent settlement.  
As Roldán observed, ‘for most Colombians the central state was an abstract concept and power was 
largely exercised and determined locally or regionally, not in Bogotá’ (2002: 296). While business 
and landowning groups played a major role in organising economic policy from above, for most 
Colombians politics was a question of localised power struggles, as regional elites struggled to secure 
their dominance in the midst of rapid socio-economic changes through varying degrees of coercion 
and consent.   
Processes of state-making were very different between the coffee regions and agrarian 
frontier.  In coffee regions such as Tolima, local clientelistic networks came to be replaced by 
corporatist state institutes as the new source of patronage. Founded in 1927 as a national trade 
association by large coffee growers and coffee merchants, the National Federation of Coffee Growers 
of Colombia (Fedecafé) provides an illustrative example of the new model of corporatist governance 
that acted as the backbone of social stability during the developmental period. The creation of 
Fedecafé was a response to both the growing social conflicts in the coffee industry and the balance 
of payments crisis of the late 1920s, which led to the abandonment of laissez-faire model in favour 
of interventionism, although without ever abandoning the basic tenets of liberalism in the coffee 
market (Palacios, 2002). Fedecafé had two main purposes: to fully insert Colombia into the world 
market, and to ‘rationalise’ the rather dispersed and complex processes of coffee production, making 
it a predictable and profitable industry (London, 1991; Palacios, 1980). To achieve this would require 
intervention at the international level to be achieved by favourable exchange rates and international 
coffee policies. Domestically, it involved internal regulation of coffee production with a series of 
mechanisms such as points of sale and warehouses (London, 1991; Palacios, 1980). 
 Although Fedecafé was dominated by the coffee elite, it paid attention all types of coffee 
producer— small, medium and large, and often justified its activities in terms of defending small 
farmers (London, 1991: 55; Ocampo, 1997). This contrasted with the SAC, which exclusively 
represented large landowners and capitalist farmers. The attitude of the so-called Antioqueño elite 
that dominated Fedecafé reflected a changing orientation of capital accumulation away from the 
hacienda in favour of small and medium farmers through a corporatist model of governance. Founder 
Mariano Ospina Pérez explicitly associated peasant unrest with the latifundio system, arguing that: 
‘we live in exceptionally grave times and any moment lost may be decisive. It is necessary to group 
at the foot of one of the two flags: the red one of revolution, or the white one of peace, progress and 
reconciliation’ (cited in Saether 1999: 26). The so-called Antioqueño model of rural development 
instead promoted agrarian reform and the predominance of small property owners.  The Federation 
celebrated small producers as a model for liberal rural democracy, and an exemplary of tenacity and 
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survival in the face of changing world market conditions (Palacios, 1981). Its goal was both to 
‘rationalise’ and ‘modernise’ the production process, whilst simultaneously placating revolutionary 
threats. 
 Through its elaborate system of economic protections, which included a price guarantee 
policy, storage facilities and access to credits and rural services, Fedecafé developed an impressive 
ability to incorporate small farmers into its organisational machine. Líbano became a focal point for 
Fedecafé’s activities, hosting its regional committee from which municipal boards and technical 
campaigns were launched. For peasants, affiliation to the Federation provided everything from access 
to credits and inputs to improved local services, and even a discount at the local supermarket. 
Fedecafé thus became the cornerstone of a stable social structure resting on the back of a relatively 
prosperous and quiescent peasantry firmly integrated into the world coffee economy. 
Meanwhile, in the agrarian frontier, the process of state formation followed a very different 
logic. In territories such as the Middle Magdalena, colonisation was often led by multinational 
corporations which ruled through coercion, while local state acted as an ‘unveiled instrument of class 
rule’, characterised by violence, dispossession and the exercise of control through coercive state and 
non-state actors such as police, paramilitaries, and security apparatuses (Uribe 1990: 32).  The period 
immediately following la Violencia saw a new wave of privatisation of public lands. Between 1931 
and 1971, around 214,000 land titles were awarded, totalling 11 million hectares of land. In contrast 
to the previous period, when colonisation had predominantly taken place on the middle slopes, this 
new wave of colonisation was mostly carried out in agrarian frontier territories such as Middle 
Magdalena and Amazonian territories. Most of these titles were for large properties of 15,000 hectares 
or over. In the Puerto Berrío municipality, for example, three plots of 65,000 has each were awarded 
to three members of a single family (Machado 2009: 288).  
However, despite the rapid privatisation of public lands, in many of these zones of recent 
settlement the state still had little or no territorial presence. In these territories provision of basic 
services, infrastructure and administration was sporadic and discontinuous, with the construction of 
transport links serving more to open up export enclaves to the world market facilitated by the US 
state and multinational corporations like the United Fruit Company on the Atlantic coast, or the 
Standard Oil Company in the Magdalena river valley. While this is often characterised as state 
absence, a more accurate depiction is provided by historian Uribe’s term ‘unilateral presence’ , 
existing ‘as a naked power, appearing only as a repressive force, as just another agent in the conflict 
and not as an adjudicatory, regulatory or organisational body’ (Uribe 1990: 32). 
 The result was that capitalism in the agrarian frontier continued to develop through predatory 
landed property, as landlords continued to accumulate lands through violence and fraud against settler 
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peasants. Absent any clearly established juridical order, the legal system failed to offer a dispute 
mechanism to redress the conflicts between landlords and peasants (Legrand 1989; Buendía 2003). 
Rather, the local authorities were typically in the hands of landlords and merchants, who used lawsuits 
over boundaries, possessions of parcels and water to usurp settlers (Legrand 1986; Molano 1992).  
The result was not only an increase in land concentration in these regions, but also that the state never 
established its authority, nor did it enjoy respect or legitimacy in the eyes of the local population.  
Since its presence was only experienced through the intervention of armed forces or political bosses, 
settlers increasingly came to see the state as the enemy. As a result, in the period following la 
Violencia, settler-landlord relations in the frontier became more conflictive, and so too changed the 
relation between peasant settlers and the state, which came to be seen as ‘the enemy’. 
 
The Green Revolution in Coffee Farming 
In the coffee regions Fedecafé responded to the threat of peasant unrest with a new program of 
agrarian reform and technological packages. Another round of agrarian reform broke up the 
remaining haciendas. INCORA intervened in almost all of the large haciendas that operated on 
sharecropping labour systems in the region, as demonstrated in the change of tenancy arrangements. 
Between 1959 and 1976, the number of agregados supervising haciendas declined from over 2,000 
to just 86 (Sánchez, 1991: 148). Yet the termination of hacienda relations was not necessarily 
accompanied by changes in landowning structures. In Líbano only two haciendas in marginal lands 
were broken up, while the remaining farms were simply discharged (Errazuriz, 1986; Rincón, 2005). 
 The second, more significant change in coffee farming was the ‘period of technification’, 
which began in the 1960s with the introduction of Green Revolution technologies into coffee farming 
processes. Although the coffee areas were not included among the DRI regions, Fedecafé conducted 
a parallel program which, funded by a price boom in the world coffee market, would bring even more 
benefits to the peasants than the DRI.  As London has argued, for Fedecafé: ‘technification of 
production appeared to be the solution for, not only the productivity problems, but also the social 
problems of the coffee zones’ (London 1994: 96). The driving logic behind these modernisation 
programs was to promote increased productivity in coffee farming by deepening commodity relations 
amongst small coffee farmers. It consisted in a technical package totalling USD $322 million, which 
introduced a new high-yielding variety of coffee, Caturra, to replace the traditional Arabica variety 
(Ramírez 2009).  In Líbano the new varieties were incorporated quickly; by 1980 53 percent of coffee 
produced in the region was of the new variety, and Líbano rose to become one of the most important 
coffee exporting regions of the country (Rincón, 2005: 339). 
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 In order to grow the new variety peasants were required to make a number of changes in 
farming procedures. Whereas Arabica could be reproduced by peasant farmers themselves through 
transplanting a seedling which then propagated into another tree, arabica had to be bought afresh with 
every new harvest. Caturra also required chemical fertilisers, which meant that nutrients that had 
previously been provided by the detritus of the chickens or pigs on the farm now had to be purchased 
too. Furthermore, it was a non-shade variety, which meant that peasants would have to eliminate the 
fruit-growing trees they had grown alongside coffee and increasingly revert to mono-cultivation. The 
non-shade variety directly exposed coffee trees to the sun, which put them more at risk from attacks 
from insects, plant viruses and fungus. This meant that farmers would also have to invest more in 
pesticides. The procedures of depulping, fermenting, washing, drying and packaging could no longer 
be undertaken with household tool, but required purchase of modern tools and equipment. As a result, 
peasants made a number of updates to the production process, such as incorporating drying sheds into 
the structure of their house. Whereas previously, coffee farming had been a relatively simple 
procedure that could be adapted into peasant polyculture production systems, the adoption of new 
technical packages forced peasants to alter their farming methods in line with a reconfigured 
economic logic. Older Líbano farmers were keenly aware of the importance of these changes: 
Before, if you walked down the street you could see women sitting at tables outside their farms selling coffee 
seedlings and other basic crops. You don’t see that any more, now we buy everything from the shop 
We used to produce a lot— fruits like zapote, oranges, mangos alongside the trees. But when we planted the 
Caturra varieties we adopted the culture of monocultivation. We tore down the surrounding trees and forests, 
we grew more dependent on chemicals and agro-inputs and we had to ask for more credits from the banco 
cafetero (Interview, Danilo Ramírez 2017) 
The result of these changes was that farmers who had once counted with some degree of self-
sufficiency came to depend increasingly on markets for their reproduction. Since peasants’ access to 
all these new means of production (seeds, fertilisers, pesticides etc) could only come through 
Fedecafé, the deepened commodification of peasant subsistence simultaneously brought greater 
dependence on the state and the world market.  
 In order to ensure technical packages would be adopted by peasants, Fedecafé set up the 
research centre Cenicafé. Cenicafé’s job was to convince small farmers of the benefits of adopting 
new production techniques, which allowed them to improve their efficiency and compete in world 
markets. North Tolima was selected for the establishment of experimental and research centres that 
directly depended on Cenicafé.   The success of these extension services required the active 
participation of local peasant producers, and Fedecafé began a campaign to incorporate such 
producers as card carrying members into its organisational structure. The Coffee Growers 
Cooperative of Líbano was founded in 1960, and counted with around 1,145 affiliates (Errazuriz, 
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1986: 321). In order to gain access to technical assistance, as well as seeds, fertilisers, and credits, 
peasants were organised into a network of groups known as “Amistades”, which acted as the 
connection between peasants and Cenicafé. Amistades offered privileged access to new technologies: 
producers were provided with training in the renovation of production procedures, administration and 
accounting with the goal of encouraging competitive production amongst coffee farmers through 
consistent improvements in productivity and efficiency. Around 69 percent of producers actively 
participated, resulting in a massive boost to productivity levels (Talbot 2004: 75; London, 1994: 6).  
Thus small farmers’ integration with the outside world and sense of belonging to a broader political 
community remained largely within the confines of regional Fedecafé institutes. 
 For small farmers, the changes may have boosted productivity, but they also implied a massive 
increase in input costs. While the initial investments for the traditional variety had amounted to 
around 33,000 pesos for the first three years, the high-yielding varieties required around 108,000— 
a 69 percent increase (Rincón, 2005: 346). In total, the herbicides and pesticides came to represent 
around half of production costs. All these new purchases meant a significant rise in household 
expenditure, since farmers needed more cash in order to buy the inputs. In order to cover the expenses, 
farmers became increasingly dependent on selling a greater portion of their crops on the market. 
Whereas previously, coffee farmers had combined their coffee crops with food crops for domestic 
consumption, they now dedicated more and more of their plots to coffee production. This is the 
process through which, as Akram-Lodhi puts it: ‘the market imperatives of the capitalist economy 
became binding’ (2013: 92).    
 Since the introduction of technological packages demanded significant amounts of capital, 
another outcome of this change was to draw coffee farmers more deeply into monetary markets. A 
series of regional financial corporations were created at the end of the 1960s to strengthen productive 
and commercial credit processes, including the National Coffee Fund and the Banco Cafetero 
(Junguito, 1978: 446). A new system of transport and the creation of a new collection centre 
concentrated all coffee production in the hands of Fedecafé, which took over as only financial 
intermediary in the region managing resources invested in the production, marketing and expansion 
of coffee production (Errazuriz, 1986: 317). The federated credit system allowed Fedecafé to disburse 
large credits in order for farmers to access technologies. Access to credit became a crucial issue for 
small coffee farmers. Between 1973 and 1975, Líbano farmers were awarded a total of around $13.5 
million in credits (Rincón, 2005: 349). This fundamentally changed farming processes, drawing small 
coffee farmers more tightly into global commodity chains and creating new relations of dependency 
on technical inputs, and, as a result, states and global capital. During the coffee boom that began in 
1975, this resulted in a massive increase in incomes for coffee farmers of 80 per cent (ibid.). The 
coffee boom attracted a new coffee bourgeoisie to the region, consisting of retired professionals, 
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politicians and military generals, who quickly established mid-sized plots with privileged access to 
Fedecafé’s systems of support. It also created raised expectations among small farmers, who 
attempted to take out further loans to benefit from the boom (Rincón, 2005: 356). 
 However, the technification and commodification of coffee production was associated with 
new processes of differentiation. For the larger farmers who could afford the technological 
improvements immediately, the transition presented no major barrier, and they were able to take 
advantage of the coffee price boom of the 1970s. Yet Fedecafé also changed its policy towards small 
farmers, who went being the ‘hero’ to the ‘villain’ (Palacios, 1986). Since they had lower 
productivity, occupied more marginal lands and had precarious economic situations, small farmers 
were ‘marginalised without being officially excluded from Fedecafé’s system of controls’. (Errazuriz, 
1986: 232) Smaller farmers had far more difficulty gaining access to credits and technologies through 
Fedecafé. They waited longer to receive credits for technical conversion, and by the time the new 
varieties had been planted and become ready for harvesting, the 1970s boom had turned into a bust 
(Hough, 2007: 80). It was only those peasants affiliated to Fedecafé’s “Amistad” groups who were 
granted access to credits and technologies, while smaller peasants unable to meet Fedecafé’s 
requirements became increasingly marginalised from the new production processes.  
 Increasing competition in the world market, together with unequal access to Fedecafé’s 
supports, generated new forms of inequality and segmentation between coffee producers.  By the 
1980s many smaller producers had fallen into debt. Smaller farmers were increasingly compelled to 
seek work on other farms to pay back their loans, or sell up and move, either to the city or the agrarian 
frontier. Meanwhile larger farmers expanded their enterprises and bought up the lands (Errazuriz, 
1986). The result was that the expansion of coffee production throughout the 1960s and 1970s created 
a coffee sector characterised by greater concentration in terms of landholdings and more 
differentiation along class lines. Between 1970 and 1980 plots of under 2 hectares diminished from 
14 to 3 per cent of total farms,  and plots of 2-5 hectares declined from 27 to 19 per cent. Meanwhile, 
plots of 15 to 50 hectares grew from 17 to 24 hectares (Rincón, 2005: 353). Thus, the technification 
of coffee production from the 1970s created a coffee sector that was more concentrated in terms of 
access to resources and ownership, and more differentiated along class lines.  
 The isolation and fragmentation of Líbano’s small farmers resulted in very weak community 
ties. Social relations were directly reflected in access to Fedecafé, which privileged the new coffee 
bourgeoisie of medium farmers, while smaller producers were increasingly marginalised, driven into 
debt and forced to take up seasonal employment on larger farms. Farmers desperately worked to 
increase their production in the hope of attaining social mobility, while the dynamics of market 
dependence, individualised production and fragmented plots left little space for the type of mutual 
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assistance and collective work that characterised the frontier territories. Exit was the most attractive 
survival option, and rapid outmigration only propelled the disintegration in community ties. 
Collective work at the level of the JACs ceased as neighbours grew increasingly mistrustful of one 
another. Thus, small farmers’ resentment was reflected in instances of migration, fence moving and 
low productivity, but resistance was restricted only to ‘everyday’ forms.  
 That is not to say that there had been no efforts at organisation. From the 1960s Communist, 
ANAPO and Maoist organisers had made efforts to unionise small coffee farmers and workers. A 
“union of coffee workers” even emerged with a handful of participants in Líbano and neighbouring 
villages. Yet organising activities remained peripheral, and failed to establish and moorings in their 
social base. Left organising remained marginal, while Liberal party bosses retained their grip on local 
politics through the concentration of political power and the management of economic resources.  
Important figures from the government and Catholic church made regular visits to the affected areas 
to re-establish the sense of prestige and respect for authority of the region. Local cacique Alfonso 
Jaramillo Salazar acted as Liberal party boss, landowner and Fedecafé representative. Jaramillo’s 
power was based on local coffee production, granting access to Fedecafé’s resources in exchange for 
favours and votes. Jaramillo acted as a political broker in the region, using his access to state resources 
such as the almacenes, cooperativas, credits and the construction of local services in exchange for 
political loyalties. He also brought prestige to the region by sponsoring bullfight festivals, and often 
reinforced bonds of personal dependency.  In turn, peasants reciprocated the ‘favours’ at election 
time, by voting for the party boss or his Liberal allies, reinforcing paternalistic relations.  Thus the 
strong development of the coffee industry reinforced the hegemony of the local political elites and 
displaced left wing forces. 
 Clientelism had an individualising effect on peasants, disarticulating them from one another, 
decollectivising their demands and acting as vehicles for the representation of interests within the 
state. As Zamosc describes, it engenders a ‘pragmatic and opportunist mentality,’ where ‘the subjects 
of power are made accomplices in their own political alienation’ (Zamosc, 1992: 50). Coffee growers 
were integrated into consumer society with all its ideologies. It entails adopting a market rationality, 
a belief that rewards will come through hard work, increased productivity and efficiency that provides 
the social foundations for liberal democracy (London, 1991). As coffee farmers learned the values of 
small property ownership, efficiency and adaptation, so the founding ideologies of capitalism were 
reproduced on a micro-scale (Bergquist 1986). It also engenders a sense of dependency on the 
institutions of capital: if a problem arises, it is the Fedecafé technician that can provide the solution, 
whereas political action is useless or counterproductive. The conversion of politics into a system of 
transaction undermines independent action. 
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Frontier migration and new forms of political class formation in the Middle Magdalena 
In the frontier territories of the Middle Magdalena, a very different trajectory of class formation 
unfolded. As chapter four described, the state responded to the failed agrarian reform process by 
initiating a new program of frontier colonisation, instead announcing that landless peasants would be 
given land titles and development assistance. This motivated many peasants to migrate to new frontier 
regions like the Middle Magdalena, Urabá and Caquetá with raised expectations of making 
subsistence from the land. However, the government’s promise of assistance failed to materialise. 
Instead, resources were captured by landlords, who continued to accumulate lands in the frontier 
through appropriation and expulsion of peasants. Peasants were abandoned by the state, and faced 
the age-old threats of dispossession and semi-proletarianisation (Alonso, 1997; Rementería, 1987: 
337). 
 Although the land reform project failed to significantly change the fate of peasants, it certainly 
did change the orientation of landlords. The threat of reform, together with an influx of credits and 
technology allowed landlords to convert their estates into palm oil plantations on the river banks in 
Santander municipalities (Kalmanovitz and López 2006; Machado and Briceno 1995). The arrival of 
palm was a major impulse for the commodification of social relations in the region, transforming the 
traditional latifundia into a new social structure based on agrarian capitalism. As Cadavid describes, 
palm oil ‘was an initial step for dissolving the pre-capitalist modes of the region’, bringing ‘a new 
logic of “progress” and “modernity” to spheres that had formerly taken a traditional and stilted 
attitude to development’ (1996: 31). The transformations brought an influx of migrant labourers to 
the region. While some workers obtained permanent employment on the plantations, palm production 
mostly relied on temporary workers who could subsist on their own plots when their labour was not 
needed (García 2006). Thus, the arrival of palm workers increased the pressure for land, further 
fuelling rural tensions (Prada 2006; Zamosc 2006).  
 The new arrivals of peasant settlers would probably have suffered a similar fate to that of their 
predecessors— disintegration and expulsion— were it not for the addition of a new dynamic into the 
settlement process: the organisational capacity of the Communist Party. Beginning with its 
experience of organising peasants in the ligas campesinas of the 1930s, the Communists had 
developed a ‘great versatility and experience’ in organising defence for peasants expelled from their 
lands by Conservative hitmen (Molano 1992; Medina, 1986). During la Violencia, the Communists 
began regrouping expelled peasants in small settlements in South Tolima. In Molano’s account, he 
describes how during this period a new form of “organised colonisation” emerged that fundamentally 
changed the dynamics of “spontaneous colonisation” that had taken place previously. Organised 
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colonisation ‘responds to an organisational structure, a common and deliberate purpose’, in contrast 
to ‘spontaneous’ forms of previous settlements, which are ‘inorganic, constituted by diffuse dreams 
rather than explicit goals’ (Molano 1987: 54). Thus, from the 1960s a new wave of frontier migration 
was initiated following a very different logic than that of the past. 
The Communist Party’s ‘organised colonisation’ strategy consisted of two main elements. 
The first was their ability to defend peasants against  landlord encroachments  through the tactic of 
armed self-defence. This had been used to defend peasants from Conservative militias during la 
Violencia, and later from army assaults in Marquetalia, which spurred Communist peasants to form 
a guerrilla army, the FARC, in 1964 (Molano 1987).  Second was their ability to organise and lead 
the settlement process by developing systems of collective labour, administration, services and 
infrastructure (Brittain 2010; Leech 2011; Molano 1992; Molano 2000; Sánchez 1989).  
In the FARC’s second conference in 1966, they drew up a “National Development Plan” for 
expanding into new frontier territories such as the Middle Magdalena. With a leadership composed 
of peasant settlers, Communist activists were readily accepted amongst peasants in frontier territories. 
As Gilhoddes describes, 
Their leaders had great prestige among the peasants, even in Conservative areas […]. The peasants believed 
that they had magic powers which made them invulnerable, but in no case did they seem to see them as a means 
of taking power, not even to occupy the land. They appeared rather as other poor peasants, persecuted unjustly 
by the powerful, by the urban interests, and to whom it was necessary to give the solidarity of the helpless 
(1970: 445).  
For peasant settlers that had long existed on the margins of society, and never enjoyed the 
representation of the state, the clandestine nature of the Communists posed no significant barrier to 
affiliation with the movement. As Molano describes: ‘these were people who did not believe in the 
state because in their own flesh they had suffered its social and economic partiality and discovered 
the hypocritical values the dominant classes defend’ (1987: 74). Besides, landlords and multinationals 
seeking to expel tenants from their estates or appropriate lands for oil extraction had always accused 
peasants of Communist activity in order to seek the army’s assistance to evacuate them (de 
Rementería, 1987). The Communist party offered a sense of belonging and dignity to landless and 
settler peasants who had never experienced political representation or participation, who lived under 
the constant threat of violence and had been marginalised from land reform and the development 
process. The Party also informed peasants of their rights, encouraging peasants not to sign contracts 
with landlords or corporations, and thus played a central role in politicising and organising dispersed 
migrant rural communities in the frontier.  Under the Communist Party, peasants were united behind 
a vision of radical agrarian democracy, which emphasised peasants’ rights to land, democratic 
participation, education and development (Medina, 1980, 1986).  
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Growing Communist influence in provincial areas such as Puerto Boyacá spurred a reaction 
from cattle ranchers and landowners, who responded by forming ACDEGAM (Asociación de 
Ganaderos del Magdalena Medio) to defend themselves against the insurgent threat (Medina 1990). 
These associations gave birth to the first paramilitary groups, MAS (Muerte a Secuestradores or 
“Death to Kidnappers”), which was formed in 1981 on the back of meetings between narco-
entrepreneurs, cattle ranchers, sectors of the urban elite and the Texas Petroleum Company. The 
activities of early paramilitary death squads clearly followed the counter-insurgent logic of the Cold 
War.  The goal was not only to annihilate the guerrillas as a military force, but to sew terror and 
anxiety amongst the entire population, deterring any potential sympathisers. Terror operations began 
in 1982 in Puerto Berrío and Puerto Boyacá in North-East Antioquia, where MAS hitmen assassinated 
dozens of activists and councillors (ASFADDES, 2010: 29). The attacks precipitated the 
disintegration of Communist organising in the region, and by 1983 the Communist party had closed 
its office in Puerto Boyacá, while its peasant support base retreated further into the Middle Magdalena 
frontier in the North-East Antioquia and South Bolívar regions of the Cimitarra valley. 
The creation of the Cimitarra peasant movement can be traced back to the re-settlement of 
Communist peasant families displaced by paramilitary violence in the 1970s and 1980s from North-
East Antioquia deeper into the frontier along the Cimitarra river. In the newly colonised regions, 
settler peasants relied on subsistence farming, producing yuca, corn and cassava as well as raising 
pigs and cattle for self-consumption. Alongside subsistence farming, peasants also relied on 
temporary work on agro-industry, fisheries, logging or river transport as well as informal contracts in 
the oil industry in order to contribute to household income. As frontier peasants increasingly 
confronted political violence and economic marginalisation, the bonds of solidarity, traditions of 
collective work and resource management became fundamental to their survival.  Thus the attachment 
to land forms the basis of the spirit of self-defence and collective work is closely tied to the need to 
resist violent appropriation from landlords and the state. In the words of one founding member: ‘if 
we hadn’t struggled collectively to defend our lands, well none of us would be here today’(Interview, 
Mario Martínez, 2015).  
The search for political autonomy in the face of state abandonment has been a primary 
objective of the Cimitarra settlers. ‘Our peasant association was born out of the necessity to organise 
ourselves in the face of state absence’, one of the older members explained to me (Interview, Alvaro 
Manzano 2015). The semi-autonomous self-governance of peasant livelihoods and communities 
through the Community Action Committees (JACs) has been central to autonomous territorial 
organisation. Throughout the Cimitarra valley, the JACs have often come to act as the basic 
organisational form for peasant settler communities. As Jaramillo describes, for the otherwise isolated 
and vulnerable settlers, the JACs ‘were fundamental in creating the feeling of belonging to a socio-
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economic unit,  providing the colonist with multiple links with a network of social relations with the 
outside world, the enrichment of civic life and the basis of their tasks and responsibilities which 
extend beyond the limits of their families and local communities’ (1988: 70). The JACs form the 
basis of community life, but they also combine daily decision making processes with deeper processes 
of political education and making demands on the state.  
In the Cimitarra valley, the organisation and basic functioning of the JACs are based on 
collective work systems and land arrangements amongst settler peasants. The JACs provide the 
leadership and organisation needed to sustain collective activity over time and coordinate day-to-day 
tasks and responsibilities. Regular assemblies are held where community problems are discussed, 
decisions made, disputes settled and actions decided upon.  Each JAC is composed of a number of 
decision-making bodies— “comités” to organise the productive activities of the communities. 
Committees are composed of around 5 people— men and women— known as ‘honest, 
knowledgeable and respectful’ to local residents (Interview, Mario Mahecha, 2015). The Cimitarra 
leaders developed the local JACs as institutions for dealing with the precarious livelihoods of settler 
peasants— providing the basis for the division of tasks, planning and strategy, and offering support 
in migration, services, farming, labouring and marketing. In this way, the JACs offered a collective 
political identity and organisation to peasants, allowing for members to participate in collective 
decision making processes over everyday issues. 
Organising committees were established through the JACS to manage the different productive 
activities within each community. Colonisation and agricultural work in the settler regions is 
organised through co-operative labour teams called convites. This type of organisation makes sense 
given the conditions of land availability, sparse populations, harsh environment and low technological 
and capital inputs. Collective labour is a vital part of settler economies since settlers with little access 
to markets or credits were unable to purchase labour. All the men on a settlement would chop and 
clearing the plot of one of the members.  At the end of the day, the family who had hosted the labour 
convite would offer lunch as a gesture of appreciation. The “labour committee” would determine and 
prioritise the tasks to be carried out by the convites (collective labour). If any member of the convite 
was unable to work on the assigned days, they would be asked to pay the JAC the equivalent value 
of a day’s labour, which at the time of interviews, could range from thirty to fifty thousand pesos 
($15-25 dollars).  Other collective tasks included preparing and packing vegetables, and sometimes 
transporting them to the market. Although the labour was collective, the harvest of crops would go to 
the owner of the land. On a successful harvest, often the local schools, hospitals and neighbours would 
all receive corn. Seeds would be kept from one harvest to the next.  
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The land committee (comité de tierras) is responsible for the adjudication of land between 
settlers and management of natural resources in the settlement. In the description of one community 
leader, their task was: ‘to know the rivers, the mountain ranges, the hills, the fertility of the lands, the 
natural wealth, to know roughly what the region possesses and what nature would leave us for a 
subsistence economy’ (Gil, 2010). The land committee decides how the land should be distributed 
and what should be produced on it, often distributing titles and settling disputes between peasants and 
families. When displaced peasants and rural labourers arrived in the region, they would make a 
petition to the JAC to be assigned a plot of land. ‘It was the community that authorised the 
adjudication of lands for new settlers— who arrived as labourers— based on the personal qualities 
they demonstrated’ (Gil, 2010). New arrivals to the region are often already known to the inhabitants, 
either through direct social ties or their connection to the JACs. The land committee would study each 
request for land in the settlement, decide its merits and present them in assemblies.  If the petition is 
accepted, the JAC then gives the newcomer a start-up package (“capital semilla”), which consists of 
animals, seeds, equipment and community labour in order to clear the plot (tumbar monte) and 
construct a home, as well as providing food until the first harvest came.  
Since the church had little influence amongst these Communist peasant communities, 
Sundays were dedicated to community work, known as “domingo rojo”. Community work teams 
dedicated the day to tasks the JACs determined necessary— building and repairing infrastructure and 
services, sanitation systems, schools, roads or bridges. The relevance of collective labour and self-
reliance show how, despite existing in a generalised system of capitalist relations, non-commodified 
relations persisted to some degree amongst frontier peasants and were central to their capacity to 
survive. This came hand in hand with strategies of political education under the leadership of the 
Communist party. 
In this way, the JAC provided the basis organising rural communities independently of the 
state. These deeply rooted organisational forms represented pockets of agrarian democracy that 
contrast sharply with the patron-client relations that presided in much of the Colombian countryside. 
They represented a form of political participation rooted in the bonds of trust, reciprocity and 
solidarity between peasants which were fundamental to their continued survival. During my 
interviews, peasant activists and others who worked alongside the communities frequently stressed 
the importance of the bonds of trust developed in community work for building solidarity and 
cohesion in their political organisation. 
[The concept of] “empeñar la palabra”— [to keep your word], is really important in our communities. If you 
promise to help out on your neighbour’s field, the next day you have to do it. Everybody in the community 
knows who keeps their word and who doesn’t, who to trust and who not to trust. 
Here we are never going to die of hunger. You know that you can live off the land. And if you don’t have 
enough to eat, your neighbour will give you some fish, or yucca. (Interview, Miguel Cifuentes, 2015). 
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Amongst peasants of the Cimitrra valley, the bonds of trust and solidarity forged in everyday 
livelihood activities— collective work, assisting others, participation in assemblies, also formed the 
basis for deeper political organising. Community members who were the most active in the 
assemblies- those that participated in collective work, those that followed up on projects, those that 
listened carefully, those that contributed to debates, would be chosen for the Communist Party’s 
political formation known as the Cadre School (escuela de cadres). One Cimitarra organiser 
described the leadership training process as follows: 
It was in the JACs that we identified the most apt people for the work. These were the types of people that everyone 
trusted, believed in what they said,  that when they promised to do something, you knew it would get done. We 
gave them support and training in the popular assemblies.  We also brought over allies from urban movements- 
students or union leaders (Interview, Miguel Cifuentes, 2015). 
In these schools classes covered a range of topics from Marxist theory— historical 
materialism, the principles of Leninism, Latin American Marxism based on figures such as 
Mariategui, the ideas of independence heroes such as Simón Bolívar, organisational structure and 
process, and Colombian political economy. Leaders from these political formation schools go on to 
become political co-ordinators. The identification of leaders from within the JACs created strong 
cohesion and organic links between the leadership and social base of the movement: most of its 
leaders emerged through the community work of the JACs and are known and trusted amongst the 
social base.  
 
The civic strike movement 
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, as peasants from Communist-aligned rural areas were cast off their 
lands and crammed into the vast slums in the urban peripheries, the geographical contours of dissent 
were reformed, and peripheral urban towns quickly became the epicentres of a burgeoning popular 
movement. By the 1960s and 1970s, Barrancabermeja was buckling to new social and political 
pressures. Rapid urbanisation had seen the population mushroom from 48,985 to 88,500 in the space 
of one decade from 1960 to 1970 (Delgado, 1990: 101). Oil might have brought wealth to the region, 
providing workers with jobs and the funds for significant social development in the form of parks, 
roads and hospitals, but it also made the town vulnerable to the boom-bust cycles inherent to enclave 
economies. A slump in oil prices in the 1970s saw masses of laid-off workers swell the ranks of the 
surplus labour force. The crash laid bare severe inequalities in the oil industry. In 1970 the oil 
company Ecopetrol accounted for 90 percent of the city’s economic output, but employed only two 
per cent of its residents (Van Isschot, 2015: 65). City administrations failed to respond to these major 
demographic changes, and newly usurped migrants poured into shanty towns bereft of roads, water 
supplies, electricity, health or education services. Disconnected from the ties of rural life, abandoned 
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by the state and marginalised from society, these newly arrived urbanites were forced to find their 
own strategies for coping with precarious urban surroundings. 
 The energies of the dispossessed were quickly channeled into new forms of urban 
mobilisation as the civic strike movement came to the forefront of political activity. Between 1971 
and 1980, around 128 local and regional paros took place, predominantly in provincial towns 
(Archila, 2002). In 1977 the three union federations (Liberal, Conservative, and Communist) came 
together to organise a major nationwide civic strike of 210,000 participants (Archila, 1997; Londoño, 
1997: 93; Medina, 1997; Pearce, 1990: 143). Civic strikes bridged the divide between urban and rural 
forms of dissent, uniting workers with rural and urban community organisations behind the common 
goal of popular power. They adopted: ‘an intentional combination of the tactics used during industrial 
actions, urban land invasions, and peasant marches by workers, squatters, and poor rural farmers over 
previous decades’ (Van Isschot, 2015: 5; Gill, 2016). Mobilisations frequently erupted as spontaneous 
outbursts of local residents who took to the streets to express frustration with the lack of institutional 
attention in issues like public services, water supply, education, public health or roads. The goal, as 
Zamosc describes, was ‘collective bargaining by disruption’— to compel officials to negotiate over 
local services and municipal development (Zamosc, 1990).  
 Provincial towns like Barrancabermeja were at heart of the radical upswell. Between 1980 
and 1993, 22 civic strikes erupted in the Middle Magdalena, both in the main town of 
Barrancabermeja, as well as smaller municipalities like San Pablo or Yondó in the Cimitarra Valley. 
They covered basic, material issues like public services, water supplies or roads— but as the violence 
mushroomed, protests increasingly centred on human rights violations (Alonso, 1992: 112; Gill 2016; 
Van Isschot 2015).  After the initial outbursts, assemblies were convened where residents could 
discuss issues, assign tasks and make decisions on further actions.  Channels of communication and 
solidarity networks were established between sparse rural communities. They used tactics like 
marches, roadblocks, refusal to pay bills and takeovers of government offices to get their voices 
heard, and it was not uncommon for actions to escalate such an extent that they paralysed the 
administrative and productive activity of the entire city (Archila, 1997; Londoño, 1997; Medina, 
1984; Pearce, 1990: 150).  
 These new mobilisations were undergirded by the strong political ties between peasant and 
labour movements. A significant example of the new forms of cross-sector activism is provided by 
the urban land invasions carried out by displaced peasants, fishermen, miners and rural labourers in 
the eastern periphery of Barrancabermeja. Between 1970 and 1980, ten such invasions took place, 
founding what are today large neighbourhoods like the Primero de Mayo. Land invasions were 
carefully planned and well-organised operations. Each invasion, which always took place under the 
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cover of night, was carried out by groups of 20 to 30 families. The first step was to invade the land, 
next it would be divided into plots. Each family would be allocated a plot, and they would quickly 
assemble makeshift homes with corrugated iron.  The final step was to mobilise the whole 
community, petitioning councillors and neighbouring communities.  Public sector unionists would 
come at weekends to set up services like electricity, water, to erect lampposts or build roads.  Activists 
from the urban occupations emphasised the importance of experience of political education and 
organisation gained from the countryside in creating the sort of cohesion and trust needed to carry 
out the operations. One Communist organiser recalled that:  
The left was strong [in the cities] because our work in the countryside had been very strong […]. Many of the 
displaced people [arriving in Barrancabermeja] had come from regions with Communist Party presence. Even if 
they weren’t [Party] militants, they knew our work and they knew we defended peasants— for this reason they 
accepted us. People might have been displaced, but they were very organised  (Interview, Pispo Suarez, 2017).  
 This emergent form of civic activism did not compete with or replace ‘traditional’ labour 
movements but connected and strengthened it, welding solidarity amongst various popular sectors of 
peasant, student, labour, women’s and community movements. Cross-sector solidarity was taken for 
granted as part of a  shared goal. Archila notes how solidarity between labour, peasant and community 
groups was a particular feature to Barrancabermeja, where: ‘the ties of solidarity are a product of the 
uprooting experienced by immigrants to Barrancabermeja.. and especially the solidarity of labour’ 
(Archila, 2006: 24). In Barrancabermeja, labour, social and peasant movements alike were closely 
tied to political parties, particularly the Communist Party but also the Liberal Revolutionary 
Movement (MRL), and the National Popular Alliance (ANAPO). One former USO activist described 
how during this time: 
The unions were allied to the civic strikes. At union offices people could make their bulletins and placards, and 
receive moral and economic support. […] The way we understood it, this was a class struggle and we were all in 
it together (Interview, Jorge Gonzalez, 2015). 
The interconnections in social base and organising strategies in the civic strikes of this period 
demonstrated the permeability of the divide between peasants and workers or rural and urban in 
understanding changing social relations and forms of organisation. The wave in civic activism came 
hand in hand with a resurgence in mobilisations and organising from within unions.  Faced with the 
erosion of workers’ rights and pay conditions, as well as the paralysis of traditional unions, a new 
generation of union leaders decided a new approach to organising was needed. They encouraged 
coordination and grassroots participation rather than competing for membership and exerting control 
from above. In Barrancabermeja USO leader Manuel Chacón became a popular hero, combining his 
position as shop steward and later on the National Executive with community activities, composing 
songs and poetry which he would perform to vast audiences in Barrancabermeja’s slums (Van Isschot, 
2015: 138-140).  Activists described the Civic Strike movement as a time of intense cultural activity. 
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Community theatres and cinemas were established in the poorest neighbourhoods, which put on plays 
and projected films on popular liberation. 
 The upsurge in independent strike activity and the formation of independent labour 
federations was quickly undermining the grip of the Liberal and Conservative parties over the two 
main union federations. After being purged from the Liberal party, the Communist Party set up its 
own labour confederation, the CSTC in 1964, which allied itself with the USO in Barrancabermeja. 
The CSTC or independent union federations organised 64 percent of all strikes that took place 
between 1974 and 1980, or 258 in total, and in 1975, a strike of 197,000 workers erupted throughout 
the country (Archila, 2000). As mobilisations escalated and were met with increasingly fierce 
repression, solidarity between sectors of civic, peasant and labour movements became crucial. In 
1963, 3,500 workers, together with their families and communities brought the Barrancabermeja oil 
refinery to a halt for 67 days (Vega Cantor 2016). As the strikes faced a crackdown and were entirely 
blocked off by the army, it was peasant solidarity in the form of food provision that allowed the 
strikes to endure (Vargas, 1992).  
 The civic strikes of the 1970s and 1980s provided the basis for the formation of new political 
instruments uniting labour, civic and peasant movements with political parties that had participated 
in the movements. The Coordinara Popular de Barrancabermeja was formed in 1983 to act as a 
coordinating body for various popular sectors, and provided a model for the formation of  similar 
movements throughout the country. Various peasant groups set up the Coordinadora Campesina del 
Magdalena Medio, composed of rural community action associations including fishermen’s 
associations, small miners’ committees, unemployment cooperatives, small farmers and rural 
workers. The Coordinadoras united various leftist organisations including the Communist Party, the 
Liberation Theology-inspired A Luchar, the ANUC, the USO and urban community groups amongst 
others. A vibrant local union movement played a vital role in reinforcing the peasant movement. They 
strengthened the upswell in social discontent by giving it coherence and unity, providing the 
leadership and organisation needed to sustain collective action over time and coordinate between 
communities. Through the Coordinadoras ‘the popular processes were strengthened and actions 
could be given continuity’ (Interview, Sonia Nevada, 2017); political instruments provided the basis 
for mobilisations to move beyond spontaneous outbursts: actions could be strategically planned and 
co-ordinated, roles could be assigned, actions agreed upon and prioritised and commitments could be 
followed up. The Coordinadora acted as the interlocutor with local government. Thus although the 
civic mobilisations had begun as spontaneous outbursts, they soon developed cohesive structure, 
strengthening class power by uniting peasants, urban communities and workers, building solidarity 
around common ideals and values that challenged the social order. However, by the late 1990s, with 
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the popular election of councillors from the civic strike movement, ‘there was a sort of contamination 
of the process through corruption and bureaucratisation of leaders’ (Interview, Sonia Nevada, 2017). 
 Throughout the 1980s, coordination between local action committees became stronger, and 
networks and alliances were established between civic action groups, unions, women’s groups, 
students, the church and political movements throughout the country. For peasants, involvement in 
the civic movements and Coordinadoras provided a sense of dignity and entitlement, and more 
broadly a sense of their own agency. The civic strike movement cemented the unique solidarity 
between the Middle Magdalena’s peasants along with worker and community groups, fostering a 
sense of ‘radical agency’ on the basis of shared solidarity, providing the basis for the formation of 
new organisational instruments.  They linked local concerns of state abandonment, underemployment 
and lack of access to land with broader national and international inspiration. While peasants’ sense 
of community had long roots in collective experience of land and occupations, it was now connected 
with broader political movements and national concerns. As peasants formed political instruments, 
made demands on the state and connected their own aspirations for land with national concerns and 
struggles, so they began to conceive of themselves, and act as part of a wider collectivity connected 
with national and international popular movement. 
 Since much of the base of popular support for the civic strikes was composed of urbanised 
peasants recently displaced from guerrilla territories, the connections between the movements were 
organically connected. The charismatic Communist leader and union organiser Luís Morantes gave 
up his political work to join the FARC, where he quickly rose to the role of commander adopting the 
name Jacobo Arenas.  Arenas was one of the strongest advocates of the strategy of combining all 
forms of struggle, and sought to establish urban support bases through networks of militias (Dudley, 
2004: 40). The armed left failed to recognise the autonomy of the civic movement, and tended to see 
civic mobilisations as “cajas de resonancia” or building blocks pre-figuring the revolutionary seizure 
of state power (Velasco, 1992). Reading the 1977 strike as prefiguring the imminent revolution, the 
guerrilla stepped up their involvement in the urban movement with the aim of recruiting forces for 
the revolution. The guerrillas’ obtrusion into the space of the popular movement was not only a source 
of friction from within the movements themselves, but it also made them more vulnerable to the 
escalating repression of paramilitary forces.  
 The resurgence of popular energy and intense polarisation generated by the civic strikes 
unleashed a new era of state-sponsored repression. In response to the 1977 civic strike, President 
Turbay (1978-1982) adopted the National Security Statute, granting extraordinary powers to military 
forces and setting the stage for a new phase of the ‘dirty war’. The military enjoyed new freedoms to 
control dissent, including detentions of protestors, searches without warrants and greater jurisdiction 
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for military courts (Aviles 2012: 41). Secret police, intelligence officers and military forces used 
extrajudicial tactics, including disappearances, kidnappings, executions and mass arrests numbering 
over 60,000 (Aviles 2012: 41).  Two army battalions, the Bárbula battalion and the 14th Brigade, 
were permanently stationed in the Middle Magdalena for the purpose of counterinsurgent operations. 
By the end of the 1980s and throughout the 1990s, the polarisation of mass mobilisation on the one 
side and far-right response on the other had plunged the Middle Magdalena into extreme turmoil. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has examined how the particular characteristics of peasant struggles of the Cimitarra 
Valley and Líbano are shaped by the very different trajectories and patterns of capital accumulation, 
agrarian class structures, political mediations and cultural traditions. In the Cimitarra valley, as settler 
peasants colonised the region from the 1970s, the conditions of political and economic 
marginalisation led them to depend on subsistence farming together with waged labour to survive. 
This was associated with a strong culture of solidarity and traditions of resistance amongst peasants, 
who came to be organised through semi-autonomous organisations of territorial self-governance 
under Communist party leadership. The strength of rural-urban solidarity with the urban oil workers 
and the civic strike movements provided the conditions for the formation of strong interconnects 
between peasants of the region and Barrancabermeja’s radical urban movement. Meanwhile, in the 
coffee regions, the technification and commodification of coffee farming fostered a closer 
dependency on Fedecafé and reinforced corporatist ties, smothering independent class formation. 
While the processes of rapid differentiation during this time saw brought new processes of 
differentiation and semi-proletarianisation among small farmers, weak community ties and little 
mutual support meant  individualised survival strategies were the preferred solution in the face of 
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In Colombia the road to neoliberalism was paved with violence. As the radical upsurge created by 
the civic strike movement gave way to intense polarisation and turmoil, a new era of political violence 
was inaugurated fuelled by narcotics wars and increasing US involvement. The government entered 
a legitimacy crisis and lost control of its monopoly of force, while large areas of the countryside came 
to be controlled by armed extra-state forces. The years 1985 to 2002 saw an average of 25,000 violent 
deaths per year; homicide became the leading cause of death for men and four million people fled 
their homes (CNRR 20103). At the peak of the violence between 2000 and 2003, Barrancabermeja’s 
homicide rates became among the highest in the world (CREDHOS 2004). As the economy 
descended into free-fall and society was thrown into chaos, the state lost its capacity to reproduce 
neoliberalism, and the balance of forces shifted towards a far-right, reactionary elite bloc tied to 
landlords, agro-capitalists, the narco-bourgeoisie, international capital and paramilitaries. This 
emergent reactionary right established its dominance through unrestrained violence and social 
repression against all organised expressions of dissent, including peasant movements, unions and 
political parties, throwing rural communities into disarray and sending the left into retreat. The rising 
reactionary agrarian elite quickly expanded through the use of extensive networks of power at the 
regional, national and international levels throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, creating mobilised 
civilian militias and capturing electoral offices. By promoting an economic growth model premised 
on foreign investment, flexible labour, commercial agro-exports and supporting the “private property 
rights” of large landlords, neoliberalism in turn strengthened the power of the reactionary agrarian 
elite. During this period, the boundary between state and extra-state power became increasingly 
blurred as the economic and administrative reforms implemented in the name of structural adjustment 
combined corruption, fraud, and paramilitary violence with new coercive market disciplines. A 
merger of political violence and economic restructuring reconfigured the relations of production, 
property and power in the Colombian countryside, paving the way for a new social order characterised 
by a massive re-concentration of land, fragmented sovereignty, soaring unemployment, economic 
precariousness and widespread dispossession. Against this background, the state lost control of its 
capacity to incorporate middle sectors of peasants and urban workers, and was increasingly 
transformed into an instrument of ‘accumulation by dispossession’, restructuring trade and property 
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regulation to facilitate the profit-making strategies of big capital through labour flexibilisation and 
the entrance of mining and agri-business corporations into rural territories. For peasants, this meant 
that whereas previously the state had represented a potential, albeit ineffective ally, it now 
increasingly came to be seen as the ‘enemy’.  
 This chapter examines how the brutal counterinsurgent war and economic shock therapy 
facilitated the establishment of a new set of agrarian property relations and webs of power in the 
Colombian countryside in the period between 1990 and 2002. I explore how the geographical 
dynamics of capital accumulation were drastically reconfigured as the country’s economic base 
shifted from exporting coffee to coca and natural resources, generating new social conflicts and waves 
of dispossession. The restructuring of the coffee industry is one of the most dramatic examples of the 
new mechanisms of dispossession and fragmentation in the neoliberal era. The coffee industry lost 
much of its economic weight and political clout, as market deregulation and severe cutbacks to 
Fedecafé forced mid-sized and small farmers into new economic relationships characterised by debt, 
insecurity and precariousness. The restructuring of the coffee industry provoked an ‘incorporation 
crisis’ whereby ‘the production of nationally protected space […]  now became the barrier to further 
accumulation, as corporations sought integration into the world-market in order to widen their sales 
base’ (Hesketh, 2013: 215). Meanwhile, marginal agrarian frontier zones such as the Middle 
Magdalena suddenly became epicentres of illegal capital accumulation, provoking a fierce conflict 
over land and resources between peasants and an emergent reactionary bloc of landlords, 
paramilitaries and the narco-bourgeoisie. The assault on left-wing movements and massive 
dispossession of rural communities established a new order premised on the re-concentration of land, 
the expansion cattle-ranching and commercial agriculture and the capture of regional state power. 
During this period, the configuration of power within the dominant classes oscillated between the 
bloc linked to global capital on the one hand, and the domestic agrarian elite on the other, linked to 
regional political bosses, paramilitarism and narcotrafficking.  Political reforms only deepened  
Colombia’s system of ‘low intensity democracy’: while decentralisation opened a space for greater 
representation for certain marginalised ethnic groups and popular elections for municipal posts, at the 
same time fierce social repression under the counter-insurgent war, greater US intervention and 
failure to address the livelihood insecurities of the rural and urban working classes deepened social 
and political exclusion. The fluctuations and tensions in political conditions had contradictory results 
on the dynamics of radicalisation and co-optation among the popular sectors, generating new tensions 
and divisions on the left. Notwithstanding important efforts to adapt to the changing conditions of 
work, the urban labour movement was sent into retreat by a combination of neoliberal restructuring 
and political violence. Meanwhile, the social energies and organising techniques developed under the 
civic strike movement were channelled into a strategy of simple defence through the construction of 
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‘autonomous rural territories’, which allowed for the preservation of the bonds of solidarity and 
organisational structures in the face of the onslaught.  
 
Colombia’s Neoliberal Turn 
Throughout the 1970s Latin America became a testing ground for neoliberal principles as successive 
countries became embroiled in debt crises and subjected to dictatorships.  Neoliberalism was brought 
to the continent through Chile in the 1970s, when General Pinochet created the conditions for the new 
era of unfettered markets through the systematic destruction of working class organisations and all 
expressions of popular dissent (Grandin, 2006: 246; Livingstone, 2013: 62-66).  While the “structural 
reform” packages of trade liberalisation and market deregulation were fairly uniform throughout 
Latin America, the Colombian case differed in a number of respects (Sanín, 2010). First, unlike other 
larger Latin American countries, Colombia had never experienced a significant state-led 
developmentalist program in the previous period. As chapters three to five describe, the Colombian 
state had always been ‘weak’, lacking any clearly defined ISI policy; the so-called ‘modernising 
elites’ were closely integrated with landlords and agribusiness, and Colombia had never strayed far 
from the path of economic liberalism. Second, neoliberalism was not ushered in on the back of debt 
crises, economic recession and hyperinflation such as those that shook the rest of the continent 
throughout the 1980s. This was a largely result of foreign exchange earnings from high coffee prices 
and the booming cocaine industry. Finally, neither did Colombian neoliberalism have the same 
authoritarian overtones as its counterparts. In fact, the most important package of reforms came hand 
in hand with a major democratisation process in the 1991 constitution—as discussed in greater detail 
below. 
 Nonetheless, from the 1980s the Colombian government began implementing neoliberal 
reforms as a result of two main circumstances. First, a combination of declining growth rates, low 
productivity levels, and a drop in primary commodity prices were giving rise to balance of payments 
problems. GDP growth fell to 0.9 per cent in 1982, compared to an average of 5.9 per cent between 
1965 and 1980. With reductions in available credit the Colombian government increasingly turned to 
the IMF for loans, and becoming more subject to its ‘voluntary’ adjustment recommendations (Aviles, 
2006: 44). The second was aid for rising military expenditures, as Colombia was dragged into the 
US-led ‘War on Drugs’. Signed in 1989, the $ 2.2 billion Andean Initiative made Colombia the 
leading recipient of US military aid in Latin America (Stokes 2005: 85). In return for the loan, Gaviria 
implemented a series of free-market reforms in his so-called ‘economic opening’ of 1990. Thus, the 
country’s descent into civil conflict was paralleled by an increasing dependence on international 
institutes in the formulation of its economic policy. 
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 The pressure for greater economic liberalisation did not come from external forces alone. It 
was also driven by changes in the internal balance of forces. In the developmentalist era, state 
protections and subsidies had allowed the finance and industrial sectors to become concentrated into 
large ‘economic groups’ (Aviles 2006: 57; Safford and Palacios 2002: 334; Pearce 1990: 87).  Agri-
business had become consolidated and more closely linked to transnational capital, operating in 
global agro-food networks in the spheres of production, processing, distribution, retailing and finance. 
During the 1980s and 1990s, federations representing the industrial, financial and agribusiness sectors 
linked to transnational capital such as the National Association of Industrialists (ANDI) and the Non 
Traditional Exports Association (ANALDEX) gained more power and political leverage within the 
state, which they wielded to push for economic reforms and deeper integration with global capital 
(Edwards 2001).  For these sectors, the reforms offered an opportunity for them to diversify their 
investment portfolios, gain access to technologies and promote exports (Aviles, 2006: 57; Edwards, 
2001: 35). There were also significant profit opportunities to be made from privatisation, and in 
particular natural resource extraction. For its part, Fedecafé supported reform insofar as it estimated 
world market integration would lower costs and lead to a depreciated real exchange rate (Edwards, 
2001: 35). 
 The emergent sectors of the capitalist class linked to global capital made comfortable 
bedfellows with a rising body of US-trained technocrats within the state. Known as the “new right” 
of Colombian politics, neoliberal technocrats argued that the agricultural protections of the previous 
era had been corporatist, bureaucratic and corrupt, privileging ‘sectorial interests’ at the cost of 
efficiency and competitiveness (Aviles, 2006: 52-54). They pushed for the dismantling of the 
previous growth model based on national developmentalism and its replacement with a new 
development strategy based on export and FDI-led growth and integration of the Colombian economy 
into the world market. The reforms were justified as a means to repay debts, increase investment 
funds, gain access to foreign exchange, promote technological improvements and boost rural 
productivity. Against the background of rising military costs, reform would also make up for lost 
investments and fiscal deficit. 
 While the first free-market reforms were initiated in the 1980s, the landmark in Colombia’s 
neoliberal turn was President Gaviria’s reform package known as the “apertura economica”. The 
reforms effectively opened the national economy to international markets, with the goal of increasing 
economic competitiveness and attracting foreign investment. Colombia’s neoliberal reforms were 
largely based on the Chilean model, covering monetary deregulation, fiscal decentralisation, 
privatisations and incentives for foreign investments (Sanín 2010: 218). In the agricultural sector, 
reforms included measures to liberalise international trade in agricultural products. The set of policies 
included the elimination of import quotas and cuts in tariffs (from 31 to 15 percent); cuts to public 
125 
investment in agriculture, which declined from 36 per cent of the total budget to just 0.9 percent 
between 1995 and 2008; the effective elimination of the DRI; the deregulation of agricultural markets 
through the prohibition and later the liquidation of the agricultural trade institute IDEMA’s monopoly 
on purchase, provision and distribution of food products; the end of direct subsidies and support prices 
for small and medium sized farm producers; the liquidation of INCORA (which was replaced with 
INCODER), and the replacement of redistributive land reform with market-led land reform (Fajardo 
2013: 78; PNUD 2011). 
 
Neoliberal restructuring in the coffee industry 
 The dismantling of Fedecafé’s system of protections for small coffee farmers was the cornerstone of 
Colombia’s neoliberal agrarian reforms. The restructuring was the product of a number of 
circumstances. First was the rising power of giant transnational conglomerates in the coffee industry, 
as coffee traders and manufacturers underwent a ‘flurry of mergers and acquisitions’ in the 1980s 
(Hough 2007: 114; Talbot 2004: 103-104). By the early 1990s, four major manufacturers controlled 
60 per cent of total coffee sales in the major consuming countries: Nestle, Philip Morris, Sara Lee 
and Proctor and Gamble (Talbot 2004: 103-104). Second was the financialisation of coffee, which 
occurred as a result of both the large-scale production and trade in coffee by the TNCs, and the 
explosion of speculative trading in financial derivatives based on the coffee futures market (Hough 
2007: 95; Talbot 2004: 110). Speculation loosened the relation between markets for coffee production 
and financial markets, creating greater volatility in coffee prices. Third were the new forms of 
imperialist intervention by the US state. Whereas previously, the US had supported the ICA despite 
the fact that it disadvantaged its own corporations and exports, in the 1980s it exerted pressure for its 
elimination. This combined with growing international competition from emergent coffee countries 
including Central America and Vietnam, and in 1989 the coffee quota system (ICA) was eliminated.  
Overall, the changes amounted to a major shift in the balance of power between class forces in the 
coffee industry, where the growing power of transnational corporations, global finance and consumer 
countries converged with the weakening of exporting countries and producers (Hough 2007; Talbot 
2004).  
The result of the restructuring was to open up new fields for capital accumulation for coffee 
TNCs and global finance in sectors of the coffee industry that had hitherto benefitted from social 
protections.  In Colombia, this meant the dismantling of Fedecafé’s protective mechanisms. 
Following the 1989 abrogation of the ICA, prices plummeted to unprecedented lows. The world price 
of coffee beans had fallen from $2.50/lb in 1987 to just over $0.50 by 1993 (Oxfam 2002: 20). By 
1993, average coffee prices were just 42 percent what they had been in the 1980s (Robledo 1998; 
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Talbot, 2004). Coffee’s share in total export earnings fell from 75 percent in 1974 to 8 percent in 
2000 (Fajardo, 2013: 78). As a result of the drop in coffee prices, by the end of the decade Fedecafé 
had incurred huge debts, totalling over USD $430 million. The shocks sent the institute into crisis, 
forcing it to abandon its price floor mechanisms and purchase guarantee policies, which had  
guaranteed the economic security of coffee farmers. In 1993, the Federation was forced to sell its 
interests in the Banco Cafetero, changing its name to Bancafé. Its new mandate was to protect the 
interests of coffee producers in favour of prioritising individual financial concerns like any regular 
private bank. Loans and investments for the purpose of supporting growers were replaced with fully 
private loans. The surge in debts that ensued resulted in bankruptcy of over 70,000 coffee farmers—
- generating a massive wave of displacement (Oxfam 2002).  
Neoliberal restructuring aimed to remove barriers to further accumulation for MNCs and 
deepen market forces in the coffee industry, but it also represented a rupture from the social and 
institutional bases of peasant representation linked to Fedecafé’s support system. The restructuring 
thus generated an ‘incorporation crisis’ for Fedecafé insofar as the basis of its hegemony was 
undercut. Fedecafé’s restructuring symbolised a major shift in the legitimation function of the state, 
which abandoned its support for small farmers in favour of facilitating the profit-making strategies 
of coffee MNCs. Fedecafé’s legitimacy crisis left a widening lacuna of hegemonic rule as the 
institutional basis of peasant control was ruptured. Although there were attempts to re-establish 
hegemonic control through the implementation of poverty-reduction policies (see chapter 8), the 
state’s increasing recourse to violent repression in the aftermath of the coffee crisis reflected the turn 
to coercion that undergirded the loss of its legitimacy  
 
From redistributive land reform to market-led land reform 
With the defeat  of the ANUC and the advent of neoliberalism, the state configured its policy agenda 
in dealing with the peasant question. With the threat of redistributive land reform firmly off the table, 
a new version of land reform appeared as part of an agenda seeking to deepen and extend the ‘market 
mechanisms’ in agriculture through ‘market-led agrarian reform’ (MLAR) (Akram-Lodhi 2007; 
Wolford 2007).  Law 30 of 1988 marked the first step in the change in legal orientation, restricting 
the state’s capacity to carry out expropriations and penalising land occupations. Law 160 of 1994 
represented the Colombian chapter of MLAR, implemented as part of a recovery plan for the 
devastated agricultural sector under the guidance of the World Bank (Berry, 2006). From the early 
1990s, the World Bank had been making the argument that weak institutions and opaque property 
rights in frontier territories were a major cause of social conflict and an impediment to further 
investment. The formalisation of property rights would allow for improvements in productivity and 
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efficiency amongst rural producers to become the new priority in dealing with rural conflict.5  MLAR 
is, thus: ‘integrally and intimately intertwined with expanded commodification […] and hence the 
status of land as an alienable commodity’ (Akram-Lodhi and Kay 2009: 231). 
 The new mechanism for defending smallholder property in frontier territories, the Peasant 
Land Reserve (Zonas de Reserva Campesina, ZRC), embodied this new market-led approach to 
addressing rural inequalities. Rather than a state-led transfer of property rights, the ZRC figure 
emphasised rule of law and institution-building as a means to address inequalities in the frontier.  The 
figure aimed to stabilise zones of recent colonisation as well as prevent further land concentration 
and environmental degradation through property titling and by limiting land purchases to two family 
units (UAF)6. Thus, while restricting further land concentration, the ZRC figure is clearly within the 
neoliberal framework regarding property rights, emphasising not redistribution but developing 
markets among smallholders: encouraging private landownership, providing security of tenure to 
producers, fostering a more efficient land market, and making it easier for land to be purchased and 
sold (Akram-Lodhi 2007; Bernstein 2004). The following chapter describes how the restricted ZRC 
provision became a central symbol in the ACVC’s defensive struggle in the late 1990s. 
Agrarian transformations under neoliberalism 
Neoliberal shock therapy precipitated a dramatic transformation in Colombian agriculture virtually 
overnight. Immediately following the reforms, an influx of agricultural imports flooded domestic 
markets, which combined with world recession and a drought to spark a crisis in the agricultural 
sector. 1992 was Colombia’s worst agricultural year in a century, with a 12.6 percent drop in annual 
crop production (Jaramillo 2002: 826). Production continued to decline throughout the decade, and 
by the turn of the century, a country that had previously produced enough food to feed its population 
now depended on foreign imports for over half of national food requirements.  The area of land 
planted with seasonal crops declined from 51 to 41 percent of the total between 1990 and 1997, with 
a drop in annual production from 2,366 to 1,687 tonnes— mostly in importable crops such as wheat, 
barley, corn and rice. Meanwhile, the area planted with permanent crops grew from 27 to 39 percent 
of the total (Jaramillo 2002: 827-8).  The most significant shift was the decline of the coffee sector 
— previously the backbone of the Colombian economy— which dropped from 75 per cent of exports 
                                               
5 In a 2007 report, the WB argued that ‘well-defined and protected property rights create opportunities to support 
administrative decentralisation and rationalise soil use’ (World Bank, 2007). The formalisation of property rights is, 
more importantly, seen to bear a fundamental relation to the opening up of land markets: ‘efficient land use requires 
conditions that facilitate the mobility of property rights, so that land can be utilised in more productive activities and by 
more efficient users’ (World Bank, 2007). 
6 Farm size is measured in the “family agricultural unit” (UAF), which is a regionally differentiated categorization of the parcels of 
land considered enough for a small farmers to make a livelihood according to a range of local criteria including environmental and 
productive conditions. The size of a UAF may vary from 7 hectares in Cundinamarca (home to the capital Bogota) to 48 hectares in 
colonization zones such as Casanare or Meta.  
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in 1970, to 15 per cent in 2004 (Fajardo 2013: 78). As the rural economy plummeted, cocaine quickly 
became the new engine diving rural economic growth.   
Neoliberal agrarian restructuring wrought havoc on rural communities, provoking a 
subsistence crisis in smallholder agriculture exacerbated by the unemployment crisis in the cities and 
rural areas. Small farmers and rural workers absorbed the brunt of neoliberal reforms. Price drops in 
the 1992 crisis resulted in the loss of around 130,000 jobs in the agricultural sector, especially in 
importable crops such as rice, corn and wheat (Lozano 2001). The drop was most severe in coffee— 
in this sector alone, 71,300 jobs were lost. Rural incomes declined by 30 per cent, leaving many small 
and medium coffee farmers in debt and at risk of losing their lands (Lozano 2001). Meanwhile, a 
sharp drop in rural wages, which fell by 14 per cent between 1990 and 1992, saw many agricultural 
workers abandon the countryside (Jaramillo 2002: 835). One World Bank study concluded that 
deregulation of the agricultural sector had been the main cause of the drop in rural incomes.  Between 
1991 and 1999, the proportion of the rural population living in poverty rose from 68 to 80 percent, 
while extreme poverty rose from 35 to 46 per cent (Jaramillo, 2002: 835). 
 The drastic transformations in productive and social relations in Colombian agriculture also 
spurred a recomposition of the agrarian elite and their relation to other sectors of the dominant classes. 
The power of traditional landlords and agrarian elite was already in decline, as reflected in the 
declining weight of the agricultural sector in the national economy. In 1970, the agricultural sector 
had represented around a third of national GDP, whereas by 1995 it was only a fifth.  The reforms 
posed a particular threat to the position of the agrarian elite, who were hit by the lowering of tariff 
barriers and a sharp drop in commodity prices. Colombian economist Ocampo summarised the 
economic restructuring as ‘a massive redistribution of income between the city and countryside. The 
biggest winners were high-income sectors in urban areas, while the biggest losers were high-income 
sectors in rural areas’ (Ocampo 2004: 115). Economic threats combined with the political threat posed 
by the rural conflict, which led many landowners to withdraw from the countryside. Some left their 
estates under the care of supervisors who turned them into pastures, and others gave up agriculture 
altogether (Jaramillo 2002: 835).   
 The agribusiness federation SAC soon withdrew its support for the reforms, lobbying for 
greater protections and compensation (Edwards 2001: 76-77).  Its efforts compelled the government 
to intervene with an ‘emergency’ recovery effort, which included financing and protections for certain 
agro-export sectors such as palm oil, sugarcane and flowers (Deininger 1999: 8; Jaramillo 2001: 822). 
As a result, much of Colombia’s agrarian elite was able to fully integrate with the new global 
commodity chains by shifting to non-traditional agricultural exports such as flowers or palm oil, 
although many more converted the lands to pastures (Jaramillo 2002, 822; Richani 2012b). This 
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brought further development of large commercial export farms based on economies of scale in sectors 
such as sugarcane, palm, fruits and flowers, which increased by around 300,000 hectares between 
1990 and 2000 (Jaramillo 2001, 822–38).  Thus the main beneficiaries of the free market rush were 
private banks, foreign investors and commercial farmers linked to global commodity chains in new 
“nontraditional” exports such as cut flowers, as well as a few fruit and vegetables. As a result, 
neoliberal restructuring facilitated new processes of land and market concentration and strengthened 
the power of a new agrarian elite. 
Neoliberal restructuring accentuated historical patterns of land concentration and generated 
new processes of dispossession and social exclusion. By promoting production for export and 
accumulation based on economies of scale, restructuring strengthened the power of landlords and 
large commercial farmers.  Between 1984 and 1996, large landowners of 1,000 hectares or more 
increased their landholdings from 25 to 38 percent of arable land. Meanwhile, farmers with fewer 
than 20 hectares of land saw their share reduced from 15 to 13 percent of the country’s agricultural 
surface (Machado, 2004). Behind the turmoil generated by economic shock therapy, class power was 
being restored in the hands of the agrarian elite. 
 Meanwhile, peasants absorbed the brunt of neoliberal shock therapy. Neoliberal reforms 
exposed peasants to new market imperatives, generating new processes of market-led differentiation, 
fragmentation and dispossession.  As a result, the social composition of contemporary peasants has 
dramatically changed.  Small and medium farmers have been exposed to new forms of competition 
in the world market, compelling them to reconfigure production processes in more capital- or labour- 
intensive patterns, engaging in a variety of strategies from agriculture to wage labour in order to make 
a living. Small farmers producing domestic crops such as corn, beans, yucca, onion and raw sugar, 
have faced greater competition from imported cereals and grains, and they have also been encouraged 
to produce non-traditional exports of fruits and vegetables for international markets— commodities 
that are controlled by large agro-industrial corporations and the dominant classes (Corrales and 
Forero 1992: 65; Goodman and Watts, 1997; Kay, 2002; Robinson, 2007: 58-75; Salgado and Prada, 
2000:83-90).  Thus, new exposures to the market imperative have increasingly pushed small farmers 
out of agriculture. Whereas in 1950 the small farmer sector represented 60 percent of rural production, 
in 2000 this had dropped to 36 per cent. Meanwhile, large-scale capitalist enterprises went from 4 to 
25 per cent of production in the same period (Kalmanovitz and López, 2006: 247). Some responded 
by farming more intensively, with a greater use of chemical inputs such as fertilisers and pesticides, 
and with increasing specialisation in mono-crops for export in international markets. This required 
more specialist knowledge and techniques, and much higher levels of financing-- monetary inputs 
accounting for around 71 percent of total farm costs for small farmers. This has resulted in drawing 
producers more closely into financial networks and increased their dependence on banks and MNCs 
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(Forero, 2010: 30; see also Corrales and Forero 1992: 65; Salgado and Prada, 2000: 83-90). Many 
have been compelled to enter contract farming arrangements with large agribusiness corporations in 
order to access credits, technologies and markets. Thus, while some small and medium farmers have 
been integrated into the new global food system, they nonetheless hold a subordinate position in 
relation to capitalist farmers. 
 The result of this greater exposure to market imperatives has been a loss of access to non-
market based subsistence together with significant transformations in the orientation of production. 
They have been increasingly compelled towards production for sale over production for self-
consumption. According to one study, sale for the market accounted for between  89 and 95 percent 
of the production value of small farms (Forero, 2010: 30). Since on-farm production is insufficient to 
meet the household subsistence needs, smaller farmers have been forced to turn to off-farm 
employment in both the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors since they have been unable to 
compete with food imports. Household incomes are increasingly derived from non-farm activities in 
service related sectors, such as artisan mining, fishing, tourism, as well as working as labourers on 
larger capitalist enterprises or in extractive multinational corporations, including oil palm, sugarcane, 
and cattle (Corrales and Forero 1992; Forrero 2010; Jaramillo 2002). This suggests that while 
peasants face new insecurities, they have not  been completely separated from the land, but rather 
they have been subjected to ongoing processes of semi-proletarianisation, engaging in a diversity of 
strategies in order to maintain their livelihoods.  
 The expansion of seasonal or temporary labour amongst rural producers is associated with the 
feminisation of the workforce (Deere 2005). Female participation in economic activity increased from 
around a fifth in 1980 to a third in 2010 (DANE, 2015). Previously, rural women had predominantly 
worked in the domestic sphere, but now rural women now increasingly combine unpaid domestic 
work with paid rural labour, or have fully entered the rural labour force. The expansion of NTAEs, 
particularly flowers, has seen a rise of female labourers on agro-export plantations: women represent 
70 per cent of Colombia’s 100,000 flower workers, compared to 40 per cent of the 120,000 coffee 
workers (Oxfam, 2004). While companies claim to employ women because of their more delicate 
handling of high-value crops, their employment in agro-industries is also because they are more 
prepared to do seasonal work, are less unionised and accept lower wages (Deere 2005; Oxfam 2004). 
In the context of violence and migration, many women are also finding themselves as heads of the 
household, caring for children and often elders at the same time as providing the main source of 
monetary income. 
 New processes of  commodification of rural livelihoods have created new processes of 
fragmentation and differentiation, but they have not resulted in the disappearance of small and 
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medium producers completely. The Colombian peasantry has experienced a ‘double squeeze’ (De 
Janvry, Sadoulet, and Young 1989; Kay 2004). On the one hand, a ‘land squeeze’ has been aggravated 
since peasants have been unable to access lands sufficiently to keep up with population increases.  
Between 1984 and 2003, those holding properties of under 20 hectares went from 85 to 86 percent of 
total producers, although the total areas of the properties decreased from 15 to 9 per cent. Meanwhile, 
landownership of five hundred hectares or more, which represents 0.4 per cent of owners, went from 
33 to 63 per cent of agricultural land, which is equivalent to around 2,300 owners of 39 million 
hectares (Salgado 2008). This means that more peasants have been forced to produce on smaller plots.  
On the other hand, they have also faced an ‘employment squeeze’ since the rapid commodification 
of rural livelihoods was not matched by growth of the urban industrial sector. The unemployment 
rate reached an all-time high of 20 percent between 1998 and 2000 (DANE, 2012).   Many peasants 
responded to the squeeze by seeking refuge in land— often through frontier migration. These new 
processes of repeasantisation are most evident in the agrarian frontier. Between 1970 and 1997, 
peasant colonisation of these regions led to a fourfold increase in the total agricultural land of the 
country, from 21 to 80 million hectares (Machado 2004). In this way, frontier migration has provided 
a refuge from neoliberal restructuring, allowing displaced peasants and small farmers to secure means 
of subsistence in hostile economic conditions. The impact of the massive influx of settlers to the 
Cimitarra valley during this period is described in closer detail in chapter seven. 
 
State crisis and fragmented sovereignty 
By the late 1990s, neoliberal shock therapy had sent the country into free-fall. A declining national 
productive base together with financial speculation saw the economy erupt in the worst crisis of the 
century, which economists called Colombia’s ‘lost half-decade’ to development (Ocampo 2004).  In 
1999 Colombia experienced negative growth rates of -4.1 percent, accompanied by soaring fiscal 
deficit, which went from 6.9 percent of GDP to 47.9 percent in 1999 (Junguito and Rincón 2007: 
303). The crisis was undergirded by major changes in the country’s economic base. Between the 
1970s and the 1990s, Colombia went from being a coffee exporter to an exporter of cocaine and 
mining products (Richani 2010; Sanín 2010). The cocaine bonanza was a consequence of both 
external and internal factors. On the one hand, the US “War on Drugs” displaced illicit crop 
production from Bolivia and Peru in the 1970s, propelling Colombia into the position of the world’s 
leading exporter of narcotics in the 1980s (Stokes 2005). On the other, the twofold crisis of urban 
wage labour and peasant agriculture meant that Colombia’s agrarian frontier provided fertile 
conditions for marijuana and coca cultivation. The narcotics boom provided a vital ‘escape valve’ to 
both the urban unemployed and small farmers facing economic devastation.  
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The cocaine industry soon became the main engine driving Colombia’s economic growth. As 
employment plummeted, the illegal economy became the primary generator of new jobs, and lower 
and middle sectors of the urban population were rapidly incorporated into the cocaine industry.  By 
the end of the 1980s, the illicit drugs industry represented around 6 per cent of GDP and employed 
over half a million people, while as much as 20 per cent of farmers were involved in coca cultivation 
(Rocha, 2000: 23). Coca production, smuggling and trafficking propelled new mechanisms of 
accumulation and brought a new set of class actors onto the scene, blurring the boundaries between 
the legal and illegal economies.  
With the coca bonanza, territories that had previously been peripheral to Colombia’s economy 
and politics suddenly became centres of economic growth, while remaining at the margins of the law. 
State presence had always been weak in these territories, but it was eliminated by definition from 
regulating the illegal market.  This opened a space for ‘aspiring state-makers’ to take on state-like 
roles such as controlling and policing the population, charging taxes and maintaining social order 
(Buendía 2003; Gutiérrez 2015; Pécaut 2015; Wills Obregón 2015). Both guerrilla and paramilitary 
forces adapted themselves to the coca industry in very different ways, and the coca surge precipitated 
a process akin to what Paige called ‘a land rush’ between paramilitaries and the guerrillas, where land 
and state power were at stake (1975: 42). As a result, a rural conflict that had initiated in marginal 
territories within the parameters of the Cold War was suddenly propelled to the centre stage of a 
fierce war that swallowed up the entire country. 
The bonanza in illicit crop cultivation in the frontier territories has its roots in the failure of 
the agrarian reform project in the 1970s. As chapter five noted, with the closure of agrarian reform in 
1972, the state instead initiated a program of colonisation in regions such as South Bolívar, Guaviare, 
Caquetá, Meta, Nariño and Putumayo. However, when the state’s promise of services and credits in 
these zones failed to materialise, it was the FARC that took the role of the state in basic functions like 
provision of services, administration, and law and order (Buendía 2003). The FARC did not initiate 
or even encourage illicit crop cultivation in peasant regions under their control, but in 1978 it did 
permit coca cultivation. Between 1978 and 1998, the area devoted to illegal crop cultivation increased 
fourfold to cover an estimated 100,600 hectares, much of which was FARC-controlled land in the 
frontier  (UNODC 2010). The injection of taxes from the coca industry combined with the arrival of 
displaced peasants and unemployed workers into frontier territories, which allowed the FARC to 
expand and consolidate its operations throughout the 1980s and 1990s. At the end of the 1970s, it had 
counted with just 700 soldiers. But by the end of the 1990s it had grown to a force of 18,000 well-
armed and trained soldiers organised into 100 fronts with a centralised command structure (Molano 
2001). It embarked on an ambitious offensive, which began with entering into frontier regions 
dominated by large landholdings and agri-business, after which it created “liberated territories” under 
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its control before finally encircling the capital city, Bogotá, by gathering forces around the Cordillera 
Oriental (Pizarro 1996; Richani 2012). They attacked military installations using gas cylinders, which 
resulted in the capture of hundreds of military prisoners. The ELN was much smaller but by no means 
insignificant. It centred its 5,000 troops on natural resource regions, where they used taxes on mining 
companies to fund community projects (Medina 2010). Initially, the state’s armed forces seemed 
unprepared for the attacks, and suffered a series of defeats to the guerrillas. 
The exponential growth of the cocaine industry also provided an opening for the emergence 
of a new class actor in Colombia’s agrarian social structures: a so-called narco-bourgeoisie. This 
emergent capitalist class was predominantly derived from the urban and rural petty-bourgeoisie, 
taking advantage of massive profit opportunities offered by narco-trafficking and smuggling 
(Duncan, 2006; Medina 1990; 2012). By the end of the 1990s, their collective annual income was 
estimated at USD $3-4 billion, equivalent to 3 or 4 per cent of Colombia’s GDP.  Investments in 
cattle ranching and large-scale land purchases became prime vehicles for money-laundering.  
Estimates suggest that around 45 percent of ‘narcodollars’ went into land and agriculture, and their 
purchases totalled around 4.4 million hectares of land— equivalent to 48 percent of the country’s best 
agricultural lands (Rocha 2000: 146; Reyes 2009).  Most of these so-called narco-investments were 
speculative in nature and did not go into productive agriculture. Conflict zones such as the Middle 
Magdalena or the Urabá coast were particularly attractive locations for drug mafias due to the absence 
of state authority and the low price of lands.  Although landlords had a long history of using predatory 
and violent tactics to displace peasants and maintain control, the narco-bourgeoisie had the arms, 
knowledge and networks to unleash violence to unprecedented new heights. Their entrance into the 
agrarian social structures catapulted the longstanding land conflict in the frontier.  
 The coca bonanza also attracted new forms of US intervention. By the turn of the century, 
Colombia had become the third highest recipient of US counterinsurgency funding and training, 
which allowed for the prolongation of Cold War counterinsurgent terror strategies established through 
the ‘war on drugs’. Initiated in 1998, Plan Colombia allowed the US to lead a complete reorganisation 
of the Colombian military, funded by a threefold increase in military aid (from $30 million in 1995 
to $98 million in 1999). In principle the funding was destined towards the drugs war, militarising 
territories in order to wipe out illicit crops ‘wherever they are grown’  (cited in Stokes, 2005: 85).  
But the program specifically targeted guerrilla-controlled regions over those where production was 
dominated by paramilitaries. A project of ‘chemical and biological warfare’ combined ground 
campaigns from the Colombian military with routine fumigations using biological agents with proven 
dangers to human health and the environment. The result was a 100 percent surge in displacement in 
territories targeted by Plan Colombia, further propelling the state’s legitimacy crisis amongst 
inhabitants in the frontier (Livingstone 2013: 177).  
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The Colombian state had always been weak, but the combination of drugs, war and neoliberal 
shock therapy war brought it to its knees. The sharp recession was accompanied by soaring 
unemployment and reductions in social services. With the politicians’ abandonment of traditional 
policies of redistribution and social protection in favour of marketisation and attracting foreign 
capital, the legitimacy crisis for the traditional political elite reached new heights. Support for the two 
main parties fell dramatically. Liberal Party supporters fell from 44 per cent of the population in 1993 
to 31 percent in 2002, Conservative Party supporters fell from 17 to 12 percent, while those that 
claimed to support no party at all rose from 39 to 55 per cent (Rodríguez-Garavito, 2008: 152). By 
the late 1990s, the meltdown reached such an extent that policy analysts came to talk of Colombia as 
a ‘failed state’ (Bejarano and Pizarro 2004). US fears surrounding Colombia’s civil conflict are 
reflected in a 1999 Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) report of Colombia’s security situation. The 
report suggested that the Colombian armed forces could be defeated within the space of five years 
unless the ‘state regains legitimacy and the armed forces [are] restructured’ (cited in Richani 2012: 
200). In Venezuela, discontent with neoliberalism had just been channelled into a wave of urban 
protests and a coup attempt led by Hugo Chávez. The threat posed by the radical upswell pushed the 
Colombian state to adopt increasingly repressive strategies in dealing with popular movements. 
 Since the late 1990s, the response of the Colombian state to imminent crisis has oscillated 
between strategies of accommodation and repression, which can loosely be connected with different 
elite blocs (Sánchez 1990). On the one hand was a current that sought to re-legitimise and strengthen 
the state through an emphasis on institution-building, citizenship and ethnic participation. This 
tendency was associated with Presidents Betancur, Gaviria, Pastrana and Santos, and by the late 
1990s had the support of multilateral development agencies. On the other, a growing far-right current 
emphasised a solution to the crisis through a strategy of warfare, the role of paramilitary actors and 
the militarisation of civil society.  This strategy is associated with Presidents Uribe and Turbay, and 
supported by the Colombian military and US military interventions, most prominently plan Colombia 
(Sánchez 2002; Richani 2012).  Within these tendencies there were many intersections and overlaps, 
with accommodation strategies often accompanied by criminalisation of more radical movements.  
 The 1991 Constitution introduced under President Gaviria provides an illustrative example of 
the oscillating strategies of coercion and consent. Negotiated by a diverse array of political and social 
groups including demobilised guerrillas, the student movement, the national Indigenous movement, 
and women’s organisations, the Constitution was intended as a pact to bring a new era of peace and 
stability (Uprimny 2002). The Constitution emphasised citizen participation, including social 
democratic reforms allowing for the election of municipal governors, as well as economic 
decentralisation allowing for local budgeting and collective land rights for indigenous groups. The 
aim of decentralisation was twofold: to provide funds to newly elected authorities to respond to 
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demands for local services, but also to placate the guerrilla insurgents by incorporating certain sectors 
of the M-19 movement into the political system (Uprimny 2002; Velasco 2015). Yet the FARC and 
ELN were not included in the negotiations, resulting a rupture in the alliance of the popular 
movements. President Gaviria used emergency powers to legalise paramilitary groups, allowing them 
to operate openly as Convivir (“special vigilance and private security services”), extending the state’s 
terror networks used to combat the radical insurgencies (CREDHOS 1999). As civilian militias 
mushroomed throughout the country, political decentralisation eventually resulted in a new era of 
parcelised sovereignty, with far-right groups moving in to capture regional state power in the 
provinces. 
 
Paramilitaries: from Cold War origins to enforcers of the neoliberal social order 
Paramilitarism is not new to Colombia. The logic of privatised force has long been integral to the 
functions of the Colombian state in defending private property, maintaining law and order and 
quelling social unrest where the state could not. The creation of private armed groups was made 
lawful in Colombia between 1968 and 1989 in line with proposals of the US army’s Plan Lazo, which 
permitted the creation of ‘civil defence forces’ in order to carry out the state’s responsibilities in areas 
beyond its reach.  The activities of early paramilitary death squads clearly followed the counter-
insurgent logic of the Cold War. Regionally based militias tied to landlords aimed to both annihilate 
the guerrillas as a military force and to deter potential sympathisers by sewing terror and anxiety 
amongst the entire population (Medina, 1990; Stokes, 2003; 2005).7 However, in the neoliberal era, 
as the country descended into crisis and the state lost hold of its capacity to reproduce neoliberalism, 
paramilitaries were expanded and consolidated, and they also acquired new functions.  They became 
increasingly tied to Colombia’s economic and political elites, and their activities became more 
focused on securing the conditions for continued capital accumulation within the neoliberal order by 
repressing unions to make way for flexibilised labour regimes, clearing peasants from lands to make 
way for agribusiness and multinational mining companies and repressing social movements and 
political parties. 
Alvaro Uribe cut his teeth as governor of Antioquia, where he developed a security policy based 
on the promotion of active citizen collaboration with state security forces through the Convivirs. 
Although the Convivir program was quickly terminated, it had nonetheless provided the basis for the 
development and consolidation of a network of militias throughout the country. In 1997 paramilitary 
boss Carlos Castaño unified various regional paramilitary groups, created a network of alliances with 
                                               
7 . Chapter eight describes the emergence of the first paramilitary groups from the peasant-landlord conflicts in the 
Middle Magdalena in closer detail  
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politicians, businesspeople, landlords and narcotraffickers, and in 1997 founded the United Self-
Defence Forces of Colombia (AUC)— a national paramilitary group with an army of 10,000 men. 
They were highly organised, with an extensive network of allies in the army, regional politicians, 
narco-traffickers, businessmen and multinational corporations.  
 Although paramilitary violence was justified as a counterinsurgent initiative, the targets of 
paramilitary violence went beyond guerrilla insurgents to all forms of organised opposition including 
peasant movements, unions and political parties. When the Patriotic Union achieved success in 
municipal elections in the 1980s and 1990s they quickly became prime paramilitary targets,  and an 
intense military campaign targeted presidential candidates, congressmen and majors as well as 
grassroots activists and organisers— killing around 4,000 members (Brittain 2010; Dudley 2004; 
Leech 2011). The state-sponsored repression of this time was comparable to that of the Argentinian 
and Chilean military in the same period, with the difference that Colombia was not under a 
dictatorship but a democracy. A new wave of ferocious political violence once again sent the incipient 
leftist movement into disarray. 
 Paramilitary violence unleashed a new phase of agrarian counter-reform, propelling a 
massive reconfiguration in relations of property, production and power in the countryside. Between 
1980 and 2012 paramilitary groups were responsible for 1,166 massacres and 8,903 targeted 
assassinations. The majority of victims of paramilitary violence were small farmers displaced from 
their lands:  in this period around 4.7 million people were displaced from around 8.3 million hectares 
of land (CNRR 2013: 36-38). The stated aim of rural violence was to ‘reclaim’ territories occupied 
by guerrillas, but they also moved in to key drug trafficking routes and natural resource and 
agribusiness regions. Their strategy began with the conquering of frontier territories following a 
threefold strategy of ‘pacifying’ the land and its occupants, maintaining the social order and luring 
wealth to the region. The Middle Magdalena provided the testing ground for these three stages, which 
soon became the blueprint for the nationwide paramilitary counter-reform project. 
The first step was the ‘pacifying’ and ‘social cleansing’ of rural territories, which the 
paramilitaries themselves conceived as one of the main functions of their activities. This involved a 
two-stage process of ‘liberating’ territories from their previous social structures, then ‘luring wealth’ 
through private investment and infrastructure. The first step was pacification of territories, 
establishing a new social order through a combination of indiscriminate violence and repression of 
social protest through selective assassinations. Small and medium farmers accounted for the majority 
of those displaced or forced to sell their lands— 51 per cent were from plots of 10 hectares or under, 
and 85 per cent came from plots of less than 50 hectares (CNRR 2013: 59).    
Following this, the second step involved the expansion and consolidation of their networks of 
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territorial power through the promotion of agro-industrial projects. As chapter eight describes, violent 
displacement was legitimated through a series of legislations aimed at supporting the private property 
rights of landlords and agribusiness. Paramilitary boss Vicente Castaño himself described the 
objectives of paramilitarism in these terms:  
The idea is to take rich people to invest in those kinds of projects in different parts of the country. By taking the 
rich to these zones, the institutions of the state also arrive. Unfortunately, the institutions of the state only back 
those things when the rich are there. So you have to take the rich to all those regions of the country and that’s a 
mission shared by all the [paramilitary] commanders (cited in Ramírez 2010) 
In this way, large-scale commercial agriculture, violent land appropriations and the ‘pacification’ of 
territories in the hands of paramilitaries facilitated the reconfiguration the pre-existing property 
arrangements through the expansion of large-scale agro-industry.   
 The reconfiguration of agrarian class structures was central to paramilitary activities since it 
created a new social hierarchy dominated by a new reactionary configuration of agrarian elite of 
landlords, cattle-ranchers, drug traffickers, and agri-business. The establishment of a new agrarian 
class structure led by a reactionary coalition that amassed wealth and power through the cocaine 
industry, land purchases and agri-business blurred the line between legal and illegal forms of 
accumulation. Richani observes that: ‘in Colombia an individual can alternate roles: that is, one can 
start as drug trafficker and end up as an agro-industrialist farming African palm and owning another 
parcel for cattle ranching used for speculation and to shelter capital gains’ (Richani 2012: 69). Some 
examples of this include Salvatore Mancuso, who bought large extensions of rice and cattle fields on 
the Atlantic coast, or alias Jorge 40, who owned a large milk-producing company, and alias Don 
Berna, owner of Palm oil company Palmas S.A (Richani 2012: 69).  This new agrarian class structure 
dominated by paramilitaries, narco-bourgoisie and landlords simultaneously created new forms of 
inequality and social exclusion.  
 Where paramilitaries and narco-traffickers did not directly take control of production, they 
nonetheless became more closely associated with multinational and large national extractive 
industries. As Carlos Castaño conceived it, the role of the AUC was to act as ‘defenders of business 
freedom and of the national and international industrial sectors’ (cited in Stokes 2006: 10). This 
occurred through various mechanisms. In Ecopetrol, Barrancabermeja, for example, the 
paramilitaries actively participated in staff-hiring and contracting firms. Multinational coal and oil 
companies also directly transferred funds to the Convivirs. Labour repression in order to meet the 
new conditions of flexibilised labour for export-led growth was a crucial component to this, since 
Paramilitary violence was used to undermine the capacity of organised workers in the palm industry 
to negotiate wages and defend working conditions, and unions in extractive enterprises were often 
the central targets of paramilitary operations. Between 1995 and 2002, 74 per cent of human rights 
violations in Colombia took place in mining and agro-industrial districts, including 828 
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assassinations, 433 massacres and 142 disappearances (Ramírez 2015). Thus the weakening of 
organised labour came hand in hand with the strengthening of the paramilitary right, as multinational 
corporations aiming meet the objectives of competitive accumulation and flexibilise labor 
increasingly permitted or actively supported violent tactics, forging closer ties to paramilitaries to 
defend their interests and power. 
 The third step involved the consolidation of regional state power. Against the background of 
state fragmentation, decentralisation and loss of territorial control throughout the 1990s, 
paramilitaries also adopted increasingly state-like functions (Ballvé, 2011; Gill, 2009, 2016).  In 
response to the success of left-wing parties in municipal elections, paramilitaries moved in to 
municipal politics in order to defend the status quo (Romero 2004).  In some cases, existing politicians 
sympathetic to paramilitaries began working more closely with them or were enlisted through bribes 
or coercion; in others, paramilitaries sponsored their own candidates (Lopez, 2010). With 
municipalities under their control, paramilitaries became  ‘overseers and coordinators of clientelism’, 
taking over clientelistic networks, channeling rural resources towards landlords and their allies, while 
protecting private enterprise (Sanín, 2003: 239).  
 Thus, through various mechanisms paramilitary violence facilitated new processes of 
neoliberal agrarian restructuring in the Colombian countryside on the basis of integration with global 
commodity markets, production for export and facilitating the entrance of foreign investments, whilst 
securing economic and political power in the hands of a ‘reactionary class configuration’ of landlords, 
paramilitaries and drug traffickers. 
 
The Left 
Whereas the 1970s and 1980s had been the apogee of the Colombian Left, the 1991 Constitution 
marked a turning point. The Constitution, which was negotiated by a diverse array of political and 
social groups including demobilised guerrillas, the student movement, the national Indigenous 
movement, and women’s organisations, inspired hope amongst many sectors of the left that an end 
to political exclusion could be translated into the end of the conflict. However, by selectively 
incorporating insurgencies into the the political system, the new Constitution also precipitated  
ruptures in the left. The M-19 and the EPL demobilised to enter into the elections for a Constituent 
Assembly, whereas peace talks broke down with the FARC and ELN, who returned to war with the 
state. The temporary unity of the guerrillas was irredeemably fractured, and the agreements of the 
Co-ordinadora Guerrillera Simón Bolívar (CGSB) collapsed. On the same day the Constituent 
Assembly came into force, the government launched an attack on the FARC’s secretariat office, 
which the FARC interpreted as a call to war (FARC-EP, 1997).  The tensions within the 1991 
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Constitution were the central focus of divisions between groups. For those who emphasised the issues 
of democratic participation and opening political spaces for participation within institutional and 
official frameworks, the constitution was seen as a major breakthrough (Murillo 2014). Meanwhile 
more radical sectors claimed that democratic participation acted as a trojan horse for the 
implementation of neoliberal policies (ELN 1997; FARC-EP 1997). 
 For its part, the FARC interpreted the decimation of the Patriotic Union as a sign that the 
doors for political reform were closed. Radicalised by paramilitary violence, the FARC stepped up 
its militaristic orientation, emphasising the primacy of rural struggle and the agency of the peasantry. 
In a volte-face of the original conception of guerrilla armies as instruments of political parties, the 
FARC officially split from the Communist Party at the eighth conference in 1993 and embarked on 
an ambitious project for the revolutionary capture of state power. Meanwhile, the ELN had moved 
into strategic mining territories, where it used taxes on mining companies to fund local community 
projects. While there is no doubt that inequality and social exclusion had reached new heights under 
neoliberalism, the armed struggle was propelled as much by “objective conditions” as the influx of 
resources from taxes on the narcotics and mining industries and kidnappings (Medina, 2010; Pizarro, 
2003; Richani, 2012: 76). 
 However, the expansion of the military capacity of guerrilla forces in the 1980s and 1990s 
came alongside their growing isolation from civil society. Against the backdrop of the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, the fall of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua and the defeat of guerrilla forces throughout 
the continent, the political horizons of armed struggle came to be discredited amongst broad sectors 
of the population, including within left organisations themselves (Archila 2003: 296; Medina 2010; 
Urrego 1990). Most of the left had reached a general consensus around the “end of socialism” thesis, 
while Marxist-Leninist principles held little sway (Archila 2003; Leech 2011; Pizarro  2003; Richani 
2010). The ELN and particularly the FARC were now isolated not only internationally but also 
nationally, as tensions grew between the rural left, whose base and leadership was overwhelmingly 
composed of peasants, and the urban left, which was led by students and intellectuals.  Popular 
movements became increasingly frustrated with the guerrilla’s failure to respect their autonomy, 
creating tensions which were often expressed as fierce and open conflicts (Archila 2003: 296).  
 The flip-side of the guerrilla insurgents’ ascendance during the 1990s was the weakening of 
the unarmed left. As Urrega describes: ‘the left’s focus on armed struggle led to the weakening of 
popular organising processes and the supremacy of military over political struggle (Urrega 2003: 
172). While the FARC gathered forces in rural frontier zones, civic activists absorbed the brunt of 
political violence in the form of massacres, death threats, forced displacements, judicial proceedings 
and persecutions in the hands of the military, police, drug traffickers, and paramilitaries. State-
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sponsored terror closed off spaces for public action, and the left’s traditional repertoire of tactics such 
as mass assemblies, marches or strikes were classified as subversive activity. Attempts to offer 
cohesive political leadership challenging the power of the dominant classes was met with brutal 
repression, as demonstrated in the ten-year massacre of 4,000 UP members. In the midst of the 
bloodbath, many UP leaders called for a complete separation from the FARC (Dudley 2006: 83; 
Leech 2011: 31-32).  
 A major public relations campaign sought to delegitimise the FARC, which drove greater 
frictions throughout the left. In 1997 the U.S. State Department registered the FARC as a ‘narco-
terrorist’ organisation, and social organisations were pressured to denounce the “terrorist” activities 
of the FARC, which fostered deeper resentments between organisations. Prolonged violence eroded 
illusions of the insurgents as ‘martyrs’, and people grew weary with the prolongation of violence 
(Della Porta 2006). There was a massive decline in support, not only of the FARC, but also of all 
leftist movements. The emergence of a centre-left political party, the Alternative Democratic Pole 
(PDA) inspired hope for broad leftist political representation when it  Bogota mayoral elections in 
2003, 2007 (Rodríguez-Garavito 2008).  However, the party failed to gain broad support amongst 
social movements, and after an optimistic start the party rapidly gave way to infighting and 
corruption. 
 Organised labour was sent into disarray by a combination of neoliberal reforms and political 
violence. Workers in the manufacturing sector had been the most significant in both numerical and 
organisational terms until the 1980s. Yet the closure of 25,000 factories brought a drastic decline in 
manufacturing jobs, which severely undermined their power (Velasco 2015; Vidal 2012). Jobs in the 
formal economy were replaced by informal jobs, which rarely even came with contracts or benefits, 
let alone union representation. By 2000, informal economy workers represented 60 per cent of the 
active workforce, while the number of unionised workers dropped from 16 percent to 6 percent of the 
workforce between 1980 and 2010 (Velasco 2015; Vidal 2012 ). The anti-union offensive combined 
a delegitimisation campaign led by the right-wing media with political persecution from far-right 
armed groups. Between 1991 and 1999, 266 union leaders and 1,070 activists were assassinated 
(ENS, 2003).  Despite some important mobilisations of public sector and communications workers 
against privatisations, conventional forms of labour activism such as strikes, assemblies, and 
collective bargaining to negotiate specific labor concerns were severely restricted by political 
persecution (Delgado 2002). 
 The creation of the CUT (Central Unitaria de Trabajadores) in 1986 was a significant effort 
to rebuild workers’ power against the neoliberal onslaught. The CUT unified workers from competing 
unions, the CSTC and the UTC, in an attempt to rebuild the labour movement through strategies of 
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grassroots organising, reaching out to precarious workers and indigenous and peasant social 
movements, politicising and educating at the rank and file (Gill 2016: 130). The CUT  contested and 
prevented the first government measures to privatise the state’s telecommunications company in 
1992, privatisations and cutbacks set to reduce fiscal transfers to finance municipal education and 
health budgets. In 2001 the union successfully co-ordinated a series of national, regional and local 
protests against the “Free Trade of the Americas” agreement (FTAA) with the United States, 
including a two-day civic strike in July 2001 (Hough 2007: 114). However, the CUT quickly 
disintegrated in the face of brutal violence, with the assassination of four thousand of its members 
between 1986 and 2003, including all of its founding members. It was also divided over the issue of 
“social pacts” aimed at linking capital and labor to defend the competitiveness of export sectors, 
which inevitably weakened and divided labour organisations, while unions were pressured to declare 
their opposition to the armed insurgents (Chomsky 2007: Medina 1996: 104). As a result, the 
Colombian chapter was among the weakest of the broad mobilisations against the FTAA that swept 
the continent in the early 2000s. 
 The fear, panic and mistrust sewed by paramilitary violence combined with new forms of 
dispossession and economic insecurity created by the neoliberal restructuring to destroy the social 
fabric of communities (Gill 2016). For a incipient left movement that had thrived on community 
assemblies, mass mobilisations and strikes, the effect of the new atmosphere of fear and mutual 
suspicion within communities was paralysing. As one activist from Barrancabermeja’s civic strike 
movement described: ‘the plazas, the streets, all the places we used to meet in public were closed 
down in the violence. We had no spaces for public meetings, assemblies and events. All the 
momentum [of the civic strike] was lost. The memories faded’ (Interview, Sonia Nevada, 2017). As 
bonds of solidarity and trust were broken down, places for public debate sealed off and political 
instruments decapitated, the entire basis of the once-vibrant left that had emerged with the 1970s civic 
strike movement was sent into disarray.  By the end of the 1990s and throughout the 2000s, there was 
a complete absence of any social or political movement of national proportions able to demonstrate 
itself as an alternative to neoliberalism and militarisation. 
 As the left was forced into retreat, energies were channelled into a defensive strategy based 
on the creation of autonomous rural communities.  The purpose of the autonomous rural communities 
is to protect rural populations from violence, whilst simultaneously sustaining grassroots participation 
and autonomous leadership. These initiatives have been very diverse. Some have sought to maintain 
ties of social cohesion by preserving ethnic and cultural traditions within a geographically demarcated 
territory, including the creation of autonomous indigenous territories in Cauca and the peace 
communities in San José de Apartadó. In these territories, rural communities have prohibited the 
entrance of armed actors— the army, police, paramilitaries and guerrillas, and have used 
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constitutionally protected land rights as a means of defending cultural, political, and economic 
autonomy. The idea of the peace territories is to maintain control over the means of production, whilst 
strengthening traditional agricultural practices, cultural values and autonomous self-governance as a 
means of resisting the threats of both political violence and neoliberalism (Lanchero 2000; Zibechi 
2012).  The following chapter explores one instance of these new autonomous territories in the 
Cimitarra Valley, which, I argue, became a political refuge from the experience of economic 
precariousness and paramilitary violence in urban areas the 1990s. I describe how the fabric of radical 
activism that had developed under the Middle Magdalena’s civic strike movement was re-channelled 
into a defensive strategy based on the creation of an autonomous territorial movement— the Peasant 
Land Reserve (Zona de Reserva Campesina, ZRC). The ZRC allowed the movement to sustain the 
bonds of solidarity, grassroots mobilisation and participatory decision making that had developed 
under the civic strikes, whilst also providing access to the means of subsistence, allowing its members 
to survive the economic insecurities. Thus, against the background of the severe weakening and 
retreat of the left, the creation of autonomous rural communities provided the foundation for 
movements to sustain and build resistance against neoliberal restructuring and paramilitary violence. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has traced how a combination of paramilitary violence and neoliberal restructuring 
reconfigured the agrarian class structures and webs of power in the Colombian countryside. It  began 
by examining the emergence of neoliberalism from the tensions inherent in the previous growth 
model, as well as changes in the balance of class forces and increasing imperialist interventions from 
the US. Economic shock therapy plunged the country into crisis, characterised by widespread 
unemployment and an escalation of the guerrilla struggle. As the state lost hold of its capacity to 
reproduce neoliberalism, the balance of forces increasingly tipped toward the far-right, and a 
reactionary agrarian bloc of landlords, narcotraffickers, paramilitaries, agribusiness gained control 
over territories through terror and displacement, and increasingly came to capture regional state 
power. Through a brutal project of violence and terror paramilitaries sought to ‘unmake’  the emergent 
popular struggle. Death threats, assassinations and massacres sent the labour movement into retreat 
and annihilated the political instruments that had emerged from the civic strikes. As the state was re-
oriented away from its functions of class incorporation and converted into an instrument of coercion 
and dispossession, it went from potential ‘ally’ of the peasantry to the ‘enemy’— both in the coffee 
regions and especially in the frontier. Against this background, a new wave of peasant movements 
sparked by the impact of neoliberalism on rural communities became prominent forces in the 
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resistance to neoliberalism.  The next chapter examines in closer detail the diverse trajectories and 








The previous chapter showed how neoliberal restructuring triggered major productive 
transformations to the Colombian countryside, characterised by a profound crisis in peasant 
economies together with an unemployment crisis in urban and rural areas.  This chapter explores this 
process from a different angle: how it was experienced by peasants at the micro-level.  The peasants 
of Líbano and the Middle Magdalena suddenly found themselves in a society structured in a very 
different way; their access to the means of subsistence was suddenly cut off, they were confronted 
with new antagonisms from the dominant classes and the state, they identified commonalities with 
others in a similar situation and they built alliances with similar groups to defend their cause. In this 
chapter, I explore the different cultural practices and political experiences that peasants drew on to 
make sense of the transformative changes affecting their livelihoods, and how they organised 
politically to defend their lands and livelihoods from threats coming from outside forces.  
 One of the main arguments of this thesis is that Colombia’s contemporary peasant struggles 
are only intelligible if considered in the context of regional diversity of agrarian structures. For this 
reason, my study compares the very different histories of capitalist development, class and state 
formation and regional cultures between the coffee region of Líbano and the marginal frontiers in the 
Cimitarra valley to account for the variation in the form and outcome of the processes of agrarian 
restructuring and peasant struggle. The comparison of these two regions is not straightforward since 
the movements represent very different types of peasants. Although both sets of farmers resemble 
‘traditional’ peasant producers insofar as they rely on household production, they are also 
differentially incorporated into the market imperative, and have very different political and cultural 
traditions in relation to agriculture.   
 Since the form and degree of market integration of various sets of producers was significant 
in determining the character and outcome, it is worth taking a more nuanced understanding of their 
characteristics. For their part, at least since the introduction of green revolution technologies, the 
coffee farmers of Líbano have been heavily dependent on commodity relations for their cycles of 
reproduction. Between a third and a half of the costs of their productive cycle are paid in money 
(Forero 2010; Ramírez 2009). Despite their integration into commodity relations, the coffee farmers 
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continued to rely on family labour (Forero 2010; Ramírez 2009). As table 1 shows, around two-thirds 
of Líbano’s producers are minifundios of less than 5 hectares, which is too small for a producer to 
generate sufficient income to sustain a family. This means they must enter the market to meet the 
household subsistence needs. Farmers rely on credits, fertilisers, and pesticides for agricultural 
production; they are updated with production techniques, including seed selection, planting and 
drying processes, they keep regular accounts and closely follow world coffee prices. Yet given their 
difficulties in accessing credits, technologies and machinery, they are also in a subordinate position 
in relation to the dominant classes. Since the crisis in unemployment and agriculture swept the coffee 
regions, many farmers remaining in the region have increasingly combined food production for self-
consumption— producing beans, vegetables, sugar cane and fruit alongside coffee (Forero 2010). 
Many also rely increasingly on wage labour in the informal sector or in construction in nearby towns. 
 Meanwhile, the settlers in the marginal frontier territories in the Cimitarra valley are more 
reliant on a mixture of market and non-market relations for their reproduction. The ‘traditional’ 
settlers have strong historical and cultural ties to subsistence agriculture, and they continue to produce 
‘peasant’ crops such as yucca, rice, beans, and corn as well as small-scale livestock, often through 
diversified farming techniques.  Thus, access to land is important for this group because it provides 
autonomy from the market, allowing them to secure the means of subsistence in very arduous 
conditions (Molano, 1987, 1992, 1990,). While they seek to enter the market to meet the needs of 
household consumption by producing corn, rice or beans, due to marginal geographical conditions, 
weak infrastructure and price fluctuations, market access is incredibly precarious. The stronger 
subsistence-orientation of the Cimitarra peasants is made possible by the larger plot sizes. As table 2 
shows, 70 per cent of farms in the Cimitarra Valley are small plots of 1 or 2 agricultural units (UAF)— 
enough to subsist and secure a household income, although this is rarely sufficient to facilitate a 
process of accumulation. Nonetheless, the peasants of the Cimitarra valley are not homogenous— 
even limited exposure to the market has brought processes of differentiation. On the more marginal 
highlands around Puerto Nuevo Ité in the Cimitarra valley, for example, there is a greater diversity 
of crop production, while some peasants on the lower territories around Yondó and San Pablo are 
more involved in capitalist markets of palm or rice production, and others are more dependent on 
labour in logging, oil or agri-business to survive.  In recent years, the closure of the frontier and the 
coming of age of a younger generation in search of land have created new demographic pressures. 
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 While recognising the diversity in the structural location of these very different sets of rural 
producers, the aim of this chapter is not to attempt to assign a particular form of consciousness to any 
designated group. Rather, I attempt to understand different forms and processes of market integration 
in terms of the type of experience it brings: their different strategies for reproduction, antagonisms 
with other classes and the state, how they were brought together with others in similar position, what 
they sought in their struggles and the types of alliances they built. At issue is understanding the way 
these different class experiences and forms of market integration played out in concrete historical and 
political circumstances.  In Líbano, farmers responded to the coffee crisis by attempting to reduce 
household consumption, yet given their greater dependence on the market for their reproduction, they 
were increasingly forced to sell products or turn to migrant labour to meet their reproduction needs. 
Meanwhile, the larger, more marginal plots of the Cimitarra valley allow for the production of 
subsistence crops alongside commodities for sale in the market, allowing peasants to in these regions 
to retreat to subsistence production in the face of sudden and drastic.  
 One of the main conclusions of this chapter is that while the neoliberal restructuring sparked 
a wave of peasant struggles throughout the country, the form and character of these movements was 
very diverse. This can partly be explained in terms of different historical experiences of capitalist 
development and class and state formation in each region. The coffee farmers of Líbano experienced 
the neoliberal agrarian crisis through a drastic drop in coffee prices and the loss of the institutional 
protections and benefits they had enjoyed from Fedecafé. Loaded with debt and without access to 
credit, Líbano’s small farmers broke from Fedecafé, and new antagonisms began to emerge between 
small farmers and the coffee elite. Thus the coffee crisis was simultaneously a hegemonic crisis for 
the institutional control of Fedecafé, rupturing the vertical inter-class alliances between small, 
medium and large coffee farmers, giving rise to widespread mobilisations and paving the way for the 
development of new oppositional organisations outside the control of Fedecafé. Meanwhile in the 
Middle Magdalena neoliberal reforms were implemented against a backdrop of intense turmoil and 
polarisation. The drop in prices of peasant crops and the privatisation of state institutes left peasants 
loaded with debts, and many turned to coca production in order to repay loans. The arrival of coca 
attracted a host of new actors to the region, including a new wave of settlers, but also narco-traffickers 
and paramilitaries seeking to expel peasants and expropriate their lands in order to convert them into 
large-scale agro-fuel enterprises. Thus the longstanding land conflict between peasants and landlords 
in the region was escalated as peasants now defended themselves against a land rush from the 
emergent agrarian bourgeoisie. 
 
 
Neoliberal crisis and peasant response 
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Líbano 
The coffee farmers of Líbano experienced the neoliberal agrarian crisis through a drastic drop in 
coffee prices and the loss of the institutional protections and benefits they had enjoyed from Fedecafé.  
As chapter six noted, the liberalisation of the coffee trade led to a drop in coffee prices, the end of 
Fedecafé’s supports to growers and the consolidation of agribusiness in the world coffee market.  The 
coffee price drop had a massive impact on farmers’ livelihoods, equating to a 30 per cent loss in 
farmers’ incomes in 1991 (Robledo 1998). The drop in incomes forced farmers into debt to cover the 
cost of household food before the next harvest, but also to purchase the next package of agrochemical 
inputs. By 1993, 1,606 farmers had reported debts, equivalent to 48 per cent of farmers in the region. 
The fact that 68 per cent of these loans were for less than 5 million pesos (roughly $2000), 
demonstrates that it was smaller farmers that were most affected (Rincón 2005: 76).   
 The turn to monoculture varieties had also made coffee farmers highly susceptible to pest 
infestations. In the early 1990s a massive borer worm outbreak brought thousands of small coffee 
farmers to the rink of ruin. In 1990, 25,000 hectares had been affected by the borer worm, and by 
1996 this had grown to 600,000 hectares, impacting 90 per cent of the country’s coffee regions 
(Ramírez 2009: 167). The timing of the borer worm outbreak in combination with the coffee price 
drop of the early 1990s was so devastating that farmers began murmuring that the worm had been 
deliberately introduced by the US in a plot against the Colombian coffee industry. To control the 
borer worm requires farmers to incorporate new mechanisms of pest control into their farming 
processes, including the application of a variety of insecticides, biological control agents, sampling 
and selecting processes. This increased the costs of production for smallholders by 15 percent, 
creating greater dependence on credits in order to continue coffee production (Ramírez 2009: 167).  
Yet the austerity cuts to Fedecafé had placed severe restrictions on provisions of credits, technical 
assistance and support for farmers. Whereas previously, Fedecafé would have cushioned the impact 
of price drops through subsidies and provided the credits, technical assistance and chemical inputs to 
deal with infections, now small farmers were forced to adapt to ruinous conditions without Fedecafé’s 
support, and under the pressure of debt. Fedecafé’s emergency plan for eradication and renovation of 
trees affected by the borer worm was only accessible for medium and large farmers, not small ones. 
Small farmers, who represented the majority of farmers in Líbano, were thus least able to cope with 
the crisis.  In Líbano, large farms of over 1,000 coffee trees reduced their production to a tenth of 
their previous size, while on smaller farms of 100 trees production ended completely (Ramírez 2009: 
167).  All of the affected farms were 30 hectares or less, and 84 per cent were 10 hectares or less 
(Rincón 2005: 27). 
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  In order to purchase the insecticide package, small farmers took out further loans. But 
without proper training and support, they inevitably failed to avoid infection. Falling short of 
Fedecafé’s export standards, the coffee affected by the borer worm was purchased at half price and 
only distributed nationally (Ramírez 2009). This drove farmers further into debt. According to one 
study, in Líbano there were 743 expired debts amongst Líbano’s farmers.  With sky-high interest 
rates of 5.4 percent a month, the small farmers had little possibility of repaying the debts, even though 
households limited food consumption to the point of survival (Ramírez 2009).  Farmers were left at 
the mercy of private banks, who were threatening legal procedures and property seizures. 
Most small Líbano coffee farmers found the economic insecurities of the new unprotected 
coffee market more than they could handle. Faced with crushing debt, many abandoned their farms, 
resulting in the loss of the harvest (El Tiempo 1995). A sudden spur of panic sales saw the price of 
farms crash. Farms that in 1992 were worth around $6,000 were being sold at $2 to 3,000— 40 percent 
less than previous market price (Ramírez 2009). All those who abandoned their plots were farmers 
of less than 5 hectares (Ramírez 2009). The most tragic manifestation of this subsistence crisis was 
the spate of suicides. Reports suggest at least 74 peasants committed suicide by consuming the agro-
chemical Thiodan (Rincón 2005: 113). Desperation from indebtedness was the common thread that 
ran through the reported suicides (Rincón 2005: 113).  Individualised and desperate survival strategies 
were the common theme of an impoverished community with very weak collective traditions. 
Yet this sudden transformation in production relations did not bring an end to smallholding 
in Líbano entirely. Rather than a complete de-agrarianisation, there has been a significant 
recomposition of coffee farming, which Forero describes as a ‘campesinización and minifundización 
of coffee production’ (Forero 2006: 98). Whereas in 1970, 300,000 farms had produced 1,067,000 
hectares of coffee, in 1993-1997, the number of farms had doubled to 609,000, yet the area of land 
cultivated had declined to 864,000 (Forero 2006: 98). National figures suggest that in the 1990s 
around 11 percent of coffee farmers abandoned production— equivalent to 63,000 farmers (Forero 
2006: 96). The demand for labour on coffee farms also dried up, and the circuits of seasonal 
agricultural workers came to a halt. Yet coffee has continued to play a central role in the economy, 
representing 19 per cent of value produced in the agricultural sector (Forero 2006: 93). Larger 
enterprises that arrived with the boom of the mid-1970s abandoned the industry, while smaller 
farmers of 10 hectares or less increased their share of cultivated land from 31 percent to 61 percent 
(Forero 2006: 98). These changes suggest that the recomposition of the coffee sector has been closely 
associated with the urban labour crisis. 80 percent of farms are 5 hectares or less— an area too small 
to derive a household income— with most coffee farmers deriving their incomes from a range of 
sources. Peasants have lowered household consumption, and produce a variety of petty commodity 
and subsistence crops alongside coffee. Frequently the female head of the household tends the farm, 
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while the children search for work in nearby towns. This suggests that Líbano’s small farmers have 
undergone a recomposition in their productive processes, experiencing processes of semi-




As E.P Thompson recognised, new processes of class formation arise when social groups are placed 
in new structures of exploitation and come to identify new points of antagonism, even if a common 
class-consciousness has not fully evolved.  The coffee crisis of the 1990s was not only about the 
livelihood devastation of tens of thousands of coffee farmers. It also threatened the entire moral and 
political leadership of Fedecafé and the coffee elite— and opened a space for new social identities 
and cultural practices to emerge. During the protectionist era, Fedecafé's legitimacy had been derived 
from the provision of credits, technical assistance and tariffs to coffee farmers. With the restructuring, 
the basis for Fedecafé’s hegemonic control were irreversibly altered.  Disillusionment with Fedecafé 
was a consistent trope during interviews with small farmers. During my interviews with small coffee 
farmers, any reference to Fedecafé was met with a disparaging response: 
Fedecafe used to be like Gods in this town, but no one pays them any regard anymore 
Fedecafe and politicians only come here for their own purposes. They just line their own pockets.  
The campesino gets no recognition from the government. The bonds of trust have been broken.  
(Interview Pastor Rodriguez, 2017; Samuel Moreno, 2017) 
The paternalistic relations between small and medium coffee farmers and political elites had 
been grounded in a system of credits, technologies and protections, which had become so central to 
coffee farmers’ livelihoods that they had come to see these as part of the ‘basic rights’ to which they 
were entitled as rural citizens. Heavily indebted, lacking in capital and technical assistance to adapt 
their farms to new conditions, the small farmers of Líbano found themselves abandoned by the new 
development model and excluded from the Colombian political system as a whole.  
However the emergence of new grievances and antagonisms amongst coffee farmers was not 
automatically translated into political action. The farmers’ abandonment by Fedecafé had ruptured 
the notion that peasants’ grievances could be resolved through technical fixes or adapting their 
production practices, yet other forms of political action were not immediately obvious. During my 
conversations with small farmers who had participated in the strikes, it was clear that many of them 
had little experience of participating in political activity besides the occasional JAC meeting. One 
participant in the movement recalled that: ‘In those times, we coffee farmers didn’t even know what 
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a strike or a protest was, we had no experience in those matters’ (Interview, Sandra Ramírez 2017). 
These were farmers with weak collective traditions and political leadership, who were  unaccustomed 
to interpreting their problems in class-based ways or seeking out collective solutions to their 
problems. 
The eruption of protests throughout the coffee regions would not have been possible were it 
not for the community work of a cadre of activists inspired by Liberation Theology. From the mid-
1970s, farmers of the region had begun sending their children to universities in major cities including 
Ibague, Bogota and Medellin. For the parents, education was a symbol of their social mobility, but 
the children also returned home with new forms of radical consciousness. They were inspired by the 
ideas of anti-imperialism and radical political change of the Cuban revolution and the 1960s New 
Left, and many Líbano students participated in civic strikes before returning home.  In 1976, a young 
Líbano-born sociologist Gonzalo Sánchez published a social history on “Los Bolcheviques del 
Líbano”, which became the subject of popular mythology amongst a new generation of teachers and 
students in the region. They were joined by more experienced peasant activists. Some had memories 
fighting in Liberal armies during la Violencia, and others had organised land invasions with the 
ANUC in the 1960s and 1970s. In 1982, the ELN established the Guerrilla Front called Los 
Bolcheviques and began agitating and educating amongst peasants. Women also played an important 
role in the emerging forms of activism, as a result of the changing position of women in the household 
following the crisis and the new emphasis on feminist, horizontal and participatory forms of 
organising from a new generation of urban-trained activists. New forms of community work 
emphasised critical reflection on the received faith in the established social order and become active 
subjects in response to changes in their materiala circumstances. The result of these various 
consciousness-raising efforts was to create community leaders organically connected to Líbano's 
peasants and inspired by new forms of collective and political action. 
When the crisis struck in 1990-1991 and peasants found themselves abandoned by traditional 
institutions, this opened a space for urban and rural activists to begin organising outside the traditional 
control of Fedecafé. The first step was to hold open assemblies to discuss the debt crisis. These 
meetings took place in the marketplace on Sundays, since this was the only day most peasants would 
congregate in the town in order to buy and sell produce. Fabian, a peasant leader from the region who 
had been involved in the founding of the movement recalled how they would go to the market on 
Sundays, since this was the time most residents would gather from the rural areas: 
We went to the market and started talking with other farmers. “I’m in debt” “Me too” “They’re going 
to evict me”, “me too” and so on. More and more people gathered round. It started with 20 or 30 or 
so, but after a few weeks there were hundreds of us gathered in the park (Interview, Fabian Cospac, 
2017). 
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Activists committed to Liberation Theology promoted new forms of organisation based on 
grassroots education, social action and consciousness-raising. They held workshops with peasants on 
organisation and strategy, teaching communities how to hold meetings, discuss issues, make 
decisions collectively, and the types of action that could be taken independently of traditional 
institutional recourse. They gathered to discuss the problems facing farmers, share their experiences 
and concerns, and debate the range of actions possible. Many new farmers became involved in the 
movement, and new leaders began to emerge. One female leader of the movement, Sandra, recalled 
how these workshops represented a whole new understanding of political participation and the sense 
of empowerment it engendered: ‘we opened up new forms of community work, there was a spirit of 
being part of a team, and new leadership roles started to emerge. […] Peasants were saying no to 
politicians for the first time, and we were forming our own association’ (Interview, Sandra Rodriguez, 
2017). These processes are testimony to new forms of awareness and politicisation arising amongst 
coffee farmers, even if only in incipient stages. 
 
 
The first course of action was to seek institutional redress. The farmers began by sending 
letters petitioning the Minister for Agriculture and Fedecafé for debt relief. But when their protests 
were met with silence, the next step was to go beyond official channels. The farmers resorted to non-
institutional means, adopting disruptive tactics in order to push for negotiations with the government.  
The turn to disruptive tactics represented a major shift in the farmers’ political understandings and 
forms of activity. It implied a rejection of the leadership of the traditional political elite and critique 
of clientelistic politics. It also strengthened the coffee farmers’ organisational autonomy, extending 
new understandings of collective participation to a part of the countryside where these had hitherto 
been virtually absent. Discussion forums were held more frequently, and provided the basis for 
assigning tasks and identifying leaders amongst rural communities.  
In February 1995 a handful of protestors held a strike in Líbano’s central park. Protest leaders 
gave speeches on the reasons for their protests to a handful of people who gathered to watch. Farmers 
gathered in the park with cries of: “We will march to the park!” “We demand a solution to peasants’ 
problems!” “We demand a solution for impoverished peasants!” (Astudillo, 2016: 9).  Seeing the 
strikers inspired solidarity amongst local shopkeepers and transport workers, who paralysed 
production for the day and joined the strikers in the park.  In the following days, hundreds more 
people arrived in the plaza from the towns of Villahermosa, Falan, Palocabildo and Casabianca, 
preventing the police and army from breaking up the protests. They set up tents and resolved to remain 
in the park until they could bring the government to negotiate. The camp lasted  
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three days, during which time they held meetings, workshops and cultural activities. In the early days, 
the strike counted 1-2,000 participants, yet by the end of the action around 14,000 people had joined. 
In other municipalities local residents set up roadblocks and various confrontations with the police 
were reported (Bautista, 2012).   
These incipient forms of organisation represented a whole new spectrum for coffee farmers’ 
political activity, offering a new repertoire of collective organising where traditional political bosses 
had no role to play. Knowing that their demands could not be processed in a machine that did not 
represent them, disruptive tactics forced open a channel for direct negotiations with the state. The 
coffee elite and Fedecafé were made visible as the common enemy, giving rise to oppositional 
sentiments and practices amongst farmers. At the same time, new connections and collective 
identities were forged between farmers and local activists as they planned and strategised over how 
to respond. Participants emphasised the emergent processes of movement-building underway:  
The mobilisations were good for developing unity and for new leaders to emerge amongst our 
members. It opened up work with our communities, we were all talking to each other. We linked up 
with others that supported our cause (Interview, Pastor Ramírez 2017) 
Community action committees, previously a mainstay for rural clientelistism, were cut lose 
from paternalistic ties and transformed into spaces for participatory discussion, collective organising 
and radical education. Vertical integration through corporatist institutes was replaced with more 
horizontal, class-based forms of organising that emphasised democratic participation, critical 
reflection and reciprocity. During interviews activists emphasised how participation in these 
processes led to new organising capacities, bonds of trust and collective work between farmers, many 
of whom had little prior experience of collective organising:  
We set up our own project committee so that we could co-ordinate our own projects and break away 
from manipulation of the politicians. Peasants themselves were rejecting politicians. They developed 
new organisational capacities, learning how about political participation in administering and 
overseeing tasks, assigning resources and managing funds (Interview, Pastor Ramírez 2017).   
 
Organisational efforts emphasising consciousness-raising and participation in the context of the 
growing influence of Liberation Theology also allowed for the emergence of organic leadership 
amongst local farmers themselves, who coordinated alongside local students, teachers and public 
education workers. 
The work of organising and coordinating the strikes provided the basis for the development 
of new democratic processes, forms of popular participation and collective work between farmers. 
After each day of protests, assemblies would be held where participants could express support, take 
on tasks and discuss the next course of action to be taken. A coordinating team was established with 
participation of leaders from each municipality, tasked with presenting and discussing grievances. 
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The demands remained centred on the immediate economic issues: support for controlling the borer 
worm, debt pardons for small farmers and incentives for productive diversification projects. A list of 
demands was collectively drawn up, which centred on debt relief and price protections, including: ‘1) 
Condemnation of debts of small and medium coffee farmers; 2) Subsidies to control diseases; 3) 
Investment support for alternative productive projects; 4) Human Rights protections’ (Bedoya 2015). 
The scale of the protest demonstrated the extent of local support, forcing officials to pay attention to 
their demands.  A delegation from the national government was sent to negotiate the debts, and 
eventually the strike was called off after twenty-two days. 
However, after the farmers had returned to their farms, it soon became clear that the 
government’s concessions had failed to materialise, while the borer worm spread further and coffee 
prices continued to plummet. At this point, opinions between leaders and participants diverged over 
the next course of action to be followed.  In the early months of 1995 a new series of meetings were 
held amongst participants to discuss how to proceed. Some leaders called for another strike, while a 
more radical strata of activists pushed for an escalation of the protest. During discussions, the more 
radical sectors of the leadership proposed an occupation of the bridge on the road to Bogotá, which 
was seen as a means of ‘heightening the level of confrontation’ (Astudillo 2016). The idea to occupy 
the bridge was prevented when the departmental authorities caught wind of the action and sent police 
to prevent the protesters from arriving. While disruptive tactics might have initially attracted public 
attention in this quiet coffee town, the initial excitement was fading and an escalation of the activities 
was needed to sustain the movement in the face of ongoing crisis. 
Even though the more radical proposals were not followed up, the protests nevertheless 
gathered momentum. In July 1995, the protestors gathered in villages more determined than ever. A 
new mobilisation was launched with the announcement of the founding of Asopema (Association of 
Small and Medium Farmers of North Tolima), composed of activists and community leaders that had 
emerged from the previous round of strikes. The main base of support was the smallest peasants worst 
hit by the crisis. Around 40 participants marched to the regional capital, Ibague, where they entered 
the park and set up camp. This time, they were joined not only by cafeteros from the North Tolima 
region, but small farmers from Huila, Valle and Antioquia too. The protesters gathered around 18,000 
participants, and launched a series of marches and roadblocks. The action became highly visible, and 
received attention in the local and national news. It eventually lasted for three months, which became 
a period of intense political activity.  
In his account of the occupation, peasant activist German Bedoya describes how participation 
in the action simultaneously allowed for new oppositional practices, processes of political education 
and consciousness-raising to emerge. Activists introduced a distinction between the traditions and 
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customs of peasant production in the region, where production for household consumption together 
with sale of coffee for the market allowed peasants to lead a dignified life, and the Green Revolution 
varieties which implied the loss of diversified peasant agriculture and control of the farming process, 
subordination to large coffee manufacturers and extreme environmental degradation from agro-
chemicals and pest infestations. In this way, new antagonisms were established between small 
farmers and Fedecafé and the coffee elite. 
We talked about how the change in coffee policy had destroyed small farmers, how the abrogation of the ICA had 
impoverished peasants, how Fedecafé had been converted into a cartel where the administrators squandered the 
farmers’ money on expensive ships, buildings and taking on responsibilities the state should have had, earning 
salaries higher than what the President earned. We blamed them for putting an end to our traditional coffee varieties 
like arabico, which had seeds that only required planting and de-weeding, and forcing peasants to grow Caturra 
which forced us to give up growing traditional food crops, and how it was they that had brought the infections like 
la araña roja, la roya, la broca that had affected our crops by making us grow the “improved” variety that was no 
good and forced us into debt with Bancafe. We also talked about how the banks were expropriating farms of 
impoverished peasants, turning their back on them and not providing the investment that was needed in the region 
(Germán Bedoya, 2015) 
Even if peasants had long incorporated green revolution technologies into their productive 
practices, the notion of peasants’ autonomy over the production process in opposition to the control 
of coffee MNCs clearly resonated for farmers given that it provided a way of understanding their 
recent experience of marginalisation in the coffee production chain. 
The protests may have been sparked by the price drops of 1990, but the farmers’ responses to 
having to stop cultivating coffee and abandon coffee farms were about far more than an immediate 
reaction to hunger and debt—or “luchas del bolsillo” as they are known among activists. Smallholder 
coffee farming was supposed to be the backbone of an economic growth model that cherished rural 
stability and agricultural production in the coffee regions and protected the livelihoods of small and 
mid-sized farmers. The statements of peasant participants conveyed the emergence of a new moral 
critique around issues of globalisation of food and agriculture that was also deeply embedded in local 
cultural traditions of this historical coffee producing region. Samuel, an older community member 
with a small coffee farm a few kilometres outside the town of Líbano, explained in passionate terms 
the sense of outrage felt by the farmers:  
Coffee is our culture, something that comes from our grandparents, that we carry in our blood. Here in Líbano 
we are farmers by trade and tradition. […] If the government doesn’t understand the problem facing the coffee 
sector, it does not understand the problem of the backbone of the economy in a coffee country. 
We emphasised to the government that there could be no peace in the countryside while they were expropriating 
us on a daily basis, taking away the farm, the property, the plot, that is, the only heritage we had of two, three 
or four decades of work. We are not willing to let ourselves be deprived of the only thing we have and we will 
defend it in whatever way we can (Interview, Samuel Moreno, 2015) 
Samuel’s reflection conveyed a sense of anger at having to give up a whole way of life which 
was at the core of his family history,  community traditions and indeed the national identity of a 
country that had grown on the back of smallholder coffee farming. Their farms had been their family 
homes, where their children had grown up, and had offered them the possibility of sending their 
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offspring to school and university. This is not precisely about risk aversion or subsistence orientation 
in the face of market penetration: like all coffee farms of Líbano, his farm is well-kept, carefully 
irrigated, sprayed and planted. It was about the prospect of giving up the hopes and expectations of 
livelihood stability and maybe even prosperity in coffee farming and facing perpetual insecurity. 
More broadly, it was also about the abandonment of a national development model that had protected 
and supported small farmers in favour of a strategy for neoliberal economic growth predicated on 
their marginalisation and dispossession.  
Through the protests, peasants built connections between each other on the basis of a shared 
commitment to a common goal, and they also linked to other sectors of students and workers as well 
as the local communities.  Public support and solidarity for the protests opened a space for the 
construction of new coalitions with other social and political organisations. The coffee protests in 
Líbano were one of the more extensive and radical instances in a broader wave of new farmer 
movements that erupted throughout the coffee region. Between 1994 and 1997, around 60,000 coffee 
farmers and rural workers participated in similar coffee strikes in 17 municipalities (CINEP 2013; 
Rincón, 2000). The CUT were looking to build widespread, cross-sector mobilisations against the 
Samper government, and organised a solidarity march for the coffee strikes in Bogota. The action 
was supported by the Education workers’ union (Fecode), the USO and telephone workers’ union 
(Sintrateléfonos).  Unions gave greater resonance to the farmers’ demands, but the mass support of 
coffee farmers also amplified the CUT’s message. For unions seeking to cause maximal disruption 
to the Samper government, the solidarity of coffee strikers— once the backbone of peace, stability 
and economic development in the country— were emblematic of the crisis. In the initial aftermath, 
organisers celebrated the march as a resounding success, demonstrating new forms of unity and class 
consciousness between the small farmers most impacted by neoliberalism. President Samper agreed 
to negotiate with the farmers, and eventually agreed create a fund to pardon debts of up to $1,000. 
For the peasant activists, the achievements of their mobilisations were about far more than the 
concessions obtained. As local researcher Rincón emphasises: ‘the coffee farmers managed to 
permeate the government’s discourse, not only with their own issues but the wider problems at large, 
linking their sector with other agricultural sectors’ (Rincón 2005: 44). For the organisers of the strike, 
who had always conceived mobilisation around immediate demands as a means of developing deeper 
processes of organisation between small farmers, these new linkages represented one of their most 
important achievements. As one organiser from the nearby town of Pitalito explained: 
 Before 1995, all our strikes had been isolated: coffee farmers complained about their issues, cotton farmers about 
their issues, but each one in isolation. What we wanted to do was break free of this isolation and unify the 
protesters’. What appeared to be emerging from the strikes were new incipient organisational processes between 
farmers with a growing oppositional stance (Perea 1996: 119) 
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Joint planning for marches involved greater co-ordination between various peasant 
movements, student groups and unions in different regions of the country. The march that had opened 
with a few dozen protests organised by a small network of Asopema activists had now become 
symbolic of a deeper crisis with the neoliberal growth model that united the country. It allowed them 
to form part of broader coalitions, such as the Congresses of National Agricultural Unity, organised 
between 1998 and 2002 by the UCN (National Coffee Unit). The UCN was composed of 50 regional 
and national organisations, who agreed that “neoliberal politics imposed by the United States through 
their international financial agencies” were responsible for their condition (Robledo 1998: 43). The 
coalitions eventually developed into a broader federation of large and small agricultural producers, 
which brought together a series of national, regional and local protests against the proposed Free 
Trade of the Americas agreement (FTAA) with the United States. The network became an 
organisational body for coordinating various sectors in opposition to neoliberal reforms. 
The very emergence of Líbano’s coffee movement was a remarkable achievement.  The 
sudden and rapid transformations in the coffee market sparked an upsurge of new peasant 
mobilisations in a sector that had hitherto been marked by its conservatism and passivity. 
Furthermore, these processes moved beyond exclusively defensive reactions. Through strategies of 
consciousness-raising, solidarity building and political formation, peasants were also building social 
and political forces opposing the neoliberal economic model and the political elite. The case of Líbano 
provided one of the more radical examples explaining the legitimacy crisis of the Colombian state 




In the Middle Magdalena, the subsistence crisis in peasant agriculture reached new heights in the 
1980s. A massive wave of settlement had occurred as a result of the growing urban unemployment 
crisis, as well as the promise of land titles and assistance under the DRI program. In the Middle 
Magdalena, around 1.7 million hectares of land came into agricultural use between 1976 and 1993, 
while the rural population increased from 60,000 to 230,000 in the same period (Machado 1994: 41). 
The Cimitarra valley was transformed from a handful of tiny villages of no more than two thousand 
inhabitants to a bustling region of 15,000 inhabitants in the 1980s, with the growth of two mid-sized 
towns in San Pablo and Cantagallo. However, the assistance promised by the DRI failed to 
materialise, and peasants were increasingly threatened by impoverishment, debt— and the predations 
of landlords. By the late 1980s, of the 3.3 million hectares of land titled in the agrarian frontier over 
the years by INCORA, 60 per cent was in the hands of large ranchers (Legrand 1989: 27). In the 
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Middle Magdalena, small plots of 50 hectares or less represented 82 percent of producers, who 
occupied only 20 per cent of the surface. This was exacerbated by the neoliberal restructuring. The 
termination of the IDEMA ended the guaranteed purchase of their crops, the liquidation of the Caja 
Agraria restricted farmers’ access to credits, and ‘peasant crops’ such as corn, beans, cacao, rice and 
bananas were subject to dramatic price fluctuations (Misas 1996: 33). 
Throughout the 1980s prices had dropped so drastically that many farmers in the frontier were 
operating at a loss.  Mario, an older farmer from the Remedios municipality in the Cimitarra valley, 
recalled: ‘the price of beans went so low that it cost more to transport a load to market than what we 
would get when we sold them there’ (Interview, Mario Martínez, 2013). Peasant economies, which 
had long operated in extremely precarious conditions, were now in dire straits as farmers found it 
almost impossible to sell crops in the market, find waged work or maintain access to their land. In 
the South Bolívar region of the Middle Magdalena, for example, there was an 85 percent reduction 
in crop production between 1990 and 1995.  Rice farming fell from 16,000 hectares to just 500 
(Machado, 1995; Misas 1996). Unable to sell their products in the local markets, peasants either let 
their crops go to waste or fed them to their livestock. Rural poverty levels in the region reached a 
high point of 80 percent in 1992 (Machado 1995: 16). 
The arrival of coca to the Cimitarra Valley was directly related to the peasant subsistence 
crisis. Coca cultivation had begun in the Amazonian frontier regions of Putumayo, Guaviare and 
Caquetá in the 1970s.  The crop quickly spread throughout the frontier territories in the 1980s and 
1990s, propelled by the conditions of peasant land hunger, marginalisation, economic precariousness 
and state absence (Molano, 1994; Reyes, 1997; Jaramillo 1988).  In the late 1990s coca production 
swept across the peasant economies of the Cimitarra Valley. In 1994, 2,000 hectares were planted 
with coca in South Bolívar, and by 2000 this had risen to roughly 6,000.  Four fifths of the coca 
production of the region took place on small plots of 2.5 hectares or less, with peasants combining 
subsistence production with coca farming (Fonseca et al., 2005: 15). Following the neoliberal agrarian 
restructuring, credits and technical assistance dried up completely. Threatened with debt, hunger and 
the seizure of their lands, peasants were forced to seek other mechanisms to access the market for 
their reproduction cycles.  The only source of credit came from a new variety of lender tied to the 
coca economy which began to arrive in the 1980s from the Amazonian regions, providing loans, 
chemical inputs and transport for peasants (Interview, Milton Mahecha, 2015). Since these were the 
only loans available to indebted peasants, many found themselves forced to cultivate coca to repay 
their loans and to maintain some degree of economic security. 
The coca boom of the 1990s propelled a major transformation in the agrarian relations of the 
region. In De Rementería’s description, the arrival of marijuana and coca to the Middle Magdalena 
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in the 1980s first integrated peasant economies into global commodity chains. Illicit crops ‘articulated 
the peasant economy into the world market, and encouraged technical specialisation in a highly 
profitable mono-crop’ (De Rementería, 1987: 343). While coca production provided a degree of 
economic security, it rarely earned them enough to accumulate a surplus. While the Colombian 
minimum wage was around $1,500 USD, most coca growers earned between $1,000 and $2,000 USD 
(Dion and Russler, 2008). Furthermore, most coca farmers remained heavily indebted to lenders and 
intermediaries in the coca economy. Because of the insecurities associated with coca, peasants 
continued to produce subsistence crops such as yucca, corn, rice and plantain alongside coca. 
Although coca to the region brought new processes of monetarisation to peasant economies, peasants 
were nonetheless unable to escape the longstanding crisis of agrculture and processes of semi-
proletarianisation. The bonanza also brought an influx of landless peasants and rural workers to the 
region with the hope of making a living from the coca industry- whether by working as raspachines 
(coca pickers), transporters, or prostitutes, or by acquiring land and producing coca (Jaramillo 1988: 
88).  
As a result of these processes, since the 1990s it has been possible to identify two sorts of 
settler in the Cimitarra valley. There are those who arrived with the early colonisation processes in 
the 1970s, who have a long history of non-monetised subsistence production combined with petty 
commodity production and waged labour, most commonly in local logging, mining or agri-business 
industries. Their family histories are intricately tied to the history of Communist Party organising in 
frontier zones, and their connection to the region is associated with the traditions of collective work, 
territorial defence and consciousness-raising. The second wave of settlers, which arrived in the 1990s, 
was connected more to the neoliberal subsistence and unemployment crises, together with the cocaine 
bonanza. The second wave of settlers is more diverse than the first, composed of landless peasants, 
rural workers and precarious city-dwellers, many of whom have little or no family history of 
agricultural production or land ownership and are highly adapted to the pressures of precarious 
commercial life. While the earlier settlers have stronger traditions of subsistence agriculture and non-
monetarised relations of production, the second are strongly dependent on commodity relations for 
their reproduction. The influx of settlers in the 1990s coincided with the closure of the agrarian 
frontier and decreasing fertility of deforested soils, which created new demographic pressures on 
land.  
 
The coca crisis and new forms of territorial organising 
The dramatic transformations of the rural economy of the frontier regions spurred by the arrival of 
coca forced the movement to adapt to a rapidly changing social and political environment. The 
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monetisation of the rural economy might have brought the promise of economic security and even 
prosperity for some settlers in the region, but for the peasant organisers of the Cimitarra valley it also 
posed a threat. The individualistic values of the new arrivals, who sought quick profits and had little 
interest in peasant traditions contrasted sharply with the ethics of community, reciprocity and 
rebellion that had been the foundations of Communist organising for the earlier settlers in the region. 
Many of the Cimitarra peasant leaders were uneasy about the arrival of coca, which became the 
subject of  fierce debates. Rather than attempting an outright ban on coca farming— which would 
have been impossible to enforce, the leaders affirmed that the decision of whether to permit coca 
farming in each municipality of the region would be made through the JACs.  
 A series of discussions ensued, which had varied and conflicting outcomes. While the 
communities of the Northeast Antioquia region decided to prohibit coca production, those in other 
municipalities such as South Bolívar permitted the crop. Peasants in the latter regions argued that 
they were already indebted to merchants, and they could not abandon coca crops for fear of retribution 
for failing to repay debts. Soon, however, the entire region was drawn into the coca economy, 
whatever their decision on the matter. Inflation had soared, and the only available transport within 
the region was through traffickers, and peasants were increasingly compelled to enter the coca 
industry.  
The unequal integration of the region into the coca economy also triggered new processes of 
differentiation between farmers. Those growing coca were increasingly marginalised from those that 
did not. Peasants of Northeast Antioquia sold up their farms and migrated towards South Bolívar in 
order to produce coca. Those that remained ceased tending to their own crops in order to work as 
raspachines for neighbouring coca farmers. The Cimitarra peasant leaders soon realised that they 
would have to accept the arrival of coca to the region. They did not have the resources to offer any 
alternatives, and decided it was better to accept the peasants’ decisions in this regard. As one 
Cimitarra leader described: 
We do not agree with [coca cultivation] but it is a reality that we can’t close our eyes to. We cannot just tell 
peasants not to grow coca. Who are we to say: “brother, (hermano) stop cultivating coca and do this instead” 
(Mario Martínez, Interview, 2014). 
 However the arrival of coca also brought new challenges to the organisers. It is one thing to organise 
peasants on the margins of political and economic society, but it is another to do so with groups 
thoroughly incorporated within global commodity circuits. Emergent processes of differentiation 
posed a threat to the traditional values of subsistence, reciprocity and solidarity on which the 
community organisations were based. The rapid commodification of peasant livelihoods placed great 
strain on the traditional communal labour systems of the region:  
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Since coca provided people with all their needs, they started saying ‘I’m not going to fix the bridge, I’ll just 
pay 20,000 [pesos]; I’m not going to fix the school, I’ll pay 30,000’ (Mario Martínez, Interview, 2016). 
Coca farming allowed peasants to enter the market to make an income, but given the 
precarious and unstable conditions associated with this crop, many did not abandon the traditions of 
subsistence farming. The Cimitarra leaders promoted a combined form of production, mixing coca 
with traditional subsistence agriculture such as yucca, plantain and livestock (Fonseca et a. 2005: 63). 
The continued traditions of subsistence farming in the Cimitarra Valley are due as much to economic 
as political reasons: the continuation of non-market production reduced their vulnerability to a coca 
market dominated by right-wing paramilitaries and narcotraffickers.  The continuation of non-market 
relations maintain the social cohesion and autonomy as a defence against the double-edged threat of 
the subsistence crisis and violent displacement. 
Paramilitarism and the Left’s retreat 
The arrival of coca to the Middle Magdalena not only transformed the region’s peasant economies, 
but it also attracted a new actor into the agrarian structure: narco-traffickers seeking to invest their 
profits in large-scale agro-enterprises such as cattle-ranching and agri-business.  The Middle 
Magdalena became an attractive location for narco-traffickers due to both the absence of state 
authority and the low price of lands, which had fallen to 300,000 pesos a hectare in the economic 
downturn of the 1980s (De Rementería, 1987: 344-5). The arrival of these new investors transformed 
the longstanding land dispute between peasants and landlords in the region, as peasants now 
confronted the dramatic expansion of large-scale agribusiness supported by narco-traffickers and 
paramilitaries.  
 The paramilitary incursions combined strategies of Cold War counter-insurgent terror with a 
rush for land and state power.  The goal was not only to annihilate the guerrillas, but to clear entire 
territories of their populations. Terror operations began in the early 1980s with a series of 
assassinations targeted against activists and councillors in Communist strongholds Puerto Berrío and 
Puerto Boyacá (ASFADDES, 2010: 29). The attacks precipitated the disintegration of Communist 
organising, and by 1983 the Communist party had closed its regional office in Puerto Boyacá. The 
MAS quickly expanded to form another 12 units by 1984 throughout the Middle Magdalena with 
names like “Rambo” or “Death to Revolutionaries”.  They targeted civilians and activists in so-called 
“Red Zones” (“zonas rojas”) working their way up through small villages in North-East Antioquia 
and South Bolívar assassinating and torturing community leaders and burning down houses with the 
aim of provoking mass displacements (Molano, 2009; Van Isschot, 2015). In 1984, paramilitaries 
invaded the small village of Vuelta Acuña in Cimitarra, decapitating the two women who ran the local 
store and burning down farms and houses.  The 1988 massacre of Segovia in North-East Antioquia 
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left 46 victims, including slaughtered bodies displayed in central points of the town with visible signs 
of torture, designed as a visible warning signs against community leaders. By the end of the decade, 
records attributed a total of 1,710 assassinations, 353 disappearances and 351 tortures to 
paramilitaries in the Middle Magdalena (Molano, 2009: 45). Repression had reached such an extent 
that the social movements of the Middle Magdalena declared a “state of emergency” (Van Isschot, 
2015: 167). 
 The wave of paramilitary terror that washed over the region in the 1980s and 1990s decimated 
the leadership of the popular movements and precipitated mass displacement of their social base. An 
assassination attempt left the Coordinadora’s President injured in 1987, which was quickly followed 
by a spate of assaults against other Coordinadora leaders. Some were murdered by armed militias, 
others were tortured by the army (Movice 2006). Key leaders, like Patriotic Union councillors 
Leonardo Posada and Ismael Jaimes, and unionist Manuel Chacón were assassinated, sewing fear and 
panic amongst the organisers that remained. In 1987, a grenade attack was launched on three Patriotic 
Union members. As the former leaders fled in panic, the entire leadership of the Coordinadora had 
to be replaced (Medina 1994: 79). UP and Coordinadora leaders became clear targets for attack, and 
activists soon refused to participate. One former UP member recalled:  
In those elections I was elected as a councilman for the Patriotic Union […]. I was 6 months in the position, but it 
was a very hard situation because paramilitarism was already empowered in Yondó. I had to tell the second of the 
list, Ramiro Ortega,  to assume [the position] but said he would not either (Interview, Alvaro Manzano, 2015). 
 The experience of seeing their comrades murdered, having their homes raided and being besieged 
by death threats had a paralysing effect on the popular movement, and the political structures that had 
been built through the civic strike movement of the 1970s and 1980s rapidly disintegrated.  As one 
Cimitarra leader described to me, ‘we knew that putting an activist into a leadership role was 
equivalent to giving the paramilitaries a target for assassination’ (Interview, Miguel Cifuentes, 2014). 
Repression quickly sent organised political activity on the defensive.  A flurry of associations were 
set up only to be quickly dismantled in the face of death threats and assaults— including the 
association of neighbourhood councils, Asojuntas, and the Coordinadora’s the “Common Front in 
Defence of Life.” Throughout the 1980s, UP activists fled-- some into exile, others further into the 
agrarian frontier in the South Bolívar region of the Cimitarra Valley.  
 
 With the disintegration of the popular movement, the mobilisations quickly lost their cohesive 
structure. Uprisings were reconverted from tools of class power to spontaneous actions or immediate 
responses to acts of violence, as people burst into the streets in response to every assassination. 
Historian Vargas described how:  
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there was a transformation with regards to the demands and forms of organisation. They became increasingly 
spontaneous in terms of their objectives. […] It was no longer about winning tangible demands but to express 
protest and disagreement in a social environment that was becoming chaotic’ (1992: 180).  
Paramilitary violence decimated the leadership of the Coordinadoras and the UP and disarticulated 
the social base, and mobilisations descended into mass confusions. Assaults and massacres were 
contested with spontaneous outpourings, as local communities burst onto the streets. The movements 
were severely weakened, their support base sent into disarray and alliances with other sectors were 
severed. The threat of repression drove many leaders into clandestinity with the FARC or ELN—not 
so much as a conscious strategy but as the only recourse in the face of annihilation. As ‘democratic’ 
social and political movements disintegrated, the FARC and ELN became the main remaining voices 
of the organised Left.  
 In the face of intense violence in the late 1980s and early 1990s, social leaders of the Middle 
Magdalena adopted a defensive strategy. The energies of the movement were channeled into 
preventing assassinations and mass displacements whilst maintaining cohesion amongst their base. 
The ‘organised displacement’, or éxodo campesino became the main tactic for preventing mass 
displacements and drawing attention to the humanitarian crisis facing the region. The first of these 
was the ‘march for peace’  organised by the Coordinadora in 1982, when 700 rural and urban 
communities marched from Barrancabermeja to Bogotá to call attention to the crisis.  In 1985, the 
Coordinadora organised another march of 7,000 inhabitants from South Bolívar to Cartagena 
(Alonso, 1992: 109). Following the Vuelta Acuña massacre in 1987, over a thousand local inhabitants 
fled to the city (Van Isschot, 2016: 102). Protestors demanded basic services, but the “right to life” 
(“derecho a la vida digna”) increasingly became a central theme. Peasants occupied municipal 
offices with the slogan “we are Colombians and human beings too”, forcing the government to launch 
inquiries into the massacres (Van Isschot, 2016: 102). The idea of the “peasant refuge” (“albergue 
campesino”) had first been adopted by human rights activists in Central America. In the Middle 
Magdalena the refuge was developed through the infrastructure of the Coordinadoras, with support 
from the teachers’ union and USO to shelter peasants and rural community leaders threatened with 
assassination attempts or death threats  (Romero 1992: 155; Van Isschot 2015: 159). The Albergues 




Land as a refuge from neoliberal restructuring and political violence 
Territorial resistance is not new in the Colombian frontier. In the memories of the older Cimitarra 
settlers, the struggle to defend the land is old as capitalism itself, stemming back to the early self-
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defence enclaves created by Communist organisers in response to the land enclosures of la Violencia 
of the 1950s. However, in the context of political violence and neoliberal restructuring in the late 
1990s the longstanding land struggle of the Cimitarra Valley acquired new dimensions. Peasants 
turned to the strategy of territorial defence in the form of the ‘peasant exoduses’ and ‘humanitarian 
refuges’ as a response to the conditions of unemployment and violence in the cities on the one hand, 
and against the predations of agribusiness and narco-traffickers on the other.  
 During the civic strike mobilisations, close solidarities between rural and urban activists had 
provided the basis for a unified and radical popular movement that bridged the rural-urban divide 
(Gill  2016; Van Isschot  2015).  However, as the barríos of Barrancabermeja swelled with displaced 
peasants unable to find employment, and later fell one by one to AUC control throughout the late 
1990s, the city ceased to offer a refuge for peasants fleeing the rural violence. Judith, an urban activist 
who had worked with the ACVC during the mass displacements of the 1990s observed that the 
reluctance of Cimitarra peasants to migrate stemmed back to the experience of the violence and 
marginalisation and alienation in urban life they had witnessed in the mass exoduses in the 1980s and 
1990s. 
Before the mass exoduses, peasants had little knowledge of the city. When they faced violence or difficult 
conditions, they would quickly leave their homes because they presumed the city offered a better life. But the 
exoduses allowed the peasants to see the reality of their situation. They saw that in the city, if you didn’t have 
1,000 pesos, you couldn’t do anything. There were no houses, no jobs, they had to beg on the streets. But when 
they stayed in the countryside, here they always had land, a home. If you needed to eat you could get fish from the 
river or yucca from the farm. I think this is an important reason why peasants opted to stay on the land and resist 
(Interview, Judith Maldonado, 2017) 
The experiences of the mass migration to the city had demonstrated to peasants the experience of 
marginalisation and alienation of life in the slums of Barrancabermeja— dominated by precarious 
work and paramilitary control. In this context, maintaining access to land increasingly represented a 
refuge from the impact of violence and neoliberal restructuring.  Judith’s observations provided an 
insightful perspective on many of the comments Cimitarra peasants made to me: 
We defend these lands because it is us that have worked them and want to continue working them, […] and because 
we don’t want to be displaced to the city which offers us nothing (Interview, Miguel Huepa, 2015) 
 Rather than attempting to mobilise peasants and communities on the streets of 
Barrancabermeja as they had done before, the turn to land-based organising offered a political refuge 
as conditions for organising in urban areas became virtually impossible. As unionists and community 
organisers faced an onslaught of threats and violence, many fled to isolated frontier territories for 
protection. Wilson Vega, one leader from the Cimitarra Valley, described how he had started his 
political career as a unionist in the banana region of Urabá, where he had participated in the Patriotic 
Union. After suffering a series of paramilitary assassination attempts, he had made contact with the 
Cimitarra peasant leaders through the Communist party’s displaced people’s association, Renacer. 
He recalled: 
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They suggested I come to the region with my family. They assigned me some land in the Aguas Claras 
municipality, and I built my farm and opened a small shop. I became part of the Cimitarra JACs (Interview, Wilson 
Vega, 2015). 
The withdrawal from urban to rural environments was one of the only options available for 
activists seeking to preserve their lives in the face of assassinations and massacres. For the Cimitarra 
peasants, the threat of forced displacement is not only about losing access to their basic means of 
subsistence, but it also threatens to undermine the sense of prestige associated with rural resistance 
and the social cohesion and bonds of trust on which their movement is founded. Since the land acts 
as the shared basis for bonds of solidarity, mutual support and reciprocity, it is fundamental to the 
continuation of the movement. Thus, the search for autonomy and maintaining access to Cimitarra 
peasant leaders saw displacement as a major threat to their bonds of solidarity and capacity to 
organise: 
For us moving to the city is not an option. We have practically nothing to do because we are from the countryside, 
our grandparents taught us to work in the countryside, to live in the countryside and to produce on the land. That's 
what we want to do. We know that going to the city means going to suffer, which is what anybody knows who has 
talked to a displaced person. […] If we displace to the cities, we are alone and isolated. We lose the basis of our 
organisation. All that we peasants have to offer is our cheap labour power (Interview, Miguel Cifuentes, 2016).  
 Miguel’s reflections demonstrate how the close connection to the land allows peasants to 
subsist through forms solidarity that are not available in the city, where they are isolated and 
vulnerable to paramilitary control. In this context, the Cimitarra peasants’ resistance to displacement 
was as much about preserving the prestige and dignity associated with being a community member 
and Communist militant as it was about avoiding the sense of alienation and isolation of city life 
under neoliberal precariousness.  
 Beginning in the late 1990s, a new wave of investments in agro-fuels sparked new forms of 
territorial dispute in the Middle Magdalena. Between 1998 and 2010, the area cultivated with palm 
oil doubled, from 60,000 to 120,000 hectares (Fedepalma 2016).  The expansion of palm in the area 
was closely tied to the entrance of the new reactionary agrarian elite (FIAN 2009: 24).  Violent land 
appropriations and the ‘pacification’ of the Middle Magdalena helped create governable spaces for 
the emergence of a rejuvenated local economy incorporated into global commodity chains, fuelled 
by increased private investment in agribusiness. One local palm oil company manager described the 
process as follows: 
[In Middle Magdalena] the political map was re-formed [. . .] The guerrillas left and the army entered, and that 
gives guarantees, so that you could invest as a businessman. You know that in areas where there are guerrillas it 
is impossible to work. In areas where there is army or another force it is easier to work [. . .] well, without saying 
we are paramilitary. But the fact that there is a military base helps a lot (Castro 2010) 
The influx of palm, closely associated with paramilitaries, landlords and multinationals, brought new 
pressures to the longstanding dispute between peasants and predatory landed capital in the region. 
The rapid expansion of palm in the Middle Magdalena is an instance of the ‘extractivist turn’ that 
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took place throughout the late 1990s (see chapter eight), but for the Cimitarra peasants this was 
inseparable from their deep-rooted struggle against latifundio encroachments.  
Our struggle has always been against this model of latifundismo, palm oil, cattle-ranching, oil companies, etc, and 
it will continue to be so (Interview, Andrés Flores, 2015) 
The influx of agro-fuel investments became the focus of a ‘territorial dispute’ between peasants and 
landlords (Fernandes, 2007). What was at issue ‘was not property, supported by law, against non 
property’ , as Thompson put it: ‘it was alternative definitions of property-rights’ (Thompson 1975: 
261). This was a struggle about different ways of life and models of development. In their opposition 
to this new wave of agri-investments, peasants increasingly drew on a juxtaposition of ‘peasant 
territories’ and ‘capitalist territories’ . While the former implied land concentration, profits, 
environmental degradation, and peasant dispossession, the other was characterised by sustainable 
agriculture, food sovereignty and agrarian democracy.   
 As the paramilitary assault mounted, the agrarian traditions of self-reliance and collective 
work became synonymous with resistance from political violence. Becerra describes the strategy as 
a ‘process of reorganisation and survival in order to cope with the military offensive and the new 
economic dynamics’ (2005: 41). In the face of these existential threats from displacement and 
violence, a renewed emphasis on territorial autonomy, self-defence, subsistence agriculture played a 
central role in the movement’s survival, allowing peasants to preserve the solidarities, trust and 
cohesion amongst their social base. Cimitarra leaders initiated a strategy of growing food crops in 
various regions, which would allow peasants to quickly take refuge in other areas in situations of 
paramilitary assault. During interviews, peasants emphasised the renewed importance of subsistence 
farming for peasants during these times of extreme turbulence. 
Yucca, plantain-- they used to grow it in various places so they could move around when they were displaced 
(Interview, Mario Martínez, 2015) 
Food sovereignty came from the economic blockade [the paramilitaries] put on the region. [Peasants] 
developed projects for autonomy: our own mills and threshers. We grew sugar, rice and beans— traditional 
peasant diets for our survival (Interview, Miguel Huepa, 2017) 
Another strategy was the idea of the community store. Since paramilitary and military 
blockades on rural areas in the region were preventing the peasants’ access to local markets, shops 
would allow peasants to exchange goods without having to go into town. From the 1980s, the 
Cimitarra peasants set up local co-operative shops called ‘Coopemantioquia’ in Puerto Nuevo Ité. 
Known as the co-operativas or tiendas comunitarias, the shops allowed peasants to engage in simple 
exchange of crops between each other, as well as to sell their products and purchase basic household 
needs at reasonable prices, escaping the grip of local merchants. The cooperatives extended 
throughout the region, stemming from Yondó to Remedios, and directly traded with larger local towns 
like Medellin and Bogotá, and brought food products from the main cities charging the same prices, 
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as well as educational materials for schools and even medical aid. The shops served a basic practical 
function: 
Thanks to the co-operatives there were no intermediaries— neither in the products that entered nor those that 
left the region. This allowed the peasants to make a surplus and maintain a reasonable living standard. 
(Interview, Miguel Cifuentes, 2016)  
But more than its practical purpose, the cooperative  also inspired a ‘great trust amongst the 
population towards the peasant leaders, who managed the resources of the whole community’ 
(Becerra 2005: 41), providing the basis for maintaining collective traditions in  circumstances of 
extreme insecurity and turmoil. 
 The traditions of collective work and ties to the land in resistance to displacement had long 
been central to the organising strategy of the Cimitarra peasants. When Cimitarra farmers described 
their resolution to remain on the land, they often used a very moral discourse, where their 
determination to remain on the land combined the search for a dignified life, protecting natural 
resources, guaranteeing means of subsistence and keeping hold of their traditions of struggle. In 
contrast moving to the city was conceived as ‘giving in’ on their commitment and community bonds. 
During discussions with ACVC members and activists, the centrality of land combined their traditions 
of subsistence farming with their sense of commitment to the movement’s collective traditions and 
their capacity to resist landlords and paramilitaries: staying on the land was always described as an 
act of ‘resistance’, ‘struggle’ or ‘commitment’ to the organisational process.  
Our struggle is for the land [. . .], to produce food for our families, to maintain a life of dignity and justice, to enjoy 
the land we live and work on, to protect our natural resources, our knowledge and our culture for future generations 
(Participant observation, ACVC workshop) 
 The changing role of women within the households and community organisations of the 
Cimitarra valley was another important change within the movement during the most intense period. 
The new visibility of women within the movement was the result of changing gender relations within 
households and communities that resulted from the paramilitary violence. At the peak of the 
paramilitary invasion, many of the males in the peasant community had been assassinated or fled— 
either joining the guerrillas or hiding in exile. The frequent absence of men from the communities 
meant that women were not only left to run the household, but they also took on important committee 
roles in the JACs (Interview, Irene Martínez, 2017). Since the early 1990s, peasant women have 
formed part of the steering committee and have often represented the movement as spokespeople at 
national events, mobilisations. Yet these women were skeptical of their real decision-making power 
within the movement, and insisted that oppressive conditions within the household  remained 
unchanged when the most intense periods of political activity were over (Interviews, Irene Martínez, 
2017; Gloria Ramos, 2017). 
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Building the Peasant Farmers’ Association 
Until the mid-1990s, the Cimitarra peasants focussed on a strategy of simple territorial defence. The 
political movements had been disbanded, and “resistance” now quite simply meant avoiding 
assassination or displacement. Between 1993 and 1996, Cimitarra leaders focussed on building an 
organisational structure, establishing channels of communication and developing strategies for 
remaining on the land. This was established through a series of assemblies aiming to open a debate 
among communities on what was to be done.  Activists from the JACs began travelling to 
communities throughout the region, holding assemblies in Simití, Santa Rosa San Pablo and 
Cantagallo.  Peasant leader Alvaro Manzano recalled how the report from the meetings was that while 
the communities’ energy and anger was high, the problem was political representation: 
We were excluded, […] we were without representation. In 1994, in light of the crisis in the region and the fear of 
threats, there was nothing we could do about the lack of social investment, and the lack of concern from the local 
council. As peasants what can we do at these times? (Interview, Alvaro Manzano, 2015) 
The main objective adopted in this time was to build a political instrument capable of uniting the 
diverse communities that had been displaced to the region, establish new networks of alliances and 
represent their needs to the state.  
 In the late 1990s, the crisis escalated to new heights when the Colombian government 
launched an intensive aerial spraying campaign throughout the South Bolívar region. Fumigation 
missions began in 1996 and were then intensified under Plan Colombia from 1998. The aim of Plan 
Colombia was to reduce coca cultivation by 50 per cent in five years and bring an end to Colombia’s 
armed conflict by undermining the FARC’s main source of funding. FARC controlled territories like 
the Cimitarra valley were the main targets of the assault (Livingstone, 2003: 150-152). In South 
Bolívar, tens of thousands of hectares were fumigated every year, and 80 percent of farms subject to 
eradications were three hectares or less (UNODC, 2010). Fumigations killed not only coca, but also 
all food crops and animals it came into contact with, as well as contaminating water supplies. Since 
farmers in the region depended on these crops for household consumption, the fumigations sparked 
a subsistence crisis among peasants. One female farmer of the region recalled to me during an 
interview: ‘we lost our crops, and our chickens all died. Pregnant women lost their babies. We got 
infections all over our skin, and our children got sick’ (Interview, Irene Martínez, 2014).  Although 
peasants of the region had a long experience organising in conditions of economic and political 
marginalisation, with the initiation of Plan Colombia and the concomitant paramilitary incursion, the 
Cimitarra leaders were suddenly faced with conditions of extreme turbulence and physical threats. 
The sudden integration of the region into the ‘war on drugs’ caused such havoc and disarray that it 
threatened mass displacements.  
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 The crop fumigations triggered a wave of protests of coca farmers in the South Bolívar region. 
The protests began in September 1996, when the first aerial fumigations were targeted against peasant 
coca farmers in South Bolívar. Around 7,000 rural inhabitants from 36 villages in the South Bolívar 
department travelled to the town of San Pablo on boats, mules and large buses known as chivas 
(Vanguardia Liberal, 1996).  The newspapers reported the action as a coca farmer protest against 
fumigations, but as with so many sudden, massive uprisings of this kind, it was about much more 
than the issue at hand. ‘Our mobilisation is not about the coca problem, like everyone wants to claim’, 
peasant spokesperson Henry Montenegro commented to reporters. ‘If peasants are planting coca, it’s 
because the government itself has forced us into it, through the lack of resources in agriculture, the 
lack of roads, and the terrible education of our children’ (Vanguardia Liberal, 1996). In many ways, 
the coca mobilisations continued the momentum of the civic strikes, denouncing not only the 
immediate issue of coca eradication, but the longstanding problems of economic marginalisation, 
state abandonment and dispossession. The protesters demanded an end to the fumigations, but also 
greater social investment in the region, respect for human rights, and guarantees to protection for 
social organisations. They occupied the central plaza and took over municipal offices of San Pablo in 
an attempt to force the government into negotiations.  
The coca protests were defensive responses to the subsistence crisis, but they were also about 
much more than the issue at hand. The mobilisations continued the legacy of the civic strikes and the 
neighbourhood councils, using many of the same tactics, organisational structures and channels of 
communication. Preparation for the actions took place in assemblies and co-ordination meetings, 
where the demands were discussed, tasks delegated and leaders assigned. A representative or 
spokesperson would be designated from each neighbourhood council, while other community 
members formed part of work commissions. The work commissions provided a channel for 
communication between the leaders and the base of the movement. One representative from the 
commissions would then be selected to negotiate with the government. In the 1996 march, for 
example, it was Gilberto Guerra who acted as spokesperson. Negotiations were open, allowing all 
participants to contribute to the discussions, propose actions and give their consent to the agreements 
reached.  The peasants insisted on negotiating with the highest level of local government, centring 
the discussion on the reasons for the march, and the agrarian problem in the Middle Magdalena. After 
two weeks of negotiations, the national authorities eventually agreed to invest US $50 million to 
improve local infrastructure and services, as well as to protect the population from paramilitary 
groups (Vanguardia Liberal, 1996). The peasants agreed to call off the demonstrations, and set up a 
number of commissions to monitor their progress: an education and health commission, a public 
services commission and a human rights commission. The processes strengthened the ACVC as a 
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social organisation, establishing its leaders as negotiators on behalf of peasants, able to articulate their 
demands (Becerra, 2005: 42). 
However, as the paramilitary incursion escalated in the region, it quickly became clear that 
the government was unwilling— or unable— to keep to its commitments. Later in 1996, 
paramilitaries invaded the village of San Francisco, murdered two elderly community members and 
burned the whole village. In the newspapers, the incident was reported as collisions with guerrilla 
(MOVICE, 2006). The late 1990s and early 2000s was the peak of massive forced displacements in 
the region. Official records suggest that between 1996 and 2004, around 57,000 people fled their 
homes in the south Bolívar region—equivalent to roughly a quarter of the population (ACNUR, 
2012). 
The Cimitarra peasants responded to the ongoing paramilitary assaults and Plan Colombia 
militarisation by organising a large-scale demonstration, or “peasant exodus” as they called it, to 
Barrancabermeja in June 1998. The action began with around 6,000 peasants, who set up tents in the 
central Parque Infantil. As the peasants arrived in the town, the Coordinadora Popular called a 
daylong civic strike. Even if less explosive than the civic strikes of the 1970s, peasants were joined 
by unions, transport workers, public service workers, and students. As Barrancabermeja’s residents 
poured into the streets another cycle of work stoppages, street protests and public denouncements 
ensued. The union installations were used to shelter peasants, which bustled with banner making and 
preparation of large community soup pots. Another three thousand peasants arrived from other 
regions, where they camped for three months. Every evening, meetings were held to update 
participants on developments, identify issues and assign tasks. In July, another day-long march was 
organised, where ten thousand peasants, workers and rural communities took part in a unified march 
for peace. Students walked out of their schools, wearing white handkerchiefs and waving banners for 
peace.  They occupied the schools in order to give peasants a place to sleep, while a handful of people 
occupied the municipal offices, where they remained for two weeks, while peasants camped outside, 
passing them food through the windows. Throughout the actions, channels of communication were 
upheld and new leadership roles developed.  The protests were met with fierce police violence and 
repression, including a series of assaults and 39 assassinations. Peasants occupied the school and 
municipal authorities, threatening to stay put until the authorities agreed to negotiate. Eventually, the 
mobilisations escalated to such an extent they brought the government to the negotiating table. 
Negotiations between the government and peasants went on for a month until finally, in the first week 
of October an agreement was reached where the government agreed to fund a regional plan to promote 
“peace, development and security” for peasants in the region. The plan included commitments to 
human rights protections, and social investment of around 180 million pesos a year (Molano 2009; 
Guarín et al. 2008).  Through the 1998 mobilisations, the Cimitarra peasants consolidated their 
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movement, establishing their legitimacy and leadership in the region amongst various groups of 
settlers. 
Conclusion 
Although the peasants of the Middle Magdalena and Líbano had very different class experiences and 
historical traditions, there were some important similarities in their struggles. They were both a 
response to new processes of dispossession and semi-proletarianisation triggered by the neoliberal 
restructuring.  Both sought to secure their subsistence in the face of tumultuous changes and an 
unemployment crisis, to defend independent production in a market controlled by the dominant 
classes and greater agrarian democracy and recognition in a highly exclusionary and violent political 
system. Their struggles threw the legitimacy of the ruling classes into question, and opened spaces 
for new forms of consciousness and political associations to develop. They made demands on the 
state for concessions, whilst simultaneously developing their own independent organisational 
processes. They also built alliances with other groups, including farmers’ associations and unions, 
and formed coalitions that challenged the neoliberal growth model and sought to change the balance 
of forces within civil society. 
 However, the class experiences and historical traditions of the social bases of the ACVC and 
Asopema were also very diverse, and this had an important effect on the character of the movement. 
In the Middle Magdalena, many peasants had long traditions of subsistence farming, and the 
memories of collective work, self-reliance and autonomous forms of organising became increasingly 
important when confronted with the subsistence crisis and political violence in the mid-1990s. The 
outbursts of 1996-8 were triggered by the sudden shock of neoliberal restructuring and political 
violence, but this was also an expression of a long history of resistance to predations of landed capital 
and abandonment of the state. Now, however, historic resistance to the latifundio is expressed as 
resistance to global agribusiness and neoliberalism’s promotion of the “property rights” of large 
landowners.  Meanwhile, since the small farmers of Líbano lived on smaller plots, they were more 
reliant on monetary relations for their survival, which in turn made them more vulnerable to the 
outbreak of infestations and debt crisis that devastated coffee farming in the region. In this case, 
Liberation Theology activists sought to develop new forms of consciousness around the subordination 
of small farmers in the corporate food system, whilst simultaneously raising consciousness and 
building social movements independent of the control of Fedecafé.  An important factor 
differentiating these two processes was the histories of class organising. The Cimitarra peasants had 
long histories of building autonomous organisations that stemmed back to Communist traditions and 
the civic strike movement. Meanwhile, the political traditions of Líbano were very different. Activists 
sought to raise consciousness, break paternalist ties to Fedecafé, develop new antagonisms and forms 
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of political association among a social base with little recent memory of independent political activity. 
Broadly speaking, the new mobilisations represented an organic development with the emergence of 
a broad array of radical movements independent of the institutional control of the state. To build and 
consolidate these incipient movements would require mobilisation on a very broad front. The next 
chapter examines the difficulties and challenges of these efforts as the countryside was plunged into 









The previous chapter examined the catalytic impact of free-market reforms on Colombian peasants. 
The intense turmoil of the 1990s had ruptured the legitimacy of the ruling classes, opening spaces for 
the emergence of new antagonisms, forms of consciousness and political alliances amongst a broad 
array of rural producers. A wave of protests emerged, initially as sporadic outbursts protesting the 
harsh effects of economic reforms and political violence on rural communities, but they soon 
developed into broader movement processes demanding greater citizenship, human rights, agrarian 
democracy— and even an alternative economic model.  Their protests forced the state to negotiate, 
and eventually yielded concessions. Following the initial successes of the mobilisations, throughout 
the late 1990s and into the 2000s emergent rural movements sought to develop the potentialities that 
had emerged in the mobilisations with an eye to consolidating a more sustained oppositional 
movement capable of changing the balance of forces within civil society.  Yet their attempts to do so 
were paralleled by a major shift in the economic development model and strategies of statecraft within 
the neoliberal project. On the one hand, in the wake of economic crisis and social turmoil generated 
by the initial ‘top down’ imposition of free-market reforms in the 1990s, at the turn of the century a 
new phase of ‘social neoliberalism’ emerged. This project sought to extend market relations, although 
this time through ‘bottom up’ strategies of ‘market citizenship’ (N. Harvey 2001), where individuals 
were supported in adapting to new conditions of market competition through the extension of property 
rights and credits for ‘productive adaptation’. On the other, as the state increasingly lost its capacity 
to deal with the massive outburst of social discontent produced by the neoliberal restructuring, 
paramilitary forces quickly gathered pace throughout the countryside, often operating in tandem with 
the army, unleashing an unprecedented wave of repression against all organised expressions of 
discontent. Left-wing political coalitions and parties of national scope were annihilated, leaving a 
scattering of localised processes with little co-ordination or leadership.  As paramilitary violence 
became increasingly fused with the new extractivist economic growth model, assassinations, death 
threats and massacres paved the way for the appropriation of peasants’ lands and resources in the 
hands of multinational mining corporations and agri-business. As a result, as the movements 
attempted to continue building their base and consolidating their organisational processes, they were 
confronted with unprecedented levels of violence and forced to negotiate new scenarios of economic 
precariousness and co-optation.  
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 Writing on the challenge of social activism in Colombia, scholar-activist Raul Zibechi posed 
the following question: 
How can one create a social movement in a militarised society, one in which the spaces for public action are 
closed, and where the activists and leaders are killed or systematically kidnapped? And, above all, how can 
civil society avoid reproducing militarism in the process? (2012: 166) 
This chapter seeks to understand the developments of the late 1990s and early 2000s from the 
perspective of the experiences and responses of the peasant activists and protestors that had 
participated in the agrarian uprisings of Líbano and the Cimitarra Valley in the 1990s. I examine how 
peasants attempted to build, develop and sustain social movements after the initial mobilisations had 
subsided, when concessions from the state had been yielded, confronted with paramilitary repression 
and isolated from their allies on the left.  I also explore how strategies for peasant livelihood 
adaptation and alternative visions of rural development were mobilised by different political forces 
in response to the crisis. For both movements, the mobilisations were about far more than a defensive 
reaction to economic hardships.  At issue was a more fundamental dispute involving the meanings of 
land, agricultural production and rural production. In different ways, both movements drew on a 
distinction between a ‘peasant’ vision of rural development, predicated on diversified agriculture, 
food sovereignty and protection of ecological resources and a ‘capitalist’ vision, predicated on 
industrial agriculture and mono-crops controlled by transnational corporations and landlords. This 
chapter also explores how these visions were informed by different culturally and historically situated 
experiences of agrarian change, but also undergirded by tensions and frictions from within the 
communities themselves. 
  Although intense paramilitary repression and new forms of co-optation were common 
features of both the Cimitarra Valley and Líbano movements, the outcome of the mobilisation process 
was very different in each case. The argument of this chapter is that the survival of the movements 
during this period was determined by their ability to develop mechanisms to sustain grassroots 
participation and retain autonomous leadership whilst simultaneously supporting the livelihood 
strategies of their members in adapting to changing conditions. A crucial strategy for this was the 
Cimitarra peasants’ (ACVC) construction of an ‘autonomous rural community’ in the form of the 
Peasant Land Reserve (ZRC). The ZRC provided the ACVC with a semi-autonomous space from 
which the movement could simultaneously defend the subsistence needs and market access of its 
members after the initial crisis had subsided, whilst also protecting them from political violence, 
activating grassroots participation and maintaining autonomous leadership. In contrast, Líbano’s 
Association of Small and Medium-Scale Farmers (Asopema) was only in incipient stages and had not 
fully solidified its base of support after the initial mobilisations. When participants were offered 
funding for ‘productive adaptation’ and confronted with fierce repression, the grassroots work ended 
and participation quickly dissolved. Asopema lost its autonomy, while Fedecafé regained institutional 
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control. These experiences illustrate the importance of constructing autonomous spaces for organising 
around day-to-day livelihood needs, whilst simultaneously developing more radical understandings 
and capacities for alternative forms of production and governance among members to sustain long-
term participation in radical rural movements. 
From ‘dogmatic neoliberalism’ to ‘pragmatic neoliberalism’ 
In the late 1990s, a second phase of neoliberalism was initiated in response to the deepening economic 
crisis and the escalation of social conflict. After the initial ‘rolling back’ of protections and supports, 
in the late 1990s a second phase of neoliberalism developed involving the ‘rolling out’ of new 
socially-oriented policies (Soederberg et al. 2005). The move was initiated by multilateral agencies 
themselves in response to fierce backlash against the first round of neoliberal reforms (Berger, 2006; 
Peck and Tickell 2002). In the face of criticism, the World Bank adopted a new stance acknowledging 
the harmful effects of free-market policies and sought for new ways to ‘make globalisation work’ for 
those it left behind. In Colombia this new position was reflected in a 1998 World Bank report in 
which it recognised the failings of the “accelerated rural development” model it had once 
spearheaded: 
Currie’s prescription of accelerating rural-urban migration and turning farming over to large-scale, modernised 
commercial farmers has now been pursued in Colombia for more than 40 years. It has not reduced rural poverty 
significantly but rather has further concentrated the poor in the countryside. It has also led to an extremely low use 
of both land and labor in this country and to low overall productivity of the agricultural sector compared with its 
enormous potential. The urban migration approach to solving rural poverty and resource degradation has been a 
complete failure (Binswanger and Heath, 1998: 24-25).  
The report’s criticism of the accelerated rural development program and subsequent structural 
reforms was based on two main concerns. First, it contained an urban bias in policy unfavourable to 
agriculture, with the capture of state funds by wealthy landlords and farmers. Second, it had failed to 
anticipate that outmigration of surplus rural labour would far exceed the expansion of agro-industry 
and urban development. The report argued that many Colombians associated its accelerated rural 
development and structural reform policies with rising poverty and conflict in rural areas. It noted 
that these policies had even  ‘increased peasant inclination to support, or at least live with 
exceptionally high levels of rural violence’ and thus posed a  threat to economic stability (Deininger 
and Binswanger, 1999).  
 As a result, by the early-2000s a shift had occurred from the initial ‘dogmatic’ neoliberalism 
of early 1990s, with its emphasis on privatisation, liberalisation and deregulation, toward a 
‘pragmatic’ neoliberalism (Kay 2002: 470) based on a more comprehensive understanding of ‘civil 
society’ and state-building, emphasising ‘the purposeful construction and consolidation of 
neoliberalised state forms, modes of government and regulatory relations’ (Peck and Tickell 2001: 
6). A 2002 report entitled “The Economic Foundations of Peace” associated the escalating civil 
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conflict with high levels of inequality and rural poverty. It insisted that the state should take a pro-
active role in combating poverty, but without committing to the full scale of redistributive or welfare 
measures needed to combat the causes of poverty. Rather, rural populations were encouraged to adapt 
to new conditions of market competition through credits and the extension of private property rights. 
It also emphasised the need to strengthen civil society by building democracy, institutions and 
transparency in order to overcome the conflict.   
 This new direction did not represent a break from neoliberalism so much as a change in 
strategy, moving away from a  top-down imposition of policies towards a series of interventions 
aimed at deepening the process of neoliberalisation within the state and society (Peck and Tickell 
2001: 4). It sought to soften the worst effects of neoliberalism, but nonetheless accepted the basic 
assumption that globalisation was inevitable and unstoppable. As neoliberalism reshaped the 
economy and created new sectors of precarious individuals, so too was the state’s responsibility to its 
citizens subject to major reconfigurations. The ‘corporatist citizenship’ of developmentalism gave 
way to a new model of ‘market citizenship’, which promoted individual adaptation to markets and 
the extension of property rights as a way of dealing with grievances (Harvey, 2001: 1047). For all its 
talk of citizenship, civil society and poverty reduction, the ‘softer’ approach nonetheless imposed 
new limits for collective action, restricting solutions to social problems to the sphere of the market 
rather than political struggles. Meanwhile, the Colombian state’s prioritisation of debt repayments 
and loan conditionalities severely limited its capacity to address inequalities in any meaningful sense.  
NGOs and new strategies of market citizenship 
The economic and political upheaval that shook Líbano and the Middle Magdalena in the 1990s 
brought much attention from national and international NGOs, church groups and development 
agencies, who initiated assistance programmes providing small loans, training and technical 
assistance to peasant organisations. The arrival of this new set of actors attempting to rebuild ‘civil 
society’ following the revolts sparked a series of debates and contestations in Líbano and the Middle 
Magdalena. For the movements, more than a question of citizenship this was a conflict over power—
that is, ‘a struggle about who is entitled to say what in the process of defining common problems and 
deciding how they will be faced’ (N.Harvey, 2001: 1046). 
 The intense polarisation and turmoil together with international concern over the war on drugs 
attracted a profusion of NGOs and social scientists to the Middle Magdalena in the late 1990s. 20 per 
cent of Plan Colombia funding was set aside for development funding for the region, while the World 
Bank provided loans for technical assistance and training. The European Union, the UNDP, 
Ecopetrol, Church aid programs and an array of NGOs (Christian Aid, Oxfam, Caritas, among many 
others) also provided grants aimed at reducing the conflict by supporting peasant economies in the 
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region.  Much of the development funding was channeled through the Program for Development and 
Peace in Middle Magdalena (PDPMM), a regional development institute founded in 1994 through 
the initiatives of local civil society organisations, with the support of USD $178 million in funding 
from the World Bank, the European Union and the Colombian government (Molano 2009; Guarín et 
al. 2008).  The PDPMM’s mission was to provide “pragmatic” solutions to the problems facing 
peasants of the region— an implied contrast to the “conflictive” approach of more radical social 
organisations like the ACVC (Loingsigh 2005).  
 The new emphasis on ‘market citizenship’ had a clear impact on the new local development 
proposals. The approach of the PDPMM emphasised the need for participatory, bottom-up 
development for peasant economies to tackle the problems of rural poverty and social conflict in the 
region. Its aim was to offset the causes of the armed conflict by creating greater economic security 
for peasants, as well as to prevent the environmental damage caused by deforestation and illicit crop 
cultivation (Álvarez 2009; Castro 2010; Guarín et al. 2008; Loingsigh 2005). One of its main 
initiatives was a contract farming scheme known as the ‘peasant palm’ project, which facilitated 
contract schemes between small farmers and palm companies, allowing peasants to produce palm 
alongside subsistence crops. The scheme was justified as a means to reduce the social conflicts 
between peasants, landlords and agribusiness by strengthening local civil society and community-
oriented rural development (De Roux 2011). It would achieve this by ‘modernising’ peasant 
agriculture, ‘adapting it to more profitable options’ and thereby raising peasant living standards 
through the incorporation of palm cultivations onto peasant subsistence farms, whilst simultaneously 
creating new forms of citizenship and grassroots participation (De Roux 2005). For palm 
corporations, these schemes would provide a stable workforce and a means of minimising political 
instability, while for farmers they provided the opportunity for secure land access and crop production 
(Barreto 2007; Castro 2010). Furthermore, proponents claimed that such projects would help combat 
deforestation and defend environmental resources in the region by promoting a rational use of 
resources in harmony with the environment (De Roux 2005). 
 In the wake of the coffee crisis of the mid 1990s, Fedecafé replaced its model of corporatist 
citizenship with a new model of market citizenship. In a 1996 report, Fedecafé laid out its new 
strategy for ‘productive transformation’ in the coffee industry. Fedecafé described its mission as that 
of becoming ‘much smaller and more focussed on saving coffee farmers, restructuring the industry, 
modernising it and making it more competitive’. It adopted a strategy supporting some to adapt to 
new conditions of competitiveness by reducing labour and administration costs.  Meanwhile: ‘those 
producers who are incapable of improving their competitiveness will have to leave the market’ 
(Fedecafé, 1996, cited in Rincón, 2005: 92).  In terms of rural poverty reduction, public policies were 
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centred on two issues: integration into the agribusiness food chain and promotion of small-scale 
entrepreneurship. In the new directive, coffee farmers were reconstituted as agricultural entrepreneurs 
oriented towards export, quality management, access to technology, higher levels of productivity, and 
their ability to negotiate power within the productive chain. Meanwhile, smaller farmers unable to 
adapt were treated under poverty reduction schemes such as the Food Security Network (Red de 
Seguridad Alimentaria), a government program devoted to alleviating poverty amongst small farmers 
by promoting self consumption (Forero, 2010: 98).  The implication was that ‘backwards’ peasant 
production— without technological modernisation, innovation, improvement in management and 
associative individual entrepreneurship, would not survive. 
 Although these schemes did not come with the same protections and benefits as before, the 
provision of credits and technical assistance for “productive diversification” projects and the hiring 
of thousands of new extension agents allowed Fedecafé to renew its regional system of paternalist 
control amongst small farmers (Forero 2006: 98). One study of Fedecafé’s clientelistic infrastructures 
concluded that: ‘although the macro-influence of the Federation has undoubtedly declined since the 
first days of the ‘coffee crisis’, the institutional presence of the FNCC in  Colombian municipalities 
is still very real and its everyday impact on citizens who live in  those municipalities should not be 
underestimated’ (Faughnan 2013: 30). Thus, by the late 1990s, despite the rolling back of most of 
Fedecafé’s systems of supports, local patronage networks maintained their control over small coffee 
farmers with a new model for incorporation of small rural producers— now in the form of ‘poverty 
relief’ rather than integral support for agricultural production.  
The movements respond 
Asopema 
The arrival of development funding was met with different responses from the various activists and 
members of Asopema, giving rise to a lively debate. For some, the concessions were a mark of the 
success of their mobilisations. Asopema’s recognition from the authorities acted as a demonstration 
of what could be obtained with collective action; it established the legitimacy of Asopema’s 
leadership among members and local communities. It also offered the chance to sustain the energy of 
the strikes and continue organising after the initial protests. Hernan, a former ANUC activist who had 
been a central figure in the coffee mobilisations, emphasised the importance of the projects: 
[Micro-development projects] were about sustaining our community work. Some of [the Asopema leaders] just 
wanted to keep mobilising. But we needed to offer them a life project, a reason to stay in the region. We wanted 
to build alternatives for them to improve their livelihoods, a solution that wasn’t just manipulation in the hands 
of political bosses (Interview, Hernan Alarcon, 2017) 
Those that supported the micro-development projects defended them as a way of allowing 
their support base to remain on the land in the face of impoverishment, and build alternative systems 
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of production and ownership that did not simply fall into the hands of politicians. The food security 
network provided mechanisms for farmers to produce subsistence crops for the family and endure 
economic hardships without being forced to sell their lands.  
The idea of the projects was to provide basic subsistence for small peasants and preserve their 
incomes in the context of the unemployment crisis and the crisis in peasant agriculture. Asopema 
worked with neighbourhood councils in projects aimed at reducing market dependence, lowering the 
use of agro-chemicals and promoting subsistence production, as well as local infrastructure and 
service projects.  As a result of these projects, peasants adopted more diversified productive systems, 
incorporating sustainable, mixed production systems of crops like fruits, avocados, beans, corn, sugar 
cane, vegetables and livestock (Forero 2006; Navarro 2016). This has involved a reduction in 
dependence on pesticides and herbicides, which reduced farmers’ vulnerability to high prices of 
inputs and loans and price fluctuations for their crops (Forero 2006). Some farmers also experimented 
with organic production, although given the high initial costs, only medium and large farmers were 
able to benefit from this. Asopema also supported the creation of community stores, health clinics 
and schools to support families suffering the worst effects of the crisis. One Asopema activist created 
a community store where local residents exchanged their products and organised collective transport 
to sell the surplus in Líbano (Astudillo 2016: 25). 
In any mobilisation process, it is not uncommon for the movement’s leadership to have a very 
different understanding of the meaning and aims of political participation from its base (Della Porta 
and Diani, 2009; Wolford, 2004, 2010). In the case of Asopema, this became a crucial factor in 
determining the outcome of the process once the state had granted concessions. Asopema became 
involved in the new support programs like the food security network with the aim of developing 
social ties and maintaining grassroots participation of the process while preventing exhaustion. Many 
of the protesting farmers came to participate in movement activities through JAC meetings, where 
discussions combined issues of productive systems with political education. A number of new 
community leaders emerged from the process, who became involved in the activities of co-ordinating 
and building solidarity between groups. However, collaboration in the development projects also 
posed a threat to the movement’s autonomy. In accepting the development resources they implicitly 
legitimised the authority of the state and the notion that farmers’ problems could be resolved through 
technical adaptations. In accepting the funds, activists came to act as mediators between aid donors 
and rural communities— in a sense filling the gap where Fedecafé had been withdrawn. They 
supported impoverished farmers in navigating the institutional landscape of credits and technical 
assistance by holding meetings and provided technical training and credits. When the local extension 
agents arrived,  Asopema prided itself on having won this concession for farmers. Yet the agents were 
also contracted by the local political bosses or Fedecafé. These same agents credited local political 
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bosses for the support, and they even worked on their election campaigns. The achievements of the 
mobilisations were soon converted into votes for the local politicians (Interview, Sandra Ramos, 
Pastor Rodriguez, 2017). The small farmers of the region lost interest in the political activity of 
Asopema and instead turned back to the patronage networks of local politicians. As described below, 
this process of re-accommodation was reinforced by paramilitary coercion.  
 As small producers were increasingly re-incorporated into the clientelistic networks of local 
politicians, Asopema was confronted with its own internal crisis. Most Asopema activists had only 
recently cut their teeth organising the street protests of the mid 1990s. Following the initial uprisings, 
many were unclear on their objectives and strategy moving forward, and fierce debates ensued. The 
arrival of funds only accentuated already existing frictions between the activists. Those opposed to 
the reformist measures grew increasingly critical of the handling of the funds. The problem of 
mismanagement of development funds deterred members from participating in Asopema’s political 
work. There were also criticisms of corruption against the members that had been involved in the 
programmes. One Asopema activist recalled that: 
There was a sort of contamination of our leaders, a bureaucratisation. We might have broken from the political 
elite, but we didn’t break from corruption. Clientelism and corruption started to break the popular process 
(Interview, Pastor Rodriguez, 2017) 
 Infighting and divisions between activists were paralleled by a cooling of activism from the 
social base. In the years that followed the mobilisations, as peasants returned to their farms with the 
help of ‘productive diversification’ loans and attempted to incorporate new farming techniques, it 
became increasingly clear most had lost interest in political organising, and participation in meetings 
dwindled. The farmers had joined Asopema in the early to mid 1990s, when coffee prices were low 
and the borer worm was at its peak. By the turn of the century, however, the poorest farmers had sold 
up and migrated, while those that remained benefitted from an increase in coffee prices, and were 
able to maintain a living. The intense violence and political repression combined with the relief from 
the worst effects of the crisis and the availability of adaptation options dissuaded peasants from 
sustaining political participation in the movement. 
The ACVC 
In the Middle Magdalena, the issue of rural development is highly contentious and politically charged. 
The arrival of the PDPMM in the midst of the armed conflict provoked a series of debates amongst 
movements over who defined peasants’ problems and who determined how to tackle them. Staffed 
by middle-class professionals, academics and church leaders from Bogotá and Medellin, the peasant 
leaders saw NGOs like the PDPMM as co-opting and appropriating the achievements of the cocalero 
mobilisations, seeking to steer peasants away from radical processes towards a more technical 
solution to their grievances. The ACVC was highly critical of the PDPMM, which they accused of 
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trying to co-opt their social base, turn peasants into palm workers and strengthen the dominance of 
agri-business and landlords in the region.  According to critics, the PDPMM’s project was 
‘ideological’: ‘it is much more than an economic issue, it is about a social partnership between 
peasants, the national government and foreign capital’ (Loingsigh 2010). There were two sides to the 
criticism. The first was about what constituted the ‘peasant’ vision of development. As described  in 
greater detail below, the ACVC advocated an ‘agro-ecological, campesinista’ vision of development 
that avoided over-dependence on chemical inputs and promoted local food sovereignty rather than 
dependence on a single mono-crop. But this was also a question of political contention and class 
solidarities: how could peasants enter into ‘partnerships’ with palm companies that had aligned with 
paramilitaries and assassinated their comrades in the palm unions?  For the ACVC, the extension of 
palm is much more than a technical issue regarding the benefits of economic development models; it 
is a concrete symbol of the outcome of the land struggle— representing the domination of landed 
capital and paramilitaries.  As the ACVC framed the issue in  their own proposals, at issue was a 
distinction between the “capitalist” and “peasant” visions of development in the Middle Magdalena.  
While the ‘capitalist’ model is premised on ‘the destruction of their productive systems, the 
bankruptcy of small and medium enterprise, the impoverishment of peasants, the wholesale 
destruction of natural resources, the concentration of wealth’, the ‘peasant’ vision prioritises human 
dignity, food sovereignty and protection of natural resources  (Mesa Regional 1999: 11). In contrast 
to the PDPMM’s agenda of rural development on the basis of global commodity chains, the ACVC 
used the negotiations of the 1996-8 mobilisations to demand an alternative model predicated on 
greater autonomy in how decisions are made concerning local democracy and development projects 
in the Cimitarra valley.  In fact, however, the PDPMM’s vision illustrates the overlap between 
‘peasant’ and ‘capitalist’ visions: it is a model predicated on diversified systems and sustainable 
techniques alongside contracts with palm companies. As part of its ‘civil society’ model, the PDPMM 
worked alongside the ACVC offering technical support and development projects to receive 
government and international funding.  
 As a result of these developments, the 1998 mobilisations marked an important shift in the 
ACVC’s organisational strategy.  The leaders identified the need to consolidate and ‘professionalise’ 
the organisation. The central focus was on establishing the movement’s control over a geographically 
demarcated territory in the Cimitarra Valley, with the recognition of semi-autonomous governance 
structures through the JACs, land rights for the inhabitants and restrictions on land concentration and 
self-determination over the area’s natural resources.  With technical support from the PDPMM and 
other NGOs, they created a formal association— the Peasant Association of the Cimitarra Valley 
(ACVC), mapping out an organisational infrastructure and channels of communication for the 56 
member community action committees covering about 20,000 peasants in the Cimitarra region. They 
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also initiated the legal proceedings for the establishment of a Peasant Land Reserve (ZRC) in the 
Cimitarra valley, which offered protections on the peasants’ land claims, community self-governance 
and funding for local development projects. The aim of the new organisational strategy organisation 
was twofold: to continue building the organisational structures and mobilisation processes established 
in the marches, and also to monitor and follow up on agreements with the government for local 
development funding. The ACVC recruited a team of technical advisors from amongst their allies in 
education and rural development, and established community workshops called the Mesas 
Comunales para la vida digna (negotiating tables) to act as a channel of communication between 
peasants and the authorities in order to follow up on the commitments made by the Pastrana 
government through community participation. 
 For the Cimitarra peasant activists, professionalising the movement and developing their 
capacities in local development was a question of developing mechanisms for its members to benefit 
from the concessions won, whilst maintaining autonomous leadership against the threat of co-optation 
with the arrival of the state and NGOs. This implied not only making demands on the state, but also 
wielding the achievements of their protests in order to continue building autonomous political 
movements and collective processes: 
 In the 1998 marches, something very important happened which I think had no antecedents [...] Before that, the peasants asked 
for a health post, some drains in the town centre, or water supplies, and so on, with no response... In all our mobilisations, 
people came with a laundry list of demands […] But in 1998, something very important happened because the demands also 
came with our own conditions... This is when the discourse of human rights and integral development began to appear (ACVC 
interview, from Castro, 2010: 158). 
Given the arrival of new economic incentives for small farmers in the Middle Magdalena, the ACVC 
also realised the need to adapt their own strategy for sustaining the movement whilst securing the 
economic incomes of their base. However, the confrontational stance of the ACVC has also come 
into conflict with their goal of securing development funding. Their first development proposal 
denounced the ‘weakness’ of the local authorities and called for a ‘new, popular’ institutional 
arrangement, in which peasant organisations would have the leading role in implementing the 
development strategy (ACVC 1999: 30). Alongside the oppositional discourse, the plan also included 
a budget equivalent to a tenth of the entire national public investment budget for the same four-year 
period. The document reflected the ACVC’s aim to straddle a more professional approach to local 
development and human rights with a continued emphasis on political mobilisation and 
confrontational tactics. As one of the economists that had helped draw up the plan described it, the 
plan ‘was more symbolic than practical as, in their view, it reflected the huge ‘debt’ of the Colombian 
state to the people of the region, after decades of absence and repression’ (Vargas, 2009: 12). 
However, the confrontational language made the proposals unpalatable to development funders and 
the Colombian state. Unsurprisingly, the plan was not taken seriously by the national government and 
funding was rejected, leading to greater rivalries and confrontation between the ACVC and 
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professional development organisations. 
 As chapter two noted, although political organisations often draw on the notion of a 
homogenous ‘peasant’ community opposed to capitalism, this narrative overlooks the socio-
economic inequalities within movements, as well as the different aims of movement participants vis-
a-vis global commodity chains. For the ACVC, these were expressed in the form of tensions and 
frustrations between the movement’s participants and leaders, as well as its disputes with outside 
groups. Despite the ACVC’s political statements denouncing ‘capitalist development’ in the region, 
in fact the PDPMM’s alternative economic program illustrates the difficulty of drawing a clear 
distinction between the peasant ‘campesinista’ logic from a capitalist one. As the ACVC’s members 
attempt to negotiate the pressures of land concentration and economic insecurity, peasants in the 
region have been increasingly incorporated into market-oriented development schemes. During my 
discussions with farmers in the region, while they clearly identified the injustices of the region as 
stemming from the predations of landed capital, the issue of agro-chemical use was more practical 
than political. Certainly peasants resented the rising costs of inputs but peasants saw this more as a 
critique of the latifundio than with their incorporation into capitalist agriculture per se: 
[Because of] this encroachment of latifundio, of african palm, of cattle ranching on our soils, now, if a peasant 
wants to grow just one corn plant, he has to use a thousand types of chemical input because he lost all the best 
lands […] and he has to farm the higher lands that aren’t so apt for agriculture (Interview, ACVC member, 2015).  
During fieldwork I visited participants in the PDPMM scheme. These farmers had benefitted from  
the palm schemes whilst continuing their membership in the ACVC. This dual participation did not 
appear to present a contradiction for the farmers, given their demands had always centred on 
providing economic alternatives to meet the needs of the population. Nonetheless, conversations with 
these farmers were very different from the ‘traditional’ ACVC settlers. Discussions mostly centred 
on the issues of the terms of contracts, crop prices and the scheduling of debt payments (Interview, 
Nelcy Mendez, 2017). Such capacities also require embracing a way of life that emphasises technical 
knowledge, productivity, individual responsibility, entrepreneurship and private ownership as the 
solution to social problems.  Even if there was a general mood of dissatisfaction with their 
subordination to the palm companies, they nonetheless considered themselves palmeros, and their 
concerns were mainly focussed on the terms of incorporation within global commodity chains. Older 
ACVC leaders were very skeptical of the schemes, identifying the problems of ‘money’, with its 
associated values of ‘getting rich quick’ or waiting for the latest cash handout or micro-project as the 
biggest threat to the movement’s disintegration (Interview, Alvaro Manzano, 2015).   
Since the 1998 mobilisations, the ACVC focussed its energies into the creation of an ‘autonomous 
rural territory’. This involved a legal and grassroots campaign for the creation of a Peasant Land 
Reserve (ZRC) in the Cimitarra Valley 
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The ZRC: towards an ‘autonomous rural territory’ 
Like most land legislation in Colombia, ZRCs are inherently contradictory, socially embedded and 
very politically charged. As chapter six described, the legal provision for the ZRC was part of the 
Market-Led Agrarian Reform of law 163 of 1994. Rather than redistributive land reform, the basic 
function of  the ZRC is to provide legal protections for smallholder property and an administrative 
platform for development projects in a geographically demarcated territory.  There is certainly no 
doubt that secure land access is a central objective for Cimitarra inhabitants. The situation of land 
tenure in the region is incredibly precarious: just 12 percent of direct producers in the Cimitarra valley 
have registered titles to their lands, while around 56 percent have only a purchase receipt (“carta 
venta”) (ACVC 2012). Insecure land tenure of this sort has long been a source of perpetual peasant 
displacement and landlord predation in frontier zones.  In this context, while a far cry from the large-
scale land redistribution envisioned in the 1960s, the establishment of a ZRC nonetheless provides a 
regulatory framework to secure smallholder land titles, protect smallholders from land concentration, 
as well as guaranteeing resources and infrastructure from the state to support access to markets. 
 From a macro-historical perspective, the ZRC figure is reflective of the limited scope for 
structural reforms in the neoliberal era. However the ACVC's adoption of the ZRC campaign is not 
simply about winning incremental concessions for its members within the confines of neoliberalism.  
For the ACVC, the ZRC is conceived as a ‘juridical tool’ in a far deeper strategy of territorial 
organising.  The ZRC campaign does not so much represent a legal battle, but defence of a collective 
way of life for inhabitants of the region, who shared a common history of land settlement, collective 
work, building community infrastructure and services, protecting environmental resources and self-
defence from landlord predations (Méndez 2013; Portuguez 2011). This understanding is affirmed in 
ACVC participant Molina’s (2011) description: 
The main development of the ZRC has been to present a regional territorial proposal that transcends the traditional 
political and administrative limits, where territorial organisation does not abide by decisions taken by traditional 
political powers, but as a response to the historical and cultural processes of its inhabitants 
During interviews with peasant activists from the ACVC, they frequently referred to collective 
management of local resources, a sense of community values and traditions of collective work 
attached to local resources in order to justify their support for the ZRC. While it was clear that the 
legal figure of the ZRC played an important role in legitimising their struggle, the justification for 
their right to access the land drew on a broader moral discourse based on alternative definitions of 
land rights. This conception is derived from, on the one hand, a challenge to the legitimacy of the 
latifundio, and on the other, the ‘basic right’  of peasants to access land because it forms the basis of 
their household subsistence and community ties,  and because it is peasants who have always 
conserved the natural environment:  
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The peasants of the region have come here mostly because they have been displaced from other regions, and 
they have an attachment and love for the land because they have nowhere else to go and because it gives them 
a home, a livelihood and a community. [The ZRC] is a legal figure that gives people a dignified life. We 
demand that this law is established because in reality it is us that have cared for the animals, conserved the 
forests, cared for the rivers and lakes (Interview, Miguel Huepa, 2015) 
When the ZRC was first proposed, a series of discussions took place at the level of the JACs. Luis 
Carlos Ariza, one of the ACVC leaders responsible for leading the discussions, describes the results 
as follows: 
When we made the [ZRC] proposal we travelled around all the villages and held meetings. Everyone liked the 
proposal, they said in reality this has always been a peasant land reserve because here we peasants have always 
been the ones that protect the hills, the rivers, the lakes, the fishes. That is to say, we only wanted the 
government to support and recognise our claim (Interview, Luis Carlos Ariza, 2017)  
Above all, this was about the basic right of peasants to access land because they worked it, it was the 
basis of their community— as against latifundio, which was unjust because it blocks peasants’ rights 
to access land. It was about contesting land accumulation, but also defending a sense of dignity and 
a collective way of life for those living in the region, who shared a common history of land settlement, 
collective work, building village services, protecting environmental resources and defence from 
paramilitary assault in the territories that have long provided a refuge and livelihood from their long 
history of displacement (Méndez Blanco, 2013; Portuguez, 2011).  
 Land is not only central for the social reproduction of Cimitarra peasants, but it is also a 
concrete symbol of the achievements of their collective struggle. In its framing of the ZRC campaign, 
the  ACVC is very clear that access to land can only be guaranteed through the process of collective 
struggle. When I questioned Mario, one of the older settlers of the region, about the meaning of the 
ZRC, he responded with a long description of the experience of paramilitary displacement, 
concluding: 
 [The ZRC] arose precisely as a result of these circumstances. We asked: what are we doing here? Are we 
going to let ourselves die of hunger here, are we going to continue being overrun by the paramilitaries, by the 
army or by the guerrillas? No, here we have to do something; here we have to shout to make ourselves heard, 
so that people know that there are people here who live and want to live. Look what happened in Puerto Berrio, 
look what happened in Puerto Boyacá, and is happening everywhere. So what are we going to do? We have to 
create something, and that was already practically being formed by initiatives, we could say, of the same 
communities. […] We built on all the experiences we already had (Interview, Mario Martínez, 2015). 
The remarks are reflexive of how it is the shared experience of dispossession, political violence and 
collective work in settling and working the land that has formed the culture of resistance that is the 
basis of the collective identity of peasants in the Cimitarra Valley. Peasants combine a shared memory 
of resistance and struggle with a sense of dignity, trust, solidarity and shared community work that 
forms the basis of their campaign for the land reserve.  For the ACVC, the ZRC acted as a concrete 
symbol of the achievements of their collective struggles in the mobilisations of 1996-8.  The 
legitimacy of the ZRC was not derived from the state, but from the collective process of struggle: 
We peasants know that we only have the ZRC because we have fought to defend it, and we know the ZRC will 
only stay in place as long as we keep struggling to defend our lands. Our hope is that if we keep on defending 
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the land through the ZRC, then eventually we will create a real agrarian reform (Interview, Miguel Huepa, 
2017). 
Thus, the ZRC acts as both a concrete symbol of the gains of the struggle, as well as providing an 
alternative space for the reproduction of a collective identity and way of life— associated with shared 
histories, memories, understandings, values and solidarities. 
 Beyond the immediate economic necessities and meanings of the population, the ZRC is also 
a tool in what is in reality a far broader process of struggle. It provides a point around which the 
ACVC can mobilise its members to defend their immediate needs within the existing system, but it 
also allows the movement to carve out a space for the development of alternative meanings, collective 
practices, autonomous governance and political education. It strengthens the land claims of its 
members, while also providing a point of reference in a broader, ongoing process of development and 
consolidation of a social and political movement. The control of a spatially determined territory 
through the ZRC is central to this because it allows for the continuation and development of the 
traditions of radicalism within the ACVC through the development of collective identities, shared 
values and political education.  
 Movement-building at the grassroots occurs in various aspects of life for the communities in 
the Cimitarra valley.  The ACVC constantly keeps its members engaged in political discussions as 
well as local governance through the neighbourhood committees. The ACVC’s participatory political 
structures are built on 56 member JACs in the Peasant Reserve. These committees act as channels for 
discussing and resolving everyday issues— like infrastructure, resource management and law and 
order, but they also form the basis of the political structures of the movement, with JAC leaders and 
representatives regularly reporting back to the steering committee. By adopting functions normally 
associated with the state, the community committees act as counter-spaces, challenging the hegemony 
of the state whilst simultaneously involving communities in the decisions that affect their daily lives. 
In the committees, common problems facing communities can be raised, possible solutions are 
discussed, actions and proposals are presented, decisions are made democratically through a show of 
hands, tasks are assigned through volunteers and in the next meeting they are followed up. These are 
spaces not only for discussing immediate community concerns like roads, education, housing and 
healthcare, but a wide number of political issues— ranging from women’s forums, the establishment 
of alternative production networks, and human rights issues to the peace negotiations, and interactions 
with the state.  
 In this way, political activity is a permanent feature of daily life for Cimitarra communities— 
not through their interactions with the state, but their own community initiatives. While most 
decisions regarding the day-to-day tasks and administration of the communities are made at the level 
of the JAC assemblies, strategic and political decisions are made in bi-annual meetings between 
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committee leaders and the political coordination, known as the “balance”. These structures establish 
the legitimacy of the ACVC as a form of semi-autonomous governance by developing a sense of 
common identity and purpose. Without fully displacing the state, the ZRC provides an independent 
space to sustain grassroots participation and continue mobilising through the development of an 
alternative organisational structure on the basis of the coordination and management of a shared 
territory. 
 Political education is one of the most important aspects of the ACVC’s approach to alternative 
forms of governance. The ACVC has created schools at the level of the JACs, which seek to ground 
education in people’s own experiences and political and cultural realities. The approach is inspired 
by Paulo Freire and Orlando Fals-Borda’s notion of “pedagogy in movement”, which links their 
struggle for land and daily reproduction with the creation of new collective subjectivities with a 
shared sense of purpose, values and practices (Moreno Rodríguez, 2012). The environment of trust, 
reciprocity and common purpose provides fertile conditions for the formation of organic political 
leadership. As ACVC leader Mario described it: 
The countryside was a space for forming a particular kind of leader. They came from the community action 
committees, they knew norms of co-existence of the countryside, about how to cultivate land, collective work, ow 
to hold assemblies in the JACs, how to organise to build roads or schools. We know each other from our collective 
work in the community committees. There is a lot of solidarity between peasants[…] these were spaces for 
organisation (Interview, Mario Martínez, 2015) 
Participation in the ACVC involves commitment to a shared set of rules, norms and and values within 
its political institution, which are known as ‘normas de convivencia’. In its training manual, the 
ACVC describes this as a commitment to the principles of commitment, hope and work (“convicción, 
esperanza y trabajo”) (ACVC 2010). The ACVC lays out a series of guidelines of practices for 
members to follow, establishing issues such as community solidarity, the right to land and its use, 
community work, behaviour in public spaces and the family nucleus, respect for property, popular 
decision making processes, the role of leaders, the transportation of products and people, and the 
principles of coexistence with the environment (Becerra 2005: 47). In the JAC assemblies, these 
standards can be used to apply to problems between community members, and sanctions can be 
applied for their violation. In this way, the structures of the ZRC have been an important part of the 
construction of a collective political identity, creating a membership familiar with decision-making 
processes and supportive of its leadership and political projects. For the communities, such local 
norms provide a far stronger point of identity than the nation state. 
 The ACVC does not seek full autonomy from the state and the outside world, but to build 
structures of alternative governance that create a sense of belonging and political identity in a broader 
national context. The ACVC has established mechanisms to support peasants’ contact with the 
outside world. Peasants from the Cimitarra valley need to come to the local town in order to access 
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medicines and services, sell their products or visit relatives. To support them, the ACVC set up a 
peasant refuge- the casa campesina in Barrancabermeja, which acts as both an administrative office 
for the ACVC, as well as a home for peasants that need to come to the city. They also established 
their own media, Prensa rural, which broadcasts a radio show and contains online publications 
discussing the situation of peasants in the region. 
 While the creation of the ZRC involves gaining concessions from the state for its members in 
the form of development and infrastructure funding, it simultaneously uses these concessions to 
develop its own autonomous production systems and political structures. The establishment of the 
ZRC involved a more professionalised approach to many of the principles and organising practices 
that had already been established in the region, but it simultaneously reinforced the ACVC’s 
autonomous political leadership. Intertwined with the day-to day tasks of organising and 
administering community livelihoods is the ACVC’s more essential goal of defending and 
strengthening these territories by building class power and organisational processes amongst its 
members. One of the most important stages in establishing the ZRC is the diagnosis. In the year 
following the 1998 mobilisations, the new development team associated with the ACVC drew up a 
‘Plan for the Development and Integral Protection of the Human Rights in Magdalena Medio’ in 
February 1999 (ACVC 1999). The plan included a diagnosis of the problems faced in the region in a 
variety of areas including agriculture, mining, environment, and health, which have since been 
followed up and monitored. During my stay with the ACVC, I accompanied several such ‘diagnoses’ 
which were being carried out and followed up at that time. While some of these processes involve 
technical aspects of landownership and production, these were also used as spaces for constructing a 
shared sense of history of the region, where people would share memories of settlement of the region, 
stories, songs, experiences— as well as how they had had to defend and protect their lands. 
 An important component in the ACVC’s claim to legitimacy within the communities is the 
promotion of forms of production that simultaneously provide peasants with economic incomes 
whilst reinforcing collective values and practices. The ACVC gained funding for co-operative 
projects including buffalos, sugar cane, rice, and cocoa farming. According to the ACVC, around 25 
per cent of inhabitants of the Cimitarra Valley have participated in these schemes (ACVC, 2012). As 
the ACVC sees it, such projects are necessary both for peasants to gain secure incomes in the 
subsistence crisis, whilst simultaneously avoiding the threats posed by over-dependence on chemical 
inputs, loans or credits. For the ACVC, these projects provide an income guarantee for their members, 
but they are also in keeping with the traditions of reciprocity and collective work among the 
communities. While landownership is individual, labour is collective and machinery and tools are 
shared.  The management and direction of the co-operatives is discussed by the communities, and 
feedback is provided at every annual meeting. The purpose of these cooperatives is to strengthen the 
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autonomous organisational capacity of the peasants whilst simultaneously providing them with 
alternative livelihood options other than coca or palm production. 
 Given the emphasis on self-reliance in production, agro-ecology has become an increasingly 
important component of the ACVC’s agricultural strategy. This ‘peasant’-oriented model of farming 
is based on polycultures rather than monocultures, and avoids agro-chemical inputs. They have 
adopted small-scale farming techniques aimed at diversifying production and reducing dependence 
on chemicals. The basic premise of these techniques was to secure peasants’ sources of income 
without creating dependency on a single crop. The use of diversified farming techniques helps to 
provide for farmers year-round and avoid the debt-cycle. Cimitarra peasants have also been involved 
in projects for local forest conservation, the protection of rivers and marshes as well as conservation 
and development of native seeds and plants (ACVC, 2012). Much of the agro-ecological turn can be 
traced to new networks of alliances, including national student and research networks as well as 
transnational campaigns like La Via Campesina. ACVC activists participated in training academies 
for leaders, they attended annual conferences and learned to incorporate an agro-ecological emphasis 
into their demands on the state. They also developed networks of alliances with agro-ecological 
research centres in national universities, and in 2016 founded an agro-ecological school that educated 
local peasants and their families on the history of the region, whilst sharing knowledges and practices 
of alternative farming techniques. They have invited urban groups to ‘ecological camps’ for political 
and ecological education in  the region as part of a strategy of solidarity and alliance building. 
 The ACVC’s objective with respect to agro-ecology was to link it to their moral claim to the 
land, and to defend the cultures, collective processes and solidarities that form the basis of their 
struggles.  This is conceived as a mechanism of community defence against the encroachment of 
‘capitalist’ development via large-scale mining and agri-business. Perhaps one of the most notable 
features of the ACVC’s adoption of agro-ecological methods is the way they combine practical 
necessities for securing the basic income needs of their members with the strengthening of community 
solidarities, identities and organisational structures, as well as the moral critique of the latifundio- 
dominated capitalist path.  
To sum up, through the control of a spatially demarcated territory, the ACVC is able to both find 
mechanisms to support the basic reproduction needs of its inhabitants, but it also opens spaces to 
reinforce and consolidate the popular struggle through the development of alternative capacities, 
forms of production, education and self-governance among its members.  
The rise of the reactionary agrarian elite 
The initiation of peace talks between President Pastrana and the FARC and ELN in 1999 marked a 
crucial turning point in the movements’ trajectory.  Two demilitarised zones in the Caguán and South 
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Bolívar were established for the negotiations, where the state recognised the de-facto territorial 
control held by the FARC and ELN guerrillas respectively. The negotiations were held at the peak of 
the guerrillas’ military strength, and they used the platform to push for an ambitious agenda of 
reversing neoliberal economic policies, including natural resource exploitation, privatisations, labour 
repression, human rights abuses and the restructuring of the armed forces, while pressing for agrarian 
reform and social redistribution. However, Pastrana was unwilling to negotiate on these terms— and 
indeed was prevented from doing so by the conditionalities of a $2.7 billion IMF loan (Hylton, 2006: 
99; Leech, 2011: 35).  The peace talks in Caguán were prolonged for over three years, during which 
time support from the sectors of the elite linked to global capital eroded. Eventually, the reactionary 
agrarian elite manoeuvred to block the talks, and paramilitary attacks on demilitarised guerrilla bases 
eventually brought the talks to a halt. This was, of course, a sign of the consolidation of the power of 
the agrarian elite, but it was also about the new limits of the type of reforms possible within the 
confines of the neoliberal agrarian model. As the prospects of a negotiated peace deal collapsed, the 
US government provided another solution to the conflict: military intervention in the frontier zones. 
 The rise of the far-right and the turn towards a militarised solution to the conflict at the turn 
of the century was cemented by a combination of two factors: the failure of Pastrana’s peace 
negotiations and new strength of US influence.  In 2002, Uribe Vélez was elected on the basis of his 
hard-line stance against the guerrillas. A descendent of cattle ranchers and openly endorsed by the 
paramilitaries, Uribe’s election symbolised a triumph for the most reactionary faction of the dominant 
classes. In the same year Uribe was first elected, politicians allied with the paramilitaries occupied a 
third of seats in congress, and in 2006 they won 22 of 32 departmental governorships (López and 
Martínez 2010). Uribe was also supported by a cross-sector of the Colombian elite who, frustrated 
about the developments of the peace agreements between the government and guerrilla forces, agreed 
to support a hard-line militaristic stance against the guerrillas in order to weaken their position and 
bring them back to the negotiating table (Richani, 2012: 136-137). The strengthening of Colombia’s 
far-right was a product of the impossibility of resolving the conflict through reform, as well as their 
alignments with international policy imperatives. 
During his two terms in office, Uribe continued the neoliberal policy orientation of previous 
regimes, with the difference that this would now take place within a new state-building project 
incorporating the reactionary faction of rural elites and paramilitaries, and re-establishing the state’s 
monopoly over the use of violence (Hylton, 2006: 109-120; Richani, 2012: 202).  In power, Uribe 
rejected the path of negotiation and reform and instead embarked on a “scorched earth” strategy for 
defeating the guerrilla insurgents. At the same time he enacted laws virtually guaranteeing 
paramilitaries immunity from prosecution for war crimes. Uribe converted the Colombian army into 
the second largest military institution in Latin America, with 500,000 soldiers and police officers, at 
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a cost of 6 percent of national GDP, together with seven US military bases (Richani, 2012).  The 
strengthening of the military apparatus came hand in hand with an attempt to ‘remodel society into a 
militia and convert the citizen into a combatant with duties and obligations in the scenes of war’ 
(Zibechi, 2005). The ‘Democratic Security’ doctrine effectively militarised all aspects of civil society 
by creating 120,000 “civilian soldiers” and establishing military territorial control in two Zones of 
Rehabilitation and Consolidation, which included suspensions of constitutional rights and massive 
roundups of suspects (Richani 2012: 204). The ‘Democratic Security’ doctrine targeted not only 
guerrilla insurgents but any social or political organisation, unionist or human rights worker that did 
not agree with Uribe’s policies. It brought Uribe into permanent confrontation with the judicial branch 
and resulted in extensive and systematic abuse of human rights (Hristov 2009; Richani 2007).  The 
militarisation of agrarian issues was certainly part of a class project that sought to promote the power 
and wealth of the agrarian elite. But it was also in line with neoliberal agenda on land and rural 
development that rejected earlier goals of placating peasants through reform and social redistribution 
towards the repression and containment of excluded populations. 
Uribe’s land legislation and rural development policy served to cement the new agrarian social 
structure dominated by landlords, paramilitaries, drug-traffickers and agri-business that had been 
created by the paramilitary counter-reform of the previous decade. While new legislation was often 
couched in neoliberal terms, promoting increased competitiveness, foreign investment and export-
led production, they had the effect of legalising paramilitary land-grabs and entrenching the 
dominance of the powerful sectors of the rural elite of landlords and agribusiness. Law 812 of 2003 
offered subsidies to land purchases on the condition that they would be used to develop agribusiness, 
overlooking the geographical and economic restrictions for peasants to engage in this sector. Law 
1182 of 2008 provided a fast-track system for land-registry, thus opening easy access routes for drug 
traffickers, paramilitaries, and landowners to legitimise their land grabs, whilst preventing re-
appropriation of illegally purchased lands,  so long as the land was being put to productive use 
(Fajardo 2014; Patel-Campillo and Bernardini 2015; Richani, 2012: 67; Vega Cantor 2012: 15).  The 
legislation combined fraud and violence with neoliberal ideology to legitimise the land grabs of the 
new agrarian elite and cement their power. Thus, during this period the use of legal and illegal extra-
economic coercion became increasingly central to securing the conditions for capital accumulation 
within the neoliberal logic. The subsidies program Agro Ingreso Seguro (AIS) was plagued with 
scandals in which dominant classes and powerful business corruptly acquired large funds in the name 
of agro-industrial projects (Grajales, 2011; Richani, 2012; Thomson 2011). The adaptation of the 
traditional agrarian elite to new market opportunities in the global economy was plagued with 
corruption and fraud, blurring the line between illegal and legal forms of wealth creation and 
cementing the power of the most reactionary sectors of the capitalist classes. But they were also in 
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keeping with the neoliberal agrarian development agenda, which promoted FDI and export-led 
growth whilst marginalising and dispossessing those that were unable to adapt to new competitive 
conditions. 
Peasant movements in the eye of the storm 
Far-right violence has a long history in the peasant-landlord struggles of the Colombian countryside. 
However between 1996 and 2002 paramilitary violence reached new heights, propelled by the social 
and economic crisis, cocaine wars, US-sponsored militarisation and the mining boom. 70 percent of 
all paramilitary massacres were perpetrated during this time— amounting to a total of 111 (CNRR, 
2013: 51). 
 Rural communities absorbed the brunt of the violence. Six out of every ten victims of 
paramilitary activities were peasants, while one in ten were formal workers and three in ten were 
informal labourers (CNRR, 2013: 54). Paramilitary violence wrought havoc among rural 
communities, with massacres, assassinations and tortures often triggering massive displacements.  As 
chapter six discussed, paramilitary violence paved the way for the establishment of a new agrarian 
class structure premised on land concentration and widespread dispossession. But it was also about 
the  ‘political cleansing’ of rural territories: eradicating social opposition by targeting not only 
guerrillas but any expression of inconformity to the social order (Romero 2004).  Activists, union 
leaders, left-wing politicians and human rights defenders were the main targets of attacks—  as one 
human rights organisation denounced: ‘community leaders, lawyers, journalists, politicians from all 
parties and people who are critical of the state and the government in power, have all now become 
targets’ (CREDHOS 1999).  A total of 1,227 community leaders, 1,495 political activists, 685 union 
leaders and 74 human rights defenders were the targets of selective assassinations throughout the 
country (CNRR, 2013: 46). Violence also undermined the capacity of rural populations to resist new 
threats to their livelihoods by tearing apart the social fabric of communities and sewing terror, 
confusion, and fear amongst victims (Gill 2016). 
  As chapter seven noted, in the 1980s the Middle Magdalena had been the testing ground for 
the brutal tactics of this emergent reactionary right force. After the successful takeover of 
Barrancabermeja, the AUC opened a Tolima chapter called the Frente Omar Isaza, and relocated 
troops from the Middle Magdalena into Líbano. Working in tandem with the army, they left a trail of 
massacres and displacements together with new patterns of land concentration. Their activities were 
orchestrated in conjunction with the army battalion that had been established in the town, which set 
up roadblocks and began military and civic operations in the zone. Paramilitaries entered territories 
with lists of known activists and community leaders, who would be the first targets of tortures and 
assassinations.  In her study of the impact of paramilitarism in Líbano, Astudillo observed how this 
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was a deliberate pattern for the quelling of dissent. ‘The leaders were always the first to be 
assassinated. This was a message to anyone who might have followed in their footsteps; it gave the 
impression that if you go on you will suffer the same fate’ (Astudillo 2016: 7).  Civilians and 
community leaders were deliberately targeted by armed organisations as part of their strategy to 
expand their territorial control in the region and facilitate the accumulation of lands in the hands of 
the agrarian elite. Targeted assassinations, threats and persecution against activists were designed to 
disrupt the leadership of the mobilisations and dissuade others against following in their path. 
 In June 1998, shortly after the success of the cocalero mobilisations, paramilitaries initiated 
counterinsurgent operations in South Bolívar with the aim of securing control of the trafficking route 
and clearing the territories of the guerrilla insurgents. Armed groups invaded the municipalities that 
had been the epicentres of protest along the Cimitarra river and throughout South Bolívar region. In 
the village of San Francisco, they murdered two elderly community members and burned the whole 
village. They soon spread throughout the region, establishing checkpoints and blocking road access 
(CMH 2012). This sparked a pattern of paramilitary invasions carried out with the aim of ‘cleansing’ 
the region of its peasant populations through assassinations and displacement. Massacres were just 
one component of a broader strategy aimed at terrorising and infusing fear throughout the social fabric 
of the entire communities it targeted. They left bodies with visible signs of torture, rape and 
disfiguring mutilations. Following the invasions, mutilated bodies were tossed into the Magdalena 
river, where they floated down in full view of the horrified urban residents of Barrancabermeja. The 
river that had once been the symbol for the traditions of reciprocity and solidarity between peasants 
and poor urban residents was turned into the horrific visual symbol of the new wave of terror. One 
peasant activist reflected how: 
The old magnificent Magdalena River ... is now a peasant graveyard; not a day goes by in this port that we do not 
witness a parade of horribly mutilated and savagely tortured cadavers tossed aside by the death squads (cited in 
Van Isschot 2015: 89). 
Mass displacements of rural communities through assassinations and forced sales of peasant lands 
were combined with targeted assassinations and judicial proceedings against peasant organisers. 
Following Uribe’s ascent to power, he declared the Cimitarra Valley to be a territory under guerrilla 
control. Between 2002 and 2006, ACVC leaders were the targets of state and paramilitary 
persecution, with 20 activists assassinated in extrajudicial killings and 9 arrest warrants issued against 
leaders (ACVC 2010). 
 In Líbano, persecution against the coffee movement had began with the assassination of one 
of its founding members, Fernando Lombana, in the hands of the police during the Bogotá 
demonstration in 1995.  But it was in the late 1990s, after the initial wave of mobilisations were over, 
that the full force of paramilitary terror began in Líbano. In 1998 the AUC opened a Tolima chapter 
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and relocated troops from the Middle Magdalena in the region. Their activities were orchestrated in 
conjunction with the army battalion, which set up roadblocks and began military and civic operations 
in the zone. On their arrival to Líbano, the AUC declared Asopema to be a military target, claiming 
it to be a front organisation for the ELN.  Asopema leaders and supporters were subjected to a brutal 
project of paramilitary terror. Military and paramilitary forces targeted social organisers, 
assassinating several of Asopema’s leaders and participants in their community projects and driving 
others to flee the region.  Astudillo (2016: 9) describes three stages to the paramilitary strategy of 
terror. First, death threats would appear against activists. Next they would go missing, and days later 
their bodies would appear with visible signs of torture. Finally, their family and networks would 
receive threats, warning them to leave before they suffered the same fate.  In 2001, paramilitaries 
assassinated 100 residents in Líbano, while in 2002 another 200 assassinations took place. Between 
2001 and 2005, 3,700 displacements were reported (UNDP 2010).  
 Paramilitary violence was carefully targeted against movement leaders, but it was also a sign 
to all of the movement’s participants and sympathisers. The army established a network of informants 
spying on their neighbours. ‘Any conversation overheard— in the streets, on public transport, was a 
risk. People who used to talk stopped talking to each other’ (Interview, Dagoberto Ramírez 2017). 
Demobilised paramilitaries claimed that around 60 percent of rural inhabitants of North Tolima had 
collaborated with the AUC, and they counted with a list of 4,000 collaborators who were paid up to 
twenty million pesos in fees (Astudillo 2016). Years of patient work by Asopema activists in 
developing bonds of solidarity, collective traditions and political education were stamped out in just 
a few months as peasants fled the violence, migrating to the coca fields or the swelling slums of the 
cities.  
The paramilitary takeovers of Líbano and the Middle Magdalena consolidated new networks 
of power. By forging alliances with local elites, politicians and security forces, as well as setting up 
schools, hospitals, community shops or NGOs paramilitaries effectively came to act as the surrogate 
state in these regions (Gill 2016; Van Isschot 2015).  Associations with names like ‘Amipaz’ provided 
the the basis for a tightening of bonds between regional elites and paramilitaries. One paramilitary 
boss claimed to have been colluding with mayors and councillors in 37 municipalities in the Middle 
Magdalena (La Portada 2012). Líbano’s local political bosses Jaramillo and Garcia were similarly 
named in paramilitary confessions. The strategy of social control acted as the ‘carrot’ to the ‘stick’ of 
paramilitary terror, allowing paramilitaries to move in to the political space abandoned by the left, 
legitimising the paramilitaries amongst local residents and irreversibly transforming local politics.  
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The impact of paramilitarism on peasant movements 
In the late 1990s and 2000s, peasant activism was at an all-time low. At the peak of the national 
peasant movement in 1971, 465 peasant mobilisations had erupted throughout the country in one 
year, but between 2002 and 2008 these declined to an average of just 79 a year (CINEP, 2013).  The 
stigmatisation of radical ideas and all forms social organising widened the gap between movements 
and their potential base of support. This came not only from paramilitaries and right-wing politicians, 
but also the national press, which increasingly conflated social activism with terrorism. When 
Asopema marched in the streets of Bogota, the national newspaper El Tiempo cited Colonel Hernán 
Contreras Peña in declaring that ‘insurgent groups had clearly infiltrated the protests, using threats 
and intimidations to force peasants to mobilise and disrupt the public order’ (El Tiempo, 1995). 
Meanwhile, paramilitary bombardments on rural villages in the Middle Magdalena were reported as 
‘clashes between the army and the guerrillas’ (El Tiempo, 1998). Stigmatisation was reinforced and 
actively instigated by the state through the use of judicial proceedings against activists for the crime 
of ‘rebellion’. Barrancabermeja and Líbano became awash with mutterings and rumours about the 
political affiliations of social and political leaders— whether they were ‘paracos’ (with the 
paramilitaries) ‘elenos’ (with the ELN) or ‘farianos’ (with the FARC). Whatever the ideological 
commitment of individual activists to radical ideas, by the late 1990s they were forced to operate in 
an environment where even minimal expressions of inconformity with the social order were labelled 
subversive or terrorist activity. 
ACVC and Asopema leaders recounted how the stigmatisation of all forms of opposition as 
“subversion” not only justified the use of violence against them, but also became a major obstacle to 
their capacity to continue organising and reaching out to their base of support.  Following the initial 
outbreak of protest, the problem of de-escalation can pose a challenge for any social movement 
(Tarrow 1989).  Yet the ACVC and Asopema were forced to confront the challenge of the cooling of 
political energy in extremely hostile circumstances— restrained by the destruction of their allies in 
the labour movement and political parties but also the incredibly high risk associated with 
involvement in political activity as a result of extreme political violence, while economic insecurity 
also threw its social base in disarray. The Colombian left had a great deal of experience with far-right 
violence, but it was nonetheless caught off guard by the extent of repression that followed the protests 
of the late 1990s. Both Asopema and the ACVC were severely weakened and struggled with the 
challenge of maintaining the energy and organisation of the mobilisations in incredibly hostile 
circumstances. In Líbano this eventually led to the dissipation of the movement entirely, while in the 
Middle Magdalena the movement was able to persist through a strategy of simple territorial defence, 
although they became increasingly isolated from Colombian civil society more broadly.  
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Líbano 
In Líbano, the intensity of the violence had a paralysing effect on social organising in the region. 
Asopema leaders were unprepared for the extent of the violence, and opinions differed on how to 
respond. The intensification of political violence radicalised some of the leadership, who called for 
an escalation of the mobilisations. At the same time counter-insurgent terror increasingly drove 
Asopema members into the ranks of the ELN (ELN, 2015). For some the turn to clandestinity was a 
conscious and strategic choice, while for others it was a last resort in the face of terror. Soon, 
democratic organising had been completely stifled by the fierce conflict between rebels and counter-
insurgents. At the peak of the violent conflict in the early 2000s, the ELN joined forces with the 
FARC and desperately fought to defend various municipalities such as Santa Teresa and 
Villahermosa as they fell one by one to paramilitary control (ELN, 2015). 
 The alignment of some Asopema activists to the ELN might not have been part of the 
movement’s own strategic or ideological goals, but the association of former members with 
clandestinity nonetheless intensified the stigmatisation and repression against the movement. During 
interviews, activists and participants described how new friendships and connections made during 
the coffee strikes were suddenly dominated by a sense of fear and mistrust: beyond the inner network 
of activists, they could never be certain who was collaborating with the paramilitaries or who would 
inform on them. The paralysing effect of fear and mistrust was conveyed duringmany interviews:  
It was like a form of psychosis. There was a lot of fear amongst us. We were isolated— people stopped talking to 
one another to the point where no one had any communication. We lost trust in each other. We lost our voice 
(Interview, Sandra Rodiguez, 2017). 
 The stigmatisation of social protest quickly sewed distrust amongst the local community and severed 
the leadership from its base. The breakdown in communication between communities quickly 
descended into a complete disintegration in the basic cohesion of the protesters, and the entire social 
fabric of rural Líbano. Asopema leaders suffered assassination attempts, threats and harassment from 
paramilitary groups, which cut them off from their social networks as peasants either became fearful 
of association with the radical movement or fled the region entirely.  
The thing is that when people are hungry and they’re losing, they will go out and fight.  [The ASOPEMA leaders] 
assumed that they would keep on fighting. But once everything had calmed down, everyone went back to their 
farms and they didn’t want to fight anymore (Interview, Pastor Rodiguez, 2017) 
 With the retreat of Asopema leaders from Santa Teresa and Villahermosa, the paramilitaries 
soon took control of the municipalities. Their control extended over social projects and civil society 
networks, and peasants were once again reintegrated into patron-client networks. Paramilitaries re-
gained control of the JACs, establishing a new form of social control and dissolving the organisational 
efforts of Asopema. The new social ties created through the mobilisations quickly disintegrated and 
became reincorporated into a new social hierarchy on the basis of paramilitary control.  One activist 
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recounted: 
It still disappoints me to see how the initiatives of the “paras” to repair roads or carry out community service 
brought out so many people, while the social work we were doing to organise peasants was virtually impossible. 
That was the scale of the fear that they inflicted (cited in Astudillo, 2016:12). 
The establishment of the paramilitary-aligned social order almost completely sealed off spaces for 
left-wing organising in Líbano. The spread of radical ideas  and traditions of collective work were 
only in weak, early stages for most of the region’s inhabitants, and they were soon overridden by 
terror as paramilitary forces took control of the region. Participants in the coffee mobilisations 
described this period as one of pervasive fear and mistrust, which prevented them from continuing 
the processes of consciousness-raising and political education. Asopema might have successfully 
raised consciousness amongst a newly activated base and developed capacities for political 
participation, but these efforts were insufficient to counter the dirty war tactics wielded against 
activists and organisers by the reactionary right, which was far more organised, connected, funded 
and armed than its opponents.  
By 2005 we were at our worst moment. We had nowhere to stay, we had no life projects. I couldn’t continue living 
there. People looked at me like an outcast. […] No one wanted to affiliate to our movement, no one is associated 
to us because they are afraid of being killed (Interview, Pastor Rodriguez, 2017) 
As Líbano and the surrounding municipalities descended into a struggle for territorial control between 
the paramilitaries and the guerrillas, the spirit of participation, grassroots empowerment and 
democracy that had emerged with the initial round of coffee strikes was quickly dissolved. While the 
ELN’s strategy of armed defence might have been the only means of protecting communities targeted 
by paramilitaries and the state, activists observed that the militarisation of the conflict undermined 
their efforts at building collective grassroots power.  
The peasants who had participated in the marches started to become afraid.  They had gone out into the streets 
because there was a lot of anger at that time- about the debts, the infections, the lack of technical assistance and 
all that, but they didn’t want to get involved with the armed conflict. When they saw all the guns, the conflict and 
the violence the peasants got afraid, and where peasants see danger they don’t get involved. They went back to 
their homes and kept their heads down (Interview, Pastor Rodiguez, 2017) 
In his analysis of the movement’s decline, Pastor was implying a weakness in Asopema’s strategy. 
Asopema had been too quick to presume that peasants would support a radical movement, without 
having solidified its base of support through more patient movement-building strategies. The peasants 
of Líbano might have suffered an intense subsistence crisis and become marginalised from the 
paternalistic networks of Fedecafé, but they were still organisationally very weak. Certainly, the 
efforts at consciousness-raising and political education had been important first stages in the process 
of independent movement building. But Asopema had been thrust into the epicentre of a brutal 
counter-insurgent war far before they had solidified their base of support by building alternative 
understandings and capacities. 
 Asopema attempted to counteract these conditions by integrating human rights education into 
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its activities. By the 1990s a coalition of human rights groups connected to the Liberation Theology 
movement was established with the aim of combining human rights training with activities of 
consciousness-raising and politicisation. Foundations like Sembrar and Fundación Comité de 
Solidaridad con los Presos Políticos (FCSPP) were invited to the region to offer workshops  
combining strategies for defence from violence through solidarity networks and building social ties 
with technical training in legal rights and how to make a denuncia (Tate 2007:47). They also 
established links with international peasant movements like Vía campesina and the MST, which 
combined training in agro-ecology with leadership workshops. Yet the political overtones of the work 
meant the stigmatisation prevailed, and a similar sense of fear surrounded the human rights 
workshops just as with any other political activity. 
 Asopema was formed to protest the effects of the coffee crisis on small farmers— to demand 
protection from the shocks of the market and greater agrarian democracy. For many of its leaders, the 
aim was also to build a more radical movement in opposition to neoliberalism and the Colombian 
state, capable of challenging the balance of forces within Colombian society. Their efforts facilitated 
a break from coffee farmers’ traditional vertical alignments with elites and the state, allowing them 
to forge new solidarities with other worker and peasant movements nationwide. However, for most 
of the protestors, participation in the mobilisations was simply a means to re-establish the the 
conditions for inclusion in the new economic model. Asopema was seen more as a ‘service 
organisation’ that would represent them in obtaining certain benefits, rather than the instrument of 
political resistance that its leaders had envisaged. After the mobilisations had subsided, little was 
done to maintain the social ties that had formed during the strikes, while the new bonds of solidarity 
were nipped in the bud by paramilitary violence. New forms of technical assistance offered an 
individualised escape route allowing peasants to withstand the crisis, while rapid outmigration also 
contributed to its disintegration. By the early 2000s, it became clear the movement had become de-
linked from its base of support as participation in meetings dwindled. The incipient processes of 
consciousness-raising and political activism that had arisen with the protests were nipped in the bud 
by paramilitary violence and the adoption of alternative livelihood strategies by its base. The 
dissipation of Asopema was so fast that by the mid 2000s the association had all but dissolved.  
 The decline of participation in Asopema was taken as a sign of the movement’s ‘crisis’. This 
conclusion might seem appropriate when seen from the perspective of the aims of its leaders, who 
had conceived of the protests as a springboard for deeper processes of consciousness-raising and 
politicisation of its members. Yet when seen from the perspective of Líbano’s peasants themselves, 
the outcome seems less of a surprise. In regions heavily dependent on the production of a single crop, 
it is quite normal for protest cycles to suddenly erupt and decline again with changes in prices and 
harvest times. As Hobsbawm warns: ‘however militant peasants are, the cycle of their labours 
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shackles them to their fate’ (1973: 12). When peasants needed to return to their farms to tend the 
crops, or adapted new strategies of diversified production to withstand the crisis, there was no longer 
any need for radical protest activity. 
 The problem is also about the type of organisational power that can be associated with a 
permanently semi-proletarianised labour force.  Political violence certainly created an environment 
of fear for any oppositional activity, but neoliberal restructuring also created a crisis in social 
reproduction for rural producers. This involves both a material loss of the conditions for farming, 
preparing and harvesting the fields, but also the social and emotional conditions for organising 
livelihood strategies, planning and projecting for the future. Líbano’s peasants were certainly 
receptive to radical ideas, but their capacity to mobilise was undermined as the search for survival 
strategies became increasingly desperate and individualised in the context of a subsistence crisis and 
crisis of employment.   
 Asopema attempted to counteract these conditions by building community support networks 
and alternative projects, but they were ultimately unable to stem the rapid outflow of semi-
proletarianised labourers.  Increasingly, migration for seasonal work in the coca fields or to the cities 
to work in construction became a basic component of the household income. Some farmers even 
resorted to uprooting their coffee plants and replacing them with coca.  In 2002, Fedecafé estimated 
that ‘the coffee crisis provoked an increase in coca cultivation in the coffee regions estimated at 
around 20,000 hectares, or 2 percent of the total area cultivated with coffee’ (Rincón, 2005: 73).  
Reports suggested that coffee farms in Tolima, as well as Antioquia, Caldas, Risaralda, Quindio, and 
Huila had been converted to coca plantations. Others migrated to frontier regions in order to start 
coca farms or work in the coca industry.  
Many cafeteros and jornaleros went to work in the coca fields. They fled out of poverty, but they came 
back rich. I knew one jornalero who went to work in the coca fields, then came back and bought the 
farm he used to work on (Interview, Danilo Perez, 2017).   
As former coffee farmers turned to migration and wage labour they became integrated into the 
informal economy as isolated and autonomous individuals— coca farmers, pedlars, pushers or 
traffickers with nothing to gain from collective action. Dominated by mutual competition and 
transient demands, precarious labour in the informal sector proved difficult to organise, eventually 
shredding the fabric that had once provided the basis for a sense of shared purpose and common 
goals. 
Middle Magdalena 
By the turn of the century, extensive violence had crippled the power of popular movements in the 
Middle Magdalena. In contrast to the outpour of popular anger that had spurred the civic mobilisations 
the 1980s, by the time Uribe rose to power the response to violence was far more subdued. Extensive 
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and brutal violence targeted against even the smallest sign of dissent deeply impacted the social fabric 
of provincial towns like Barrancabermeja and undermined traditional tactics for building class power 
by strengthening their base or building coalitions with other movements. Public spaces like 
neighbourhood councils, co-operatives and Coordinadoras were sealed off by violence, and the 
solidarities and shared cultures they had fostered were reconfigured into individualised struggles 
(Gill, 2016). In Barrancabermeja, the USO was severely weakened by paramilitary violence, and 
stripped of its traditional role as a centrifugal force in the coalitions between worker, community and 
peasant movements. Between 1981 and 1997 it ceased to go on strike entirely, and in 1996 its 
albergue campesina in Barrancabermeja was closed (Van Isschot, 2016: 161).  
 On his election to office, Uribe immediately suspended the ZRC, calling it an “independent 
republic” of the FARC.  Under the Uribe administration, all people living in conflict zones were 
considered real or potential ‘enemies’;  social activists, especially from rural movements like the 
ACVC, faced arbitrary detentions, judicial set ups and massive incarcerations. The justification of 
the persecution was that activists were considered “civilian guerrillas,” or at least collaborators with 
the insurgents. Between 2006 and 2007, 17 ACVC peasants were assassinated by military forces.  
They were subsequently dressed up as guerrilla soldiers in a strategy that later became a nationwide 
scandal known as the “False Positives”. In 2007, 18 arrest warrants were issued against the ACVC’s 
coordinating committee, and they were detained for six months.  
 Paramilitary and army raids drove the remainder of the leadership into exile and isolated the 
movement from its base. With the popular movement in retreat, the FARC were the only remaining 
line of defence for communities faced with widespread displacement. The FARC launched several 
successful assaults on paramilitary bases between 2000 and 2003, resulting in several paramilitary 
casualties. When the paramilitaries temporarily retreated, the FARC planted landmines throughout 
the region and the conflict eventually reached a stalemate. It is almost certain that without the FARC’s 
intervention the entire Cimitarra region would have been annihilated and forced into mass 
displacement. Yet the FARC’s defence and permanent presence in the region has also been the basis 
for the stigmatisation of the movement. 
 During the most intense period of repression between 2002 and 2006, the ACVC adopted a 
strategy of simple defence aiming to remain on the territory and resist the latest wave of persecution. 
The central committee called an emergency meeting between 700 community leaders. The meeting 
concluded with the declaration that, despite the ZRC’s suspension, it did not need a legal basis and 
would continue to operate “de hecho”. Rather than seek refuge in the city of Barrancabermeja, which 
had descended into violence, they relocated to new territories, declaring the villages of Ojos Claros, 
Carmelias and Dos Quebradas in the Cimitarra valley a humanitarian refuge.  The humanitarian 
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refuge involved an organised exodus of 350 displaced peasants, who resettled in these small villages 
(ACVC, 2010). The humanitarian refuge prevented the complete dissipation of the Cimitarra 
communities, allowing the ACVC to protect its members, sustain participation and continue building 
at the grassroots.  This involves a combination of providing subsistence guarantees for its members 
in the face of economic crisis and political violence, whilst continuing social ties and participation 
through strategies of self-governance and collective work. 
 Notwithstanding strategies for self-defence, this was nonetheless a low point for the 
movement. Whereas previously, acts of far-right violence had sparked massive outpourings onto the 
streets, the attacks of 2002-6 provoked a very subdued response.  While day-to day organising 
continued at the level of the community action committees, overt protests ceased almost completely. 
Although repression did not entirely dissipate the movement, it distanced the ACVC from its allies 
and prevented the movement from mobilising a wider base. Land-based organising certainly provided 
a vital survival strategy, but this was also a far more subdued form of activism than the broad 
coalitions of popular movements the ACVC had engaged with in the past. Isolated from broader 
society and prevented from building alliances and coalitions, their capacity for action was severely 
limited. As chapter six noted, paramilitary terror had weakened Colombia’s social and political left 
as a whole. The system of alliances that had connected the peasant movement to community and 
labour movements dissipated, leaving those that remained isolated from their traditional networks of 
alliances. 
 As the violence intensified throughout the Cimitarra valley, “human rights” became an 
increasingly important tactic. As chapter five noted, human rights demands had a long history in 
social mobilisation in the Middle Magdalena, stemming back to the petitions of the civic strike 
movements of the 1970s and 1980s. The movements had initially drawn on the notion of “human 
rights violations” to call attention to state repression and garner support for an alternative bloc of 
popular power. However, as a result of crushing violence in the late 1990s and 2000s, human rights 
activism was increasingly part of a defensive move arising ‘from the violent destruction of class-
based forms of political protest and the discrediting of older utopian visions of socialism’ (Gill 2016: 
189). The Middle Magdalena had first attracted the attention of international Human Rights 
Organisations (HROs) such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch after the paramilitary 
massacres in Puerto Boyacá in the early 1980s. By the late 1990s, however, as Barrancabermeja’s 
traditional alliance structure of unions, popular coalitions and political parties disintegrated through 
violence, it came to be replaced by a series of international HROs such as Peace Brigades and 
Christian Peacemaker teams and national HROs such as the  Regional Corporation for the Defense 
of Human Rights (CREDHOS), and the Barrancabermeja Human Rights Workers’ Forum 
(ETTTTDDHH) which had far more restricted participation and political clout than the 
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Coordinadoras that had preceded them.  
 The ACVC’s adoption of human rights activism did not involve abandoning the popular 
struggle in favour of a legalistic one, but should be understood as a tactical move based on their 
analysis of the balance of forces of the time. During this period the ACVC conducted an internal 
evaluation, concluding they “were alone” in the sense they had been isolated from the popular 
movement (Becerra, 2005: 44). This is affirmed in Miguel Cifuentes’ account of the turn to human 
rights activism as a tactical move responding to a particular analysis of the political conjuncture: 
You have to understand that before 1996 there was so much fear it was impossible to even have an organisation. 
[…]We stopped talking of ourselves as UP because that was a sure way of getting killed. Instead, we had to talk 
of ourselves as Community Action Committee leaders, displaced people’s associations, women’s or youth 
groups or Human Rights NGOs.  […] It’s not that the work of the [Patriotic Union] ended completely-- we 
continued our work. This was a tactical and not an ideological shift. We had to organise in other ways (Interview, 
Miguel Cifuentes, 2017) 
 The ACVC adopted human rights discourses with the objective of calling attention to the 
crisis facing peasants at the heart of Cold War violence, but this was specifically about denouncing 
the abuses of their traditional class enemies— landlords and multinational corporations. The ACVC’s 
first human rights denunciation was about ‘showing our disagreement with cattle-ranchers with 
regard to human rights violations’. This involved producing a documentary ‘demonstrating the 
involvement of cattle-ranchers in assassinations of peasants’ (cited in Becerra, 2005: 44). Alongside 
the denouncements, grassroots tactics of self-defence that had been initiated with the humanitarian 
refuges became more professionalised, linking up to technical training and national and international 
human rights networks.  The ACVC provided workshops throughout the JACs in identifying human 
rights abuses, establishing a channels of communication for denouncing abuses in the region, and a 
system of alerts through the ombudsman and international networks.  
 This form of human rights activism rooted in older forms of class solidarity, and which called 
attention to the violence of the state and landed capital, certainly contrasted from the objectives of 
European and North American HROs, which sought to protect persecuted individuals and encourage 
the state to uphold international law. For a Communist movement  far more comfortable with the 
language of anti-imperialism that pitted the popular masses against landlords and the oligarchs, the 
new language of a universally shared commitment to the ‘human rights’ of individuals was not a 
comfortable one to make. It forced movements to couch their cause within the far more limited 
framework of the so-called “international community” of government agencies and NGOs, which 
adopted more individualistic understandings of human rights as restricted to protections for 
persecuted individuals and making the state more accountable to its citizens. Grounded in a liberal 
understanding of the rights belonging to individuals, the frame presumed simultaneously the 
legitimacy of state power and the illegitimacy of guerrilla violence (Gill, 2016; Striffler, 2015).  This 
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was a sharp contrast to the politics of confrontation and class power, and it also failed to recognise 
the organic and historical relations between many Colombian social movements and insurgents. 
While there is no doubt the focus on technical and legalistic activities was a reflection of the left’s 
political and organisational weakness during this period, in the case of the ACVC the important point 
to make is that alliances with human rights networks neither compromised its political autonomy nor 
turned attention away from grassroots work. Their modest achievement was to open spaces for the 
continuation of low-level organising during a time the left was in retreat.  
Conclusion 
A comparison of the ACVC and Asopema provides a more nuanced understanding of the political 
dynamics surrounding the shift toward new strategies of repeasantisation that took place during this 
period. In the context of the neoliberal subsistence crisis, there was an important turn to greater self-
reliance, a reduction in chemical inputs and greater diversification in the smallholding farming 
systems of in both regions. However, the political character of this shift was ambiguous. In the Middle 
Magdalena, this involved drawing on the traditions of self-reliance, co-operation and solidarity that 
had long been central to Communist frontier organising in order to build a defensive strategy against 
paramilitary violence and neoliberal precariousness. In this sense, the move to repeasantisation was 
highly politicised and solidaristic, reinforcing social ties, grassroots participation and organisational 
capacities between members.  In contrast, in Líbano the turn to more diversified production 
techniques acted more as a shock absorber for the impact of the crisis, promoting only re-
accommodation within the social order dominated by local elites and the naturalness of the local 
social hierarchy.  In this sense, for many members, repeasantisation involved an individualised 
strategy for survival, with the underlying implication that broader social problems could be solved 
through productive adaptation.  What this suggests is that the subjective and political character of 
repeasantisation is not pre-ordained, but only intelligible when situated within the broader array of 
class relations and power structures.  
 One of the main challenges facing Colombian social movements is how to continue 
politicising and mobilising in a context where intense political violence has sealed off public spaces 
for action and debate, and where a subsistence crisis in agriculture and an unemployment crisis in the 
cities has prompted a turn to individualised survival strategies to solve social problems. The most 
difficult and crucial issue for rural social movements has been that of maintaining grassroots 
participation and organisational autonomy in extremely hostile circumstances. In this context, the 
strategy of constructing ‘autonomous rural territories’ has allowed movements to carve out a space 
to meet the specific livelihood needs of their members within the current system in coping with the 
subsistence crisis (for example, through diversified production) whilst simultaneously developing 
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alternative bonds, capacities, understandings and organisational structures that provide a basis from 
which to push for more radical transformation of the existing structures. The creation of alternative 
rural territories allows the movement define common problems and collectively build strategies for 
alternative relations of production and self-governance. In this context, struggles to defend and 
expand autonomous territories have become increasingly crucial for rural movements in the 
neoliberal era. A further challenge for these movements is scaling up their local processes and linking 
to wider movement projects that challenge the balance of power in society. This issue is addressed in 
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The outcome of any social movement project is not an overnight achievement, but nor is it fixed or 
pre-ordained. Colombian social movements face incredibly hostile circumstances, but there is also a 
relentless vitality and energy to their activism, which is constantly being reshaped and reprojected in 
response to evolving circumstances. Activists are involved in debates and discussions around 
different political moments, they are continuously analysing changes in the balance of forces and 
searching for new strategies to organise collectively and build alliances. After three decades of 
decline, since the 2010s there has been a significant upsurge in social mobilisation, particularly in 
rural areas. The rise in rural mobilisation has been catalysed by a number of factors: the impact of 
free trade agreements, the wave of dispossession caused by the extractives sector, as well as the 
political opening offered by the peace agreements.  New rural revolts have taken a variety of forms, 
from spontaneous outbursts such as roadblocks, protests, strikes and occupations, but they have also 
developed new political instruments and built platforms for connecting diverse struggles, co-
ordinating collective actions and developing national campaigns.  
 This chapter analyses the political strategy of Colombia’s resurgent agrarian movements. New 
movements have arisen from localised understandings, but they have also developed new strategies 
for finding commonalities and co-ordinating with other groups in a similar position. Far from isolated 
or spontaneous responses to immediate issues, I argue that these new conflicts have created and 
expanded spaces for the development of alternative understandings, connections and capacities, 
which are laying the groundwork for the construction of broader social movement projects with 
transformative potential. I examine how the wide array of mobilisations has given birth to new 
political instruments and movement projects, which can unify and co-ordinate very diverse groups. 
These new forces have developed shared platforms, built alliances and negotiated with the state. As 
a result, the surge in particular struggles is increasingly coming to be associated within a more general 
set of interconnections among rural and urban movements nationwide, and with transnational 
movements. There has also been a significant shift in the ideologies and demands of contemporary 
rural movements. In contrast to the land reform movement of 1960s, which had demanded industrial 
205 
inputs on the basis of a model of capitalist development via smallholder agriculture in alliance with 
the state, contemporary processes have emphasised the need to reduce reliance on industrialised 
farming processes, defence of ecological resources and political autonomy. 
  In an exclusionary political system and a society characterised by fragmentation and violence, 
movements operate in very limited space. Nonetheless, they have made remarkable achievements in 
building a national movement project that has successfully mobilised large sectors of the population, 
pressured the state, and gained political rights in processes that allow them to strengthen their power 
within civil society. In this chapter I trace the movements’ experiences in negotiating with the state 
and building alliances with other social and political movements. I assess the movements’ attempts 
to negotiate concrete gains and basic political guarantees for their members whilst simultaneously 
attempting to build alternative capacities and political forces to promote more radical change.  
 In different ways, both the Cimitarra and Líbano movements have sought to connect their 
specific regional struggles with broader oppositional campaigns by linking up to coalitions and 
building alliances with wider movement projects. For the Peasant Association of the Cimitarra Valley 
(ACVC), this has centred on a campaign for peasant land reserves that links various territorially-
based peasant struggles with a national coalition through a combination of grassroots self-
organisation and negotiation. For the rural activists of Líbano this has involved the formation of an 
anti-mining coalition. This chapter assesses these attempts to build solidarities and construct social 
and political instruments capable of changing the balance of forces to create more favourable 
conditions for the popular movement. My analysis of these resurgent movements draws on the notion 
of territorial disputes used by Fernandes (2005) and ‘militant particularisms’ and ‘militant socialism’ 
in the sense of Williams (1989) and Harvey (2000) (see also Cox and Nilsen 2014; Featherstone 
2005).  This involves questioning the way that a particular set of localised values, cultural practices 
and solidarities may be united and generalised into a more ‘universal’ politics (Harvey 2000).  The 
experiences of the emergent campaigns provide important considerations for understanding how 
particularist struggles related to a specific location can be generalised and universalised by identifying 
common grievances and adversaries, and constructing forces through cooperation and organisation 
around concrete campaigns.  
 Although the Colombian left remains weak and has failed to significantly alter the balance of 
forces within civil society, movements are developing tools for mobilising and coordinating very 
heterogenous social groups, promoting new forms of grassroots participation and self-organisation, 
providing political leadership and a clear set of objectives, which is giving rise to the emergence of 
new oppositional blocs. Broadly speaking, there are two types of leadership style amongst 
Colombia’s new rural movements: so-called “Camilista” movements inspired by the ideas of 
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Liberation Theology which gained traction in the 1970s, and national-popular “Gaitanista” 
movements rooted in Communist Party and radical currents of the Liberal party. Both these leadership 
styles are characterised by diverse tendencies, have been inspired by each others’ ideas and have 
evolved over time in dialogue with their own bases and other tendencies across Latin America, such 
as the MST and the EZLN.  They continue to be strongly influenced by classic Marxism and Latin 
American Marxism, which have been fused with growing ecological sensitivities, feminist 
perspectives and ethnic concerns.  
 The Communist leadership style adopted by movements such as the ACVC and the Patriotic 
March (Marcha Patriótica) has followed the traditional approach of radical Latin American rural 
movements combining grassroots mobilisation amongst rural communities with a vision of building 
class power to confront the state. They are more pragmatic in their approach to negotiating with 
political parties and building political coalitions, and there is an emphasis on the need for unified 
leadership as a means for ensuring greater political coordination and coherence. They have been more 
focused on building political parties and entering alliances as a way to challenge dominant powers, 
and their main tactics have emphasised large-scale mobilisations as a means of building and 
demonstrating class power. Meanwhile, the leadership style of “Camilista” movements— which 
include Asopema activists and the People’s Congress have been more sceptical of hierarchical 
political organisations and electoral politics, rejecting the perceived ‘vanguardism’  of traditional 
movements. Taking inspiration from the Zapatistas, they have emphasised self-governance and 
autonomy over the capture of state power, as well as a greater concern with participatory democratic 
procedures, grassroots education and the recognition of ethnic, gender and cultural diversity. Their 
strongest base is in indigenous and urban movements of students and intellectuals. These two 
movements share a common social base uniting rural communities of peasants and ethnic minorities 
with workers and other social movements of women, human rights organisations, LGBT groups and 
displaced people. Their main differences concern issues of political strategy and state power. 
Although these movements have not changed the balance of forces to a sufficient degree to alter the 
structures of power in Colombian society, movements like Marcha Patriotica and the People’s 
Congress have carved out an important space by insisting on consultation in the peace process and 
agrarian issues, and they have become popular leaders with national recognition. This chapter 
discusses the contexts and strategies of two of the most significant social movement projects that 
have emerged in Colombia in recent years: the anti-mining coalitions called Comités Ambientales 
and the social and political movement Marcha Patriótica. 
The extractivist turn 
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Beginning in the early 2000s, the so-called ‘extractivist’ turn in the economic growth model has 
precipitated a major shift in the Colombian economy and its relation to the world market. The origins 
of the shift can be traced to the ongoing global crisis of multiple dimensions— finance, food, fuel, 
energy and climate— which came to be manifested in a boom in commodity prices in the world 
economy (McMichael 2010; White et al., 2013).  Between 2001 and 2011, the prices of some of 
Colombia’s chief primary commodities increased exponentially: gold by 4.5 times, coal by 2.5 times, 
nickel by 4.7 times and palm oil by 6.7 times (Index Mundi 2016).  As a result, Colombia and Latin 
America became the main destinations for an influx of  ‘resource-seeking’ capital.  
 On the domestic level, the extractive turn was also an upshot of Colombia’s adherence to a 
neoliberal economic development model, which since the 1970s and 1980s had become increasingly 
dependent on FDI and export-led growth under the direction of international financial institutions. 
By the late 1990s, the economic crisis associated with Colombia’s declining productive base, 
increasing financial speculation and soaring fiscal deficit pushed successive governments into greater 
dependence on primary commodities exports in order to make up fiscal revenues.  In 1999 and 2002, 
IMF agreements committed the government to further open its economy and promote foreign 
investment in the sectors where Colombia enjoyed a ‘comparative advantage’ such as biofuels, oil, 
gold and coal mining (Garay 2013; Richani 2012). 
 The new consensus on mining policy was enshrined in the adoption of the new mining code, 
Law 685 of 2001.8 The code reconstituted the property and contract law surrounding mining, opening 
up the titling process on a “first come, first served” basis, with equal access granted to foreign and 
domestic firms. It removed entry barriers for private investment such as taxes, restrictions, and 
environmental regulations. State participation in extraction was ruled out, and the role of the state 
was relegated to regulation and rent collection (Fierro, 2012: 38).  Changes in the mining code opened 
the doors for multinational mining companies and speculators to seize rights to resource extraction 
throughout Colombian territories. In 2012, 1,717 companies and 7,200 individuals held active 
licenses for mining exploration and extraction on a total of 7.4 million hectares of land.  One 
Ombudsman report suggested that  concessions for exploration or exploitation of natural resources 
on an estimated 59 per cent of Colombian national territory (Garay 2013). The code facilitated large-
scale and foreign investments whilst effectively eliminating the participation of small and medium 
scale miners by removing provisions based on the distinction of small and large enterprises, forcing 
small-scale miners to comply with standards of large companies (Cardona, 2012). As a result the 
reconfiguration of labour and property regimes has been associated with new patterns of uneven 
                                               
8 The new code was created from an agreement between the Colombian Ministry for Mines and Energy and 
the Canadian Energy Research Institute, which was predicated on the guarantee of foreign investment and 
bilateral agreements.  
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geographical development and territorial fragmentation. The changing role of the state as an arbiter 
of the new extractives sector also prompted a change in relations between the state and rural 
populations. 
For Uribe, the primary commodities boom also provided life support for a failing war 
economy.  By the mid-2000s, the mounting costs of the extensive military program alongside the 
growing fiscal deficit pushed Uribe to dramatically expand the extractives sector.  Uribe desperately 
sought to attract foreign mining companies to make up for the fiscal deficit generated by his military 
programme.  A 2005 report from the national planning agency for mines and energy entitled 
‘Colombia: a mining county’ aimed to place Colombia as the third greatest receiver of FDI in the 
mining sector (UPME 2005) through an array of reforms surrounding taxes and investor protections. 
Uribe also expanded the war apparatus, provisioning a second phase of Plan Colombia, entitled the 
‘Social Recuperation of Territory’. This expanded military presence into 53 new regions of strategic 
importance where major companies such as BP, Repsol and Harken energy were operating, and two 
new battalions were created to protect mining and energy companies (Ramírez 2015; Ismi 2012). 
Uribe proceeded to extend free market policies, implementing labour and pensions reforms and public 
sector cuts to all areas except the military, and initiating free trade agreements with the E.U, China, 
the US and Canada. The state oil company Ecopetrol was liquidated, and in its place the National 
Hydrocarbon Agency was made responsible for administering concessions for multinational 
corporations (Garay 2013).  
The various measures had the effect of dramatically increasing foreign direct investment in 
mining. FDI in the mining and energy sectors expanded tenfold from $466 million to $4.5 billion 
between 2002 and 2010, increasing its share of total FDI from 42 to 67 per cent (BNR, n.d). Whilst 
during the Pastrana administration (1996-2000), 221,000 hectares of land were under mining 
concessions, during the Uribe administration (2002-2010) this rose to 7.4 million (ABColombia, 
2011).  The influx of extractive capital propelled a massive reconfiguration of rural property 
structures, giving rise to new forms of capital penetration into rural territories, alongside new 
processes of land concentration and appropriation of natural resources in the hands of multinational 
mining and agribusiness corporations. 
 The extractives surge also brought a new wave of militarisation and paramilitary repression 
to rural territories.  Intensified violence and militarisation of rural areas created the conditions on the 
ground for the influx of mining capital into rural territories, through widespread displacement of rural 
communities and attacks on organised opposition. Multinational mining companies often entered new 
territories through agreements between national mining corporations, the Ministry of Defence, private 
security companies and paramilitary armies, which created and enforced the security conditions 
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necessary for extractive companies to operate by providing protection from guerrilla forces, forcibly 
dispossessing local communities from their lands in strategic mining areas, repressing labor unions, 
and enforcing flexibilised labour contracts (ABColombia 2011; Pax 2014; Richani 2010). Thus the 
extractives turn further fuelled the longstanding agrarian armed conflict, turning far-right forces into 
shock troops for the entrance of mining companies and spurring new patterns of violence and 
dispossession while fuelling new animosities between frontier peasants and the state. 
Paramilitary terror paved the way for major reconfigurations in relations of property and 
power, allowing for rural territories in the Cimitarra valley and Líbano to be incorporated into the 
new extractivist growth model. In the South Bolívar region, for example, paramilitary violence and 
targeted assassinations against movement leaders preceded the entrance of multinational corporations 
AngloGold Ashanti, Corona Goldfields and Gran Colombian Gold, which began acquiring mining 
titles covering around 90 per cent of the area in the first half of the 2000s (O’Connor and Bohórquez 
2010: 101; PBI 2012: 27; Richani 2005: 123). Meanwhile, during the violence in North Tolima the 
AngloGold Ashanti company was buying titles for a gold mine project covering 515 hectares of the 
region— including the municipality of Líbano, consuming 31.5 million cubic meters of water a day 
and threatening the livelihoods of 2,400 families, mostly rural inhabitants (CSC 2011).  Like in the 
South Bolívar region, the initial exploration for gold in Líbano in the early 2000s coincided with the 
retreat of peasant activism, when paramilitary violence prevented any public gathering or discussion, 
and when a mood of fear surrounded any expression of opposition to the established order. The 
atmosphere of fear that prevailed around all forms of organised social activity prevented any real 
democratic procedures on the arrival of mining communities, such as public forums and consultations 
allowing for information to be shared and the issues discussed. Although organised resistance to the 
new processes of capital penetration was initially very weak, since roughly 2008 a new wave of anti-
mining struggles has erupted with impressive force and rapidity. 
Extractivism and new socio-environmental movements 
After a period of decline, the past decade has been witness to a proliferation of mobilisations related 
to rural issues. The social research institute CINEP found that 274 social mobilisations associated 
with resource extraction had taken place between 2001 and 2011, and that the number of 
mobilisations rose consistently between 2005 and 2012 (CINEP, 2012). These new mobilisations are 
also composed of a different social base than popular struggles of the past. While labour movements 
represented half of the total protestors, 25 percent of participants were rural communities, including 
10 percent ethnic groups and 15 percent peasant farmers, 13 percent were small-scale miners, and 12 
percent were urban communities (CINEP, 2013). These figures reflect the ongoing decline of the 
traditional labour movement, and the rise of new forms of conflict in rural areas, including resistance 
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to open-pit mining projects, the construction of hydro-electric plants and the expansion of large-scale 
agribusiness projects. 
 Many of these protests began as immediate or spontaneous responses, but deeper processes 
of political education and movement-building have also been underway. One example of this is 
provided in the opposition to the Anglo-Ashanti gold mine in Tolima that emerged in the late 2000s.  
Rural opposition began as a spontaneous and immediate response to concerns with the growing 
presence of mining officials surveying and purchasing land in the region. Local peasant and 
indigenous groups launched a campaign to protest the lack of transparency and consultation 
surrounding the project with local protests and roadblocks preventing company traffic entering the 
region (García, 2014). But rather than remain as a single-issue or localised campaign, the groups soon 
established connections with a variety of other activist groups through the formation of a cross-sector 
coalition of peasants, indigenous people, students, environmentalists and local urban residents’ 
groups opposed to the mine.  Collective action around an urgent and concrete issue provided a point 
of commonality and convergence for an array of dispersed and fragmented groups, helping them to 
establish collective working practices and share a common goal (García, 2014). 
 Through political leadership and after a series of discussions and debates, what had begun as 
small-scale and immediate protests was developed into a major campaign with significant scope.  The 
regional environmental group, the Comité Ambiental y Campesino en Defensa de la Vida 
(Environmental Committee in Defence of Life) was created in 2010 (CSC, 2013: 94). The Comité 
Ambiental provided a space for a cross-sector of activists, local businesses, resident groups and 
NGOS to organise together, combine strategies, share resources and plan actions. Part of the political 
structure of these processes has been inherited from the infrastructure of human rights NGOs and 
platforms set up during the period of intense repression and the mushroom in international human 
rights activism. International organisations like Pax Christi gave workshops raising awareness about 
the mines in the region, their impact and experiences and strategies for opposing the mine. The 
Colombian-British solidarity group Colombia Solidarity Campaign (CSC) and Human Rights Watch 
commissioned reports to research the potential impact of the mine and Anglo-Gold’s human rights 
record in the Congo, bringing anti-mining rural activists from other regions in Colombia and Latin 
American countries to Cajamarca to share experiences of the impact of the mine on their communities 
and tactics of resistance.  Collective learning processes such as these have built on understandings 
from local or everyday struggles against the immediate effects of mining towards the development of 
broader campaigns.  
 A key achievement of the Comités Ambientales has been to reach out and mobilise broader 
sectors of the population who were not previously active.  The Comités Ambientales have made a 
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deliberate shift away from confrontational tactics and language traditionally associated with the 
Colombian left, emphasising instead cultural activities and a non-confrontational discourse and 
tactics in order to reach out to broader sectors of the population. Every year since 2012, the committee 
has held a marcha carnaval— a street carnival in the town of Ibague resembling a demonstration, but 
which also combines cultural activities like music, dancing, arts and crafts. The latest march of 2017 
brought out 120,000 participants from 12 nearby municipalities (García, 2014). The Líbano chapter 
of the committee is composed of two dozen or so activists, counting amongst them Asopema, 
students, JAC leaders, farmers, local businesses and religious groups. Cultural events emphasising 
non-violence and environmental concerns have avoided directly criticising the state or mining 
companies. This is because of the stigmatisation of all confrontational tactics or demands as 
‘guerrilla’ or ‘criminal’ activity. The Carnavals have also brought in many young people to the 
movement. Students, musicians and artists who are sceptical of associating with ‘old’ leftist 
movements and tend to reject politics and politicians take an active role in movements with an urgent 
and immediate objective. 
 One of the most important tactics adopted by the anti-mining campaign has been the popular 
consultation. Referendums allow communities to hold a democratic consultation regarding important 
decisions for their inhabitants. The first of these consultations was carried out in the town of Piedras, 
Tolima, in 2013. The campaign collected 5,000 signatures in just 15 days, with 99 percent of 
participants voting “no”. The activities of the committee successfully stalled the mine, and the initial 
start date of 2016 was postponed for three years. The campaign has succeeded in raising awareness 
and changing the public understanding of mining as the solution to economic growth, drawing 
attention to the democratic vacuum surrounding the mining projects and exposing the extent of 
damage and making the project unacceptable both for local communities and the country as a whole 
(Dietz, 2017). With President Santos’ approval rating dropping to a low of 24 per cent in 2017, the 
popular consultation acted as a symbolic act of rejection of the government’s extractivist policies and 
traditional politicians and parties, while community organising was able to grow, gather strength and 
motivate new people. 
  In 2017, the activists of Líbano began their own popular consultation process.  After a decade 
of low political activity, the initiation of the popular consultation process has re-opened a very fertile 
space for a diverse array of activists to organise together around a concrete task.  Long-time activists, 
JAC leaders and teachers have been joined by new, young activists. By carrying out door-to-door 
education and campaigning, they have undertaken significant grassroots work and convinced many 
local residents who are usually mistrustful of traditional politicians and reject political campaigns.  
The popular consultation has been a particularly effective tool in drawing attention to the ever 
widening incompatibility between the current growth model and local democracy: the concentration 
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of power and resources, the by-passing of democratic procedures and political exclusion of local 
residents in decisions over control and access to local resources (García, 2014). It draws on the 
increasing sense of alienation from the state whilst simultaneously developing popular capacities for 
self-organisation. These movements are led by peasant and indigenous activists, who work closely 
with other groups including urban residents— particularly students and education workers, and 
national and international environmental activists. Sharing experiences and collective learning have 
provided the basis for new connections between rural communities affected by mining through 
collective processes of awareness-raising on the impacts of mining and developing capacities and 
resources for their campaigns.  
 The Comités Ambientales have made significant achievements in terms of raising awareness, 
garnering support from broad sectors of the population and building coalitions that transcend local 
boundaries towards national and international coalitions. Yet they are nonetheless limited to a single 
field of action— opposition to mining and popular sovereignty over natural resources.  Thus far, they 
have have been reticent to engage with broader political instruments challenging the economic model 
and political system as a whole. A distrust of politics and politicians is pervasive— even towards 
centre and centre-left politicians. During my participation in one of the organising meetings in 
September 2017, participants expressed their frustration with the centre-Left party the Democratic 
Pole, which had run candidates in Ibague shortly after the popular consultation, who were criticised 
for their involvement in manipulative political tricks (“politiquería"), and using the energy and 
momentum from the activists’ grassroots campaigning for their own political gains.  The Comités 
have insisted on autonomy from political parties and electoral politics, which they tend to see as 
manipulating, appropriating and co-opting the energy they have built. Their rejection of electoral 
politics and the use of peaceful and cultural tactics aims to avoid the stigmatisation associated with 
traditional left-wing movements as well as attracting a broad base of support from amongst 
community members, NGOs, and local business groups that would usually be deterred from 
confrontational tactics. Yet the absence of political leadership has also left the movement dispersed 
and fragmented; it has difficulty finding direction and coherence in the long-term after the initial 
mobilisations have subsided. Notwithstanding these limitations, through collective learning processes 
and strategies for reaching out to broader sectors of the population, the comités have made significant 
advances in changing consciousness and building solidarities as part of a broader  power struggle at 
the level of civil society, as well as scaling-up local issues to become part of national and global 
processes. 
 
“Extractivist peace”: Santos, the peace accords and the new scenario for social movements 
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The ascension of Juan Manuel Santos to the presidency in 2010 marked an important turning point 
in terms of agrarian policy and the armed conflict. After agrarian reform had all but disappeared under 
Uribe’s presidency, Santos’ two terms in office re-opened a major nationwide debate on rural 
development and the armed conflict. Santos proposed Law 1448, known as the ‘Victims and Land 
Restitution Law’ in 2011, as a gesture of goodwill before opening peace negotiations with the FARC. 
Described by Santos as an ‘agrarian revolution; not a revolution with guns, but though the constitution 
and the law’(Martínez, 2014), the law overlapped with the peace negotiations as part of Santos’ 
attempt to bring an end to the armed conflict.   The ‘agrarian question’ may have been revived in the 
national debate, but this time around it was in a much weaker form.  Despite the fact that land reform 
had been the FARC’s central demand throughout the 60-year conflict, this time redistributive land 
reform was not on the negotiating agenda. Instead, the law was more concerned with modernising 
state institutions by creating mechanisms for administering victims of displacement, land registration 
and the formalisation of property titles in the latest of a series of attempts to transfer land assets from 
narco-traffickers to victims of the conflict throughout the 2000s which, despite their popularity with 
the Colombian public, had very little impact (CNRR 2013:  125-7; Martínez, 2014). The most 
important concession Santos offered to agrarian movements was the re-instantiation of the ZRC 
model in the rural development agenda after it had been frozen under President Uribe (Méndez 2013).  
 However as critics pointed out, the focus on restituting land to victims of the conflict and 
protecting property only in marginal frontier territories already presumed the impossibility of major 
restitution, reducing the unresolved land conflict to a question of victim reparation and technical 
assistance (Fajardo, 2012).  Moreover, the reform was very weakly implemented and failed to 
recognise that displaced peasants are too afraid to return to their lands given the continuation of the 
armed conflict. Only 2.5 per cent of appropriated lands had been returned between 2012 and 2016 
(OIDHACO, 2018). The law is also restrained by the confines of the neoliberal economic model, 
which prioritises ‘fiscal sustainability’ over compensation for victims, and provides guarantees 
against expropriation for investors in lands on which entrepreneurial projects are being carried out 
‘in good faith’ (Fajardo 2012). This was stated explicitly by Santos, who promised that the agrarian 
reform law would not pose a challenge to ‘the current model of economic development in Colombia; 
the legal regime that protects private property; the current foreign investment model, and military 
doctrine’ (cited in Martínez 2014). This ruled out any discussion of the socio-economic and political 
dimensions of the agrarian conflict.  The weak terms of the peace deal, together with the fact that it 
was largely supported by the United States and major business groups, including the SAC and 
Fedegan, was reflective of the dramatic shift in the balance of forces from the countryside that has 
taken place during the five decades of armed conflict. 
Meanwhile, the main thrust of President Santos’ rural development proposal was clearly 
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oriented towards the demands of Colombia’s agrarian elite and international investors. During two 
terms in office Santos accelerated natural resource extraction, with his National Development Plans 
of 2011–2014 and 2014–2018 both aiming to make Colombia a top destination for foreign investment 
in mining in Latin America, mobilising land markets and promoting export-led growth and 
competitiveness (Fajardo 2012; 2015; Martínez 2014; Perfetti et al. 2013).  Santos accelerated the 
mining policy by implementing a new ‘fast-track’ process for licensing, together with mechanisms 
of juridical stability, institution building, competitive fiscal policy, combatting illegal mining activity 
and the provision of new physical infrastructure, including new roads, bridges and ports to facilitate 
the export of raw materials, which resulted in a significant increase in the extraction of gas, oil and 
gold. The establishment of “Business Development Zones” removed restrictions on land acquisitions, 
which facilitated land purchases for large corporations, and thereby further concentrated land in the 
hands of landlords and multinational companies. By promoting neoliberal policies promoting the 
“private property rights” of landlords, large-scale agri-export and mining, Santos’ development 
policy cemented the inequalities and exclusions established by paramilitary violence and land grabs, 
whilst strengthening the power and wealth of the most reactionary sector of the agrarian elite.   
Notwithstanding the continued militarisation of rural territories under the extractivist growth 
model, the initiation of the peace negotiations did provide a limited political opening for the left. 
Santos’ presidency certainly did not mean an end of political violence, but it did allow for ‘an opening 
of the public agenda to allow diverse social actors to speak out, a recognition of the right to protest 
and public opposition, which had all been prohibited by his predecessor’ (Cruz, 2016: 96). The 
negotiations gave greater visibility to social leaders, who appeared in national debates discussing 
issues of land, food production and mining policy on national media. Yet even as they emerged as 
public figures, they continued to face repression and threats. During the peace negotiations, while the 
murder rate amongst the general population reached a record low, targeted assassinations against 
social activists increased as ‘new’ paramilitary groups called ‘Bacrim’ continued to stalk the 
countryside. Between 2013 and 2017, an average of 80 assassinations of social leaders were 
committed every year, and threats were particularly targeted against rural communities involved in 
land claims (Somos Defensores, 2018).    
Marcha Patriotica 
Peace negotiations are times of intense political activity in Colombia. They open national debates on 
Colombia’s political system, human rights, social inequality— and crucially, rural issues and land 
reform.  They also provide opportunities for social organisations to mobilise public support around 
key issues, push for concessions from the state and build popular coalitions.  The electoral victory of 
Juan Manuel Santos in 2011 and the initiation of peace negotiations marked a turning point in the 
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political strategy of the ACVC and the Colombian left more broadly. Since the opening of the peace 
negotiations the ACVC has dedicated itself to the formation of a popular coalition of nationwide 
organisations called the Patriotic March, or Marcha Patriotica.  Marcha is composed of an alliance 
between the Communist Party, Senator Piedad Cordoba’s Poder Ciudadano (citizens’ power), the 
National Federation of University Students and a variety of women’s groups and rural movements 
including the National Association for peasant land reserves—ANZORC, and the rural union 
movement Fensuagro. The movement’s creation was established with a mass mobilisation of around 
200,000 participants— most of whom are affiliated to the movement through member organisations. 
On its foundation it had 1,500 member organisations, which have since grown to around 2,050 
organisations. These organisations are very diverse, ranging from national movements to community 
networks (Ribón 2014). Since the initiation of the peace negotiations, the ACVC has been dedicated 
to pushing for rural issues including agrarian reform (in the form of ZRCs), opposition to mining and 
human rights protections in the Havana negotiations through the Marcha. 
 The formation of a popular coalition with other sectors of labour, student and rural movements 
has been crucial in the development of a national project. Marcha has insisted that it is not a political 
party but a social and political movement, which places emphasis on autonomous development of 
grassroots movements whilst also unifying diverse struggles with a political movement pushing for 
issues on the national agenda. Its first National Plan highlighted some of the movement’s key 
principles, amongst which are included: 
A) Unity within struggle. The need for a broad coalition composed of national, regional and local movements 
uniting various social forces for engaging in debates on the political situation 
B) Autonomous development of grassroots movements A basis in grassroots organising work through 
neighbourhood councils, committees and other organisational structures. Constant participation and 
consultation of grassroots movements 
C) An alternative national program that unifies the struggles of diverse social actors. The promotion of 
debates, decisions and collective structures based on democratic decision making practices and 
organisational practices (Marcha Patriótica 2014) 
 The political strategy of Marcha resembles that of much of the contemporary Latin American 
left in seeking to build political instruments capable of raising alternative national agendas and uniting 
diverse social movements, whilst also respecting their autonomy (Harnecker, 2015, 2016).  In 
Colombian civil society, which has been characterised by atomisation and fragmentation for at least 
two decades, much of Marcha’s activity seeks to create spaces for the convergence and strengthening 
of diverse organisations in order to co-ordinate actions around a common goal. It promotes self-
organisation and internal democratisation, respect for the diversity of aims of movements and the 
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need to fight on various fronts such as ethnic, gender and LGBT issues, but without losing sight of 
the need for political leadership to determine strategic priorities, and unify and cohere actions 
(Rodríguez and Silva 2017).  
 The movement has developed on the basis of a series of national events, called Encuentros, 
which combine mass mobilisations with participatory workshops for discussion amongst their 
members and the formulation of a joint statement. One of the first such initiatives was the National 
event of rural communities for land and peace in Barrancabermeja, which held workshops for 
collective discussion and education on issues from land and agrarian reform to mining and the war 
on drugs. The creation of Marcha in 2012 involved two days of deliberation from 3,000 delegates 
from member organisations, who each brought their own analysis and proposals from their 
movements in order to define the character, position and internal structure of Marcha (Rodríguez and 
Silva 2017). Since then, organisations within Marcha have mobilised for their own issues, particularly 
with regard to the peace negotiations. Under the banner of Marcha,   diverse organisations ranging 
from the youth group  “Juventud Rebelde”, the artists’ group  “Movimiento Cultural”, as well as 
women, teachers, and workers have organised mobilisations seeking to push for their own issues. One 
of the most notable advances of Marcha was to demand the direct participation of civil society and 
social movements within the Havana peace accords independently of the FARC. Although the 
outcome of the peace process remains incredibly precarious, Marcha has made remarkable advances 
in opening a broad discussion and coordinating amongst a diversity of grassroots movements, 
developing capacities for grassroots self-organisation to have significant impact on the national 
agenda through unified political leadership. 
 
ANZORC 
The ACVC’s ZRC campaign has also provided the basis for the connection and joint mobilisation of 
a new wave of territorial struggles throughout the country. Santos’ support for the ZRC model 
provided a more favourable political climate for the land movement to advance. In  response, the 
ACVC broadened and amplified the ZRC campaign, seeking to widen the scope of the land struggle 
and build political coalitions with other sectors of workers and students. The struggle for land was 
intensified by mobilising other peasant groups to initiate similar campaigns for peasant land reserves 
(ZRCs). The most important locations for these new land struggles have been marginal frontier 
territories in similar  conditions to the Cimitarra Valley, in regions such as the North West (Bolívar 
and North Santander), South (Cauca) and the Amazonian regions (Caqueta, Guaviare, Meta), which 
all share the issues of high levels of land concentration, and precarious access to markets and basic 
resources. In many cases, the ACVC has provided support to local processes in creating associations 
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with organisational structures and semi-autonomous territorial governance systems, including ‘sister’ 
organisations  Cahucopana and Ascamcat.9  Since the ACVC initiated this expansion project, the 
number of regional organisations making applications for land reserves has risen from 11 to 68, and 
they have formed a national movement, called ANZORC.   
 ANZORC is the most important nationwide land movement to have emerged since the ANUC, 
but it is also based on a very different model to previous national land movements. The most 
important difference is that ANZORC was not created by the state, but the movements themselves. 
The creation of a network of land campaigns is the product of the hard work of rural leaders building 
and linking grassroots organisations, while mobilising members for local-level collective action. As 
one of the very few rural social movements to have maintained its social base and organisational 
structure during the intense violence of the 1990s and 2000s, the ACVC has played a leading role in 
developing the nationwide movement and training other organisations. ACVC leaders have provided 
workshops and technical assistance to other movements on the procedures for making an application 
for the constitution of a ZRC, drawing up regional development plans with community input, 
developing community-led human rights warning systems to prevent mass displacements, as well as 
discussing the developments in the peace negotiations and their implications for peasants. Since the 
opening of the peace accords, ACVC leaders became national figures, frequently acting as 
spokespeople on the issues of agrarian reform and the rural conflict in national debates.  
 The nationwide ZRC campaign can be understood as an attempt to implement a new land 
reform process “from below”— guaranteeing land and access to markets for its members not from 
the state but through self-organisation. According to Cesar Jerez, president of ANZORC: ‘the idea 
[of ANZORC] is to promote an agrarian reform by amplifying peasant struggles at the territorial 
level’ (Interview, 2016). That the movement is more about grassroots mobilisation than any initiative 
of the state is demonstrated in the fact that, although several of the applications did not get approval 
from the state, the movements decided to push ahead with the campaigns, declaring the ZRCs ‘de 
hecho’. The purpose of this is to demonstrate that the ZRCs are more a product of the self-activity of 
movements themselves than any recognition granted by the state. ANZORC’s approach has combined 
a confrontational discourse with a pragmatic approach to negotiating with the state. It  has secured 
posts for its members within state institutes like INCODER, whilst trying to maintain the grassroots 
self-activity rather than transfer of authority within the movement from activists to leaders. 
 A important feature of the ZRC has been the opening of spaces for collective learning, sharing 
experiences and building collective identities between movements. Every year between 2012 and 
                                               
9 Corporación Acción Humanitaria por la Convivencia y la Paz del Nordeste Antioqueño and Asociación 
Campesina del Catatumbo respectively 
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2016 ANZORC held national events bringing together thousands of participants for shared education, 
training and organisation. In workshops, participants shared knowledges of sustainable agriculture, 
co-operatives, they discussed issues of mining, coca and agri-business affecting their territories, and 
shared songs, stories and food. These have become important spaces for collective movement project 
building for activists in territories that are by and large the main part geographically very isolated and 
diverse. The achievements of ANZORC have been remarkable insofar as it has formed a nationwide 
coalition on the basis of establishing and maintaining ‘autonomous rural communities’ through 
grassroots organising amongst very diverse rural movements.  
 
The agrarian strike 
From the 1980s until the 2010s, with the end of the land reform movement and the intense violence 
that spread throughout rural areas, rural activism had been at a low point. However, rural protest re-
emerged with force in 2013, when 1,027 rural protests erupted throughout the country— the biggest 
upsurge in social struggle Colombia has ever seen (CINEP 2013).  The national agrarian strike was 
the most important of these actions. The main factors provoking the strike were the ‘second wave of 
free-market reforms’ free-trade agreements with the United States and the European Union that had 
come into force in 2011. According to one report, imports from the US had increased twofold, soy 
imports fourfold and pork by two thirds (Salcedo et al., 2013). But the roots of the agrarian crisis can 
be traced much deeper: to the failure of the land reform movement, to political exclusion, to the 
ongoing militarisation of the agrarian frontier as well as the destruction of ecological resources as a 
result of the extractive turn. 
 In February 2013, 150,000 small, medium, and large coffee farmers had blocked roads in 
thirteen departments across the country in response to drops in coffee prices, and the crisis of the 
coffee sector more generally. In Líbano, peasant activists were joined by students and urban residents 
in a roadblock that lasted 12 days. In June 2013, what began as spontaneous protests of coca farmers 
against aerial crop spraying in Catatumbo ended as a fifty-three-day action during which around six 
thousand peasants coordinated roadblocks. They demanded the immediate suspension of crop 
eradications, agricultural support programs, and the creation of a peasant land reserve. Eventually, 
when the government agreed to negotiate, peasant leaders from the Cimitarra Valley were asked to 
lead the discussions.  
 As rural communities across the country caught wind of the actions, mobilisations quickly 
cropped up throughout the country. Between June and August, what had begun as sporadic and 
isolated outbursts developed into an explosion of agrarian mobilisations. Small and medium farmers 
producing domestic crops such as potatoes, rice, and milk started roadblocks in Antioquia, Boyacá, 
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Cundinamarca, and Huila, among other locations. Identifying themselves as the Agrarian Dignities 
Movement, they protested the government’s failure to protect the agricultural sector, and the signing 
of free-trade agreements with the European Union, the United States, Mercosur, and the Pacific 
Alliance. Chants such as ‘we want chicha, we want corn, we want multinationals to be gone!’ 
(“¡Queremos chicha, queremos maíz, multinacionales fuera del país!”) drew on a vision of 
Colombia’s agrarian traditions, which were deemed incompatible with an economic growth model 
dominated by multinational corporations (Dorado 2013; Rodríguez 2017).  The mobilisations enjoyed 
significant support from various sectors of the population. The indigenous movement came out in 
support of the strike, calling a minga (the Quechua word for a collective work action) that brought 
forty-eight communities together to participate in roadblocks across eighteen departments. Their 
demands linked the struggle for territorial autonomy to the need to resist large-scale mining projects 
and neoliberalism. Urban sectors, including truck and taxi drivers, teachers, public-sector workers, 
community organisers, and radical young activists, soon came out. In thirty cities across the country 
people marched in the streets and took over plazas, banging pots and pans and wearing ruanas — a 
traditional peasant overcoat. The protesters declared that “we are all children of peasant farmers,” 
simultaneously recognising the peasantry’s central place in the national identity and standing in 
solidarity with the rural sector against neoliberal devastation. The support of students and organised 
labour was another major gain for the strike. The United Workers Central (CUT) provided financial 
support and sent solidarity delegations. Students and young people, who had developed impressive 
creative and organisational capacities during the 2011 educational reform protests, played an 
important role in mobilising urban forces (Coscione and García Pinzón 2014).   
 Developments in telecommunications and social media have been vital for connecting rural 
communities that have historically been geographically dispersed and culturally isolated. Photos and 
videos of peasants taking to the streets in their traditional clothes, organising roadblocks and 
destroying their crops received massive circulation on social media, contributing both to more 
communication between disperse rural groups and more visibility of rural problems to urban groups. 
Peasant groups have set up their own online news media to bring attention to rural issues such as the 
ACVC’s Prensa Rural. They coordinate between geographically isolated communities using 
messaging groups. The impact of telecommunications has been central to the capacity of disperse and 
fragmented groups to mobilise their members for meetings and marches, inform participants on 
updates and coordinate between organisations. Social media have provided isolated peasant 
communities with new instruments for horizontal communication, to communicate problems of 
repression between them and make these issues more visible to a wider public. 
 While it is too early to predict the outcome of these emergent processes, it is notable that they 
have adopted new strategies for connecting local campaigns. While many of the new mobilisations 
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have been triggered by single issue or local campaigns such as price drops or resistance to natural 
resource appropriation, they have also adopted strategies for finding common ground and connecting 
their struggles. This has combined traditional ‘pavement’ tactics involving mass demonstrations of 
hundreds of thousands of participants with new tactics of collective learning and participatory 
decision making, which seek to connect their struggles and build common understandings between 
members and leaders. Following the agrarian strike of 2013, movements including the Peoples’ 
Congress and Patriotic March convened the Popular Agrarian Summit, which gathered thirty 
thousand participants and twelve national movements. The summit was designed to bring together 
the array of rural popular movements into a single movement project united around issues of shared 
concern. These included traditional demands such as land access, agrarian democracy, an end to the 
fumigations and demilitarisation of territories, but they also included new ecological concerns, such 
as buen vivir, agrarian reform, food sovereignty, mining, and the peace process. On the basis of 
participatory discussions carried out over three days, they drew up an eight-point petition of joint 
demands, which included measures of protection from the agrarian crisis, land access, democratic 
consultation on mining projects and guarantees against violence (Cumbre Agraria, 2014).  Leaders 
from the People’s Congress and the Patriotic March acquired national level visibility as 
representatives of the movement, making appearances on national television, radio and newspapers. 
The Popular Agrarian Summit concluded that “the strike represents the most important mobilisation 
of recent years in our country. We peasants have managed to show to Colombian society our capacity 
to bring broad support to defend our dignity and our rights” (Cumbre Agraria, 2014). The 
convergence of diverse grassroots movements is a demonstration of new forms of communication, 
shared understandings and cooperation developing amongst broad sectors of the Colombian left, 
which have the potential to deepen and extend collective action in the formation of a broader social 
movement project.  
 Notwithstanding these new processes of unification, there were also many frictions in the 
process, which reflect ongoing tensions between the social mobilisations, individual politicians and 
the state. The government chose to negotiate only with the sector of farmers associated with the 
Dignities Movement and offered them a “great agrarian pact”, which included supports such as the 
‘Protection for coffee farmers’ incomes’—  a series of immediate demands such as price floors, 
subsidies, and tariffs, while excluding other ‘radical’ sectors (Coscione and García Pinzón 2014). As 
a result, the middle farmers represented by the Agrarian Dignities Movement soon stepped away from 
the ongoing protests, making little effort to coordinate with other sectors. Instead, they organised 
themselves into a national farmers’ union to defend sectoral interests.  
 Although coffee farmers had initially been at the forefront of the protests, their support for 
the protests quickly ebbed away. The initial round of protests in February was shortly followed by 
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the harvest, and farmers returned to their farms. Repression and stigmatisation of social mobilisation 
has tended to make other sectors of civil society  weary of participation and cooperation with other 
sectors for fear of association with radicalism. Nor could they present a unified and coherent position 
on the crucial issues of land reform, food sovereignty, and the constituent assembly. A further 
problem was related to the peace negotiations. Piedad Cordoba, a Liberal senator in Marcha, 
attempted to call off the strikes, fearing that any attempt to destabilise the Santos government would 
only strengthen the far-right opposition. The confusion and disorientation had a paralysing effect on 
subsequent mobilisations, and undermined the Left’s capacity to push for more substantive reforms 
at the negotiating table in Havana. 
 An important lesson to be drawn from this is that, within broader movement projects, different 
processes have very different sets of interests, understandings and aims. While large-scale 
mobilisations can give rise to new political instruments and platforms for co-ordination, different 
processes can have very different understandings of political activity. Sectors of mid-sized farmers 
like coffee, potato or rice farmers had seen the mobilisation as a form of service organisation to 
represent them in negotiating with the state. Once concessions had been negotiated they had little 
interest in forming part of a resistance project.  Their notions of private property, support for 
traditional political parties and fear of stigmatisation mean the broader social movement projects fail 
to resonate among these sectors. Thus, any examination of broader movement organisations between 
rural producers must take into account the spatially differentiated processes of class formation from 
which they emerged. 
Conclusion 
Even after decades of armed conflict, the Colombian countryside is still home to some of the most 
dynamic political activity in the continent. The penetration of mining companies into new territories 
has triggered new waves of dispossession and given rise to new processes of revolts and upsurges, 
particularly from rural territories. As the role of the state has increasingly turned away from 
incorporation of rural communities, instead becoming an agent of accumulation by dispossession, it 
is also increasingly seen as the enemy by broad sectors of the rural population. Against this 
background, a new wave of territorial conflicts have gathered momentum in recent years. While many 
began as spontaneous and local outbursts, deeper organising processes are also at work.  Movements 
are developing tools for mobilising and coordinating very heterogenous social groups, promoting new 
forms of grassroots participation and self-organisation, providing political leadership and a clear set 
of objectives which is giving rise to the emergence of new oppositional blocs. Perhaps one of the 
most interesting of these advances has been the development of networks of ‘autonomous territories’ 
committed to self-organisation at the grassroots and participation in broader political instruments. 
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Although this has not changed the balance of forces to a sufficient degree to alter the structures of 
power in Colombian society, movements like Marcha Patriotica and People’s Congress have carved 
out a important space by insisting on consultation in the peace process and agrarian issues, and they 













In the concluding chapter I synthesise the main argument of this thesis and highlight the contribution 
of the research to the field of peasant studies. The chapter is divided into two sections. I begin by 
providing an overview of the historical analysis of the thesis, highlighting  the main macro-structural 
observations regarding the transformations of the Colombian countryside and the prospects for 
peasants in the contemporary era. The second section summarises my conclusions on peasant class 
formation in the neoliberal era. 
I. 
The historical project of this thesis attempts to build on E.P. Thompson’s legacy by inquiring into the 
making and unmaking of class among Colombia’s rural producers during the transformative changes 
of the neoliberal era. Major social and productive transformations placed peasants into new situations, 
forced them to confront new situations of precariousness and marginality, and simultaneously created 
new conditions of struggle.  Yet there is an important sense in which the struggles of the peasants of 
the Cimitarra Valley and Líbano also preceded class: peasants experienced the changes in their own 
culturally- and historically- situated ways— in the form of new  antagonisms with landlords, capital 
and the state, and they responded by adapting their livelihoods, forging commonalities with others 
and building new political alliances in the hope of mitigating and transforming the conditions of their 
oppression. It was through the concrete experience of collective struggle for land and livelihood that 
class formations and class consciousness were able to emerge.  
 The first nationwide wave of land struggles broke out in the early twentieth century century 
in response to the initial penetration of capitalist relations and the rupture of peasants’ access to 
subsistence with the development of ‘coffee capitalism’ and the export of raw materials to the world 
market. The outcome of these processes was conditioned by the regionally differentiated patterns of 
capital accumulation, state formation and class struggle. In coffee regions such as Líbano, peasants 
were threatened by landlords’ attempts to incorporate them into the coffee haciendas, and struggled 
to produce coffee independently. In confirmation of the observations made by Eric Wolf, ‘middle 
peasants’ with access to land of their own were the main candidates for radical upsurge during this 
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time. The success of the coffee farmers’ struggles of this period paved the way for capitalist 
development to proceed via a middle peasant path of small and medium coffee farmers who 
benefitted from land reform and favourable state policies, combined with favourable geographic and 
market conditions. However, the class structures and patterns of geographical development were very 
unevenly spread throughout the Colombian countryside. In the frontier territories, the marginal, 
precarious and fragmented conditions of peasants meant their resistance to predatory landed classes 
was much weaker, while the state intervened only to support landed capital and multinational 
corporations. As a result, capitalism developed via a junker path led by landlords who transitioned to 
large-scale commercial farming and speculation, while expelling peasants and appropriating their 
lands. Alongside the predatory landed classes stood a sector of settler peasants on the most marginal 
territories, who survived through petty commodity and subsistence production, whilst also being 
subjected to ongoing processes of semi-proletarianisation. 
 The land struggles of the 1960s and 1970s took place at a critical conjuncture in the period of 
rapid industrial growth and economic modernisation. The ‘reformist alliance’ between peasants and 
modernising currents within the Liberal party was part of an offensive that sought to shift the broader 
balance of power in favour of a peasant path of agrarian development. As Skocpol argues, once 
political organisations arrive on the scene there is no reason why a variety of different types of class 
cultivator cannot be united (1982: 364). The ANUC brought together peasants from a variety of 
different sectors: small and medium cultivators, tenants, settler peasants and rural workers, and 
throughout the course of the struggle developed an increasingly radical orientation which climaxed 
with the land invasions of the early 1970s. However, the struggles of the ANUC were brought to an 
end when the ruling classes closed ranks to prevent land reform through the Chicoral pact, instead 
leading to a new path of agrarian development on the basis of the conversion of large estates to agro-
enterprise supported by a new phase in export-oriented development. 
 The Chicoral pact closed the possibility of a ‘reformist alliance’ between peasants and the 
state on the basis of a model of economic growth with social redistribution, but it did not signal the 
death of the peasantry entirely. A central argument of this thesis is that following death of agrarian 
reform, with the full transition to capitalism in agriculture and the onset of export-oriented growth in 
the 1970s there was an important recomposition of the peasantry in the sense used by Fernandes 
(2005; 2013). New processes of recampesinización arose as settlers increasingly moved into frontier 
regions, which were organically tied to political and cultural forms of territorial organising. The new 
conditions of export-oriented accumulation brought rapid processes of differentiation; yet in the 
context of the escalating urban unemployment, rather than migrate to the cities peasants migrated 
further into the frontier, which provided a refuge from the labour crisis. In the newly settled frontier 
regions, due to marginal conditions and landlord predations, peasants would soon have been subject 
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to expulsion were it not for the addition of a new factor: the organisational efforts of the Communist 
Party and its armed wing, the FARC. By adopting a state-like presence in regions marginal to the 
political system, the Communist Party developed a significant base of popular support among settler 
peasants. In these territories, peasants relied on subsistence farming and petty commodity production, 
which in turn were associated with strong cultural traditions of collective self-defence and a spirit of 
co-operation.  Meanwhile, in the coffee regions, the introduction of green revolution technologies 
brought new processes of monetarisation of peasant reproduction cycles, leaving peasants heavily 
indebted and resulting in rapid differentiation and decomposition of the livelihoods of smaller 
peasants. 
 Neoliberal restructuring was enacted in the midst of intense turmoil and polarisation. The 
dismantling of the developmentalist protections triggered new processes of adverse incorporation for 
small and medium farmers, leading to a legitimacy crisis for the traditional system of state control. 
Meanwhile, in the frontier, new waves of investment in agribusiness triggered a fierce land dispute 
between peasants and an emergent agri-bourgeoisie. The agrarian struggles that broke out in the 
1990s and 2000s confronted very different political and economic conditions than those of previous 
decades. Following the failure of the land reform movement, the wave of protests that swept across 
the countryside in the mid-1990s was the first nationwide rural mobilisation to have erupted in two 
decades. The protests were catalysed by the devastating impact of neoliberal restructuring and 
political violence that shook the countryside during this period as well as the crisis of urban 
unemployment. They were also part of a broader initiative that sought to precipitate a change in the 
balance of forces within civil society, develop new forms of political participation and create a 
national coalition in opposition to neoliberalism and war. In the context of the intense social 
polarisation created by the armed conflict, movements sought to move political struggles out of the 
sphere of war and into the sphere of democratic negotiation. By opening spaces for  greater 
democratic participation the hope was to negotiate concessions for the marginalised, but also to 
strengthen popular resistance within civil society and build a broader oppositional bloc of social 
forces to contest state power.  
 However, the movements were ultimately unable to break out of the political straightjacket 
imposed by the armed struggle. By the turn of the century, the counter-reform project waged by the 
reactionary agrarian far-right escalated to unprecedented levels, ushering in a new wave of rural 
dispossession and a massive re-concentration of land and resources. The incursion of mining 
companies and the expansion of agri-business further promoted the upwards redistribution of land, 
resources and power in rural territories, and by the 2000s a new agrarian social structure had been 
created cementing the power of multinationals, agri-business, narco-traffickers, landlords and their 
political allies. The movements were confronted with intense paramilitary and state repression, while 
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their negotiations secured only transitory concessions for their members.  The strongest movements 
developed in the more marginal frontier territories more favourable to long-term grassroots 
mobilisation, while the newer mobilisations such as those of the coffee regions quickly disintegrated 
in the face of violence.   
 In the absence of a broader political or social movement project with national scope able to 
provide coherence and leadership to new popular demands, the weakened rural movements were left 
fragmented and isolated throughout the 1990s and 2000s. The militarisation of society, the closure of 
spaces for public action and systematic repression prevented movements from developing stronger 
networks for politicising, mobilising and coalition building, leaving the localised mobilisations that 
arose isolated and with restricted political options. Another factor was the arrival of a new round of 
concessions in the form of productive adaptation projects and micro-development loans from NGOs 
and state institutes, which offered more attractive livelihood alternatives to peasants fearful of the 
risks associated with radical political activity.  Meanwhile, many of the smaller peasants that had 
formed the main part of the mobilisations had been forced to migrate by the early 2000s, undermining 
the potential of sustained political involvement. The changing basis of capital accumulation towards 
natural resource extraction reconfigured rural producers’ rights of access to land, in many cases 
resulting in their forced ejection from territories and putting further restrictions on their abilities to 
make land claims. 
 A further setback for the movements was related to the issue of alliance structures. The 
strategy of new peasant movements has been severely limited by the incredibly hostile political 
environment and  fragmentation of the Colombian left.  The extermination and retreat of radical 
coalitions, trade unions and political parties left the peasant movements isolated nationally and in a 
very weak position to negotiate their demands. The limited scope of the concessions the movements 
attained made it difficult to sustain participation and eroded their base of support, conditions which 
were accentuated by the intensity of the violence. In the highly polarised Cold War climate, many of 
the brightest and best movement leaders were either radicalised, turning to revolutionary means to 
achieve their aims, or more often were terrorised by assaults or assassinations.  In either case, the 
result was that the slow, patient work of grassroots organising was discarded amidst the turmoil. In 
Líbano, the embryonic radical movement virtually ceased to exist, while in the Cimitarra Valley the 
movement was sustained in defensive form through the construction of an autonomous rural 
community, albeit while becoming increasingly isolated.   
 Today, emergent social movement projects are making significant advances in terms of 
politicising broad sectors of the population and developing new collective education, communication 
and decision-making processes which are bringing new processes of co-ordination and unification to 
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a broad array of struggles. Although these new blocs remain on the outskirts of mainstream politics 
and have been unable to alter the balance of forces within civil society, they have nonetheless made 
remarkable achievements in a country where neoliberal restructuring has paved the way for the 
expansion and consolidation of the far-right. 
 
II.  
One of the main contributions of this thesis has been to provide historical and geographical context 
for understanding the processes of political class formation among peasants. In recent years, an 
important line of thought inspired by Chayanov’s observations of  the ‘peasant logic of production’ 
has put forward the argument that a new ‘peasant condition’ has emerged, seeking land and 
productive autonomy as a way to mitigate the impact of the neoliberal subsistence crisis. While these 
new campesinistas do not propose that peasants persist in feudal relations, the notion nonetheless 
holds that there is a distinct logic to peasant productive forms, characterised by an emphasis on 
reducing external inputs and increasing self-reliance, whilst simultaneously strengthening their social 
ties and organisational processes. As the analysis of this thesis has attempted to demonstrate, there 
are certainly important features of the productive systems of the Cimitarra valley and Líbano peasants 
that resemble ‘classic’ peasant producers, which also bear an important relation to their political, 
cultural and ecological characteristics. However, rather than presuming an innate logic to these 
producer types, it is important to understand their particularities in relation to the concrete sets of 
historical, geographical and political conditions in which they are enmeshed. 
 Strictly speaking, the structural locations of the producers of Líbano and the Cimitarra valley 
were semi-proletarians: they relied on both agriculture and wage labour for their household incomes. 
Because of the crisis in agriculture and high unemployment that has been a pervasive feature of the 
Colombian countryside since at least the 1970s, they have increasingly depended on other relations 
of social reproduction for their survival— in a process akin to the creation of a new peasant condition 
or repeasantisation. However, differences in forms and degree of market integration were important 
in determining the nature of peasant response. Partly as a result of the marginal geographical 
conditions and larger plots of the Cimitarra peasants, there is a stronger inclination to relations of 
collective work and co-operation, which in turn foster a reliance on social relations of reciprocity and 
solidarity in order to secure reproduction in hostile conditions. Through the construction of an 
autonomous rural community, the ACVC was able to promote projects of repeasantisation through 
day-to-day support for peasants’ livelihoods, whilst simultaneously developing understandings and 
organisational capacities for alternative production and governance among members, thereby 
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securing the grassroots participation and political autonomy of the movement. 
 
 In contrast, since Líbano’s peasants subsisted on far smaller plots in territories with deeper 
market integration, these producers have always been more dependent on commodity relations for 
reproduction. Since the coffee crisis, farmers have certainly reduced their dependence on inputs and 
increased their self-reliance.  However, although Asopema did attempt to mobilise these 
repeasantisation strategies as part of a broader project of grassroots participation and political 
autonomy, for the peasants themselves shift was in the most part for practical reasons rather than a 
question of any innate cultural traditions. Nor was the turn to self-reliance particularly conducive to 
the strengthening of social ties and organisation amongst Líbano’s poorest producers. Indeed, the 
main outcome of their struggles was only to reinforce the institutions and vertically-aligned political 
networks that protected them from the worst of the economic hardships— providing a ‘niche’ for 
poor peasants within the social structure whilst decapitating their organisational independence.  Thus, 
the ‘new peasant condition’ in Líbano amounted to a poverty-driven form of individual resilience, or 
at best an ‘everyday form of resistance’ that simultaneously eschewed the development of more 
transformative processes. 
 These observations lead to what is perhaps the more relevant insight of this study: the role of 
institutionalised relations between agrarian classes and class organisations in determining the 
subjective and political character of peasant response. The experiences of both Líbano and the 
Cimitarra Valley demonstrate how the eruption of radical peasant movements in the wake of the 
neoliberal subsistence crisis is only intelligible if related to the consciousness-raising and movement-
building work of organic leaders from Liberation Theology and Communist party traditions.  Frontier 
settler peasants were dispersed, weak and at the mercy of landlord encroachments until the 
Communist party succeeded in mobilising a distinct form of co-operation and self-defence amongst 
these very ethnically and socially diverse subaltern groups. Similarly, the peculiarly explosive and 
radical character of the coffee mobilisations in Líbano can only be understood by taking into account 
the work of Liberation Theology activists in developing new forms of consciousness and independent 
organising capacities among semi-proletarianised peasants during the subsistence crisis. What 
seemed vital in both these cases was the capacity of the movements to develop organisational 
structures and tactics capable of mobilising various sectors of peasants, which resonated with their 
own concrete experiences of subordination and marginalisation in the agrarian system, whilst 
building solidarities through a strategy of alliances with other popular sectors. 
 Within both these processes, the transformation of consciousness was never guaranteed or 
complete, and the trajectory of each depended on the movements’ capacity to mobilise around 
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particular cultural, political and economic experiences. In Líbano the development of critical 
consciousness allowed peasants to overcome the ‘localised common sense’ concerning the 
naturalness of the established order dominated by Fedecafé and local political bosses. This meant that 
the large-scale mobilisations sparked by neoliberal restructuring created the basis for the construction 
of a radical peasant organisation outside the institutional control of Fedecafé. Peasants drew on a 
critique of the impact of Green Revolution technologies in terms of the loss of traditional diversified 
peasant production systems, the growing corporate control of the farming process, environmental 
degradation caused by chemicals and pest infestations and new processes of inequality and 
impoverishment for smaller farmers. The formation of a radical, independent movement of coffee 
farmers symbolised the broader legitimacy crisis of the Colombian state. 
 Meanwhile, in the Cimitarra valley peasants responded to neoliberal restructuring with a 
defensive strategy emphasising territorial-based organising. Peasants drew on longstanding peasant 
traditions of collective work, cooperation, the spirit of resistance and right to a dignified life 
traditionally associated with the Communist party.  The ACVC had always drawn on a moral 
discourse denouncing the injustice of the latifundio system, where lands were left idle in the hands 
of absent landlords while settlers were forced into the most degraded lands, which were insufficient 
to sustain a family. However, in the neoliberal era waves of investment in export agro-fuels in the 
region capitalised the latifundio system, as large tracts of lands in the hands of landlords and narco-
traffickers were converted into monocrop plantations of palm oil. As pressure on lands increased, the 
longstanding territorial conflict acquired new dimensions as peasants increasingly came to frame their 
critique as one of large-scale mono-crops for world market export against a ‘peasant’ vision of 
development premised on agrarian democracy, ecological sustainability, productive diversity and 
food sovereignty. It was these culturally and historically situated understandings of the subsistence 
crisis that created the conditions for the emergence of the movements, and these were also vital 
determinants of their prospects and sustainability. 
 The more difficult issue was that of maintaining participation and politicisation once the initial 
cycle of mobilisations had subsided and the state had granted concessions. My conclusions in this 
regard can only be tentative given that the most overwhelming determinant was the impact of the 
armed conflict on the balance of class forces both regionally and nationally. Paramilitary violence 
decapitated the leadership, tore apart the social bases and cut off the alliances of agrarian social 
movements, leaving them severely weakened, isolated and with very few avenues for recourse. 
Nonetheless, I have argued that the key factors in determining the movements’ survival during this 
period were their capacity to maintain autonomous leadership and grassroots participation. In the case 
of Líbano, the leadership was divided and radicalised in the polarised Cold War climate without 
having fully solidified its base of support. As a result, after the initial cycle of mobilisations had 
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subsided, concessions were granted and far-right violence intensified, the base of the movement was 
unwilling to continue the disruptive tactics, and did not share the confrontational approach of its 
leaders. As peasants either fled from poverty and terror, or else returned to their farms with the hope 
of initiating a productive diversification project, the movement disintegrated with astonishing 
rapidity. Meanwhile, the ACVC’s capacity to channel the energies of the mobilisations into the 
construction of an autonomous rural territory in the Cimitarra valley was key for the movement’s 
survival during this period. By mobilising around the creation of an autonomous rural territory, the 
ACVC was able to negotiate basic economic benefits and income security for its members whilst 
simultaneously reinforcing alternative production relations, organisational capacities, education and 
social ties needed for political autonomy and self-governance. Perhaps one of the most interesting 
fields for further research is to understand in more detail the processes through which these particular 
territorial struggles are connecting up and developing into a broader social movement project able to 
resonate across a diverse set of local experiences. 
 As a final conclusion, this thesis has defended a form of political economy analysis of 
contemporary peasantries emphasising not whether this productive form has reached its final end, but 
how the contradictions in particular historical and geographical processes of capitalist development 
give rise to new forms of resistance, and the transformative potential of these movements. This thesis 
leaves no doubt as to the immense social energy and spirit of resistance that characterise Colombia's 
rural activists, which makes them able to continuously respond, collaborate, mobilise and organise 
around an array of conditions beyond their control. While there is certainly no guarantee these 
resistance processes in themselves are sufficient to lead to more fundamental systemic 
transformations, they nonetheless provide important lessons for understanding how alternative spaces 




ACCU   Autodefensas Unidas de Cordoba and Uraba (United Self-Defense Forces of 
   Cordoba and Uraba) 
ACDEGAM   Asociación Campesina de Agriculrores y Ganaderos del Magdalena Medio 
   (Association of Peasant Farmers and Ranchers of the Middle Magdalena) 
ACVC   Asociación Campesina del Valle Cimitarra (Peasant Association of the  
   Cimitarra Valley) 
ANDI    Asociación Nacional de Empresarios (National Association of Industrialists) 
ANALDEX  Asociación Nacional de Comercio Exterior (Non Traditional Exports  
   Association) 
ANAPO  Alianza Nacional Popular (National Popular Alliance) 
ANUC   Asociación Nacional de Usuarios Campesinos (National Association of  
   Peasant Users) 
 ANZORC   Asociación Nacional de Zonas de Reservas Campesinas (National   
   Association of Peasant Land Reserves) 
 ASOPEMA   Asociación de Pequeños y Medianos Agricultores del Tolima (Association 
    of Small and Medium-Scale Farmers of Tolima) 
 ASCAMCAT  Asociación Campesina del Catatumbo (Peasant Association of Catatumbo) 
AUC    Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (United Self-Defense Forces of  
   Colombia) 
CINEP   Centro de Investigación y Educación Popular (Center for Investigation and 
   Popular Education) 
CGSB   Coordinadora Guerrillera Simón Bolívar (Simon Bolívar Coordinated  
   Guerrilla Group) 
CGTD   Confederación General de Trabajadores Democráticos (General   
   Confederation of Democratic Workers ) 
CONVIVIR    Servicios Especiales de Vigilancia y Seguridad Privada (Vigilance and  
   Private Security Cooperatives)  
CREDHOS  Corporación Regional para la Defensa de los Derechos Humanos Credhos  
   (Regional Corporation for the Defense of Human Rights) 
CTC   Confederación de Trabajadores de Colombia (Confederation of Workers of 
   Colombia) 
CUT    Central Unitaria de Trabajadores (United Workers Central) 
DRI   Desarrollo Rural Integrado (Integrated Rural Development ) 
ELN   Ejército de Liberación Nacional (National Liberation Army)  
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EPL   Ejercito de Liberación Popular (Popular Liberation Army ) 
ETTTTDDHH Barrancabermeja Human Rights Workers’ Forum (Espacio de Trabajadores y 
   Trabajadoras de Derechos Humanos de Barrancabermeja) 
EZLN   Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional (Zapatista Army of National  
   Liberation) 
FARC    Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary Armed 
    Forces of Colombia)  
Fedecafé   Federación Nacional de cafeteros National Federation of Coffee Growers  
Fedegán   Federación Colombiana de Ganaderos (Federation of Colombian Cattle  
   Ranchers) 
FTAA   Free Trade of the Americas  
ICA    International Coffee Agreement  
IDEMA   Instituto de Mercadeo Agropecuario (Agricultural Marketing Board)  
IMF    International Monetary Fund  
INCODER   Instituto Colombiano de Desarrollo Rural (Colombian Rural Development 
   Institute)  
INCORA   Instituto Colombiano para la Reforma Agraria (Colombian Institute of  
   Agrarian Reform)  
ISI    Import-Substitution-Industrialisation  
JAC   Juntas de Acción Comunal (Community Action Councils) 
M-19   Movimiento 19 de Abril (19th of April Movement) 
MAS   Muerte a Secuestradores (Death to Kidnappers) 
MLAR  Market-led agrarian reform 
MNCs   Multinational corporations 
MST   Movimento dos Trabalhadores Sem Terra (Landless Workers' Movement) 
PCC   Partido Comunista de Colombia (Communist Party of Colombia) 
PSR   Partido Socialista Revolucionario (Socialist RevolutionaryParty) 
SAC    Sociedad de Agricultores de Colombia (Agricultural Society of Colombia)  
UAF   Unidad agrícola familiar (Family Agricultural Unit) 
UCN    Unidad Cafetero Nacional (National Coffee Unit)  
UP   Union Patriótica (Patriotic Union) 
USAID  United States Agency for International Development  
USO   Union Sindical Obrera (United Workers Union) 
UTC    Unión de Trabajadores Colombianos (Union of Colombian Workers) 
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In order of citation: 
1. Danilo Ramírez Líbano coffee farmer, 7 September 2017 
2. Mario Martínez, ACVC member, 8 December 2015  
3. Alvaro Manzano, ACVC member, 10 December 2015, 18 August 2017 
4. Mario Martínez, ACVC member, 10 December 2015, July 2016, 12 August 2017 
5. Miguel Cifuentes, ACVC member, 2 December 2015, 10 December 2016, 22 August 2017 
6. Pispo Morales, ACVC member, 27 August 2017  
7. Milton Mahecha, ACVC member, 18 December 2015 
8. Wilfran Gonzalez, USO member, 14 December 2015 
9. Sonia Nevada, Barrancabermeja activist, 2017 
10. Sandra Ramírez ACVC member, 16 August 2017 
11. Fabian Cospac, Asopema member, 2 September 2017 
12. Sandra Rodriguez, Asopema member, 9 September 2017 
13. Pastor Ramírez Asopema member, 9 September 2017 
14. Samuel Moreno, Líbano coffee farmer, July 2015 
15. Judith Maldonado, Barrancabermeja activist, 13 August 2017 
16. Miguel Huepa, ACVC member, 4 December 2015;  15 August 2017 
17. Wilson Vega, ACVC member, 16 December 2015 
18. Irene Martínez, ACVC member, 15 December 2015;  22 August 2017 
19. Gloria Ramos, ACVC member, 22 August 2017 
20. Hernán Alarcon, Asopema member, 3 September 2017 
21. Nelcy Mendez, PDPMM participant, January 2016 
22. Dagoberto Ramírez, Asopema member, 2017 
23. Luis Carlos Ariza, ACVC member, 18 December 2015 
 
OTHER INTERVIEWEES 
24. Professor, National University, 11 January 2015 
25. Professor, National University, 12 January 2015 
26. Professor, National University, 12 January 2015 
27. Professor, Javeriana University, 14 January 2015 
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28. Leader, National Agraran Unity, 17 January, 2015; August 29 2017 
30. Senior member, Agricultural research centre, 20 January 2015 
31. Researcher, Foundation of Ideas for Peace,  21 January 2015 
32. Researcher, ILSA  22 January 2015 
33. Researcher, ILSA, 22 January 2015 
34. Researcher, ILSA, 22 January 2015 
32. APEMECAFE activist, 4 March 2015 
33. APEMECAFE activist, 4 March 2015 
34. Fensuagro leader 4 March 2015 
35. Fensuagro leader,  4 March 2015 
38. ACVC Staff member, 7 November 2015 
39. Staff member of San Pablo palm company 7 November 2015 
40. PDPMM staff member, 7 November 2015 
41. ACVC participant 9 November 2015 
42. ACVC participant 9 November 2015 
43. ACVC participant  11 November 2015 
44. ACVC participant 11 November 2015 
45. ACVC participant  11 November 2015 
46. ACVC participant  15 November 2015 
47. ACVC participant  15 November 2015 
48. ACVC participant  16 November 2015 
49. ACVC participant  18 November 2015 
50. ACVC lawyer 30 November 2015 
51. ACVC technical assistant  
52. Former UP member 
53. ANZORC president 16 August 2017 
55. ANZORC staff 17 August 2017 
56. ANZORC staff  17 August 2017 
57. Marcha Patriotica organiser  19 August 2017 
58. Marcha Patriotica organiser  19 August 2017 
59. INCODER staff  17 December, 2016, 
60. CINEP Researcher  12 December 2016  
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61. Asopema participant 4 September 2017 
62. Asopema participant 4 September 2017 
63. Asopema participant 6 September 2017 
64. Asopema leader 6 September 2017 
65. Asopema participant 6 September 2017 
66. Líbano organic coffee farmer 9 September 2017 
67. Líbano JAC leader 9 September 2017 
68. Staff member of Fedecafé 9 September 2017 
69. Comité Ambiental of Ibague organiser  10 September 2017 
70. Comité Ambiental of Ibague organiser 10 September 2017 
71. Magdalena Medio palm workers (group of 5) 15 November 2015 
72. Barrancabermeja women’s rights activist 13 August 2017 
73. Barrancabermeja displaced person’s activist 15 August 2017 
74. Ombudsman of Barrancabermeja 15 August 2017 
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